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Electromechanical Actuators (EMAs) are being increasingly used in many 
applications. There is a need to augment good design of EMAs with continuous 
awareness of their operational capability and make them „intelligent‟ for two key 
objectives: enhancing performance to address exigent task requirements and to track any 
changes from their „as-built and certified‟ state for condition-based maintenance. These 
objectives are achieved using a decision making philosophy where the human system 
operator supervises EMA operation using performance criteria and decision surfaces; 
updated by in-situ measurement of the variables of interest via a suite of diverse sensors.  
However, operational decisions made on the basis of faulty data could result in 
unwelcome consequences. With unexpected variations in a sensor‟s output from its 
anticipated values, the challenge is to determine if it indicates a problem in the sensor or 
the monitored system. In addressing this conundrum, it is also essential to account for the 
inherent uncertainties present in the values being analyzed. To this end, this dissertation 
presents the development of a novel Sensor and Process Fault Detection and Isolation 
 viii 
(SPFDI) algorithm. This provides a framework to utilize data from all the available 
sensors in a holistic manner to detect any faults in individual sensors or the system 
components concurrently. The algorithm uses a Bayesian network to model a system; 
populated with extensive empirical data. The probabilistic foundations of this method 
allow for incorporating and propagating uncertainties. The construction of a modular 
testbed and its Bayesian network are discussed in detail. Several design/ operational 
criteria have been proposed to aid in the creation of more usable networks in the future.  
The SPFDI algorithm estimates multiple values for each measurand using 
different combinations of input variables and probabilistic inferencing. These values are 
compared against those indicated by the corresponding sensors; a difference between 
them is indicative of a potential problem. Quantitative indicators to track the condition of 
different system components and sensors, termed as belief values, are modified after each 
comparison. The final belief values obtained at the end of an iteration of the algorithm 
provide a definitive indication of the sources of anomalies in the observed data and can 
provide guidance to the operator on decisions such as whether or not to use data from a 
particular sensor for updating existing decision surfaces. 
The representative examples and experimental results confirm the efficacy of the 
algorithm in detecting and isolating single as well as multiple sensor faults. The 
algorithm has also been found to be capable of distinguishing between sensor and 
system/process faults. Special categories of faults and factors that influence the execution 
characteristics and quality of results from the algorithm were also explored meticulously 
and suitable modifications have been suggested to enable the algorithm to continue to 
function effectively in these situations. To demonstrate the flexibility of the proposed 
SPFDI algorithm, its potential utilization in four broad classes of applications consisting 
of complex systems monitored by multiple sensors was also explored in this report. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
  Research efforts over the years at the University of Texas Robotics Research 
Group (UT-RRG) have been centered on creating the foundation for an open architecture 
of intelligent and reconfigurable systems- ranging 
from industrial manipulators for manufacturing to 
precision surgical robots; from mobile robotic 
systems to naval and aircraft subsystems, human 
rehabilitation, battlefield systems, etc. [Tesar, 2009]. 
At the core of this effort is the modular intelligent 
Electro-Mechanical Actuator (EMA)1, which 
dictates the performance parameters of the overall 
system like stiffness, power, efficiency, etc. EMAs offer significant advantages over 
purely electrical (more power-dense), pneumatic or hydraulic systems (lower 
weight/volume, no complex piping/valves, reduced maintenance, etc.) with comparable 
or better performance characteristics (force/torque, speed, efficiency, noise). The 
objective is to develop an array of EMAs of different capabilities (high torque, 
ruggedness, quietness, fault tolerant, high precision, etc.) with standardized hardware and 
operating software, to populate the widest possible range of applications.  
Sophisticated component-level design especially in the areas of prime movers 
[Ashok and Tesar, 2001], gear trains [Sigwald and Tesar, 2008], [Park and Tesar, 2005], 
and design configuration management [Vaculik and Tesar, 2008] has contributed 
immensely in increasing the performance of EMAs by orders of magnitude over many 
state-of-the-art options available commercially [Tesar, 2009]. However, even with such 
improvements, as applications in which EMAs are deployed demand ever-increasing 
performance, it is essential to use the resources available in an EMA to their utmost 
                                                 
1 In this work, an EMA refers to a rotary actuator with an electric prime mover (switched reluctance or 
brushless DC motor), gear train, bearings, sensors, controller, etc. all contained in a compact, integrated 
package with standardized hardware and software interfaces for plug-and-play capability [Tesar, 2009]. 
 
Figure 1-1: Electro-Mechanical 
Actuator  
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potential. This can be achieved by making the EMA intelligent. The question arises- what 
exactly defines ‗intelligence‘ in the context of EMAs.  
1.2. THE ‘INTELLIGENT EMA’ 
An intelligent EMA can be defined as one which has complete awareness of its 
operational capability at all times and has the ability to reconfigure its resources 
optimally to adapt to varying operational duty cycles or task requirements. Such 
generality of response can be imparted by the EMA controller and sensors along with 
novel control algorithms (in embedded software) [Tesar, 2009]. An intelligent EMA can 
be said to have the following characteristics [Tesar, 2009][Ashok and Tesar, 2007]: 
 Use of criteria-based Control: Numerous performance criteria are used in 
conjunction with parametric models of the EMA, sensor-inferred models and end-
user priorities to adapt to operational demands imposed by the application in 
which the EMA is deployed.  
 Reprogrammability and reconfigurability: The functionality of EMA 
hardware/software can be altered easily based on extant task requirements2. 
 Provision of fault tolerance when necessary: When required, an intelligent EMA 
can utilize redundant resources3 or use its available resources to continue 
operation under any partial or complete component-level faults. With these 
additional resources, the EMA can also provide more advanced operational 
capabilities like layered control (mixing physical scales of motion [Rabindran and 
Tesar, 2004]) or combined force-motion control (independent force/velocity 
priorities [Rabindran and Tesar, 2009]) 
 Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM): An intelligent EMA has the ability to 
continually monitor its performance, identify any incipient component 
degradation, and provide timely warnings about any impending malfunctions. 
This enables preemptive or condition-based maintenance to be carried out. CBM 
                                                 
2 For example, altering motor phase angles for quieter operation [Ashok and Tesar, 2007] 
3 Redundant resources could exist as duplicate hardware within the EMA (e.g. dual gear trains) or in an 
analytical form, such as models/maps or heuristic knowledge. 
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provides the benefits of reduced overall maintenance costs and a reduction in false 
alarms regarding the remaining useful life of an EMA [Hvass and Tesar, 2004] 
[Tesar, et. al, 2010].  
The elemental requirement for EMA intelligence i.e. complete operational 
awareness can be addressed via two key sources of information regarding the EMA 
capabilities. The first is comprehensive knowledge/parametric models of the performance 
capability of a new (as-built) EMA over the complete range of its operating points, 
represented in the form of performance maps and envelopes (Section 1.2.1). The second 
is an updated profile of the same capabilities assessed in real-time during operation, by 
in-situ sensors (Section 1.2.2). 
1.2.1. Performance Maps and Performance Criteria 
[Janardhan and Tesar, 2008] emphasize that nameplate specifications of EMA 
performance are nominal metrics and valid only for a specific operating state (e.g. torque-
speed ratings of an electric motor at no load). However, in reality, an EMA operates over 
a broad range of conditions and such single-point specifications do not provide much 
information regarding how the system is likely to behave under different circumstances. 
A solution to this issue is often found in the form of analytical models/expressions for 
different parameters of interest in the system that can be used over the entire operating 
domain. For instance, in a brushless DC motor, torque T is often estimated via a linear 
relation T = Kt.I (Kt = torque constant, I=current). However, such analytical descriptions 
often neglect the nonlinear nature and the high degree of coupling between the various 
EMA operational parameters4. For instance in the example above, the value of Kt is also 
influenced by factors like operating speed, magnetic saturation, temperature, etc. [Yoo 
and Tesar, 2004]. These simple models are therefore unable to provide accurate 
operational estimates. With aging and extended operation, these relations may undergo 
further subtle changes leading to incorrect estimates of values of interest. Hence, rather 
than using single-point measures to characterize system performance there is a need for 
                                                 
4 Power parameters (e.g. torque/speed), operating parameters (e.g. bandwidth) and environmental 
parameters (e.g. temperature) 
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other means to characterize the 
behavior of different parameters over 
the complete operating range of an 
EMA. This led to the development of 
the concept of performance maps and 
envelopes [Tesar, et. al, 2005].  
A performance map represents 
the functional relation among the 
control, reference and dependent 
parameters of an EMA for all its 
achievable operating points [Tesar, et. 
al., 2005]5. The control parameters are 
the inputs that govern the EMA 
operation (e.g. voltage, phase turn-
on/off angles for motor commutation, 
etc.). The reference parameters are 
those that cannot be directly controlled 
and usually represent the state variables 
(e.g. speed, acceleration, torque, etc.). 
The dependent parameters are those 
which do not affect the other control or 
reference parameters and can be considered as ‗effect‘ variables (for example, noise 
generated by the EMA). A performance envelope may represent the extreme limits of 
performance i.e. the limits to which the EMA operation can be pushed for short periods 
on demand or for known periods at specified performance levels without breakdown or 
an envelope may be an algebraic combination of several maps. A set of such maps can be 
                                                 
5 Researchers have used concepts similar to performance maps for diverse applications- [Omekanda, 2003] 
to determine optimal operating points for a switched reluctance motor (from torque efficiency and ripple 
perspective), [Paganelli et. al, 2001] for automobile powertrain performance optimization, [Sainsot and 































Example of a Performance Map and Performance 
Envelope for a Switched Reluctance Motor 
[Ashok and Tesar, 2007] 
 
Example of a Gear Train Performance Map 
[Podra and Andersson, 1999] 
Figure 1-2: Examples of Performance Maps 
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defined for each component of the EMA (Figure 1-2) or the EMA as a complete system, 
using the functional form described in [Tesar, et. al., 2005] and [Ashok and Tesar, 2007]: 
                     Eq. (1-1) 
where PM indicates performance map, * represents one of {p, g, b, c} (p-prime mover, g- 
gear train, b-bearings, and c-controller); m is an index for the number of maps, p1, p2 are 
control or reference parameters, p3 is a dependent or a reference parameter or a 
performance criterion, and K is a constant. Such performance maps can be generated by:  
 Empirical testing over the entire EMA operating range [Janardhan and Tesar, 
2008] 
 Combining related performance maps of individual EMA components (motor, 
geartrain, bearings, etc.) into an overall EMA performance map [Ashok and 
Tesar, 2007] 
 Via analytical methods [Omekanda, 2003] 
Irrespective of the method used, the sheer volume of information contained in a 
performance map presents a significant challenge in terms of conveying it to the end-user 
for use in operational decision-making6. The data points for the maps can be compactly 
stored as look-up tables or as fitted regression equations. These methods often become 
‗black-box‘ models and do not convey an insightful interpretation to the end-user as to 
how certain operational parameters vary with respect to the independent control variables 
[Janardhan and Tesar, 2008]. However, a visual representation (of relevant performance 
measures over the complete range of operating conditions) can provide a more intuitive 
interface that can not only be used by a non-expert system operator to make appropriate 
operational decisions based on existing operating conditions but also retain sufficient 
granularity of information for an expert user to analyze EMA performance over a broad 
range of the parameters of interest or to perform diagnostics [Ashok and Tesar, 2007]. 
For easy visualization, performance maps are represented as three dimensional surfaces 
                                                 
6 Hence, [Ashok and Tesar]also refer to these maps as ‗decision surfaces’. However, performance maps 
need not be strictly restricted to the operational phase of a system. They may also be used to assist 
decision-making during the design process as described in [Vaculik and Tesar, 2008] 
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with p1 and p2 typically represented along the X/Y axes and p3 on the Z axis (Figure 1-2) 
[Tesar, et. al, 2005]7. 
In order to enable practical application of these maps in operational decision-
making for any system, user-defined/ application specific criteria are needed (these are 
usually represented on the Z axis of a map). [Hooper and Tesar, 1994] outlined various 
properties that were desirable while defining similar criteria for system level decision-
making in robotics such as physical significance of the criteria, continuous variation over 
the operational range of interest, computational efficiency, task independence, finiteness 
of magnitude, etc. amongst others. Based on these guidelines, the works of [Scott and 
Tesar, 1999], [Turner and Tesar, 2000], [Hvass and Tesar, 2004], [Yoo and Tesar, 2004] 
and [Janardhan and Tesar, 2008] led to the development of more than 40 different criteria 
to characterize EMA performance (e.g. rise-time, efficiency, current/voltage saturation, 
operational margin, torque ripple, velocity ripple, health-margin, backdrivability, output 
oscillation, remaining useful life, noise, vibration, temperature, etc., see [Ashok and 
Tesar, 2007]).  
In addition to the development of numerous performance criteria, there was also a 
need to identify a few simple measures that could be derived from the available 
performance maps8 and used to represent the criteria across the entire operational space 
of the EMA. The goal in this case was to provide a greater understanding of such criteria 
to the end user as well as to determine critical operating points on the map (especially 
when the duty cycle of an EMA requires it to function close to its operational margins). 
The use of such measures or norms (single-number extracts derived from the maps) was 
first demonstrated in [Hvass and Tesar, 2004] for Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) 
of EMAs. [Ashok and Tesar, 2007] further advanced the practice to develop a formalized 
decision making framework (using Bayesian networks) intended to address a wider set of 
                                                 
7 A performance map can also be a hyper-surface i.e. a surface with dimensionality greater than 3, as 
described in [Hvass and Tesar, 2004]. With a three dimensional representation, any or all axes of a map can 
be reference parameters but a map can have only one dependent parameter (on the Z axis). 
8 Via relatively simple mathematical operations such as integration, differentiation, summing, differencing, 
averaging, normalization, etc. as described in [Ashok and Tesar, 2007] and [Hvass and Tesar, 2004] 
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objectives. Based on simple analytics, ten norms (monotonicity, maxima, minima, 
volume under the map, etc.) to characterize any performance map were developed. 
[Ashok and Tesar, 2007] also provide examples using these criteria/norms to combine 
different maps into performance envelopes  as well as combining multiple operational 
criteria into a single map in order to provide optimum EMA performance over all those 
criteria. The authors assert that the proposed methodology could be used to address any 
operational requirement in concert with (or in some applications even supersede) 
traditional control methodologies. 
The maps, criteria and norms, envelopes, etc. described thus far represent the first 
step towards achieving complete nonlinear operational awareness. But this is knowledge 
in a feedforward sense i.e. they represent how an EMA can be expected to perform under 
certain specific sets of control parameter conditions over the entire operating range. To 
complete the feedback cycle, this knowledge needs to be periodically updated with 
reliable and accurate information regarding all the parameters of interest in the 
application, reflecting the actual extant conditions of the EMA (for control purposes as 
well as to track the health of the various EMA sub-components using CBM algorithms).  
1.2.2. Multisensor Architecture for EMAs 
The ability of an EMA to respond adequately to a range of operating requirements 
or duty cycles is dictated chiefly by the embedded controller‟s capacity to accurately 
infer its present operating condition and capabilities, in order to decide on a suitable 
control strategy. Conventional EMA control schemes often rely on a small set of sensors 
for feedback (variables such as position/speed, current and voltage are most commonly 
used in many applications). In some specialized applications (such as robotics, aerospace 
applications, etc.) or in a testing/certification environment, additional sensors for 
variables such as temperature, torque, vibration, acoustic noise, etc. may also be used. 
Increased cost and additional design challenges in integration are often cited as the 
reasons why sensors in addition to those strictly needed for operation are not integrated 
into most commercial EMAs. The number of sensors is kept to a minimum, mainly to 
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reduce the overall costs. The perception is that adding more sensors to any system adds 
additional locations where single-point failures may occur, since even state-of-the-art 
sensors are susceptible, to some extent, to factors like temperature, shock/vibrations, 
electromagnetic interference, humidity, connector/cabling failures, etc9. However, 
adhering to such limited operational information especially in applications that demand a 
high level of EMA performance (for example, actuating control surfaces in fighter 
aircraft [Koran and Tesar, 2008], precision robotics, etc.), not only throttles its 
capabilities but can also prove catastrophic in case of sudden sensor failures or 
degradation since it may lead to eventual overall system failure.  
  With a limited set of internal sensors, the ensuing awareness of an EMA‟s actual 
operating conditions is also limited. This typically leads to a restriction of the EMA 
operation within a conservative range specified by the manufacturer (i.e. the rated 
specifications) with a view to avoid any deterioration of its sub-components (for 
example, operating the electric motor using a low current to prevent over-heating and 
avoid any damage to its windings). Almost always this means that, the EMA‟s 
capabilities are under-utilized10, when they can actually be pushed beyond these nominal 
ranges for short periods of time when the application demands it (or in an emergency 
situation). There is thus a clear need to comprehensively track in real-time, the actual 
variation in the EMA variables vis-à-vis the „as-built‟ or expected behavior of those 
parameters under the prevalent operating conditions. This is to account for any 
unaccounted changes in the available system models (i.e. the performance maps for each 
of those parameters). 
Given the multitude of possible maps (as described in [Tesar, 2005] and [Ashok 
and Tesar, 2007]), this calls for the use of an extensive suite of diverse, in-situ sensors 
                                                 
9 Other factors deterring the inclusion of multiple sensors are the lack of appropriate sensors and the 
available computation/ signal processing capabilities to handle multiple streams of data. Though the desired 
performance (range, resolution, etc.) can be found in off-the-shelf sensors, often the limiting factor is the 
lack of an appropriate form factor to allow for compact integration in an EMA. This in turn necessitates 
custom-designed solutions. This is often the case for output position sensors or torque sensors used in 
EMAs [Tesar, 2009]. However, with constant innovations and modern sensor and data 
acquisition/processing/computing technologies, these concerns have been alleviated to a great extent. 
10 This often leads to EMAs being over-designed for an application, leading to bulkier and costlier systems 
 9 
that can be compactly integrated into an EMA11. As will be seen during the course of this 
work, the benefits of including multiple sensors far outweigh the risks; especially, since 
the enabling sensor technology exists. The issue of cost can also be justified in case of 
high-value applications where reliability (uninterrupted data availability), accuracy and 
extensiveness of available information can mean everything. To determine the set of 
measurands/sensors that are applicable across a range of applications, a detailed analysis 
of factors affecting the behavior of the various EMA components (which in turn has an 
effect on the overall EMA performance) was carried out and a ten-sensor architecture 
(position, velocity, acceleration, torque, temperature, noise, vibration, current, voltage, 
magnetic field) has been proposed to provide complete awareness and comprehensively 
track variations in the different EMA characteristics (refer Appendix A).  
The advantages of integrating several diverse sensors in an EMA can be examined 
in context of the characteristics desired of an intelligent EMA (as outlined in the 
beginning of Section 1.2) as follows: 
I. Multi-Criteria Decision Making: With additional sensors monitoring measurands 
(like temperature, noise, etc.) other than those strictly needed for EMA operation 
(such as position, current, etc.), it is possible to specify and utilize additional 
operational criteria (e.g. minimum acoustic noise) as benchmarks to quantify and 
improve the performance of an EMA. If redundant resources are available to 
expand the architecture of EMAs (such as multiple prime movers or gear trains 
[Tesar, 2009]), appropriate criteria may be used to judiciously allocate the 
available resources to meet a much broader set of task demands (for instance, as 
described in [Rabindran and Tesar, 2009] to independently allocate force/torque 
priorities) or address partial component failures (where the embedded controller 
can reconfigure alternate physical pathways in the EMA to accomplish the task). 
The concept is analogous to the approach used in robotic systems where multi-
criteria decision making is often used to exploit any kinematic redundancy 
                                                 
11 It is obvious that quality information from the same diverse group of sensors is also needed to generate 
the performance maps in the first place. 
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available in a robotic manipulator for fault tolerance, recovery, etc. [Cetin and 
Tesar, 1998] [Cocca and Tesar, 2000]. 
II. Operational Fault Tolerance: In any system, sensor feedback is used to determine 
the appropriate control action to dictate the system operation. The prime concern 
is therefore that any loss of data from one or more sensors should have the least 
disruptive effect on the overall system operation (or it should not lead to a 
complete failure of the system in the worst case). Operational fault tolerance in 
the context of sensors can be defined as the ability to detect, identify and 
accommodate partial or complete failures. This can allow a system to continue to 
function at an acceptable level of performance or at least have a „limp-home‟ 
capability in safety-critical situations without requiring urgent intervention. 
 Although the easiest way to achieve this objective is via hardware 
redundancy for each sensor, such an approach adds greater complexity, cost and 
weight to EMAs that are already hard-pressed in terms of having to integrate 
many components in a dense package. Hence, it is often not feasible especially if 
the EMA is used in applications where volume/weight may be at a premium12. 
Using sensors for a diverse set of measurands and correlating the different 
variables through appropriate models, it is possible to detect the signs of 
degradation/failure in any sensor and provide alternative pathways to infer the 
different variables of interest via functional redundancy13 (this aspect is explored 
further in Chapter 5). Thus, under nominal operating conditions, the performance 
of an EMA with additional sensors is either improved (due to more 
comprehensive evaluation of the EMA operational capability) or at least remains 
the same. But in off-nominal conditions, the availability of additional sensors can  
                                                 
12 Despite its drawbacks, hardware redundancy is still the preferred approach especially in applications 
where human safety is at stake (such as in aircraft where quad-redundancy in critical systems is still 
prevalent [Tesar, 2009]). Depending on the configuration of the different sub-components within the EMA 
and the resulting geometrical constraints, it may still be possible to incorporate hardware redundancy for 
some sensors such as temperature, current, and voltage sensors, etc. 
13 This may be as simple as deriving the value of a variable A using the values of other variables B, C, D, 
etc. using available relations (for instance, A=f (B), A= g(C), A=h(D), etc.) and using a voting scheme.  
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make a major difference to operation by enabling information fault tolerance.  
III. Actuator Condition Monitoring: For EMAs used in applications like aerospace, 
tele-operated robotic systems 
used in nuclear facilities, etc. 
reliability of the system and 
ensuring safety of the users 
involved are two of the prime 
objectives. There is an 
evident need in these 
applications for techniques 
that can provide advanced 
warning of any potential 
degradation in performance 
and prevent any minor faults 
that may originate in EMA components like bearings, motor, etc. (due to quality 
of manufacturing and materials used, wear and tear of contacting surfaces, 
environmental effects like heat, humidity, excessive vibrations, etc.) from 
developing into major faults. However, signaling a 100% EMA failure when signs 
are noticed that some component(s) are not performing at desired levels, neglects 
any residual capability an EMA may have to perform the task at hand. A 
scheduled/periodic maintenance approach may result in EMAs being replaced 
earlier than necessary, leading to higher lifecycle costs. Adopting a continuous 
monitoring strategy for EMAs is a more prudent alternative, wherein its 
performance capability is continuously evaluated and it remains in service until it 
is estimated that it is no longer capable of meeting basic/essential task demands. 
In the Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) methodology proposed by 
[Hvass and Tesar, 2004], vital EMA variables are continuously monitored for 
signs of degradation. The occurrence of faults in any of the EMA components 
leads to a change in the model parameters represented by its corresponding map 
 
[Hvass and Tesar, 2004] 





















(Figure 1-3 represents the changes occurring in the efficiency map of a brushless 
DC motor due to winding faults). The residuals between the sensor-inferred 
values and the estimated values (from the map) are used to determine the extent of 
degradation and to calculate the remaining useful life, the % health margin (the 
relative ability of an EMA to meet its task demands as compared to its as-built 
condition), etc. [Hvass and Tesar, 2004]. With multiple sensors monitoring 
different characteristics, it may be possible to accurately pinpoint the cause of a 
defect using the available sensor information (for instance, excessive vibrations 
may be traced to a particular defective bearing [Shakkari and Tesar, 2007]). The 
sensor values are also used to constantly update the maps to reflect the latest 
EMA health condition for subsequent cycles of the CBM algorithm. 
1.3. DECISION MAKING IN INTELLIGENT EMAS  
In many intelligent systems, the preferred approach is to minimize or eliminate 
human involvement in decision-making for greater autonomy14. But automated decision 
making has not always improved system performance, either due to problems in 
interpretation of their results or due to unanticipated interactions between sub-systems 
leading to erroneous verdicts [Parasuraman, et. al., 2007].  
Resource allocation based on task requirements is difficult to program into an 
automated decision-making system, more so if it operates in an uncertain, dynamic 
environment. With a fully autonomous (rule-based) decision-making arrangement, if the 
operating conditions vary drastically from the norm (or the data on which the decision-
making algorithm was trained on), the system may not respond satisfactorily. Reliance on 
complete automation for decision making has also been directly attributed to a lower 
level of operator awareness, sometimes leading to safety critical situations (e.g. in 
avionics [Qureshi and Urlings, 1999]). [Hunn, 2008] states that the out-of-loop 
                                                 
14 Primarily for reasons of safety, the ability to supersede automated decision-making and assume charge of 
crucial operations in case of unexpected events or sudden changes in task requirements is still considered a 
human responsibility. Even in highly autonomous systems (like mobile robots) human operators are 
involved in the system operation to a large extent by defining rules/operational constraints required to 
achieve the mission objectives, interpreting data streamed from on-board sensors, diagnosing issues, etc.  
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performance leaves the human operators of such systems handicapped in their ability to 
contribute their expertise to make the system perform optimally or take over operations 
when needed. [Parasuraman, et. al., 2007] describe the common pitfalls of completely 
automated decision-making as over-reliance, skill degradation, and reduced situation 
awareness, especially in emergencies. [Parasuraman, et. al., 2007] also highlight studies 
by [Crocoll and Coury, 1990] and [Rovira et al., 2007] (for aircraft identification and 
battlefield engagement respectively) involving automation support for decision-making 
that was not perfectly reliable and provided either status information or a task 
recommendation. It was found that the end cost was greater when end-users acted on a 
flawed verdict automatically provided by the decision-making system (decision 
automation) than when they were provided only status information from which they 
derived their own decision (information automation).  
The above findings imply that in dynamic/vaguely defined scenarios, critical 
judgment based on present context rather than pre-programmed options is vital for 
successful decisions with the operator also actively involved in the decision-making 
process [Tesar, 2010 (4)]. Human-in-the-loop approaches, with human and machine 
contributions toward a complex end goal defined by the human operator, are therefore 
being explored in many domains to utilize the best capabilities inherent in both
 
[Hunn, 
2008][Kaupp, 2007].  With enough computing resources, it is possible to rapidly analyze 
vast amounts of low-level raw data to derive higher level information or features using 
suitable algorithms. But with uncertain or incomplete information, completely automated 
decision-making algorithms are generally unable to infer enough about the system status 
and may even arrive at erroneous decisions. Conversely, humans can naturally infer the 
context of any situation, assimilate partial/uncertain knowledge, prioritize new 
information or eliminate redundant information and make decisions adaptively using a 
combination of past experience and available facts15. Such an ability is often unavailable 
to machine systems, where decision-making is more deterministic. A human in the loop 
                                                 
15 This ability to infer patterns in data or imagery that intuitively seem to fit without detailed analysis is 
referred to as ‗Gestalt perception‘ [Hunn, 2008]. 
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approach to decision-making thus provides an improved ability to understand/interpret 
system behavior due to the human ability to extrapolate a priori knowledge of what the 
system can and is likely to do, based on experience and combine it with measured data. 
[Parasuraman et. al. 2000] suggest that in complex systems, early-stage functions like 
data acquisition, processing, low-level control functions, etc. may be automated with 
great benefits. But for higher-level (or high-risk) operational decisions, unless the 
automated decision-making system can be certified to be fully reliable under all possible 
scenarios, the human operator should not only be involved in the constituent processes of 
the decision-making cycle, but also make the final decision. The arrangement ensures that 
the operator is not over-burdened with a deluge of raw data but still retains the flexibility 
to integrate different sources of information before arriving at a final decision.  
It is widely accepted that a synergy of human and machine intelligence can 
provide an opportunity to enhance the capabilities of today‟s systems, and increase their 
robustness and reliability [Pavlin, 2007] [Kaupp, 2007] [Bruemmer, et. al., 2005] [Fong 
et. al. 2002] [Ross, 1998]. A pertinent example of human-in-the-loop decision-making 
can be found in mobile robots deployed in combat zones or urban search and rescue 
which rely on human-robot (intelligent system) interaction rather than complete 
autonomy for greater flexibility in responding to limitations imposed by system design or 
uncertain operational environments [Lewis, et. al., 2007].  The UT-RRG philosophy of 
EMA intelligence (Figure 1-4) is modeled on similar lines in that it is imparted as a 
means to realize and expand the choices of a human arbiter for maximum operational 
flexibility at the EMA level [Tesar, 2009]16. While lower-level data acquisition and 
control functions are automated, human operators are responsible for supervisory control, 
providing the final decision for EMA operation. This is done by visually providing 
information regarding the EMA parameters to the user in the form of decision surfaces 
(performance maps/envelopes) and norms derived from these surfaces. These are used in 
combination with user-defined performance criteria and sensor-inferred EMA 
                                                 
16 Since, an EMA forms a basic building block of higher-level systems (Section 1.1), this automatically 
helps expand the operational choices available to the operator to improve the overall system performance. 
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characteristics (the decisions are made by the operator based on residuals between the 
maps and the actual sensor-inferred values) to satisfy various task demands. The 
feasibility of using such an interactive approach to decision-making has been verified in 
[Ashok and Tesar, 2007][Hvass and Tesar, 2004] and [Yoo and Tesar, 2004]. 
 
 
Figure 1-4 : Decision making in Intelligent Electromechanical Actuators 
1.4. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The quality of human-in-the-loop decisions will only be as good as the 
information available to the decision maker. Reliable and accurate sensor data from an 
extensive set of sensors forms the basis for generating all the maps/envelopes used in the 
decision making process as well as in real-time evaluation of the EMA capabilities. Some 
factors which affect the quality, availability and the use of sensor data and their impact on 
the operator/decision-maker are as follows: 
 In practice, sensors usually do not operate in exact accordance with their 
theoretical models. All sensor readings have an element of uncertainty due to 
inherent sensor physics or external factors which add noise to the signals or cause 
some form of sensor malfunction17. This in turn, is reflected in the form of 
                                                 
17 Noise is manifested as high frequency random fluctuations from the true sensor reading.  It is commonly 
observed when sensors are located close to components like switching power supplies. Noise can also be 
added to a signal at various stages: from the measurand itself during the sensing process; "picked up" in the 

















increased uncertainty in the decision surfaces used for EMA control18. Concepts 
such as CBM rely heavily on the differencing of such decision surfaces [Hvass 
and Tesar, 2004]. To reduce false alarms from these algorithms, it is essential to 
ensure that the resultant difference is accurately indicative of performance 
degradation, after accounting for the inherent uncertainties.   
 Often there is a need to infer quantities that are not directly measurable (e.g. 
efficiency). This is usually achieved via analytical/functional models that 
incorporate available sensor data. The accuracy of the inferred value depends on 
the quality of the models used as well as the quality of measurands used as model 
inputs. In such cases, the resultant uncertainty needs to be propagated to the 
higher levels of the decision-making hierarchy (an EMA controller or the human 
who controls the final decision-making) in order to maintain awareness of this 
uncertainty at the system level. 
 A sensor with mechanical/moving components experiences wear and degradation 
during its operational life. Solid state sensors are also subject to extreme 
conditions (e.g. high temperature, shock/vibrations) when integrated into the 
confined spaces within an EMA. Failure in sensor harnesses and connectors are 
also quite common [Puls and Tesar, 1994]. In such scenarios, an arrangement 
using single sensors (absence of any hardware redundancy) is not very robust 
since any one sensor failure may result in complete system failure. If the outputs 
from faulty (or failed) sensors are used in updating the available performance 
maps/envelopes outputs, it may cause false alarms from CBM algorithms which 
may result in the EMA being replaced earlier than necessary in its lifecycle.  In 
feedback control, faulty sensors may cause disastrous results as the system may 
become unstable, or may provide poor regulation in precision applications [Xu 
and Kwan, 2003]. Failure to identify an „abnormal‟ sensor and take appropriate 
corrective action could result in expensive and unnecessary system shutdowns or, 
                                                 
18 The parametric models or maps may have inherent modeling uncertainty arising from how they are 
generated (experimentally or analytically) [Ashok and Tesar, 2007]. 
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worse, accidents that endanger both system and personnel. Typically, it may not 
be warranted to replace the whole EMA in case of loss of sensor information. It is 
usually not practical to replace a failed sensor(s) when the EMA is in service. 
Hence, some safeguard is needed to detect signs of any form of sensor failure or 
degradation and provide advanced warning. 
 To balance choices like sensor geometry (for compact integration), performance 
(accuracy, resolution, etc.), power and signal processing requirements, cost, etc. 
compromises are often made in the selection of sensors for an EMA application. 
Sensor ratings are usually selected to conform to nominal EMA operating 
conditions since these conditions prevail for a majority of its operational life. 
Hence, all sensors do not perform equally well over the entire operating period of 
the EMA and a significant deviation from desired performance is often observed 
especially in regions close to the operational envelope of the EMA. Hence, some 
form of information redundancy (using different sources in different operating 
regimes for the same measurands) may be needed to achieve better data fidelity. 
 Individual sensors can only present a partial appraisal of the operational capability 
of an EMA or its environment. Therefore each sensor needs to be used 
concurrently with other available sensors for a more realistic assessment of the 
present EMA operating conditions.  
The objective of this work is not to try and improve the design of off-the-shelf 
sensors (which often have tremendous capabilities), but to make the best of the existing 
capabilities of these sensors while addressing some of the shortcomings discussed above 
through EMA operational software (Appendix C). Post-acquisition, the first step is to 
filter the raw sensor data to separate useful information from extraneous noise 
components. This data needs to be further bolstered via computational tools to ensure its 
„correctness‟ and used in concert with information from other sensors to provide 
information of greater value, which can be used by the system operator for more reliable 
control and diagnosis.  
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1.5. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The benefits of EMA intelligence cannot be achieved if input data to the decision-
making process (Figure 1-4) is of questionable quality. But operational decisions still 
have to be made in spite of imprecise and uncertain sensor data. Some core issues that 
have been identified to define the research objectives for this work are as follows: 
I. With any unwarranted deviations in sensor readings from their expected behavior 
(based on past operational history or available calibration data), the challenge is to 
determine if the variation indicates a change in the states of the monitored system 
or if it is the result of one or more malfunctioning sensors. However, it is often 
difficult to detect abnormal sensor behavior as it can be masked by normal system 
changes (for example, a change in the EMA operating speed)19. In most 
approaches to sensor fault detection, the underlying assumption is that the 
monitored system itself is operating correctly with no existing or incipient faults. 
Conversely, with most system level fault detection approaches, the principal 
assumption used is that all the sensor readings are perfectly valid and any 
deviation in readings is the result of a fault in one or more sensors. Thus, the first 
research objective is to: 
Create a unified framework that can detect any system faults and sensor faults 
concurrently, independent of any assumptions regarding the health/condition of 
either the sensors or the monitored system. 
II. When readings from individual sensors are used in isolation, there is no 
mechanism to evaluate their correctness. But, by correlating all the measurands 
using a suitable framework, it may be possible to detect the presence of any errors 
in available data. The first step is to use the information redundancy enabled by 
such correlation, to generate multiple values for each measurand that can then be 
compared against real-time measured data. In the second step, based on the 
                                                 
19 An abrupt sensor failure, caused by power failure, loose/corroded contacts, or data acquisition system 
faults, etc. is relatively easy to detect (for instance, with simple limit checking). However subtle faults like 
drift (caused by deterioration of the sensing element) or cross sensitivity are more difficult to detect. 
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closeness of agreement of the predicted and measured values20, a measure of 
belief may be assigned to the readings from each sensor. By tracking such 
measures over time for all the sensors, it may be possible to distinguish a faulty 
sensor from a faulty system21.   
Multiple values may be estimated for a variable of interest via analytical 
or functional redundancy. With analytical redundancy, the values are synthesized 
from direct mathematical models22, relating a measurand to its dependent 
variables (e.g. V=IR). However, such relationships are unlikely to exist for all 
combinations of measurands. Functional redundancy is a more general approach 
in which the variable is estimated via readings from non-redundant sensors that 
are not measuring it directly, but additional variables that are related to it by some 
physical process. Usually, nonlinear models derived from empirical data (such as 
performance maps, look-up tables or regression equations [Janardhan and Tesar, 
2008] [Ashok and Tesar, 2009]) are used for this purpose. In doing so, data from 
multiple sensors must be brought together coherently to avoid propagation of 
conflicting information through the control hierarchy. Thus, the second research 
objective is to: 
Use an empirical data-driven approach to functionally correlate the variables of 
interest in an EMA in a physically meaningful manner. 
III. Any modeling framework that is used to associate the variables of interest must 
be able to numerically quantify the inherent uncertainties that exist in the sensor 
readings (due to limitations on linearity, accuracy, resolution, etc. dictated by the 
physical principles unique to each specific sensor) as well as in the presumed 
relations among the variables (due to the inability to account for all the factors 
that may influence a specific variable or due to simplifying assumptions made 
                                                 
20 Such a comparison may be carried out based on user-defined thresholds, statistical measures, etc. 
21 In the simplest scenario, if the measure of belief for a single sensor seems to be out of line compared to 
others then it is likely that the particular sensor may be faulty whereas variation in the measures associated 
with multiple sensors may either be indicative of multiple sensor faults or an incipient system level fault. 
22 Typically linear for ease of computation. 
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during experimentation, data fitting, etc.)23. There is also the need to have 
formalized procedures (that are also mathematically tractable) for manipulating 
and propagating these uncertainties across different levels of the resulting 
framework as well as in updating the resultant model as and when new 
information becomes available (primarily for CBM algorithms). Such techniques 
also need to be scalable to address system models with a large number of 
variables of interest and the different combinations in which the variables can be 
potentially related. Thus, the third research objective is to: 
Utilize well-defined mathematical principles to enable quantification, 
combination and propagation of uncertainties resulting from different facets of 
the system operational decision making process, in a computationally tractable 
and scalable manner.  
IV. Often, it may not be possible to represent all the relevant domain knowledge via 
functional models. Hence, it is essential to implement mechanisms that can allow 
human system operators to utilize their experience and knowledge of the EMA 
behavior under different operating conditions to carry out tasks such as 
dynamically selecting suitable sensors to act as data sources for updating the 
available performance maps (especially when the quality of information from one 
or more sensors seems to be deteriorating), modify/ select appropriate control 
strategies to account for any deterioration in the condition of any of the EMA 
components (bearings, motor windings, etc.), identify suitable sensors that may be 
used to provide alternative information pathways for failed sensors, etc. To enable 
such decisions, there is a need to provide an interface that maximizes the 
operator‟s comprehension of what is actually happening within the subsystems. A 
quick and intuitive way to achieve this is to present all the component factors 
required for decision making in a visual and interactive manner [Ashok and Tesar, 
2008][Hunn, 2008][Ruspini, et. al, 2005]. A proven application of such an 
                                                 
23 Note that these uncertainties will be automatically manifested in the available empirical data that is used 
to generate the performance maps 
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approach is the use of head-up displays for aircraft. In the present context, in 
addition to a visual display of the appropriate performance maps and envelopes 
(as described in [Ashok and Tesar, 2007] and [Yun and Tesar, 2007]), additional 
resources that can assist an EMA operator (or even a domain expert) in making 
operational decisions are easy to interpret visual representations of the influences 
among different physical variables in the system as well as the quantitative 
indicators that can provide a preliminary assessment of the health/condition of 
each component of an EMA and every sensor integrated into the EMA (a detailed 
prognosis for these components as well as the overall EMA health could be 
obtained from more comprehensive CBM algorithms as proposed by [Hvass and 
Tesar, 2004] [Shakkari and Tesar, 2007], etc.). Thus, the fourth research objective 
is to: 
Provide a visual representation of the relationships among the different physical 
variables to complement performance maps as well as preliminary quantitative 
indicators for the condition of different system components and sensors in order 
to enable a human-in-the-loop approach to operational decision making for 
optimal allocation of the available resources. 
1.6. REPORT OUTLINE 
This chapter outlines the philosophy of intelligence in mechanical systems like 
EMAs, emphasizing the need for a human-directed decision making paradigm utilizing a 
combination of decision surfaces (performance maps and envelopes), user-defined 
performance criteria and real-time evaluation of all the physical variables in the system 
using a suite of multiple, heterogeneous sensors. Given the central importance of sensor 
data as the foundation for such intelligence, various issues in ensuring the availability and 
quality of such data were identified in Section 1.4 and the research objectives for this 
work were listed in Section 1.5. 
Chapter 2 provides the argument for using Bayesian networks as the method of 
choice to graphically model the complex associations between the numerous physical 
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variables as well as to provide a formal method to account for uncertainties (using 
probability theory) in a system like an intelligent EMA. The chapter provides a brief 
review of the fundamentals of Bayesian networks, and concludes with the description of 
three popular probabilistic inferencing algorithms that can be used for forward/inverse 
propagation of uncertainties across the model.  
Based on some of the concepts discussed in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 describes the 
development of a comprehensive Bayesian network for a representative EMA test bed 
comprised of a four phase Switched Reluctance Motor (SRM) with other auxiliary 
components and monitored using an array of sensors (the details of the testbed are 
provided in Appendix B). The overall network topology is developed by linking various 
smaller models representing the causal relationships among diverse physical facets of 
motor operation such as torque generation, motor dynamics, generation of acoustic noise, 
motor thermal characteristics, etc.  
Chapter 4 delves into the need for a criteria-based sensor management framework 
to help decide on and optimally utilize sensing resources in any complex system to their 
fullest potential. The chapter discusses various criteria that may be used to decide the 
physical embodiment of sensors in the system as well as in developing its corresponding 
Bayesian network representation. The chapter also describes additional criteria that may 
be used by the system operator to prioritize the available sensor and computational 
resources, in order to improve the operational use of the network thus developed.  
  Chapter 5 presents the development of a novel algorithm referred to as the 
„Sensor and Process Fault Detection and Isolation (SPFDI) algorithm. In case of any 
unexpected variations in sensor readings, the proposed algorithm utilizes the available 
Bayesian network representation of a complex system like an EMA and the real-time 
information obtained from a suite of multiple sensors to help distinguish between sensor 
and process/system faults in tandem (without the need for simplifying assumptions 
regarding the condition of either the sensors or the overall system). The algorithm also 
provides a quantitative belief value representing the health of each sensor or sub-
component that can be used by the system operator during the decision-making process. 
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Chapter 6 then discusses four broad application classes (each consisting of a 
complex system equipped with multiple sensors and utilizing a human-in-the-loop 
approach to decision making) with different objectives (viz. human safety, system 
availability, cost of system failure, and performance maximization) where the SPFDI 
algorithm may be applied with beneficial results, Three representative examples are 
presented for each class of applications, with an in-depth description of a selected 
example in each class,  
Chapter 7 provides a summary of the work presented in this report and also outlines 
future avenues of research.
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Chapter 2. Bayesian Networks 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to provide the motivation and the necessary 
mathematical framework for the use of Bayesian networks as a viable method for 
modeling intelligent EMAs, capable of handling both nonlinearities and uncertainties 
associated with the different operational parameters of an intelligent EMA. Section 2.2 
briefly outlines the desirable characteristics in modeling techniques that are needed to 
describe a system, and also provides a brief discussion on various formalisms to handle 
uncertainty. Section 2.3 describes various concepts and definitions in probability theory, 
including the Bayes‘ theorem which forms the core of the Bayesian reasoning approach.  
Section 2.4 formally defines Bayesian networks and delves into its different properties. 
This is followed by a description of different algorithms that may be used to propagate, 
combine and update the uncertainties (represented using a probabilistic approach) 
associated with the different variables of interest. 
2.2. MODELING OF INTELLIGENT EMAS 
As an initial step to achieve the objectives listed in Chapter 1, it is necessary to 
model the interaction between the various actuator parameters with a view to provide 
functional redundancy for all the parameters of interest. The goal is thus to create a 
comprehensive EMA model based on the parameters of interest which can be directly 
measured from sensors integrated into the system (or accurately inferred using the 
available measurands). Some criteria to evaluate a good system modeling technique may 
be adopted from the list provided by [Zhang and Bivens, 2007]1 as follows: 
 The model obtained as a result of the adopted methodology should accurately 
represent the system (or available data) and should have adequate flexibility in 
rapidly changing environments where the model has to be frequently 
reconstructed 
                                                 
1 Although the focus of the authors work is in computing systems, the requirements may be considered to 
be generally applicable to other types of systems too 
 
 25 
 The evaluation speed of the resulting model should be quick, in order to enable it 
to be used for system response predictions with high intensity 
 The modeling technique should accord the model designer the ability to 
incorporate existing domain knowledge. Such knowledge may be in the form of 
expert experience or hard empirical data. The objective is to exploit this 
knowledge to enhance model performance using readily available information 
during system operation. 
 Any model that is created using such a technique must have easy interpretability, 
in order to enhance human understanding of the model as well as the confidence 
to use the model during system operation. 
 The technique should allow extension of the use of the resulting model to 
capturing different behaviors, thereby increasing its capability to accurately 
represent the system. 
 The technique should support multi-way model evaluations, for example cause to 
effect as well as effect to cause inference or inferring data not available because 
of restrictions imposed by system design.  
 The modeling technique should allow for incorporation of different types of 
uncertainty during analysis.  
The ability to account for uncertainty is particularly important. Conventional 
engineering analysis tends to be deterministic, based on single-point values of variables 
of interest. However, this is never true in reality because every variable has some degree 
of uncertainty associated with it. [Korb and Nicholson, 2004] describe the three distinct 
forms of uncertainty an intelligent system has to be able to handle in general- ignorance 
(caused by limits to knowledge), indeterminism (arising from inherent randomness in 
physical quantities), and vagueness. Some of these uncertainties are inherently introduced 
as a result of any modeling process. For instance, mathematical equations that are used to 
characterize a physical phenomenon are usually arrived at empirically and are an 
approximation of the actual phenomenon at best. These equations are often further 
simplified for further use, using certain assumptions, for computation reasons. In 
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addition, the sensors used to measure physical variables are not purely deterministic and 
add an additional element of uncertainty. Uncertainty in sensor data may result from 
many sources like numerical errors in signal processing algorithms, A/D conversion, etc. 
Hence, quantifying the accounting for uncertainty in a variable of interest is just as 
important as the exact value of the variable itself.  
Uncertainty in sensor data may be characterized using different methods as 
described by [Brooks and Iyengar, 1998]2: 
 Explicit accuracy bounds using statistical techniques: Data values are assumed to 
follow a known statistical distribution (a Gaussian distribution is commonly used 
since it has many favorable attributes both from mathematical and computational 
perspectives) centered on the actual sensor reading as the mean value. The 
accuracy or certainty bounds for a given sensor are then derived statistically by 
finding the distribution of the signals generated under normal operating 
conditions.  
 Probabilistic bounds: Each data value is assigned a probability value ranging 
from 0 to 1, and suitable mathematical techniques may be used to combine the 
probabilities to produce a single (un)certainty value. 
 Belief functions: The Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions computes the 
probability that the available information/evidence supports a particular 
proposition rather than computing the probability of the proposition itself [Russell 
and Norvig, 1995]. A belief function is usually represented as a probability 
interval instead of a single value. 
 Fuzzy logic: Each data value is viewed as a membership function of a fuzzy set. 
Rules are then defined for quantifying a sensor reading using the values of these 
membership functions. 
                                                 
2 [Naish and Croft, 1999] also define the concept of uncertainty ellipsoid (based upon the normal 
distribution), utilizing a geometric ellipsoid data representation to quantify uncertainty. The center of the 
ellipsoid is the mean of the measurement and its boundary represents a distance of one standard deviation 
from the mean. A beneficial feature of this model is that it can represent data of any dimension using the 
same mathematical framework.  
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The work of [Walley, 1996] provides a detailed comparison of the different 
uncertainty handling approaches mentioned above on the basis of six criteria and is also 
summarized in [Ashok and Tesar, 2007] as shown in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1: Comparing Uncertainty Measures  
(Reproduced from Ashok and Tesar, 2007) 
Each of the above methods has been successfully applied in different applications 
and each is more suitable to a particular domain/objective than others. For instance, belief 
functions are more suitable in modeling ignorance whereas fuzzy logic is more suitable in 
modeling vagueness [Russell and Norvig, 1995]. For the present work, qualitative 
judgments about vagueness or ignorance are not major issues (but accounting for 
variations in sensor signals is) since the performance maps based decision making 
methodology for intelligent EMAs is based on extensive experimental data that is 
obtained by rigorous experimentation as presented in [Janardhan and Tesar, 2008]. For 
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the same reason i.e. the availability of extensive empirical data, the probabilistic 
approach has been deemed to be the most suitable approach to quantify uncertainty 
[Ashok and Tesar, 2007] [Das, 2004]. In dynamic environments where the system model 
has to be updated or reconstructed regularly, [Zhang and Bivens, 2007] suggest that a 
probabilistic model is more suited for capturing the uncertainties. In addition, the use of 
probability allows encapsulation of a large set of circumstances in an approximate but 
very concise manner [Russel and Norvig, 1995]. Both these factors are important from 
the point of view of intelligent EMAs where the performance maps need to be 
periodically updated (locally as well as over the entire range) to accurately reflect the 
extant conditions. Once the uncertainty is quantified, it is also essential to determine how 
the modeling technique can enable these values to be propagated and combined in order 
to examine their effects on different parts of the model (for instance, if the model for a 
particular system is of the form A= f(B), the goal is to determine how uncertainty in the 
value of B affects the uncertainty in the estimate of A).  
[Ashok and Tesar, 2007] also provide a detailed comparison of some commonly 
followed approaches for modeling intelligent EMAs such as state-space modeling, neural 
networks, etc. In the state-space modeling approach, the models are physics based (which 
provide a sound analytical basis along with well-defined model interpretation) and 
experiments are conducted to find the constants in the model after it has been finalized. 
But such models are typically not robust enough to handle uncertainty in data unless they 
have been explicitly included in the model when it is created. Also, multi-way (forward-
inverse) model evaluation, uncertainty propagation, etc. is not always easily handled in 
this approach nor is it always physically relevant because of the simplifying assumptions 
(e.g. linearization) made during the modeling process. On the other hand, approaches like 
neural networks are data-based and have the ability to learn complex patterns directly 
from actual (noisy) data [Berchialla, et. al. 2007]. They tend to perform well in many 
multivariate, nonlinear applications (for e.g. as described in [Correa, et. al., 2009][Zheng, 
et. al, 1999], etc.) but their reasoning process is inaccessible to human understanding 
(they are often referred to as ‗black-box‘ models). The resultant model is implicit in the 
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network structure (which is not necessarily based on physics or engineering principles, 
and therefore may lack a strong analytical foundation) and no explicit knowledge 
representation is available in a form that can be easily understood by the human system 
operator [Zheng et. al. 1999]. While such approaches permit the solving of many 
problems, they are typically structured to solve one particular problem. Furthermore, due 
to gradient-based optimization processes involved, possible data over-fitting may 
significantly deteriorate the robustness of neural network based schemes (i.e. the model 
may not perform equally well over the entire operating range of the system).  
To address the above issues, there is a need for a graphical and intuitive model 
presentation (based on physical principles) and can not only assist users in quickly 
grasping the model, but is also data-driven (allowing for propagation of uncertainties) 
with a solid mathematical foundation (facilitating forward and inverse inference of any 
variable), thereby increasing the user confidence in its correctness [Zhang and Bivens, 
2007]. These needs are best served by using a Bayesian network framework to model 
intelligent EMAs in terms of its measurands. Such an approach also complements the 
overall EMA decision-making methodology developed in [Ashok and Tesar, 2007].  
2.3. PROBABILITY CONCEPTS 
The following section provides an overview of some essential probability 
concepts that form the basis for Bayesian networks. Many of the definitions provided in 
this section are drawn from [Pearl, 1988], [Neapolitan, 2003], [Korb and Nicholson, 
2004], and [Darwiche, 2009] 
 
Definition 2.1: Consider a sample space S consisting of n distinct events i.e. S= {e1, 
e2,….en}. A function P is a probability function on the subsets of S, if it assigns a real 
 number P(E)to every event E   S and has the following properties[Neapolitan, 2003]: 
1. 0≤ P(E) ≤1 and P(S) = P(e1)+ P(e2)+….. P(en)=1 
2. For disjoint subsets     of non-elementary events E={            } 
P(E) = P(   )+ P(   )+…+ P(   ) 
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The pair (S, P) is then known as a probability space3.  The term probability is thus used to 
quantify the level of belief regarding the occurrence of an event. In other words, it can be 
used as a measure of uncertainty and quantify it. 
 
Definition 2.2: If A and B are any two events such that P(B) ≠0, then conditional 
probability (i.e. given that the event B occurred what is the probability of the event A 
happening) is defined as follows [Neapolitan, 2003]: 
                   Eq. (2-1) 
 
Definition 2.3: Two events A and B are said to be independent (represented by ‗ ‘) if 
P(A| B) = P(A) for P(A) ≠0 and P(B) ≠0  [Neapolitan, 2003]. The independence relation 
is symmetric. In addition, P(   )=P(A)P(B).  
 
Definition 2.4: If A is independent of B only with the knowledge of a third event (or a set 
of events)C, where  P(C) ≠0, then such a situation is referred to as conditional 
independence and is represented as (A    B | C)4. In this case, P(A|    )= P(A| C) for 
P(A| C) ≠0 and P(B| C) ≠0 [Neapolitan, 2003] 
 
Definition 2.4: The total probability for any event A, given a set of n mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive events B1, B2, …. Bn that constitute the space S (i.e. for any i ≠ j, Bi  Bj = 
Φ and B1  B2  …  Bn = S) is defined as [Neapolitan, 2003]: 
                  
 




Definition 2.5: The concepts discussed above are equally valid when specified in terms of 
random variables instead of events. Analogous to events, a random variable can be 
defined as one which takes on a unique value corresponding to every outcome in the 
sample space of interest [Neapolitan, 2003].  The individual values which such a variable 
                                                 
3 The function P is also known as a probability distribution when used in the context of random variables 




can assume are referred to as its ‗states‘ and the combined set of states is referred to as 
the variable‘s state space [Korb and Nicholson, 2004].  Random variables may be 
continuous or discrete.  Continuous random variables may assume any value over the 
entire range of real numbers while discrete random variables have a finite set of states.  
For the present work, all the variables are assumed to be in the discrete domain5. 
An example random variable in the context of the present work would be the reading 
from a sensor corresponding to a particular variable of interest in the system, like torque 
or speed. Even though many real-world phenomena (like temperature) can be considered 
to be continuous in reality, when such variables are measured using sensors, any 
information regarding their variation is available in the form of discrete steps due to the 
signal processing associated with the sensors and their auxiliary data acquisition 
equipment. In other words, continuous values are approximated by using discrete values. 
For instance, if the motion of a robot joint is measured using a position sensor, and the 
absolute joint position (assuming the starting position represents 0
o
) is represented by the 
random variable JP, then JP may take discrete values as JP = 0.5
o
, JP = 1.0
o
 and so on as 
indicated by the sensor reading. The greater the resolution of the sensor used, the more 
the number of discrete states that can be measured. The granularity of discretization (i.e. 
number of states) for the variables is typically dictated by the application requirements. 
Introducing some notations, the discrete random variables are denoted by capital 
letters as A, B, C, etc. The distinct values assumed by each of these variables are denoted 
by the lower case letters as a, b, c, etc. The probability that a variable A assumes the 
value a is denoted as P(A=a) or simply P(a). The function P(A=a) for different values a 
is then referred to as the probability distribution of the random variable A. The 
conditional probability that a variable A assumes a value of a when the variable B 
assumes a value of b is similarly represented as P(A=a|B=b) or simply P(a|b). The joint 
                                                 
5 Primarily because a large number of the algorithms that have been developed in the realm of Bayesian 
networks (Section 2.5) are focused towards dealing with discrete variables There are also algorithms that 
deal with continuous variables (Gaussian) or mixed networks with both continuous and discrete variables 
as described in [Sudderth, et. al, 2003], [Neapolitan, 2003], [Darwiche, 2009], [Cobb and Shenoy, 2004], 
[Chang and Sun, 2003] and many others. 
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probability distribution of A and B is denoted as P(A=a ∩ B=b) = P(A=a, B=b) or 
P(a,b). The marginal probability distribution of A is then defined as P(A=a) =      
       where ∑b indicates that the summation encompasses all the values in the state 
space of B. A set of random variables V, with a joint probability distribution defined over 
all these variables is referred to as a probabilistic model [Pearl, 1988]. 
2.3.1. Bayes’ Theorem     
The probability concepts discussed thus far now enable the definition of the 
Bayes‘ rule or Bayes‘ theorem. This provides a mechanism by which conditional 
probabilities of variables of interest may be determined using known or available 
probabilities when new information becomes available. The theorem can be stated as: 
       
          
    
 
Eq.(2-3) 
The probability of a hypothesis H conditioned on some evidence E is computed by 
multiplying the probability of its likelihood P(E|H) with the prior probability of the 
hypothesis P(H) and ultimately normalizing by P(E) i.e. the probability of observing the 
evidence. The normalization ensures that the conditional probability of all such 
hypotheses sum to 1.  The quantity P(H|E) is referred to as the posterior probability of the 
hypothesis after taking into account the evidence and is often termed as ‗belief‘ [Korb 
and Nicholson, 2004]). The process of updating the beliefs (or propagating the 
uncertainties) is referred to as ‗inferencing‘ (Section 2.5). The goal is thus to use the 
states of those variables which are available or can be observed easily in order to 
determine those of other variables which are harder to observe directly or are unavailable. 
The above equation may be generalized to a set of n mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
hypotheses {H1, H2,….Hn} such that P(Hi) ≠0 for i=1,2,…n, 
        
            
        
 
        
 
Eq.(2-4) 
In the context of performance maps, the Bayesian approach essentially provides a way to 
modify the system models represented in those maps (H) when new data becomes 
available from the sensors (E) that are used in monitoring the system.   
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Consider two random variables A and B each with two states such that P (B=b1) = 
0.1, P (B=b2)=0.9, P (A=a1|B=b1)=0.6, P (A=a1|B=b2)=0.8. Now in order to calculate P 
(B=b1|a=a1), Bayes‟ rule is applied as follows 
         
             
                           
 
Eq.(2-5) 
The process of Bayesian inferencing is simple when there are only two variables 
involved, each with a finite number of states as shown above, since it is easy to model the 
joint probability distributions (there is a need to specify only 2
2
 probability values that 
cover all possible combinations of the values of A and B). However, in any complex 
system, there may be numerous operational parameters, each represented by a random 
variable. As the number of variables increases, the specification of the joint distributions 
(eliciting their probability values) and calculations of the normalizing constants in the 
above equations becomes computationally very complex. For instance, in a system 
consisting of n variables with m states each, n
m
 probability values would have to be 
estimated (a daunting task if the values are obtained by expert opinion and even if it is 
obtained by experimentation) Bayesian networks have been proposed as a possible 
solution to the above issues [Darwiche, 2009] due to their ability to make the problem 
more tractable by exploit the inherent dependence and independence relationships that 
exist between the variables in the domain of interest. 
2.4. BAYESIAN NETWORKS 
Bayesian belief networks are referred to using many different names- belief 
networks, causal networks, probabilistic networks, etc. The concepts used are derived 
from fields of graph theory, probability theory, and statistics. They have gained 
popularity in recent years as a method for both modeling of complex problems 
(incorporating uncertain knowledge) as well as for decision making/ performing 
reasoning under uncertainty [Pearl, 1988]. These networks have been used for modeling 
multinomial data (both discrete and continuous). In essence, a Bayesian network 
represents the interconnectedness between the different random variables that represent 
the parameters of interest in a given domain. The graphical framework of Bayesian 
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networks not only provides an intuitive understanding of the domain being modeled but 
also allows for a compact representation of multivariate probability distributions (by 
representing the joint probability as product of local distributions). Such models have 
been used in a wide variety of application areas such as medical diagnosis [Spiegelhalter, 
1989][Acid, et.al., 2004], fault detection [Lampis and Andrews, 2009][Li et. al., 
2007][Ibarguengoytia, et. al. 2005], gene analysis [Freidman et. al. 1999], situation 
assessment in military applications [Bladon, et. al, 2006], etc. to name a few. 
2.4.1. Definition  
A Bayesian network is a graphical structure that consists of a set of nodes that 
represent the random variables X= {X1, X2,….Xn} pertinent to the physical domain of 
interest. The random variables may be discrete or continuous. These nodes are connected 
in pairs by a set of directed arcs (or links or edges) which explicitly represent the 
probabilistic dependencies between the variables. The lack of an arc between two nodes 
explicitly represents their independence. The direction of these arcs is such that no cycles 
(a directed path from a node to itself [Neapolitan, 2003]) are formed. The structure is 
therefore referred to as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). 
If a node A and a node B are connected by a directed arc as A→B, then B is said to 
be conditionally dependent on A.  If the directed edges indicate direct causal influences or 
dependencies between the variables then the network is also known as a Bayesian causal 
network6. A is said to be the parent node of B and B is its child. A is said to be an ancestor 
of B if there is a path formed by such links from A to B and B is said to be its descendant 
in this case. Any other node C which is not a descendant of A is said to be a non-
descendent. A node which has no parents but only children is referred to as a root node. 
Conversely, a node which has no children is referred to as a leaf node. Any non-root or 
non-leaf node is referred to as an intermediate node [Korb and Nicholson, 2004]. In a 
                                                 
6 The distinction between a purely causal network and a Bayesian causal network is provided in [Nadkarni 
and Shenoy, 2001] [Ashok and Tesar, 2007]. Causal networks are directed maps that are primarily used to 
represent domain knowledge in terms of cause-effect relations but they need to be conditioned into 
Bayesian networks to allow propagation of uncertainties. Conversely every relation represented in a 
Bayesian network need not necessarily represent causality.  
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causal network, the parent nodes in the network can be considered to directly influence 
their children nodes, with the cause-effect relation represented by the link starting from 
the influencing or the parent node and terminating at the child node.  
 The structure of a Bayesian network may assume different forms as shown in 
Figure 2-1. In case of a tree structure (Figure 2-1(a)), any node in the network may have 
at most a single parent. In 
case of a singly connected 
or a polytree structure 
(Figure 2-1(b)), a node may 
have multiple parents but 
there is only one path 
between any two nodes in 
the network. In case of a 
multiply connected structure 
(Figure 2-1(c)), a node can 
have multiple parents and there may be more than one path between any pair of nodes in 
the network. This is the most general type of network.  In general, multiply connected 
networks are more useful when modeling real-world systems but as will be seen later, 
probability propagation in such structures is more complicated as compared to trees or 
singly-connected networks. The strength of the relationships (dependencies) between the 
nodes (and the inherent uncertainties in the relationships between the nodes) is quantified 
by the conditional probability distributions. These values are encoded as Conditional 
Probability Tables (CPT) at each node7. The CPT describes the probability that the node 
will take on its mutually exclusive values (for example, true or false for a binary random 
variable) given the values of its parents. A Bayesian network thus consists of a qualitative 
part (the nodes and the links/connections between them representing the structure of the 
problem being modeled) and a quantitative part (the probabilistic knowledge associated 
                                                 
7 For discrete variables 
   

















with each node in the network). The following section now provides some formal 
mathematical definitions for a Bayesian network and its components. 
 
Definition 2.6: A Bayesian network B for 
a set of random variables of interest X = 
{X1, X2,…Xn} is a pair (G, θ) where G is 
a directed acyclic graph over all the 
variables X and θ is the set of Conditional 
Probability Tables (CPTs), one for each 
variable in X, representing the 
parameterization of the nodes [Darwiche, 
2009].  
 
[Pearl, 1988] defines such a set of variables X and a joint probability distribution 
defined over all the variables as a ‗probabilistic model‘. The individual entries in the CPT 
for a node Xi can be represented as            where Pa(Xi) represents the set of parent 
nodes (direct predecessors) of the node Xi 
8
.            is referred to as a network 
parameter. Each            corresponds to a particular value assigned to Xi and each of its 
parents (this is referred to as an instantiation). Essentially,  
                                            
           
 
   
Eq.(2-6) 
i.e. it represents the conditional probability of Xi, conditioned on all the variables in the 
set Pa(Xi). The values P(Xi|Pa(Xi)) are referred to as local probability distributions 
[Heckerman, 1995]. Figure 2-2 shows an example of a simple Bayesian network 
consisting of three nodes and their associated CPTs. The joint probability distribution in 
this case can be simply represented as P(a, b, c)= P(c|b). P(b|a). P(a) 
                                                 
8 For a node with n states and i =1 , 2, 3….k parents, and if Si is the number of states for the i
th 
parent, the 
size of the CPT is n rows and   
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2.4.2. Properties of Bayesian Networks  
In general, modeling any domain using a Bayesian network necessitates the 
assumption of the Markov property which is defined as follows [Neapolitan, 2003]: 
 
Definition 2.7: Given a joint probability distribution P over the random variables in a set 
X and a directed acyclic graph G = (X, E) where the elements of X are the nodes and the 
elements of E are the edges (ordered pairs of distinct elements of X), (G, P) is said to 
satisfy the Markov condition if for each variable     , {Xi} is conditionally 
independent of the set of all its non-descendents given the set of all its parents.  
If ND(Xi) represents the set of all non-descendents of Xi, the Markov property 
may be represented as I({Xi}, ND(Xi)| Pa(Xi)). Based on this property, an alternative 
definition for a Bayesian network may be provided as follows [Neapolitan, 2003]:  
Given a joint probability distribution P over the random variables in a set X and a DAG, 
G = (X, E), (G, P) is said to be a Bayesian network if it satisfies the Markov condition. 
The conditional independence assumption allows for a compact representation of 
the joint probability distribution over X as a product of local distributions which in turn 
helps in the development of efficient probability propagation algorithms. Mathematically, 
the joint probability distribution of a set of variables X= {X1, X2,….Xn} encoded by the 
Bayesian network can now be represented as:  
                  
 
   
 
Eq.(2-7) 
Eq.(2-7) is also known as the chain rule of probability [Korb and Nicholson, 
2004]. Bayesian networks which have the Markov property are referred to as 
Independence maps or I-maps, wherein all the conditional dependencies are modeled 
explicitly by the arcs in the network and every independence that actually exists in the 
domain of interest is suggested by the absence of an arc between the corresponding nodes 
(Figure 2-3(a))[Korb and Nicholson, 2004]. On the other hand, if every arc in a network 
indicates a direct dependence between the connected nodes in the domain of interest, then 
such a Bayesian network is referred to as a Dependence map or a D-map [Pearl, 1988]. 
 
 38 
A network that is both an I-map and a 
D-map is said to be a perfect map. The 
idea of conditional independence 
represents fundamental qualitative 
information about the variables in the 
domain of interest that may be 
exploited during the propagation of 
evidence/uncertainties. In particular, 
there are three types of conditional 
independencies that are important in 
determining how the influence of 
different variables travels across the network and can be interpreted from the topology of 
the Bayesian network as described in [Pearl, 1988], [Korb and Nicholson, 2004].  
i. Serial / Causal Chains 
Consider the Bayesian causal network in Figure 2-3(b), where A causes C which 
in turn causes B. The structure represents the conditional independence relation 
P(B|A,C) = P(B|C) ≡ A B|C Eq.(2-8) 
Any knowledge of A will determine the state of C which in turn will influence the 
value of B. Conversely, any evidence about the state of B influences the value of 
C which in turn updates the belief in its cause A. If, however, any state of C is set 
as evidence, then knowing this value is sufficient to determine the probabilities of 
various states of B (using its CPT that contains conditional probability 
information representing the link C->B). Any available evidence about the state 
of A is neither required nor influences the value of B any longer. Conversely, by 
instantiating C, any knowledge of B will not influence the value of A. Thus, in this 
serial/causal chain A and B are conditionally independent and separated by C.  
ii. Common Causes / Divergent Connections 
Consider a Bayesian causal network where A causes both B and C (Figure 2-3(c)). 
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P(C|A, B) = P(C|A) ≡ C B|A Eq.(2-9) 
Any knowledge of B influences the value of its cause A, which in turn, determines 
the belief in the value of its other effect C. However, if information regarding A is 
known and is used for instantiation, then any additional information regarding the 
value of B does not contribute in any form to the value of C. The value of C in 
such a situation is solely determined by using its CPT which contains the 
conditional probability information representing the link A->C. Thus, with a 
common cause type of structure, the nodes B and C are conditionally independent 
and separated by A.  
iii. Common Effects / Convergent Connections 
In this case, the effect node C has more than one cause, A and B (Figure 2-3(d)). 
The conditional independence provided by such a structure is represented as: 
P (A|B, C) ≠ P(A|C) ≡ ¬ (A   B | C) Eq.(2-10) 
The symbol ¬ represents a logical NOT. The above equation can be interpreted as 
follows. The nodes A and B are independent until the value of C is known. 
However, once the value of C is known A and B become dependent. In other 
words, with such a structure, any information about the common effect makes its 
parent nodes which are previously marginally independent, become dependent 
[Korb and Nicholson, 2004].  
The different types of conditional independencies discussed above for pairs of 
nodes can be extended to a set of nodes using the notion of d-separation as follows [Korb 
and Nicholson, 2004][Russel and Norvig, 1995]. 
 
Definition 2.8: An  (undirected) path between two sets of nodes X and Y can be defined as 
a sequence of nodes between a node in X and a node in Y such that each adjacent node-
pair is connected by a link (without considering the direction of the link) and no node 





Definition 2.9: If X, Y, Z represent three distinct and disjoint subsets of nodes in a DAG, 
then Z can be said to d-separate X from Y, if along every path from a node in X to a node 
 in Y there is a node W such that  
i)  W has converging links (common effect) 
and neither W nor any of its descendants are in 
the subset Z 
ii) W does not have converging links 
(common cause or causal chain) and is included 
in the subset Z  
In both cases, if the value of W is unknown then 
the path between X and Y can be said to be active 
whereas any knowledge of W is said to block the 
path.  Such a set of nodes Z is then said to d-
separate the two sets of nodes X and Y if every 
path from a node in X to a node in Y is blocked 
given Z. In Figure 2-4, the node C  can be said to d-separate A from B in each case. 
2.4.3. Developing Bayesian Networks  
As seen thus far, using a Bayesian network for modeling and decision making in 
complex problems offers a number of benefits over other techniques, since they not only 
provide an intuitive graphical representation of the relationships among the variables but 
also provide a relatively simple yet powerful mathematical structure based on probability 
theory for quantifying, combining and propagating uncertainties. Explicit representation 
of the independence and conditional relationships between the variables of interest is 
especially useful when humans are involved in the decision making loop, as is the case in 
intelligent EMAs using a performance maps based decision making methodology [Ashok 
and Tesar, 2007]. Since any good decision made regarding the domain typically needs to 
take into account all the variables involved, the calculation of joint probabilities is often a 















Developing a Bayesian network for a given application involves three main steps: 
 Identifying the pertinent variables of interest to be represented as nodes along 
with their possible states /values that these variables may assume.  
 Identifying relationships between the variables and representing them graphically 
by connecting the appropriate nodes with the links directed in a specific manner 
 Quantitatively characterize these relationships i.e. populate the CPTs for all the 
nodes in the network with the appropriate probability distributions. 
2.4.3.1. Network Structure 
[Darwiche, 2009] identifies three methods by which Bayesian networks are 
constructed typically when trying to model and reason about any system. The first 
method relies on the knowledge of the domain experts to create the structure of the 
network. The second method synthesizes the network structure from some formal 
knowledge (especially when the resultant network is used for system analysis). 
[Darwiche, 2009] refers to these two approaches as the ‗knowledge representation 
approach‘. The third approach is to learn the network structure from an available data set 
using machine learning algorithms (referred to as data-based approach by [Nadkarni and 
Shenoy, 2004]9) for example, as described in [Liu, 2008]. Within each approach, the 
probabilities associated with the different variables represented in the network may be 
elicited by subjective means from the domain experts or derived from available data.  
In the present work, the knowledge representation approach will be used to 
develop the structure of the Bayesian network. [Nadkarni and Shenoy, 2004] emphasize 
the fact such an approach is particularly useful when extensive domain knowledge is 
readily available and eliciting qualitative knowledge from experts is possible to develop 
comprehensive causal networks. For many engineering systems, different researchers 
explore a few particular aspects of the system in great detail while not accounting for 
other facets that may still play an important role in influencing the system behavior. 
                                                 
9 [Heckerman, 1995], [Acid, et. al, 2004][Neapolitan, 2003][Korb and Nicholson, 2004] provide an 
extensive treatment of learning algorithms used to learn the network structure as well as probabilities. 
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However, when taken as a combination, these different fragments of knowledge can be 
used to develop a truly comprehensive model of the system that may be used for effective 
operational decision making. Once the qualitative structure is available, the quantitative 
aspects associated with the structure may be estimated using data (for instance, obtained 
from extensive testing) to develop very effective Bayesian causal networks. The process 
of constructing a Bayesian network for a switched reluctance motor and some criteria that 
may be used to aid the procedure are discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively.  
2.4.3.2.Quantifying Relationships  
Once the structure of the Bayesian network has been determined, the next step is 
to quantify the strength of the relationship between the connected pairs of nodes in the 
form of appropriate conditional probability distributions (for the root nodes this takes the 
form of prior probability distributions).  In other words, to completely specify the 
network and enable calculation of the joint distribution, it is essential to determine the 
value of           = P(Xi|Pa(Xi)) for each node Xi in the network. In order to do this, it is 
necessary to consider the number of parents of each node and all possible combinations 
of values of all such parent nodes. Every combination in this set of parents is referred to 
as an instantiation [Korb and Nicholson, 2004]. Then, for each such instantiation of the 
parent nodes, the conditional probability for each state of the child node needs to be 
specified. In case of root nodes, the CPT contains only the values representing the prior 
probabilities of the variable that it represents.  Evidently, as the number of parent nodes 
increase or if the parent nodes have a large number of states, the size of the CPT 
increases exponentially. 
The parameterization of the different node probabilities is done using the same 
extensive testing data set that is used in the generation of performance maps. For the 
present work, data for the Bayesian network has been collected through rigorous testing 
procedures similar to those described in [Janardhan and Tesar, 2008] and [Yoo and Tesar, 
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2004]10. The test set-up described in Appendix B is used for this purpose, by operating it 
through a complete range of control parameters11. There are a number of possible ways to 
estimate the CPT parameters- using methods like canonical models as described in 
[Kokkonen, 2005] who employ a generalized Noisy-OR model or weights to represent 
the relative influence of variables as described in [Das, 2004], in order to simplify 
elicitation from experts or using available data in conjunction with algorithms like Gibbs 
sampling or Expectation Maximization (EM) [Korb and Nicholson, 2004]. [Murphy, 
1999] states that a frequentist method is an oft-used approach to estimate the conditional 
probability values in the CPT. In the present work too, since all the nodes in the network 
are assumed to represent discrete variables, the probability distributions are estimated 
using histograms and a relative frequency approach as follows12.  
Consider a data set consisting of n samples of data, corresponding to the discrete 
random variable X with k values xi. Typically, in order to construct a histogram, the range 
of the variable of interest is divided into a number of intervals, referred to as bins. The 
states xi that X can assume are taken to be centered on the bin limits (midpoints). If each 
xi, occurs mi times, then the absolute frequency of xi is said to be mi and the relative 
frequency fi is calculated as [Marques, 2007]: 
   
  
 
              and      
 
    Eq.(2-11) 
In other words, the relative frequency of each state is considered a proportion of 
total number of observed values for the variable that lie within that bin. With a large 
number of samples, the probability of a particular event xi can be considered as the limit 
of its relative frequency [Marques, 2007] i.e.  
                                                 
10 In addition to CPTs, the data can also be stored compactly by fitting structural equations between pairs 
of cause-effect variables (representing the links in the Bayesian network representation of the system) using 
Bayesian regression procedures as described in [Ashok and Tesar, 2007] and [Janardhan and Tesar, 2008]. 
11 The control parameters for the test set up used in this work include the main supply voltage, the duty 
cycle and frequency of the pulse width modulation (PWM) signal used to control the motor terminal 
voltage and the load acting on the motor. The experiments were conducted by varying the supply voltage 
between 0-20VDC, the PWM duty cycle between 1 and 7 %, and PWM frequency between 2 and 15 kHz.  
12 This is done only to estimate the initial parameters. A method to update these parameters during system 
operation is presented in [Cohen, et. al, 2001] and will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
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   Eq.(2-12) 
where P(xi)  [0,1] and       
 
     . The values of P(xi) thus calculated constitute the 
probability distribution or probability mass function (pmf) of the discrete variable 
[DeVore, 2000]13 which indicates the probability that a particular state xi is obtained. 
Consider a random variable X such that 0≤X≤5. Suppose the variable is  
discretized into bin sizes of 1 as 
[0,1],[1,2]….[4,5] . The discrete states of X in 
this case are X = {0.5, 1.5, 2.5, 3.5 and 4.5}. 
Suppose ten values of X are obtained over a 
specific time duration (say, from a sensor 
used to measure X) as follows X= {0.7, 1.2, 
1.6, 2.1, 2.4, 2.6, 2.7, 3.3, 4.5, 4.8}. The 
histogram for this data is shown in Figure 
2-5, where the height of the rectangle is 
proportional to the absolute frequency of the 
samples. The relative frequency of the 
samples is taken as indicative of the 
probability value of the variable state. Note that the histogram essentially represents the 
discrete approximation of the variable as mentioned earlier.  
2.5. BAYESIAN INFERENCE 
 Once the Bayesian network has been constructed and all its CPTs have been 
populated, the model is ready for use in determining different probabilities of interest 
given the observation of some specific variables in the network. Since a Bayesian 
network represents a complete joint probabilistic model for all the variables, it can be 
used to determine updated knowledge of the states of specific variables (posterior 
distributions) or subsets of variables, by conditioning on the observed values. The process 
                                                 
13 As the number of samples increases, the empirical histogram (limited samples) obtained in this fashion 
converges to the actual probability histogram (infinite samples) (law of large numbers).  
 
 el. Freq. Prob 
P(X=0.5) P(0≤X≤1) 1/10 0.1 
P(X=1.5) P(1≤X≤2) 2/10 0.2 
P(X=2.5) P(2≤X≤3) 4/10 0.4 
P(X=3.5) P(3≤X≤4) 1/10 0.1 
P(X=4.5) P(4≤X≤5) 2/10 0.2 
 
Figure 2-5: Determining CPTs 
















of determining the posterior probability distributions of the different variables 
represented by the different nodes in a Bayesian network, given the knowledge of a 
subset of those nodes, is referred to as ‗updating beliefs‘ or ‗probabilistic inferencing‘ or 
‗probabilistic propagation‘ [Korb and Nicholson, 2004].  
In essence, the process provides an idea of how probable the different values/ 
states of a specific variable/node are, using the knowledge already encoded in the CPTs 
in the network and combining it with newly available knowledge in the form of the 
observed nodes. The nodes whose values are known or observed are referred to as 
evidence nodes. The subset formed by one or more nodes (other than the evidence nodes) 
whose posterior distribution values are calculated are referred to as query nodes. 
Depending on which nodes are set as evidence and which nodes are the query nodes, the 
process of reasoning may be cause to effect (predictive in nature), effect to cause 
(diagnostic) or combined [Korb and Nicholson, 2004]. 
2.5.1. Belief Updating in Causal Chains 
Consider a simple two node network of the form A->B.  If there is evidence 
available about the parent node as A=a, then the posterior probability P(B=b) can be 
determined directly from the CPT of B as P(B=b|A=a). If B=b is the state set as 
evidence, then the posterior probability P(A=a) can be easily determined using Bayes‘ 
theorem (Eq.(2-3)). With a three node network of the form A->B->C, the calculations are 
slightly more complex. In this case, if there is evidence in the form A=a, then, P(C=c| 
A=a) is determined using the implied conditional dependencies and the chain rule of 
probability (Eq.(2-7)) as: 




Similarly the value of P(A=a| C=c) can again be calculated using the chain rule of 
probability and Bayes‘ theorem. But, for more complex Bayesian network structures, the 
process of belief updating can be quite complex. 
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2.5.2. Belief Updating in Polytree and Multiply Connected Networks 
Various algorithms have been developed by researchers for belief updating in 
singly connected networks or polytrees as well as multiply connected networks. The 
algorithms are broadly classified into two categories as exact (e.g. Pearl‘s message 
passing algorithm [Pearl, 1988], the Lauritzen-Spiegelhalter clique tree propagation 
algorithm [Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988], the symbolic probabilistic inference (SPI) 
algorithm [Li and D‘Ambrosio, 1994], etc.) and approximate inferencing algorithms (e.g. 
Logic Sampling [Henrion, 1988], Likelihood Weighting [Fung and Chang, 1989], 
[Shachter and Peot, 1989],  Loopy Belief Propagation [Murphy, et. al. 1999], etc.).  [Guo 
and Hsu, 2002] provide a comprehensive review and comparison of different such types 
of algorithms. Some algorithms are appropriate only for sparse networks, while some can 
be applied only to polytree structures. The choice of an appropriate algorithm to use is 
determined by factors like the structure of the Bayesian network, computational 
requirements, etc.14. The following section describes three popular algorithms in detail. 
2.5.2.1.Exact Inferencing  
2.5.2.1.1. Pearl’s Belief Propagation Algorithm 
[Pearl, 1988] developed a message-passing exact inferencing algorithm to 
propagate beliefs in polytree networks15. The algorithm makes use of the local 
independencies between the nodes as embodied by the structure of the Bayesian network 
and Bayes‘ theorem to determine the posterior probability distributions of the query 
nodes in the network.   
Consider a Bayesian network comprised of a set of nodes X = {X1, X2, .. Xn} 
where n is the total number of nodes in the network. Suppose the values E=e are 
specified for a set of evidence nodes E= {E1, E2,… Em} i.e. {E1= e1, E2=e2……Em=em}, 
where E   X and m is the number of nodes set as evidence to the network. The objective  
                                                 
14 The problem of exact as well as approximate inferencing in Bayesian networks were proven to be NP-
hard by [Cooper, 1990] and [Dagum and Luby, 1993] respectively; indicating the computational challenges 
involved even for moderately sized networks where the nodes have a limited number of states. 
15 The core algorithm is for singly connected networks but has been extended to apply to multiply 
connected networks as well using methods like conditioning /clustering, etc. 
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is thus to determine the posterior distribution for one or more query nodes Xi. In order to 
do this, two types of parameters known as the  (Xi) and  (Xi) values are used in the 
conjunction with the CPT of a node Xi to 
update its belief. The values of these 
parameters are calculated based on two 
types of messages-   and   that Xi 
receives. The   messages are sent from a 
child node to all its parent nodes (i.e. 
against the direction of the links in the 
network) and are represented using the 
notation                i.e. 
                   [Korb and 
Nicholson, 2004] The   messages are 
sent from a parent node to all its child 
nodes (i.e. in the direction of the links in the network)and are again represented as 
               i.e.                    [Korb and Nicholson, 2004]. Note that every 
node Xi in the network sends and receives these messages. The notations used in the 
algorithm are shown in Figure 2-6. Let W1...p represent the set of parent nodes for a given 
node Xi. Let Y1…q represent the set of child nodes for Xi. Let Z represent the set of other 
parent nodes for a given child node Y of Xi. [Korb and Nicholson, 2004] described the 
three major components of the algorithm as: belief updating, bottom-up propagation and 
top-down propagation, which are discussed below. 
In bottom-up propagation, the   messages sent from a node to all its parents are 
computed. For every child Y of the node Xi, the   message sent from Y to Xi, for every 
value x of Xi, is calculated as [Neapolitan, 2003] 
                                 
 
   
     





where y are all the values of Y, Z1…Zk are the parents of Y other than X, with values z.  
 













The   values are computed as follows [Neapolitan, 2003]: 
 If Xi   E i.e. it is an evidence node and if the state   is the state set as evidence,  
      
 
          
  
Eq.(2-15) 
 If Xi   E (i.e. not an evidence node) but is a leaf node, then for all values x, 
       Eq.(2-16) 
 If Xi   E (i.e. not an evidence node) and it is also not a leaf node, then for all 
values x 
         
          
    Eq.(2-17) 
where         represents the set of all the child nodes of Xi. 
In top-down propagation, the   messages sent from a parent node to all its 
children are calculated. If Wp is any parent of the node Xi, then for all the values x of Xi, 
then the    messages are given by[Neapolitan, 2003] 
              
              
     Eq.(2-18) 
where               represents the set of children of a node Wp other than Xi. 
The   values are calculated as follows [Neapolitan, 2003]: 
 If Xi   E (i.e. an evidence node) and if the state   is the state set as evidence, then 
      
 
          
   
Eq.(2-19) 
 If Xi   E (i.e. not an evidence node), but it is a root node, then for all values x 
          Eq.(2-20) 
 If Xi   E (i.e. not an evidence node), and it is also not a root node, then for all the 
parents W1, W2, …Wp of Xi (with values w1,w2, ….wp) and for values x of Xi. 
                            
 
   
 





Finally, the belief for a node Xi is updated when the messages arrive from its children and 
parent nodes, indicating a modification in their respective belief values. The updated 
posterior probability for the different states x of Xi is given by [Neapolitan, 2003]: 
                 Eq.(2-22) 
where α is a normalizing constant which ensures that           =1 
With all the above computations, the algorithm can now be summarized using the 
pseudo-code, as described in [Neapolitan, 2003], as follows (this algorithm has also been 
implemented in C++ as part of the AMOS libraries (Appendix C) for this work): 
 
Objective Given a Bayesian network consisting of a set of nodes X = {X1, X2, .. Xn} 
= {Xi}, where i =1, 2,….n, n is the total number of nodes in the network  
with a singly connected or a tree type of structure and a set of evidence 
nodes, determine the posterior probability values for the query nodes 
Inputs The specified set of values E=e of a set of evidence nodes E= {E1, E2,… 
Em} i.e. {E1= e1, E2=e2……Em=em}, where E   X  and m is the number of 
nodes set as evidence to the network 
Outcome The conditional posterior probability values for all the query nodes in the 
network i.e. computing P(Xj | E) where Xj   (X – E) 
 
Algorithm 
1. For every node in the Xi network  
Loop through i for number of nodes Xi  
Loop through number of states j for the   
   node 
Set all λ(x) =1 
Exit Loop j 
Loop through number of parents p for the   
  node 
Loop through number of states l for the  
   node 
Set all       =1 
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Exit Loop l 
Exit Loop p 
Loop through number of children q for the   
   node 
Loop through number of states l for the   
   node 
Set all       =1 
Exit Loop l 
Exit Loop q 
Exit Loop i 
2. For the root nodes 
Loop through number of root nodes p  
Loop through number of states k for the p
th
 node,  
Set all      = P(w), the prior probability 
Exit Loop j 
Loop through number of children i for the p
th
 root node 
Send_  _Message from Wp to Xi 
Exit Loop i 
Exit Loop p 
3. Update the Network 
Given a set of evidence nodes E= {E1, E2,… Em} i.e. {E1= e1, E2=e2……Em=em} 
Loop through i for number of nodes Xi  
If Xi   E and if the state   is the state set as evidence 
Set λ( ) =1,       =1, P( |e) =1 
For all other states x of Xi where x    
Set λ( ) =0,       =0, P(x|e) =0 
Exit Loop i 
4. Definitions of the Send_ _Message and Send_  _Message functions 
Send_ _Message from a child Yq to Xi 
For all k state values x of Xi,  
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Calculate       using Eq.(2-14) 
Calculate λ (x) using Eq.(2-17) 
Compute        using Eq.(2-22) 
Exit Loop k 
Normalize        
For each parent Wp of Xi such that Wp   E, Send_  _Message from Xi to Wp 
For each child YYq of Xi such that YYq  Yq, Send_  _Message from Xi to YYq 
 
Send_ _Message from a parent Wp to Xi 
For all k states w of Wp 
Calculate       using Eq.(2-18) 
If Xi   E, calculate      for all states x of Xi using Eq.(2-21) 
Compute        using Eq.(2-22) 
Exit Loop k 
Normalize        
For each child Yq of Xi, Send_  _Message from Xi to Yq 
If at least one state of Xi or all its descendents is instantiated (i.e. λ(x)≠1 for all 
states x of Xi),  then 
For each parent WWp of Xi such that WWp   E  and WWp  Wp 
Send_  _Message from Xi to WWp 
2.5.2.2. Approximate Inferencing  
Even though algorithms like loopy belief propagation, clustering, etc. are efficient 
even for multiply connected networks, the computational complexity increases 
tremendously for networks with a large number of nodes or for networks that are densely 
connected [Korb and Nicholson, 2004]. This led to the development of approximate 
inferencing algorithms. The two primary approaches to do this are by using stochastic 
simulation and by using deterministic search [Neapolitan, 2003]16. In stochastic 
                                                 
16 [Guo and Hsu, 2002] provide a detailed survey of other approaches used for approximate inferencing  
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simulation, inferencing is accomplished by sampling data based on the probability 
distributions of the different nodes in the network (in other words, a large number of 
different cases are generated to simulate the process of sampling from the network 
distribution17). The generated samples are then used to determine the posterior probability 
distributions of the nodes of interest. As more and more cases are generated, the 
estimated posterior probability distributions of the different nodes converges to the exact 
distributions based on the law of large numbers from classical statistics [Korb and 
Nicholson, 2004]. The following section discusses two such algorithms that are 
commonly used, the Logic Sampling algorithm and the Likelihood Weighting algorithm. 
2.5.2.2.1.Logic Sampling  
The Logic Sampling algorithm was originally developed by [Henrion, 1988]. The 
algorithm begins with an ancestral ordering of nodes18. The algorithm traverses each 
node in the network, beginning from the root nodes down to the leaf nodes based on this 
ordering. At each step, a value (state) is randomly generated for every node at the 
existing ordering level based on their conditional probability distributions (for root nodes, 
this corresponds to the prior distribution and for any other node in the network, this 
corresponds to the appropriate CPT value based on the sample values that are generated 
for all the parents of that node).  
If during the process, the value generated for an evidence node does not coincide 
with the value that has already been specified for it, the algorithm restarts by generating 
fresh random values for all the nodes starting again with the root nodes and working its 
way through the network. The process continues until a value has been successfully 
generated for every node, which happens only if the correct values are generated for all 
the evidence nodes. When all the nodes have been visited in this manner, then it can be 
                                                 
17 For instance, using a random number generator that produces values between 0 and 1. The random 
number generator used in the AMOS implementation of approximate inferencing algorithms (Logic 
Sampling and Likelihood Weighting) is the Mersenne Twister fast implementation developed by 
[Matsumoto, M. and Nishimura,T.,1998] and ported to C++ as described in [Bedaux, J., 2008] 
18 An arrangement of nodes in which, if node B is a descendant of node A, then B occurs later in the 
ordering than A as <A, B> 
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said that a successful instantiation has been obtained for one trial or case [Korb and 
Nicholson, 2004]. The above procedure is repeated for a specified number of trials 
(usually specified based on some user-defined convergence criteria for a given 
application). The final posterior probability distributions for every node in the network 
are then calculated based on the number of times the different states of each of those 
nodes are successfully generated as samples within the specified number of trials.  
The aspect of rejecting cases for which the values generated for evidence nodes 
are not favorable, is often cited as the major drawback of the Logic Sampling algorithm. 
This is because, if the evidence for any node in the set of evidence nodes E is unlikely 
(i.e. P(E=e) is very low), then each time a random value for that node is generated in a 
particular trial and it does not correspond to the state e, then all such cases will have to be 
rejected with a probability of 1-P(e) [Neapolitan, 2003] . In other words, these cases (i.e. 
samples that are inconsistent with the observed evidence) will be discarded and will not 
contribute towards the convergence of the probability distributions for the query nodes 
under consideration. This results in a much slower convergence of the estimated 
probability values to the true distributions (since a large number of samples need to be 
generated to result in sufficient number of usable values).  
The Logic Sampling algorithm implemented as part of the AMOS C++ library is 
based on the pseudo-code provided in [Neapolitan, 2003] and is described in the 
following section using the same. 
 
Objective Given a Bayesian network consisting of a set of nodes X = {X1, X2, .. Xn} 
where n is the total number of nodes in the network and a set of evidence 
nodes, determine the posterior probability values for the query nodes 
Inputs  The specified values E=e of a set of evidence nodes E= {E1, E2,… Em} 
i.e. {E1= e1, E2=e2……Em=em}, where E   X  and m is the number of 
nodes set as evidence to the network 
 Number of trials t 
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Outcome The conditional posterior probability values for all the query nodes in the 
network i.e. computing P(Xj | E) where Xj   (X – E) 
Algorithm 
1. Order the n nodes in the network in an ancestral ordering 
2. Loop through j for number of nodes Xj where Xj   (X – E)   
For each node Xj, with k states (i.e. xj1, xj2, ….xjk) in the network  
a. Create a variable, say,         to track the number of times each state k of 
Xj is generated during the sampling process  
b. Initialize          for each xjk = 0 
Exit Loop j 
3. Loop through number of trials t (user-specified) 
For each new trial 
a. Loop through the number of nodes n starting from j=1 and while j <= n 
i. Generate a value (  ) for the node Xj knowing the values generated for 
its parents Pa(Xj) in the previous step i.e.     and using the conditional 
probabilities from the CPT i.e. P(xj |    ) 
(for root nodes generate random values using their priors) 
ii. If Xj   E with xjk as the instantiated state, if    = xjk,  
Go to the next node in the ancestrally ordered list (increment j) 
      If not, reset j =1  
Exit Loop j 
b. If the values for all the nodes have been generated successfully, 
Loop through j for number of nodes Xj where Xj   (X – E) 
Loop through number of states k for the   
   node 
If the sample generated    is the same as the value of the k
th
 state 
xjk for the   
   node, increase the corresponding count variable 
        by 1 
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Exit Loop k 
Exit Loop j 
Exit Loop t 
4. Loop through j for number of nodes Xj where Xj   (X – E)   
Loop through number of states k for the   
   node 
For each state k of the node Xj,  calculate the estimated posterior probability 
value            as:           
         
 
 
Exit Loop k 
Exit Loop j 
 
The algorithm described above can be applied to any number of query nodes. In order to 
assess the quality of convergence [Korb and Nicholson, 2004] suggest the use of 
appropriate distance measures to quantify the difference between the true distribution P 
for a random variable represented by a node, and its estimated distribution   . One such 
measure, the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between P and    (assuming discrete 
distributions) is given by: 
                     
    
    
 
   
 
Eq.(2-23) 
2.5.2.2.2.Likelihood weighting  
In order to mitigate the shortcomings of the Logic Sampling algorithm when 
dealing with unlikely evidence values, and to make use of every sample that is generated, 
the Likelihood Weighting algorithm was proposed [Fung and Chang, 1989], [Shachter 
and Peot, 1989]. In this case, instead of incrementing the         variable by 1 only 
when a favorable sample is generated (i.e. one which is consistent with the available 
evidence values), the variable is incremented by an amount which represents the 
fractional likelihood of occurrence of the evidence values (i.e. how likely are the sample 
values generated for the evidence nodes, based on their CPTs [Korb and Nicholson, 
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2004]). This incremental amount is referred to as score by [Neapolitan, 2003] and is 
defined as follows. Consider a Bayesian network consisting of a set of nodes X = {X1, 
X2,... Xn} where n is the total number of nodes in the network. Let the values be specified 
for a subset of m evidence nodes E= {E1, E2,… Em} where E   X as {E1= e1, E2= 
e2…Em= em}. Let Xj be the set of nodes such that Xj   (X – E). The value of score is then 
defined as [Neapolitan, 2003]: 
                    
    
 
Eq.(2-24) 
Where    and     are the values generated during the sampling process for the nodes Xi 
and its parents PAi which belong to the set of evidence nodes E, and    represents the set 
of values generated for the variables in Xj. The Likelihood Weighting Algorithm 
implemented as part of the AMOS libraries is based on the pseudo-code provided in 
[Neapolitan, 2003] and is described below using the same. 
 
Objective Given a Bayesian network consisting of a set of nodes X = {X1, X2, .. Xn} 
= {Xi}, where i =1, 2,….n, n is the total number of nodes in the network 
and a set of evidence nodes, determine the posterior probability values for 
the query nodes 
Inputs  The specified set of values E=e of a set of evidence nodes E= {E1, 
E2,… Em} i.e. {E1= e1, E2=e2……Em=em}, where E   X  and m is the 
number of nodes set as evidence to the network 
 Number of trials t 
Outcome The conditional posterior probability values for all the query nodes in the 
network i.e. computing P(Xj | E) where Xj   (X – E) 
Algorithm 
1. Order the n nodes in the network in an ancestral ordering 
2. Loop through j for number of nodes Xj where Xj   (X – E)   
For each node Xj, with k states (i.e. xj1, xj2, ….xjk) in the network  
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Initialize the estimated posterior probabilities for each state k of Xj as 
  (xjk | e) = 0 
End Loop j 
3. Loop through m for number of nodes Xm where Xm   E 
Clamp the estimated value of Xm i.e.    to the value of Em in e 
End Loop m 
4. Loop through number of trials t (user-specified) 
For each new trial 
a. Loop through the number of nodes n starting from j=1 and while j <= n 
Generate a value (  ) for the node Xj knowing the values generated for 
its parents Pa(Xj) in the previous step i.e.     and using the conditional 
probabilities from the CPT i.e. P(xj |    ) 
(for root nodes generate random values using their priors) 
Exit Loop j 
b. Calculate the score based on the clamped evidence values 
                    
    
 
c. Loop through j for number of nodes Xj where Xj   (X – E) 
Loop through number of states k for the   
   node 
If the sample generated    is the same as the value of the k
th
 state xjk 
for the   
   node, increase the estimated posterior probability by the 
score as  follows: 
  (xjk | e)=   (xjk | e)+score 
Exit Loop k 
Exit Loop j 
Exit Loop t 
5. Loop through j for number of nodes Xj where Xj   (X – E) 
Loop through number of states k for the   
   node 
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Normalize   (xjk | e) 
Exit Loop k 
Exit Loop j 
2.6. Chapter Summary  
This chapter has identified the use of Bayesian networks as the method of choice 
in modeling intelligent EMAs. The key topics discussed in this chapter and the relevant 
sections are shown in Table 2-2.  
Bayesian networks allow the representation of intricate relationships (causal/non-
causal) between the different variables of interest in the domain in an explicit manner and 
also provide a means to account for the uncertainty in each of those variables using 
probability theory (in the form of conditional probability tables for discrete variables). 
This not only facilitates the incorporation of the knowledge of domain experts in 
developing the model for a given system but also allows for the refinement of this 
knowledge (for instance, via Bayes‘ theorem) when new data becomes available 
[Friedman, 1997].  
The graphical nature of the technique also provides an intuitive understanding of 
the resulting model (especially causal influences) and provides a greater insight into the 
observed behavior of the system when compared to many other approaches where such 
knowledge is not very easily accessible. This has the advantage of the model being more 
readily adopted and easy to use when humans are involved in the decision making 
process, as is the case in intelligent EMAs. The network also has the advantage of being 
modified with relative ease with the addition of new nodes and links (when the associated 
data is also available) to account for additional variables of interest. Depending on the 
resultant structure, the network can be evaluated quickly based on available information 
(evidence) to make both forward and inverse (predictive and diagnostic) inferences about 
the other variables in the network (queries) using different belief updating algorithms as 
described in Section 2.5. The next chapter will now discuss the development of a 
Bayesian network for the test set-up described in Appendix B. 
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Table 2-2 : Chapter Summary 




Requirements of modeling technique 
 Ability to accurately and compactly represent systems 
without requiring many simplifying assumptions (like 
linearization) 
 Incorporate existing domain knowledge (available data) 
 Intuitive to understand 
 Support forward and inverse decision-making 
 Allow incorporation and propagation of uncertainty in 
different variables pertinent to the system/application 
 Fast evaluation and modification/reconstruction  






 Graphical modeling using Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs)  
 Based on well-developed concepts of probability theory 
 Compact representation of the joint probability distribution 
of a group of random variables (discrete/continuous) 
 Explicit representation of probabilistic dependencies (nodes 
connected by directed links and characterized by 
conditional probability tables or CPTs) 
 Updated knowledge of values of different variables in the 
network based on a subset of observed/evidence values 
obtained via belief updating  
 Use of inferencing algorithms to update beliefs 
― Exact Inferencing  
e.g. Pearl‘s Belief Propagation Algorithm 
― Approximate Inferencing 




Chapter 3. Bayesian Network Model of Switched Reluctance Motor 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
As seen in Chapter 2, a Bayesian network can provide a unified framework for 
graphically modeling a system consisting of numerous parameters of interest with 
relative ease as well as for decision making (for operation, condition monitoring, 
maximum performance, etc.) in the presence of uncertain knowledge. In this chapter, the 
development of a Bayesian network to represent a system consisting of a switched 
reluctance motor, controller, loading brake and instrumented with multiple sensors is 
explored. The complete model is first presented in Section 3.2 and different segments of 
the model are explained in greater detail in the different subsections of Section 3.3. 
3.2. BACKGROUND 
A Switched Reluctance Motor (SRM) is a singly-excited motor with multiple 
phases consisting of salient stator and rotor 
poles. The motor has windings only on the 
stator while the rotor is built up from a stack 
of steel laminations with no windings or rare 
earth magnets. A stator phase consists of two 
series-connected windings on diametrically 
opposite poles. The different phases in a 
SRM may be considered as working 
independently with low mutual coupling 
between the phases. This simplification is 
often used to reduce the complexity of analysis in many aspects. The process of 
conversion of electromagnetic to mechanical energy can be analyzed in a single phase 
and a superposition of individual values (for each motor phase) of parameters of interest 
 











like torque, losses, etc. may be done in order to determine their total values1. When a pair 
of stator poles is energized (by current flowing through its phase winding), the pair of 
rotor poles closest to it is attracted towards it until the rotor comes to a configuration 
where the two poles are aligned. By switching the successive phases on and off in 
sequence (a process referred to as commutation), continuous rotation and torque 
production can be achieved in either direction. The use of SRMs as the choice of prime 
mover has been explored in many of the intelligent EMA designs developed at the UT-
RRG [Tesar, 2009][Ashok and Tesar, 2001] due to the many advantages it offers - 
brushless operation (low maintenance), good power density and lower losses compared to 
other motor types for specific sizes, better robustness and reliability, high efficiency over 
a significant range of operation, capability for high speed operation, potential for fault 
tolerance (due to electrically separate windings), simpler cooling requirements, etc. 
(Increased torque ripple, acoustic noise generation, need for complex control electronics 
are some of the commonly cited disadvantages for SRMs [Ramu, 2001]).  
The motor has also been widely studied by various researchers over the years 
from different perspectives covering both design and operational aspects [Gobbi, et. al., 
2007][Omekanda, 2003][Ramu, 2001], [Soares, et. al, 2001][Hatcher and Tesar, 2000], 
[Miller, T.J.E, 1993], etc. Such research has yielded powerful and comprehensive (but 
highly nonlinear2) mathematical models tailored to different aspects of motor design and 
control like maximizing torque production/efficiency, reducing acoustic noise generation, 
etc. However, most of these models are typically meant to investigate motor behavior in 
simulations. When implemented in real world systems, these individual models are used 
to address a specific objective and typically do not account for the interaction between 
the different physical phenomena that affect the motor performance (for instance, as 
demonstrated in [Ustun, 2009], [Beno, et. al, 2007], [Rahman, et. al, 2001] which explore 
the use of neural networks, fuzzy logic, etc. to model and control SRMs). Hence, they are 
                                                 
1 The work of [Kokernak and Torrey, 2000] however demonstrates the benefits that can be achieved by 
taking the mutual coupling into account. 
2 These nonlinear relations are often stored as look-up tables, for example, rotor position vs. torque/flux  
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not easily adaptable for direct use in overall system-level decision making or condition 
monitoring using the performance maps and envelopes based approach. In addition, the 
uncertainty in various parameters is not taken into account in these approaches. 
[Matveev, 2006] demonstrates a multi-disciplinary approach to model a SRM 
(from a design perspective) that takes into account various aspects like torque production, 
acoustic noise generation, drive efficiency, thermal considerations, etc. with detailed 
analyses and mathematical models for each of these aspects as well as the 
interconnections among them. The work presented in this chapter aims to follow a similar 
approach, taking into account the different facets mentioned above, to develop a 
comprehensive SRM model that is useful from the decision making (operational) point of 
view. Figure 3-2 shows the Bayesian network model of the test set-up used in this 
research3 (a detailed description and important specifications for the different 
components used is provided in Appendix B).  
The network structure is derived by combining different segments representing 
the different models available in literature using the Bayesian network framework. The 
control parameters (supply voltage, PWM duty cycle and frequency for each phase, phase 
status and turn-on/turn-off angles), the reference parameters (phase resistances, relative 
phase angles, brake load and ambient temperature), and the dependent parameters (phase 
currents, radial and tangential flux densities, torque, speed, acceleration, noise, losses, 
etc.) are also shown with their respective notations. Note that the network is causal and 
represents how the variables influence each other. This helps make the network intuitive 
to the end-user faced with having to make system-level decisions on how to manage the 
motor performance based on maps and decision surfaces. Correlating the different 
variables in this manner helps to retain and propagate the uncertainty information 
associated with each parameter. In addition, it also forms a basis to provide functional 
redundancy for all the variables involved. This is particularly valuable in providing 
                                                 
3 The sensor nodes and the links (shown in dotted lines) are not part of the actual network structure. They 
are shown only to illustrate the variables which can be directly measured or derived using information from 
the sensors available in the test set-up 
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alternative sources of information as well as in validating sensor readings. The following 
section describes the individual network segments in greater detail. 
 
   i  = 1, 2, 3, 4 = Number of motor phases   
Vs   = Supply Voltage (Line) 
DC = PWM Duty Cycle 
FR  = PWM Frequency 
Vi     = Phase Voltage 
 Ri    = Phase Resistance  
Θph = Rotor Angle Relative to Stator 
 PS = Phase Status (On/Off) 
Θoff  = Phase Turn-off Angle  
Θon  = Phase Turn-on Angle 
  I     = Phase current 
  Is   = Supply Current (Line) 
 BR  = Magnetic flux density, radial 
 BT  =  Magnetic flux density, tangential  
      τi  = Torque produced by a single phase 
      τ  = Total Electromagnetic Motor Torque  
      α  = Angular Acceleration of Rotor 
      ω = Angular Velocity of Rotor 
      θr = Rotor Position 
Load  = External Load Torque  
Noise = Acoustic Noise 
  Pin   = Input Electrical Power 
  Pout = Output Mechanical Power 
 Ploss = Total Power Losses 
    η  = Motor Efficiency 
 Tamb = Ambient Temperature 
Ploss = Total Power Loss 
    T  = Average Motor Temperature 





































































3.3. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
3.3.1. Influence of Control Parameters on Motor Phase Voltage 
  The 5V TTL Pulse 
Width Modulated (PWM) 
input signals from the motor 
controller are passed to the 
motor via an opto-isolator 
bank through the H-bridge 
amplifier circuit (see 
Appendix B for details). 
This input signal is used to 
pulse the supply voltage (0-
60VDC range) which results 
in the final voltage across 
the individual motor phases. 
The current drawn by each 
phase depends on this 
voltage. Thus the input 
PWM signals control the 
amount of power entering 
the system. A PWM signal 
is characterized by its duty 
cycle and its frequency (Figure 3-3). Duty cycle is the ratio of the “on” time of the pulse 
to the “off” time of the pulse. The frequency dictates how fast the switching of the signal 
occurs. If Vmax and Vmin are the maximum and minimum voltages across which the signal 
is pulsed with a duty cycle DC, then, the average voltage is:  
                             
Eq. (3-1) 
      
i = 1…n = Number of motor phases,  
DC= PWM Duty Cycle, 
FR= PWM Frequency, Vs= Supply Voltage 
Figure 3-3 : Relation between PWM Duty Cycle, PWM 
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[Ashok and Tesar, 2007] 
Figure 3-4: Effect of PWM Duty Cycle and Frequency on 





A low value for the duty cycle produces a low value of average voltage which in turn 
results in a lower current flowing through the motor phase and vice –versa. The higher 
the switching frequency, the smoother is the supplied voltage and smoother is the 
resulting current profile [Ashok and Tesar, 2007]. Figure 3-4 shows the effect of varying  
PWM duty cycle and frequency on the phase current profile. Thus, it can be seen that the 
motor phase voltage (amplitude and quality) depends on the duty cycle and frequency of 
the PWM input signals and the magnitude of the supply voltage (Vs)4. 
3.3.2. Relation between Phase Voltage, Phase Current and Phase Resistance 
The current drawn by a phase depends 
on the voltage applied across it, whether it is 
switched on/off based on its occurrence in the 
commutation sequence, its resistance, the 
mechanical rotor angle (relative to the stator) 
and the turn-on and turn-off angles for the 
phase as shown in Figure 3-5. The phase 
voltage is applied across the windings only 
when the particular phase is switched on or 
off during the commutation sequence. The 
equation governing the phase voltage across 
the stator windings (neglecting the nonlinear 
effects of saturation and mutual fluxes) relates 
it to the resistive voltage drop and the rate of 
the flux linkages and is expressed as follows 
[Ramu, 2001]: 
     
       
  












                                                 
4 Note that with the present test set-up (Appendix B), it is possible to control the DC and FR values 
individually for each motor phase to dictate motor performance in terms of lowering torque ripple or 
acoustic noise generation, but for simplicity, the same values are used for all phases during testing. 
 
i = 1…n = Number of motor phases,  
Vi = Phase Voltage, Ri = Phase Resistance,  
Θph = Rotor Angle Relative to Stator,  
PS= Phase Status (On/Off) 
Θoffi = Phase Turn-off Angle,  
Θoni  = Phase Turn-on Angle 
Ii = Phase Current 
Figure 3-5 : Effect of Various Control 
and Reference Parameters 








where V is the phase voltage, R is the phase resistance, I is the phase current,   is the flux 
linkage per phase, and θ is the rotor angle5.  
The relation between flux linkage and current is nonlinear due to magnetic 
saturation. It also depends on the rotor position since the salient rotor and stator poles 
cause a variation in inductance of a phase (L) as the rotor rotates wrt to the stator (i.e. 
          
 
Figure 3-6: Flux Linkage Curves 
The value of flux linkage is at its maximum when a rotor pole is completely aligned with 
a stator pole and is at a minimum when the rotor and stator poles are completely out of 
alignment (Figure 3-6). Assuming no mutual coupling between phases, the flux linkage 
can be represented as a set of curves of   vs. I with   as a parameter.  
           Eq.(3-3) 
From the above equations, the voltage is given by: 
              





    




where          is the motor speed. The three terms on the right hand side of Eq.(3-4) 
(which is, in essence, a simple nonlinear SRM model) represent the resistive voltage 
                                                 
5 Typically, θ is assumed to have a value of zero when the rotor and the stator poles just begin to align and 






















drop, the inductive voltage drop and the induced back emf respectively. When voltage is 
applied to the phase windings, the amplitude of the resulting current depends largely on 
the phase resistance. But the rate of rise or fall of current (dI/dt) depends on inductance as 
well as the back emf6. This, in turn, affects the torque produced. Typically the resistance 
does not vary much but in cases where the motor is pushed to its extreme performance 
limits, a change in the winding temperature (primarily due to I
2
R or iron losses in the 
stator windings) causes a variation in resistance as given by: 
                 Eq.(3-5) 
where    is the resistance at temperature T ,    is the resistance at temperature   ,   is 
the temperature coefficient of resistance. For the present work, this effect is not deemed 
to be significant and hence will not be included in the overall model. Thus, the influence 
of the phase voltage, phase resistance and the rotor angle on the phase current can be 
explained. The following paragraphs now explore the influence of the turn-on and turn-
off angles for the phase on the current. 
In a SRM, torque is produced by the tendency of the magnetic circuit to adopt a 
configuration where magnetic reluctance7 to the flow of flux is minimal or the inductance 
is maximum both of which happen when the air gap between a stator pole and a rotor 
pole is minimum. For a particular phase, the stator magnetic field pulls the rotor and 
causes it to move until it aligns with the excited stator pole. In Figure 3-7, La and Lu 
represent the phase inductance values when the poles are completely aligned and when 
they are not aligned. By synchronizing the excitation of each phase with the rotor 
position, a continuous rotation of the rotor and hence a continuous torque in the desired 
direction can be obtained. For optimum torque production, ideally each phase must be 
switched on during the commutation sequence when its inductance starts to increase, and 
then switched off when the inductance starts to decrease. The rotor mechanical angles at 
                                                 
6 This is similar to a typical R-L circuit with a resistor R and inductor L in series. With a constant voltage V 
applied to the circuit, the resulting current is given by                    , where t is the time.  
7 Reluctance in a magnetic circuit is analogous to resistance in an electrical circuit 
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which this switching happens are referred to as the ‗turn-on‘ (θon) and ‗turn-off‘ (θoff) 
angles respectively (Figure 3-7). 
From the instant that a phase is switched 
on at θon, it takes some time for the 
current to build up to its maximum 
value. Similarly when the phase is 
switched off at θoff, it takes some time 
for the current to fall to a zero value. 
This behavior is due to the inductance 
and the back emf in the circuit as 
mentioned earlier.  
The resultant torque profile 
follows the current profile. Useful 
torque is produced only in the region 
where the inductance gradient is 
positive. But if the rotor continues past 
the completely aligned position (due to 
inertia), the attractive force from the stator magnetic field acting on it produces a braking 
effect. This negative torque produces no useful work. This effect is manifested as torque 
ripple, since the net torque produced by the SRM is a combination of torques produced 
by all the phases. Torque ripple contributes to vibration which in turn creates acoustic 
noise [Miller, 2002]. To mitigate this undesirable effect, it is necessary to switch off the 
current to a phase at an appropriate time before the stator and rotor poles start aligning or 
separating
8
. For a desired torque, if the current required is Imax and tp is the time available 









                                                 
8 This procedure is referred to as ‗current profiling‘ in the literature.   
 
Figure 3-7: Inductance (idealized), Current 
and Torque profiles for a 






























When the motor speed increases, the time available tp decreases and it becomes 
difficult to regulate the current to its desired value. Thus, for optimum torque production, 
it is advantageous to switch on and switch off a phase in advance of θon and θoff 
respectively, so the current has sufficient time to build up the flux from zero to the 
desired value before the inductance starts rising as well as sufficient time to decay to 
prevent producing any negative torque. Since the speed of the motor influences the back 
emf (Eq.(3-4)), there are different modes of performing this switching to control the 
current, based on the motor speed as described in [Panda and Amaratunga, 1993], [Ramu, 
2001] and others.  
When the SRM operates at a fairly low speed, the back emf value is also 
somewhat small as compared to the supply voltage. So, the current rises quickly to its 
desired value Imax. In this elapsed time, the angular motion of the rotor is relatively small. 
Hence it is necessary to switch the supply voltage (and thus the current) on/off rapidly in 
succession to maintain it at a constant value before the rotor pole is completely aligned 
with the stator pole. This is referred to as the ‗chopping‘ mode of operation (Figure 3-8 
(a)). In this mode, both θon and θoff occur in advance of angles at which the stator and 
rotor poles are unaligned and fully aligned, respectively.  
 
   
(a) Chopping Mode (b) Single Chop Mode (c) Single Pulse Mode 
Figure 3-8: Phase Current Waveforms for Different Operating Modes 
The next mode of operation is when the operating speed is moderately high (~60-
80% of rated speed). The back emf is still not very significant [Panda and Amaratunga, 
1993]. θon is advanced further ahead with respect to the unaligned position (more than in 




































However, in the subsequent chop cycle, the rotor has already moved to a position of 
greater inductance since it is now more aligned with the stator pole. This results in a 
greater back emf which in turn causes the rate of rise of current to decrease. But the time 
for the current to rise to Imax is of the same order as the initial current rise time. Thus, 
there is only sufficient time for a single chop. This mode is therefore referred to as 
‗single-chop mode‘ (Figure 3-8 (b)).  
The third mode of operation known as the ‗single-pulse mode‘ (Figure 3-8 (c)) is 
applicable at high speeds (close to the rated motor speed). The back emf increases 
significantly, sometimes even exceeding the supply voltage. Since the rotor covers a 
greater angle in a given period, the inductance also increases rapidly. Both of these 
greatly diminish the rate of rise of the current and it is unable to reach a value of Imax. 
This in turn results in reduced torque output. In this mode, there is insufficient time for 
any chopping to take place and the motor operates with a single pulse of current in the 
phase winding. Thus, it is evident that in addition to factors like the phase voltage, the 
phase resistance and the rotor position, the values of θon and θoff for a motor phase also 
play a significant role in determining the current drawn by that phase.  
3.3.3. Relation between Current and Flux Densities 
Often the standard equations that are used in the process of designing or 
controlling SRMs do not provide significant information on the radial and tangential 
force components in the air gap [Zhu et al., 2005]. An improved understanding of these 
force characteristics is however, crucial due to their influence on the overall torque and 
vibration characteristics of the motor. This section will examine the influence of the 
phase currents on the radial and the tangential flux density in the air gap between the 
stator and the rotor of the SRM. Figure 3-10 illustrates the general operating principle for 
one phase of the motor. When the stator windings are energized, it attracts the rotor pole 
nearest to it until the two are aligned. This attracting force    can be resolved into two 
components. The tangential component     is primarily responsible for producing 
electromagnetic torque on the rotor. The radial component     can be considered parasitic 
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in the sense that it contributes to the radial vibration of the stator poles by creating a 
deformation of the stator. This, in turn is the major contributor to acoustic noise in SRM 




i = 1….n= Number of motor phases, 
Ii= Phase Current 
BR= Magnetic Flux Density, radial 
BT =  Magnetic Flux Density, tangential 
 
Figure 3-9: Relation between Current and Flux 
Densities 
 
Figure 3-10 : SRM Principle 
One of the methods used to numerically relate these two force components and their 
corresponding magnetic field components is the Maxwell Stress Tensor Method [Toth 
and Szabo, 2001][Benhama et. al., 1999]. This method requires the body under 
consideration to be located in the air or in a material with permeability     . The 
Maxwell stress tensor is defined as [Toth and Szabo, 2001]: 
                
 
 
       
Eq.(3-7) 
where    is the unit vector normal to the surface. As described by [Toth and Szabo, 2001], 
the electromagnetic force (            is a combination of the Laplace force (   ) and the 
magnetic force (   ) and the electromagnetic impulse theorem provides the equivalence 
between            and the surface integration of    : 
                         
 
 
        
  
                  
 







where    is the current density9,     is the total magnetic flux density (    is the result of the 
interaction between    and    ),     is the magnetic field intensity,   is the permeability of 
iron (via the B-H curve), and S is the surface enclosing the body under the force.  
The total magnetic flux density can be resolved into two orthogonal components:  
Bn normal to the surface S and Bt tangential to the boundary S. Thus, the flux density 
vector can be expressed as     = Bn.    +Bt.  , where   and    are unit vectors in the 
tangential and normal directions respectively. If the total field acting on the body is 
known, then     (called    henceforth) can be determined using the above equations as 
follows [Toth and Szabo, 2001] [Benhama, 1999]: 
      
 
  
        
 
     
 
   
   
    
  
 
       
Eq.(3-9) 
where     is the permeability of free space and L is the length of the body normal to the 
surface S. Considering radial (normal) and tangential directions with respect to the motor 
poles, the above equation can be re-written as: 
      
 
  
        
 
     
 
   
   
    
  
 
      
Eq.(3-10) 
The terms in the above equation represent the radial and tangential force densities, 
       and        respectively as described in [Edrington et.al, 2003], where: 
       
 
   
    
    
  
 
     
 Eq.(3-11) 
       
 
  
         
 
   
Eq.(3-12) 
Thus, from the above equations, it is clear that an understanding of the air gap 
flux density is crucial for optimizing not only the design but also the operation of a SRM, 
since, as described earlier; these force components determine the production of torque 
and acoustic noise.  
                                                 
9 For a conductor with cross section area ac carrying current I, the current density J is defined as J = I / ac 
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Ideally, the flux density should be measured in real-time during the motor 
operation by using magnetic field sensors. The ideal location to obtain the magnetic flux 
density readings is in the air gap between the rotor and stator which is the area of the 
maximum flux density. However, the issue with such an arrangement is that the air gap 
dimensions are usually kept very small to maximize torque capability [Ramu, 2001] 
[Ashok and Tesar, 2002]. The sensor size must be suitable for integration in such tight 
spaces and should not mechanically interfere with the rotor rotation. The sensor should 
also not affect the existing flux density distribution with its presence. Although there are 
sensors available which satisfy these constraints (for example, miniature transverse Hall-
generators from Lakeshore Cryotronics [Yoo and Tesar, 2004]), unless their inclusion is 
accounted for in the design phase of the motor, it is often difficult to accommodate them 
after the motor has been manufactured without significantly affecting the motor 
performance characteristics. Hence, the flux distribution is often obtained analytically or 
numerically via finite element techniques with the knowledge of other variables.  
The analytical methods rely on the calculation of the aligned and unaligned 
magnetization curves and the use of special numerical functions to represent the 
magnetization curves (flux linkage versus position with current as a parameter) as 
discussed in [Matveev, 2006] [Miller and McGilp, 1993], etc. Although they are faster 
for simulation in many cases, the initial problem set-up procedure is often laborious 
[Deihimi et. al. 2002] and requires interpolation to calculate the individual magnetization 
curves between the aligned and unaligned positions10. They also do not provide much 
information on the distribution of the radial and tangential components of the flux 
[Edrington, 2003] [Parreira et. al., 2005]. In finite element analysis (FEA), the problem 
domain is discretized into small elements and numerical techniques are used to obtain 
approximate solutions to boundary-value problems. It is well suited for problems with 
complex magnetic circuits, nonlinear material properties, etc. and hence has acquired 
                                                 
10 Analytical models used for an SRM are typically based only on the voltage equation (     
       
  
) 
and the torque equation (  
   
  
 i=const where W‘ is the co-energy) and do not take into account the 
magnetic and electric coupling of the motor phases [Matveev, et. al., 2003]. 
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wide acceptance in modeling/analysis of SRMs where modeling issues arise primarily 
due to the double salient structure and magnetic saturation effects that occur in the 
partially aligned stator–rotor poles [Mizia et. al, 1988][Ramu, 2001][Miller, 2002][Lin, 
et. al. 1996][Omekanda,et. al., 1996]. [Matveev, 2006] demonstrates with example 
calculations of the static magnetization and torque curves for different SRMs, using both 
the analytical and FEA procedures (2-D), that the analytical results are less accurate and 
reliable than those obtained by FEA when the end-effects are not taken into account.  
The underlying principle of FEA for electromagnetic systems is minimization of 
the energy functional F, the difference between input and the stored energy [Matveev, 
2006] 
            
 
 





   
Eq.(3-13) 
where,    is the magnetic vector potential. The two classical FEA methods to formulate 
this problem are the Ritz variation method and the Galerkin method [Matveev, 2006]. 
Once the problem is formulated, the subsequent step involves solving a system of 
equations. Most commercially available FEA software (e.g. ANSYS) use Maxwell‘s 
differential equations as the basis for simulating and analyzing electromagnetic fields. 
The subset of Maxwell‘s equations relevant to the present discussion are the Maxwell-
Ampere‘s law, Faraday‘s law and Gauss‘s law for magnetism, as listed below. 
         




       




        Eq.(3-16) 
where     is the electric flux density vector and      is the electric field intensity vector. 
 Ideally any FEA should be done in three dimensions to represent the complete 
geometry of the electromagnetic structure being analyzed. But such models are more 
complex to generate than 2D models. Hence, most FEA involves 2D analysis by making 
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some assumptions to arrive at a reliable model as described in [Ji, et. al., 2005]. The 
magnetic field distribution is assumed to be constant along the motor axis. The stator and 
rotor materials are assumed to be isotropic and hysteresis effects are neglected. The outer 
periphery of the stator is considered the zero magnetic vector potential line due to the 
negligible field outside the stator. The currents induced in the stator and rotor iron are 
neglected due to the high resistance of the steel laminations to the eddy currents along the 
motor axis.  [Matveev, 2006] demonstrates that the magnetic parameters of a SRM can be 
derived using such 2D analysis and then corrected for end-effects analytically without 
significant loss of accuracy.  With these assumptions, the above equations now become:  
          ,          and          
A solution for these equations can be obtained using potential functions. Based on factors 
like field dimensionality, dynamics, domain size, discretization, etc. the available choices 
are the magnetic vector and scalar potentials [Matveev, 2006]. As magnetostatic fields are 
non-conservative, a scalar potential is unsuitable. Using a magnetic vector potential   , 
the magnetic field can be obtained by derivatives. For any vector   ,  
            Eq.(3-17) 
                      Eq.(3-18) 
To completely and uniquely specify   , it is necessary to specify its curl and its 
divergence (Helmholtz theorem). This can be done by using the Coulomb gauge equation 
for magnetic vector potential [Stiles, 2007] 
       Eq.(3-19) 
               Eq.(3-20) 
                Eq.(3-21) 
By definition,                  where   is the magnetic permeability of the iron,    is 
the absolute permeability,    is the relative permeability. Thus,  
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Eq.(3-22) 
          Eq.(3-23) 
Considering the 2D (planar) static magnetic analysis, the components Ax and Ay of 
   are not applicable. The only relevant component of current density    is Jz (or J, 













    
  
  
     
Eq.(3-24) 
The above equation is referred to as the Poisson‘s equation for the planar case 
with a perpendicular current carrying conductor and can be solved using the Dirichlet and 
Neuman boundary conditions for the magnetic vector potential [Matveev, 2006]. The two 
components of the flux density in the above case are defined as: 
   
  
  






Radial Magnetic Field  Tangential Magnetic Field  
Rotor Position Unaligned To Aligned, i=30A 
[Edrington et. al., 2003] 
Figure 3-11: Variation of Radial and Tangential Components of Magnetic Flux Density  
The combined effect of all such components, taken at each rotor position and over 
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respectively. From the above equations, it can be concluded that the current density in the 
phase coils directly influences the magnetic vector potential, the gradients of which, in 
turn, determine the radial and the tangential components of the magnetic flux density. 
Figure 3-11 shows a typical variation of the field components in the air gap of a 8/6 SRM 
for a current of 30A as the rotor moves into alignment with the stator pole from a 
completely unaligned position [Edrington, et. al. 2003]. 
3.3.4. Relation between Flux Density, Speed and Acoustic Noise 
The sources of acoustic noise in a SRM can be broadly categorized into 
mechanical, aerodynamic, electronic and magnetic sources. [Vijayaraghavan and 
Krishnan, 1999] and [Pillay and Cai, 1999] provide in-depth analyses of these sources of 
noise as well as control techniques that can be used to mitigate the generation of 
excessive noise. The mechanical sources include factors like the coupling between the 
motor and its load, the mounting method used for the motor, noise arising from the motor 
bearings (due to the bearing type, installation, etc.), rotor imbalance, etc. A non-uniform 
air gap between the rotor and stator due to manufacturing inaccuracies or non-isotropic 
rotor and stator materials result in the creation of uneven magnetic flux. This, in turn, 
creates asymmetric forces on the both the 
rotor and stator producing vibrations that 
are manifested as acoustic noise. The 
aerodynamic sources of noise primarily 
arise from windage effects. The doubly 
salient structure of a SRM causes the rotor 
poles to act as blades as they rotate in the 
air, causing acoustic noise. This category 
also includes noise arising from the 
motor‘s cooling fans. The electronic 
sources of noise arise primarily from the 
motor‘s drive system. SRMs are inherently prone to produce more noise than smooth air-
 
i = 1….n = Number of motor phases, 
BR= Magnetic Flux Density, radial 
ω = Motor Speed, N= Acoustic Noise 
Figure 3-12 : Relation between Radial Flux 







gap machines due to the fact they are operated with pulsed excitation [Vijayaraghavan 
and Krishnan, 1999]. The main factors that contribute towards this are the presence of 
harmonics in the applied voltage and current. The currents through the stator windings 
interact with the local magnetic field to produce forces on the windings, which can create 
winding vibrations. The vibrations induced are typically of higher amplitudes at higher 
currents or when the poles are close to alignment, or when the rate of change of current is 
high [Vijayaraghavan and Krishnan, 1999].  
As seen earlier, torque in a SRM is produced due to the attractive force between 
an excited stator phase and the rotor created by the magnetic field. This force contains a 
radial component in addition to the tangential component that produces useful torque. 
The magnetic sources of noise in the SRM are primarily due to these radial forces. A 
variation in the flux density as the rotor aligns with the stator poles, results in a variation 
in the corresponding radial force on the stator. This induces deformations of the stator 
lamination stack. The torque ripple11 in the torque profile of a SRM (produced as a result 
of commonly used commutation/control strategies and drive electronics) can be directly 
correlated with the tangential magnetic 
force acting on the motor poles. To a lesser 
extent, this also contributes to stator 
vibrations. The stiffer rotor is not deformed 
as much and its reaction to most forces is 
small [Wu and Pollock, 1999]. If a certain 
radial force frequency coincides with the 
natural frequency of the stator stack, then 
resonant vibrations occur [Colby et. al., 
1995], manifested in various mode shapes.  
The natural frequencies of these 
mode shapes depend on the motor 
geometry and its material properties. The circumferential modes of vibration are more 
                                                 
11 The torque ripple can be defined as Tripple = |(Tmax-Tmin)/Tavg|  [Wichert, 2008].  Tmax,Tmin,Tavg are the 
maximum, minimum and average value of the motor torque 
m=mode number 
[Anwar and Hussain, 2000] 




dominant in their contribution to acoustic noise than the longitudinal ones [Anwar and 
Hussain, 2000]. For airborne noise, the significant modes of vibrations for small 
machines are 1-4. [Colby et. al., 1995] demonstrate that the intensity of acoustic noise is 
most when the second order circumferential mode (m=2) is excited.  [Anwar and 
Hussain, 2000] provide an analytical expression for the amplitude of dynamic 
circumferential deflection for modes >= 2 as:  
        
            






     















where,        is the amplitude of dynamic deflection,     is the amplitude of the radial 
force wave (radial force/unit operating area),      is the excitation frequency, m is the 
circumferential mode number,    is the mode frequency,    is the mean radius of the 
stator yoke,    is the stator pole height, and   is the logarithmic decrement (     
              ). The magnitude of acoustic noise depends on the extent of Dcircum. The 
sound power radiated by the motor is then given as [Anwar and Hussain, 2000]:   
               
      
         
            Eq.(3-27) 
where P is the sound power radiated,      is the relative sound intensity = k
2
 / (1+ k
2
) , k  
is the wave number = (2.  .     .     )/c, c is the speed of sound in the medium,   is the 
density of the medium,      is the outer radius of the stator, and      is the stator stack 
length. Assuming a reference sound power level Pref of 10
-12
 watt (the threshold of human 
hearing), the acoustic noise power in decibels is given by [Anwar and Hussain, 2000]: 
           
   
    
  
Eq.(3-28) 
For analyzing vibrations, a SRM can be represented as a linear superposition of 
multiple single degree of freedom (dof) viscously damped spring-mass systems, although 
it is a multi-dof system [Cai et. al., 2001]. The stator vibration can be expressed as 
[Michaelides and Pollock, 1999]: 
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Eq.(3-29) 
where Fr is the radial force, m is the equivalent mass, x is the stator displacement, b is the 




   
   
     
  
  
   
   
Eq.(3-30) 
where   
 
    




Typically, the structural vibrations are measured using accelerometers. If a is the 
acceleration corresponding to the displacement x, then differentiating the above equation 
twice and simplifying [Michaelides and Pollock, 1999],  
 
 
    
   
 
   
   
     
  
  
   
   
Eq.(3-31) 
From Eq.(3-31), it can be seen that the second derivative of the radial force Fr drives the 
stator acceleration and thus it is important to understand the factors influencing it 
[Michaelides and Pollock, 1999].  
The radial force may be calculated using FEA. Analytically, the static radial force 
characteristics maybe determined using energy based methods as described in [Ramu, 
2001] or alternatively, by the Maxwell stress tensor. From  Eq.(3-11), it can be seen that  
 
[Michaelides and Pollock, 1999] 
 
[Cai, et. al., 2001] 
Figure 3-14: Variation of Radial Force in 
a SRM  
Figure 3-15: SRM Vibration Acceleration  
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Fr depends on both the tangential as well as 
the radial components of the magnetic flux 
density. The equation also provides a 
method to estimate the value of Fr 
analytically. By selecting an appropriate 
integration path around the individual 
motor poles and assuming that flux paths 
can be approximated as being purely radial 
across the air gap, [Garrigan, et. al., 1999] 
illustrate this with a simple example. The contour selected for stress calculation is such 
that the flux lines are either orthogonal or parallel to the contour. This yields forces only 
normal to the contour and are given by simplifying  Eq.(3-11) [Garrigan, et. al., 1999]: 
For orthogonal field lines:    
 
   
    
  
 
      Eq.(3-32) 
For parallel field lines:    
 
   
     
  
 
      Eq.(3-33) 
If Lstack is the stack or the iron length along the motor axis, Bm is the main air gap 
magnetic field (primarily along the radial direction when the poles begin to align) and Bf1 
and Bf2 are the first and second fringing fields, then using the above equations, for the 
contour shown in Figure 3-16, Fr can be calculated as follows [Garrigan, et. al., 1999]: 
   
      
   
















    
 
      
   
    
       
              
      
  
     
   
 
Eq.(3-34) 
Thus, the radial force can be considered to be equivalent to integrating the radial flux 
density Br over the surface area of the air gap [Garrigan, et. al., 1999]12, since all the 
                                                 
12 This is only an approximation since Bt also influences Fr but not as much as Br 
 
[Garrigan, et. al, 1999] 
Figure 3-16: Using Maxwell‘ Stress 




other parameters in the above equation are fixed by the motor geometry or are constants. 
The net force is obtained by combining all such forces vectorially. 
3.3.5. Relation between Flux Density and Torque 
  As seen in the earlier sections, all the major electromagnetic parameters for a 
SRM like the phase inductance, current drawn by a phase, flux density, etc. vary 
continuously with the rotor position due to the 
doubly salient geometry of the motor. The phase 
current influences the overall air gap magnetic field 
and the tangential component of the force produced 
by this field creates the useful motor torque. Thus 
the torque produced by the motor also continuously 
varies as the rotor poles move from the unaligned to 
the aligned position with respect to the stator poles. 
The two popular methods to determine the SRM 
static torque are by using the Maxwell stress tensor 
or via the virtual work principle. Using the 2-D 
Maxwell stress tensor formulation as described 








where Lstack is the stack length of the iron core,   is the closed contour around the stator, 
and r is the radius of the cylindrical surface in the mid air gap around which the 





       
           
 




i = 1….n = Number of motor phases, 
BR= Magnetic Flux Density, radial 
BT =  Magnetic Flux Density, tangential 
τi  = Torque produced by a single phase 
Figure 3-17: Relation between 






where m are the discrete position values at which the magnetic field is measured 
[McCann, et.al, 2008]. The above expression clearly shows the influence of the product 
of the two flux densities on the motor torque.  
[Moallem, et. al, 1992] demonstrate that the radial component of the flux density 
is dominant at most of the overlapping positions between the rotor and the stator poles. 
The tangential component, on the other hand, does not have a very significant effect 
except around the pole tips of the excited stator pole and the nearest rotor poles. The 
authors also investigate the extent that certain rotor pole profiles have in shaping the 
tangential flux on the distribution on the pole face and their impact on the torque 
produced and conclude that decreasing the air gap length will result in an increase in the 
magnitude of Br and slanting or serrating the rotor pole phase influences the profile of Bt, 
both of which in turn significantly affect the average torque. Thus, due to such close 
coupling between the two components of the flux density, it is more beneficial to 
examine the effect of overall air gap flux density on the torque. [Garrigan et. al, 1999] 
again provide a simple expression to approximately determine the torque based on a 
judicious choice of integration contour (Figure 3-16): 
  
       
   
      




          
    
   
 
Eq.(3-37) 
where     represents the air-gap length. The above expression is based on determining the 
value of Bm using the Maxwell‘s stress tensor 
formulation.  
However, the more commonly adopted 
method to determine the torque is based on the 
virtual work principle since the variables that 
influence the torque equation are obtainable with 
relative ease (measured by sensors or determined 
analytically with a high degree of accuracy). The 
SRM magnetization curves form the basis for 
torque calculations using this method. In this approach, torque is calculated by evaluating 
 










the rate of change of co-energy (defined as the complement of the energy stored in the air 
gap field [Ramu, 2001]) with respect to the rotor angular displacement. The area above 
the magnetization curve represents the stored energy (  ) and that below the curve 
represents the co-energy (  ) (Figure 3-18). The energy balance can thus be given by:  
         Eq.(3-38) 
Multiplying Eq.(3-2) by current I and simplifying, 
             
  
  
    
  
  
   
Eq.(3-39) 
The product term on the left hand side of the above equation is the rate of change 
in the supplied electrical input energy (WS). The terms on the right hand side represent the 
rate of energy dissipated as copper losses (WL), the change in the energy stored in the 
magnetic field (WF) and the change in the energy converted to mechanical work (WM) 
[Wichert, 2008]. The difference between the input and the dissipated energy is given by  
                     
  
  
    
  
  
   
Eq.(3-40) 
Due to the double saliency of the SRM, the incremental energy stored in the field 
is a function of both the rotor position   and current I, i.e.   = f (I,   ) [Wichert, 2008].   
    
   
  
   
   
  
   
Eq.(3-41) 




   
  




   
  
    
Eq.(3-42) 
The energy stored in the air gap field for a given rotor position (Figure 3-18) is given by 
     
 
 
        
 
 
   
Eq.(3-43) 
Taking a partial derivative w.r.t I, 
















   
  
    
The rate of change of mechanical work can be expressed in terms of the torque produced 
by each phase and the differential change in the rotor position as: 
          Eq.(3-45) 








From Eq.(3-38), for a constant value of I, partially differentiating wrt   
   
  
 







Thus, the instantaneous torque produced by each phase is given by: 
     
   
  
 
       
 
Eq.(3-48) 
The total instantaneous motor torque is the sum of the torques produced by each phase: 
          
            
   
 
Eq.(3-49) 
A continuous torque is obtained by sequentially switching the different motor 
phases in order (the unequal number of stator and rotor poles in a SRM ensures that at 
every instant, there is at least one pair of unaligned poles which can be energized to 
create a rotation as shown in Figure 3-10).  In order to obtain sufficient accuracy for real-
time applications (due to the presence of the derivative, the estimates may be fluctuating), 
torque is often computed over a time period as an average value [McCann, et al 2008]: 
     
 
 
      
 
 
   
Eq.(3-50) 
Thus, the torque can be determined from the co-energy for a given current value. 
[Ramu, 2001] provides a method to determine the value of co-energy. Assuming 
the iron to be infinitely permeable, the only reluctance in the circuit is provided by the air 
gap between the stator and the rotor. The total air gap flux density B can be expressed 
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purely as a function of the pole angle of overlap between the stator and the rotor i.e. θ, 






        





where   is the flux, N is the number of turns in the phase coil ( =N ), H is the magnetic 
field strength, Lstack is the iron length (along the motor axis), r is the rotor radius, and    
is the permeability of air. Re-arranging, the flux-linkage is given by: 
  




The co-energy Wc is then calculated as: 
     
 
 
   
  
 
      




   








Differentiating partially wrt to    for a constant current I, 
    
  
 




   




          
  
     
Eq.(3-54) 
The above expression is similar to the one proposed by [Garrigan et. al, 1999]. 
Thus it can be seen that, given the geometrical parameters of the motor, the torque 
produced by any of the motor phases is primarily determined by the magnitude of the 
magnetic flux density in the air gap. 
3.3.6. Relation between Motor Torque, Acceleration, Speed and Position 
The torque generated by the motor magnetic field acts against the friction in the 
system (arising from bearings, seals, etc.) and any external load acting on the motor 
shaft13 in order to propel the rotor inertia. The resultant acceleration, speed and position 
of the motor shaft are thus a direct outcome of the torque generation mechanism. The 
                                                 
13 In the present case, the load is determined by a hysteresis brake attached to the motor.  When the motor 
is coupled to a geartrain, the gear ratio dictates the load reflected back to the motor. Also, only viscous 
friction will be considered in the present case. The method proposed in [Gobbi, et. al., 2007] may be 
adopted to include the Coulomb friction effects in the dynamic model for the SRM.  
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dynamic behavior of the SRM can be represented 
using standard equations of motion as follows: 
where θr is the rotor position, ω represents the 
rotor angular velocity, α is the angular 
acceleration, J is the combined inertia of the 
rotor and the load, A is the coefficient of viscous 
damping, τe is the total electromagnetic torque produced by all the motor phases 
combined and τL is the external load torque acting on the motor shaft.  
3.3.7. Power Conversion and Efficiency of a SRM   
 
 
Figure 3-20: Power Losses in a SRM 
 
τ  = Total Electromagnetic Motor Torque  
α = Angular Acceleration of Rotor 
ω = Angular Velocity of Rotor 
θr = Rotor Position 
Load = External Load Torque 
Figure 3-19: SRM Dynamics 
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In any motor, ideally, all the electrical input power (Pelec = VI) would be converted 
completely into useful output mechanical power (Pmech = τω). However, in a real system, 
different types of internal losses, both electrical and mechanical, occur during the process 
of this energy conversion and affect the overall motor efficiency14. To alleviate the 
effects of such losses, there is a need for a better understanding of the factors causing 
them. These include design choices like the type of steel laminations used in the motor 
construction [Hasegawa et al., 2002], winding configurations, etc. as well as operational 
factors like speed, the PWM parameters, etc [Ashok and Tesar, 2002].  The typical losses 
in a SRM are as follows: 
Electrical losses: This category includes two main types of losses, namely copper or 
Ohmic losses and iron or core losses. Copper losses are the consequence of the resistance 
of the motor phase windings to the current flow and are given by [Miller,1993]: 
      
     Eq.(3-58) 
where n represents the number of motor phases, I is the rms value of the phase current, 
and Rph is the resistance per phase (assumed to be approximately the same for all the 
motor phases). The phase resistance is affected by a number of factors like temperature, 
skin effect (uneven flow of current across the cross section of a conductor), proximity 
effect (caused by the interaction of magnetic fields in adjacent conductors), etc., all of 
which eventually influence the current density and usually have an adverse effect on the 
copper losses [Ashok and Tesar, 2002].  
 The losses may be particularly highly at high excitation levels when the motor is 
being pushed to its limits and draws high currents. In order to estimate the magnitude of 
these losses accurately, the exact current profile needs to be known but this is often 
complicated given the non-sinusoidal nature of the current in a SRM and its dependence 
on the motor speed and the switching strategy being implemented. [Materu and Krishnan, 
1992] suggest using an approximation that assumes an ideal current waveform with zero 
                                                 
14 To accurately determine the overall system efficiency, it is also essential to account for additional losses 
that may exist in the motor power supply, conduction and switching losses in the motor controller, the gear 
train efficiency (when the motor and the geartrain are integrated in an EMA), etc.  
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rise time and a flat peak value of Ip to estimate the rms value of the phase current as 
       , which in turn can be used to estimate the value of copper losses. 
The other major component of the electrical losses are known as core losses 
which occur due to currents induced in the ferromagnetic motor material as well as due to 
the characteristic response of the material to applied magnetic fields. These two 
constituents are referred to as the eddy current loss and hysteresis loss respectively. 
Under a time varying magnetic field, a voltage is induced in ferromagnetic cores (the 
stator iron stack in case of SRMs), causing eddy currents which flow in closed paths. The 
direction of flow of these currents is such that it opposes the rate of change of flux that 
would be caused by the voltage source15. Hysteresis losses represent the rate of change of 
the energy used to affect magnetic domain wall motion as the domain grows and rotates 
under the influence of an externally applied magnetic field [Raulin, et. al., 2004]. These 
losses hamper the rapid buildup of flux in the motor air gap which affects the speed of 
response. They are independent of the motor load but depend on the switching frequency 
of the applied voltage. [Miller, 1993] states that although the magnitude of total core 
losses in SRMs is relatively low as compared to other motor types, they are dominant at 
higher speeds relative to the other losses. The two components of the core losses can be 
determined using the Steinmetz equation described in [Miller, 1993] as follows: 
              
     
         
        Eq.(3-59) 
where PFe represents the total core losses, Pec represents the eddy current losses, Ph 
represents the hysteresis losses, Ce and Ch are the Steinmetz coefficients for the eddy-
current and hysteresis losses respectively, Bmax is the peak magnetic flux density, f is the 
switching frequency and a, b are constants  for the material of the electromagnetic core 
(usually derived experimentally). A limitation of this approach is that the use of the 
Steinmetz equation requires the flux waveforms to be sinusoidal, which is not the case in 
SRMs. [Miller, 1993] suggests a modification of the eddy-current term in the above 
equation in order to account for the non-sinusoidal flux waveforms as: 
                                                 
15 The stator of the SRM is built up with laminations to reduce the effect of eddy currents. 
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Mechanical Losses: Mechanical losses are a significant component of the total losses in 
a SRM. The two types of losses included in this category are friction losses and windage 
losses. Friction losses may be either Coulomb losses (e.g. in shaft seals) or viscous 
friction losses, primarily occurring in the motor bearings, due to the effect of motor 
operating speed on lubrication and material damping characteristics. [Dabala, 2001] 
provides an approximation for friction losses (in W, for a single bearing) as: 
     
       
   
     
Eq.(3-61) 
where F is the radial force (in N) on the bearing,   is the perimeter speed on the bearing 
race surface (m/s) and dbe is the average diameter of the roller elements (m). [Dabala, 
2001] also provides an expression to calculate the losses due to the motor seals as:  
                 
    Eq.(3-62) 
where   is the coefficient of friction,  F is the force between the seal and the end-shield, n 
is the rotational speed of the motor, and ds is the average seal diameter. 
Windage losses result from the aerodynamic effects caused by salient rotor 
geometry churning the surrounding fluid (air) as it spins. If a cooling fan is used, it also 
adds to these losses marginally. Evidently, windage losses are highly dependent on the 
operating speed. Although many researchers have attempted to provide analytical 
formulations to calculate these losses, the most reliable way to estimate these losses is via 
experiments. [Raulin, et. al., 2004] provide a general expression for friction and windage 
loss as: 
           
  Eq.(3-63) 
where aw is a windage coefficient, Vair is the volume of air in the motor assuming that the 
stator is full, ω is the motor operating speed and q is a curve-fitting parameter.  
[Gieras, 1999] provides an approximation to calculate the windage loss (by 
assuming a cylindrical rotor) as: 
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Eq.(3-64) 
 where C is the friction coefficient, ρ is density of the cooling gas, Ω= 2 n is the angular 
velocity of the rotor, Drotor is the rotor outer diameter and w is the axial length of the 
rotor. The friction coefficient is influenced by the turbulence in the air gap flow as well 
as the surface quality of the rotor and stator. [Gieras, 1999] states that for surface speeds 
< 200 m/s, the coefficient can be estimated as: 
  
      
  
               




where Re is the Reynold‟s number , μ is the dynamic viscosity of the cooling gas (air or 
helium), and g is the air gap length.  
 The contribution of each of these to the total losses is different at different motor 
operating speeds. Typically, the electrical losses dominate at lower to moderate speeds 
(copper losses tend to dominate at the lower end of the range and core losses at higher 
speeds) whereas at very high speeds, 
mechanical losses dominate. Other operating 
factors also influence the composition of 
losses. [Materu and Krishnan, 1992] provide a 
comprehensive analysis for an estimation of 
SRM losses under all conditions including 
using effects of stator current waveforms, 
conduction angle, speed, saturation, etc. 
[Hasegawa et. al, 2002] demonstrate that 
optimizing the applied voltage decreases 
copper losses but results in an increased value 
of iron losses. By judiciously varying the 
various control parameters (e.g. based on 
performance maps as described in [Tesar, et. al. 2005]) for the SRM like the phase turn-
on and turn-off angles, the supply voltage, the duty cycle and frequency of the applied 
 
Pin = Input Electrical Power 
Pout = Output Mechanical Power 
Ploss = Total Power Losses 
η = Motor Efficiency 
Figure 3-21: Relation between Input 
Power, Output Power, 





PWM signal, etc., based on the prevalent operating conditions, it is possible to minimize 
these different losses. Depending on the sensors used in an application, the efficiency of 
the SRM can be estimated in realtime by determining each of the different types of losses 
described above. Alternatively, with just the knowledge of the input electrical power and 
the output mechanical (shaft) power, the overall efficiency of the SRM can be calculated 
as: 
  
    
   
 
         
   
 
    
          
 
     
     
 
Eq.(3-66) 
where       represents the sum of all the losses described above (Figure 3-21). 
3.3.8. Relation between Power Loss and Motor Temperature 
Usually the focus is on the electromagnetic and mechanical aspects of the motor 
during the design phase as well as during operation. Due to its complex and nonlinear 
nature, thermal analysis for such systems is often not given due importance. The different 
types of losses that occur during the 
conversion of electrical input energy to 
mechanical output power as described 
earlier are primarily dissipated in the 
form of heat, which leads to an increase 
in the motor temperature. The heat 
generated is typically not concentrated 
and is unevenly distributed across the 
different motor components like the 
bearings, the windings, the stator iron, 
the rotor etc. The knowledge of this 
distribution can help provide guidance on the cooling method to be used, the values of 
current, frequency that can be used for operation, etc [Miller, 1993]. In order to determine 
the temperature rise of the different motor components, the common approach is to create 
 
Tamb = Ambient Temperature 
Ploss= Total Power Loss 
T= Average Motor Temperature 
Figure 3-22:  Relation between Power Losses 






a thermal equivalent circuit for analysis using lumped parameters [Miller, 
1993][Rouhani, et. al, 2007] or via FEA [Wu, et. al., 2003][Inamura et. al., 2003].  
An increase in the motor temperature not only affects the motor efficiency 
adversely but may also result in an overall degradation in the motor performance. 
[Balamurugan et. al, 2004] state that the influence of increased temperature on the 
electromagnetic characteristics of a SRM is not significant under light operating 
conditions (because of the time constants of thermal phenomena are orders of magnitude 
different from those of electrical or magnetic phenomena) but may be crucial when the 
motor is operating under high loads since the temperature rise under such conditions may 
be significant enough to influence these characteristics.  Although there is no danger of 
demagnetization of magnets at high temperatures as in the case of brushless DC motors, 
high temperatures are still a concern in SRMs since it can affect the winding insulation, 
the bearing lubrication characteristics, and could potentially cause a complete motor 
failure.  
For a constant current, the copper losses can increase significantly with an 
increase in the temperature since the winding resistance increases [Miller, 1993]. 
[Lunifeld and Tesar, 1995] show that motor temperatures can vary from 25
o
C to greater 
than 150
o
C in EMAs under different operating conditions. With such drastic changes in 
temperature, the increase in resistance may be as much as 20% for a 50
o
 C rise (and 53% 
for a 135
o
C rise) in temperature in case of copper windings, causing a corresponding 
increase in the copper losses, thus setting up a vicious cycle [Miller, 1993]. [Brancato, 
1992] states that the thermal life of an insulation system (rated for a given temperature) is 
halved for every 10
o
C increase in temperature. Typically motors use grease lubricated 
bearings instead of oil lubrication, where the oil is fed by an active lubrication system. 
Increased temperatures may reduce the lubricant viscosity in bearings making it more 
difficult for a lubricant film to be formed on the rolling surfaces of the bearing, which in 
turn leads to higher friction and a further rise in temperatures. Higher bearing 
temperatures may lead to a reduction in the operational clearance in the bearings due to 
thermal expansion and may ultimately result in bearing seizure. Analysis by [Kang and 
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Tesar, 2004] shows that the bearing load vs. deflection characteristics are also 
significantly influenced by temperature changes.  
The magnitude of rise in temperature depends on how effectively the heat 
generated in the motor is removed. With effective heat dissipation, issues like variation in 
resistance can be addressed, which in turn allows a higher current carrying capacity for 
more torque production. Since the SRM has active power coils only on the stator, most of 
the electrical losses are localized to the stator and its windings; the rotor remains 
relatively unaffected and runs cooler on average. Heat transfer is achieved by a mix of 
conduction (from the stator coils to the motor shell, from the shell to the mounting frame, 
from the shaft to the bearings to the motor shell, etc.), convection (from the motor shell to 
the surroundings, or to the cooling fluid, if active cooling is used16) and radiation (from 
the motor shell to the surroundings).  
The amount of heat dissipated by conduction can be approximated as [Miller, 
1993]: 
    
  
  





where ΔT is the temperature difference assuming that the heat is being conducted across a 
the block of thickness t and area A, k is the thermal conductivity which depends on the 
material and is also a function of the temperature. In case of the SRM, conductive heat 
transfer occurs from the conductors to the stator core and further to the motor shell. The 
temperature distribution in each of these components and at the interfaces between them 
can be determined using equivalent thermal resistances for each of them [Miller, 1993]. 
The heat generated in the windings has to pass through several layers before it reaches 
the motor shell. The windings are often coated with a resin of high thermal conductivity 
to alleviate this problem to a certain extent.  
From the motor shell, the heat is transferred to the surroundings via convection is 
given by the relation: 
                                                 
16 In applications where the EMAs operate under significant duty cycles, to achieve higher power/ torque-
densities, active cooling using oil or other liquid coolants is often employed 
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       Eq.(3-68) 
where ΔT=T-Tamb, is the temperature difference between the cooling medium (air, in 
most cases) and the surface being cooled, and h is the convective heat transfer coefficient. 
Its value is determined by the viscosity, thermal conductivity, specific heat, and velocity 
of movement of the coolant [Miller, 1993]. This is termed as free convection where the 
flow of the coolant is not aided by pumps, fans, etc. as compared to forced convection 
where one of these is used. [Miller, 1993] estimates h for free convection around a 
horizontally mounted, unfinned cylindrical motor with diameter D as: 





With forced convection of air, the value of h increases almost six times, based on 
the air velocity. If V is the air velocity and L is the frame length of the motor, then the 
corresponding h is given by [Miller, 1993] as: 
                
Eq.(3-70) 
The total heat transferred by radiation is given by the Stefan-Boltzmann equation as: 
           
   Eq.(3-71) 
where σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant for a black body, e is the coefficient of 
emissivity (a measure of the effectiveness of radiation from a body relative to that of a 
perfect black body), T is the absolute temperature of the heat radiating surface and T0 is 
the absolute temperature of the surroundings. The amount of heat transfer via radiation is 
typically lesser than the heat transferred via convection.  
As seen from the equations for each mode of heat transfer, the total heat 
dissipated from the interior of the motor to its shell and eventually to its surroundings 
depends on the surface area of the motor shell. Fins are sometimes used to increase this 
area without drastically affecting the overall size of the motor. The other critical factor 
that determines the total heat transferred from the motor is the temperature of the ambient 
medium. Thus, for a given motor geometry and cooling arrangement, the average 
temperature at which the motor operates is primarily determined by the overall magnitude 
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of motor power losses which dictate the amount of heat generated and the ambient 
conditions. This relation is shown in Figure 3-22. 
3.4. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The development of a comprehensive Bayesian network model for a four phase 
switched reluctance motor was presented in this chapter. Diverse facets like torque 
generation, acoustic noise generation, motor dynamics, and thermal considerations were 
examined in detail using mathematical models available in literature to derive the 
corresponding causal representations for each of these aspects individually. The smaller 
causal networks were then combined to generate the complete network representing the 
test set-up in its entirety (Section 3.2). The different models discussed in this chapter and 
the relevant sections are shown in Table 3-1. 
Since modeling the system was the prime objective in the present case, a causal 
approach was adopted to make the resultant network intuitive to the end-user as well as 
represent the actual interaction between the variables in the physical system as closely as 
possible. However, a number of other criteria driven by factors like application 
requirements, need for fail-safe operation, availability of specific types of performance 
maps, etc., may influence both the structure of the network itself as well as how well it 
can be utilized in an application. A few of these criteria will now be explored in further 
detail in Chapter 4. 
Table 3-1: Chapter Summary 
Sub-network Notation Description Section 
 
  i   = 1…n = Number of motor phases, 
DC = PWM Duty Cycle, 
FR  = PWM Frequency, 















Table 3-1: Chapter Summary (continued) 
Sub-network Notation Description Section 
 
i      = 1…n = Number of motor phases, 
Vi     = Phase Voltage,  
Ri     = Phase Resistance, 
Θph = Rotor Angle Relative to Stator, 
PS   = Phase Status (On/Off) 
Θoffi = Phase Turn-off Angle 
Θoni = Phase Turn-on Angle 










i      = 1….n= Number of motor phases, 
Ii       = Phase Current 
BR   = Magnetic Flux Density, radial 







i     = 1….n = Number of motor phases, 
BR   = Magnetic Flux Density, radial 








i     = 1….n = Number of motor phases, 
BR   = Magnetic flux density, radial 
BT  =  Magnetic flux density, tangential 







τ    = Total Electromagnetic Motor Torque  
α   = Angular Acceleration of Rotor 
ω  = Angular Velocity of Rotor 
θr   = Rotor Position 










Pin     = Input Electrical Power 
Pout  = Output Mechanical Power 
Ploss = Total Power Losses 


























Table 3-1: Chapter Summary (continued) 
 
Tamb  = Ambient Temperature 
Ploss  = Total Power Loss 
T  = Average Motor Temperature 
Relation 
between 





Detailed Bayesian Network Model of a Four Phase Switched Reluctance Motor Obtained by 










































































Chapter 4. Criteria Based Resource Management 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The development of a Bayesian network for a switched reluctance motor was 
presented in Chapter 3. The resultant network structure (causal) was dictated purely by 
the motor physics. However, for a network to be of practical use in many applications, 
there may be other factors that not only influence its configuration in terms of the number 
of nodes and the interconnections between them, but also the manner in which the 
parameters of the different nodes are populated, the choice of appropriate inferencing 
algorithms to use for the available network structure, etc. This chapter explores some 
such issues that may need to be factored in, when designing and utilizing a Bayesian 
network for representing and making operational decisions for any system of interest. 
Section 4.2 defines the problem of resource management. This is followed by Sections 
4.3 and 4.4 which provide descriptions of the different criteria that can be used to achieve 
this objective from design and operational perspectives respectively. 
4.2. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Given the numerous parameters associated with even a moderately complex 
system, a full suite of sensors is often required to enable comprehensive monitoring of 
the system. There are three main facets to consider in the use of multiple sensors as 
outlined in [Xiong and Svennson, 2002]1:  
 Sensor deployment: To address when, where, and how many sensing resources are 
needed to respond to changes in the monitored system and/or its operating 
environment. This typically happens during the system design phase  
 Sensor assignment: Given finite sensing resources, plan sensor functions and 
adapt sensor usage according to changing mission requirements. This may involve 
decisions on the best way to correlate the information collected from the different 
sensors during the system certification phase 
                                                 
1 The focus in the authors‘ work was sensor fusion in a target tracking application 
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 Sensor coordination: Sharing information between sensors to make the best use of 
the available information when the system is in operation.  
These aspects are driven by the combined (and often conflicting) objectives of effectively 
addressing a system‘s feedback needs, keeping the costs and complexity to a minimum 
and without any compromises on the overall reliability or performance of the system. 
There is thus a need for a criteria-based resource management framework that can help 
decide upon and best utilize the available sensors and other resources at any given time.  
The term ‗sensor management‘ is often used in the context of wireless sensor 
networks to refer to the process of scheduling and activating the appropriate sensors 
within a group of sensors distributed over a wide geographical area to address issues like 
energy consumption, limited bandwidth, etc. or in the context of target tracking where it 
refers to the process of selecting appropriate sensors, modalities, etc. to optimize their 
effectiveness in characterizing the probability of a target occurring in a region under 
consideration [Onel et. al, 2009], [Kolba and Collins, 2006], [Vaidya, et. al. 2005] 
[Kreucher, et. al. 2003]. The common thread in the examples above is that application 
specific criteria are used to make decisions on what sensors to use, when and for which 
purpose. Many of these applications use criteria/norms derived from field of information 
theory (such as entropy, mutual information, Kullback Leiber or Renyi divergence, etc.) 
in combination with some form of estimation theory (Kalman filter, particle filters, etc.) 
[Augenbaugh and La Cour, 2008]. In addition, researchers have also explored alternative 
approaches to sensor management in other domains such as the use of geometric 
interaction between sensors and the environment in conjunction with Bayes reasoning for 
sensor selection in a robotic system [Giraud and Jouvencel, 1995], the use of a gating 
neural network and a rules/knowledge database to estimate the reliability of sensor 
readings and the sensors to be used in a surface grinding process [Kobayashi, et. al. 
2002], using an empirical Bayes procedure for fault detection in diesel engines 
[Subrahmanya, et.al., 2010], using a decision-theoretic approach based on user defined 
criteria for surveillance [Spaan and Lima, 2009], using soft computing/fuzzy logic 
techniques in aircraft sensor management [Oosterom, et. al, 2002], etc. 
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In the present context, the objective of resource management is to enable the 
selection and coordination of a suite of sensors to monitor a dynamic system using well-
defined criteria during both the design phase as well as during the operational phase. 
With such an approach, it is possible to provide a synergy (via functional redundancy) 
that can enable the use of different sensors to corroborate each other as well as influence 
the availability of information in situations where data from specific sensors becomes 
partially or completely unavailable due to sensor or connector failures, bandwidth/power 
constraints, etc. Criteria based resource management can help in the selection and use of 
a finite set of sensors in concert with available computational resources to maximize the 
utility of the information available to the operator regarding the system at any given time 
(by providing guidelines that the system designer or operator can use to make decisions 
such as determining the priority of a sensor or a subset of sensors to address a specific 
objective). It can also help avoid overwhelming data transfer, computational and memory 
requirements in a multi-sensor system by ensuring that only the truly essential data is 
acquired and utilized.  
4.3. DESIGN CRITERIA 
[Korb and Nicholson, 2004] describe the process of construction of a Bayesian 
network for any system, first put forth in [Pearl, 1988], as an algorithm consisting of the 
general steps as shown below: 
Pearl’s Bayesian Network Construction Algorithm 
1. Determine the set of n variables {Si}, where i =1,2,….n, that are relevant to the 
domain under consideration 
2. Determine the ordering of the variables <S1, S2, S3….Sn> 
3. Loop through 1 to n 
a. Insert Si into the network 
b. Create arcs from the minimal set of nodes that are already present in the 
network Π (Si) such that the variable Si is conditionally independent of all 
its non descendants given its parents  Π (Si) i.e. 
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P(Si| S1, S2, S3….Si-1)=P(Si| Π (Si)) where Π (Si)  { S1, S2, S3….Si-1} 
c. Define the conditional probability table for Si 
End loop 
For most engineering applications, the nodes in the Bayesian network represent 
the different physical parameters of interest, for which sensors are integrated into the 
system. A network composed of these measurands/variables therefore needs to be 
designed concurrently with the design of the actual system itself. It needs to mirror the 
actual system as closely as possible, since it is meant to represent the behavior of the 
system for decision making during operation. The process thus tends to be iterative, as 
there are numerous criteria that need to be balanced simultaneously2.  
The following section discusses some design criteria that may be used not only to 
determine the choice of sensors while designing the physical system but also to address 
some of the requirements to create a Bayesian network representation for it as per Pearl‘s 
network construction algorithm i.e. determining relevant nodes, their ordering, directing 
the links appropriately, defining the node parameters, etc. (Note that these criteria are 
only a representative list to provide some guidelines that may be used to create and refine 
the network. Numerous criteria have been proposed and applied successfully in many 
applications, for instance, in [Jensen and Nielsen, 2007][Rajabally, et.al, 2004][Neil, et. 
al., 2000] and others.  More application-specific criteria may be defined in the future)  
4.3.1. Application Requirements 
The number of sensors in any system is principally dictated by the feedback 
requirements of the application itself. In some applications, it is imperative to include 
certain sensors for effective system operation. These may be termed as ‗essential‘ 
sensors, for without them system operation may not be possible. For instance, for 
conventional speed control of a brushless DC motor, the use of a position sensor (to track 
the rotor position for commutation) in conjunction with voltage sensors for each motor 
phase (to track the voltage signal applied across each phase which in turn dictates the 
                                                 
2 In the present case, it is assumed that the network is created by experts with in-depth domain knowledge. 
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overall motor speed) is vital. In case of robotic manipulators which are used for precision 
operations like positioning or assembly, accurate joint position sensors or force-torque 
sensors are a must. In addition, there may be other sensors that can be integrated into the 
system for more comprehensive monitoring purposes. For example, temperature sensors 
may be integrated into motor windings to monitor power lost in the form of heat (which 
is detrimental to the motor windings) or an acoustic noise sensor to determine the 
increase in the noise generated by the motor as the operating speed increases (due to 
additional windage effects). These can be referred to as the ‗optional‘ sensors. Appendix 
A shows the typical set of sensors recommended for a general class of electromechanical 
actuators consisting of the four major components as indicated [Tesar, 2009]. Depending 
on the components that are more critical than others for a specific application (and hence 
need to be controlled or monitored exhaustively), the set of essential and optional sensors 
can be chosen from this array of possible choices. 
Also included in the category of optional sensors are sensors that may be used to 
indirectly estimate parameters for which physical sensors do not exist or are difficult or 
expensive to integrate into the application3. For example, if motor efficiency is an 
important criterion in an application, it may be estimated using current and voltage 
sensors to determine the power input to the system and torque and speed sensors to 
compute the output power from the system. In some applications, especially in those 
where human safety is involved, hardware failures cannot be tolerated (e.g. space 
applications) and it is often imperative to have hardware redundancy for all the sensors in 
the system. To enable condition based maintenance of systems using performance maps 
and envelopes, it is necessary to have sensors corresponding to the measurands 
represented in those maps, so that they can be continuously updated to reflect the extant 
condition of the system at any given time. The number of all such essential and optional 
                                                 
3 The common approach in most application is to use off-the-shelf commercially available sensor options 
wherever possible to keep the overall system development costs low (during the design phase). Pursuing 
special purpose sensor designs is usually only done in one-off cases where there are no other alternatives 
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sensors, taken together determines the total number of nodes in the network4. The size of 
the network has a direct bearing many factors that influence the operational use of the 
network like memory/storage requirements (for the different CPTs), choice of inferencing 
algorithms, computational requirements, ease of understanding or intuitiveness to the 
operator, etc.  
4.3.2. System Design Constraints 
In any application, it is desirable to incorporate as many sensors as possible 
(without impeding system operation) to provide the most comprehensive monitoring of 
the system‘s various operational parameters. This may not be difficult for a laboratory 
test setup but in many cases, the inclusion of additional sensors other than the most 
essential ones is often restricted by the size (overall volume) and weight constraints 
imposed by the application. For example, in case of EMAs used in aircraft or small 
diameter (0.25‖ to 2‖) EMAs used in precision surgical robots [Tesar, 2010], etc. both 
weight and volume are at a premium. There is also the need to account for any design 
modifications that may be required to accommodate the additional cabling required for 
power supply and signal transmission requirements (or analogously the additional on-
board power and transmission required for wireless sensors), etc. all of which typically 
contribute towards increasing the overall dimensions and weight of the system, for 
example as described in [Iaconis and Tesar, 1991], [Nowak and Tesar, 1998], etc. 
The inclusion of more sensors usually calls for a number of compromises to be 
made during the system design process to accommodate the sensors as effectively as 
possible without compromising the system performance. This is often encountered when 
the sensors have to be close to or located at the stimulus (for example, temperature 
sensors like thermistors or magnetic field sensors to measure the field strength in a motor 
air gap). In such cases, careful design is required to integrate them into the system as 
                                                 
4 It is assumed that every node is ‗measurable‘ directly by a sensor or can be determined analytically using 
the available measurands, in order to be able to update the corresponding node parameters and performance 
maps. For nodes which do not have a direct physical sensor associated with them, this includes the case 
where the human expert‘s opinion is taken as the definitive value for the variable represented by that node. 
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compactly as possible while simultaneously protecting the sensors as well as the on-board 
electronic circuits from potential damage due to factors like excessive vibrations, 
proximity to components that dissipate heat, etc. In some cases, although a particular 
variable may be considered crucial to the overall system operation, the available off-the-
shelf sensors may not be suitable for compact integration into the system or they may be 
too fragile in their construction (which may be an issue when deployed under real-world 
conditions). This may call for the development of a completely new sensor design to 
satisfy the dimensional constraints imposed by the application. A pertinent example of 
this situation is the limited variety of rotary torque sensors in suitable form factors that 
can be compactly integrated into modular EMAs [Tesar, 2010]. 
In such scenarios, choices often have to be made a) whether to leave out some 
sensors from the system completely, b) if it is worthwhile to invest in a new sensor 
design, c) if some of the existing design constraints may be relaxed to accommodate 
available sensors, d) if the variables of interest can be analytically inferred to an 
acceptable degree by integrating other sensors which can still satisfy the existing design 
constraints (for instance, inferring the EMA output torque using the current drawn by the 
electric prime mover in it, after factoring in the gear ratio), etc.  
4.3.3. Overall Costs 
Although the cost of sensors (as a fraction of the overall system cost) is much 
lesser than that of other parts of a system in general, the outlay for some critical sensors 
may be a significant portion of the overall system budget (for instance, high accuracy 
position sensors or rotary torque sensors for use in precision actuators are typically more 
expensive other components). Integrating additional sensors, other than the essential 
sensors, typically implies an increase in the overall system cost, since it not only includes 
the actual cost of the sensors but also the auxiliary equipment needed i.e. power supply 
sources, additional cabling/channels needed for data acquisition from all the sensors, 
computational resources needed to handle the extra data, etc. As mentioned earlier, 
special provisions may need to be made to the overall system design to accommodate 
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more sensors which in turn may also add to the total cost. The overall cost may not be a 
significant factor in special purpose or one-off system designs, but for systems which are 
more widely deployed it can often be an overriding factor. This may necessitate the 
exclusion of certain sensors from being integrated during the design phase.  
In such cases, it may still be possible to include the nodes corresponding to the 
absent sensors into the Bayesian network during the model design phase if a definitive 
source of information for that variable is available (in the form of expert opinion, 
performance maps or accurate analytical relations from which they can be inferred using 
other variables)5. Another approach that is often adopted is to use lower cost alternatives 
for the more expensive sensors. Such sensors may not provide the same high standards of 
performance but may still be used to provide useful information which may be of lower 
‗quality‘ (resolution, accuracy, etc.) and considered acceptable for the application. A 
relevant example is the use of lower cost hall-effect sensors as compared to precision 
position encoders for motor commutation. 
4.3.4. Relative Importance of Sensors  
As discussed earlier, in any application, there are essential sensors without which 
it may be impossible to achieve satisfactory system operation and additionally there may 
be optional sensors that are used to monitor some secondary parameters of interest to 
enable enhanced system performance. For instance, Table 4-1 shows the importance of 
different types of sensors for a general class of intelligent EMAs (rotary), considering 
their use in a variety of domains as explored in [Tesar, 2009]. It can be seen that the 
position and torque sensors are the two most critical sensors in such systems.  
In certain applications, the sensors corresponding to the critical variables of 
interest may be too fragile and may be prone to frequent failure or loss of performance 
(for instance, high precision position encoders are usually sensitive to high operating 
temperatures). Any degradation or unexpected loss of information from such a sensor 
                                                 
5 However, caution must be exercised if such an approach is adopted because it may not be always possible 




vital to the system, may lead to undesirable system behavior or in the extreme case, a 
catastrophic system failure. 
 Table 4-1: Relative Importance of Sensors in Intelligent Electromechanical Actuators 
Sensor Significance to Intelligent EMAs 
Note: Scale of 1 to 
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In such situations, if the sensors are too expensive to replace or are located in an 
inaccessible location within the system and it is not possible to replace or repair them 
when the system is in operation without other consequences (altering the system, 
downtime costs incurred as a result of shutting down 
the system for repair, etc.), it is desirable to provide 
some failsafe provision for obtaining these critical 
measurands, in case of a loss of information from 
their corresponding sensors. 
With the use of a Bayesian network to 
provide functional redundancy, data from one or 
more of the other operational sensors can be used to 
set evidence to the network and the value of the node 
corresponding to the sensor of interest, say SI, can be 
determined using probabilistic inferencing as 
described in Chapter 2. In terms of the network 
structure, this means that the node SI must be related to as many other nodes as possible. 





Figure 4-1: Fault Tolerance for 
Critical Sensors 
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the critical measurands so that failsafe operation is possible6. Different network structures 
can produce data of differing quality. The most suitable network would be one where the 
value of SI can be obtained from the node/s which can be potentially set as evidence, 
without the need to traverse through a lot of intermediate nodes or links7. As an example, 
consider two possible network structures representing relation between five variables of 
interest S1, S2...S5, (Figure 4-1) with S5 being the most critical measurand. Consider the 
case where there is a loss of information from the sensor corresponding to S5. From 
Figure 4-1 (a) it can be seen that in, the value of the node S5 can be inferred using data 
from any of the sensors corresponding to nodes S1 through S4 with only one intermediate 
link involved. The uncertainty in the inferred value of S5 is determined by the 
relationships S5->Si as encoded in the conditional probabilities P(Si|S5), where i =1, 2, 3, 
4. Even if one or more of the other sensors S1…S4 become partially or completely 
unavailable, an alternative always exists to infer the value of S5 (except in the extreme 
case where all the sensors S1…S4 become unavailable). However, in Figure 4-1 (b), the 
best option available to infer the value of S5 with least uncertainty is by setting the value 
of the sensor corresponding to S2 as evidence to the network. Although any of the other 
sensors S1…S4 may still be used to infer the value of S5, if the sensor corresponding to S2 
also becomes unavailable, the uncertainty in the inferred value will be higher. 
4.3.5. Type of Data Available  
As seen earlier, the degree to which functional redundancy can be achieved for 
different variables in the Bayesian network for any system is determined to a large extent 
by manner in which the nodes are connected with each other. These interconnections are, 
in turn, often dictated by the form in which data to populate the parameters of the 
                                                 
6 Although any node in the network can be set as evidence to infer the value of SI, the choice of which 
sensors may be used to set evidence may be driven by other factors. For instance, it may not be advisable to 
use a node whose corresponding sensor has a low accuracy, as evidence. The inaccurate sensor may result 
in an incorrect node state being set as input to the network, resulting in an erroneous inferred value of SI.  
7 The resultant value obtained for SI and its uncertainty as given by the spread of its probability distribution, 
is directly proportional to the number of intermediate links between SI and the evidence node/s as well as 
the conditional probability distributions of all the intermediate nodes. These factors are investigated in 
greater detail in Section 4.4 
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different nodes in the network is available (or the manner in which it can be acquired), 
and based on the judgment of the domain expert who creates the network. In the present 
context, the construction of links between the different nodes in the network depends on 
how the available data has been structured in the form of different performance maps8 
since the probabilistic models (conditional probability values) that are encoded in the 
CPTs at each node are derived from the same data used to generate these maps.  
Consider a system with five 
variables of interest S1, S2…S5. Figure 4-2 
shows a few of the many possible 
configurations in which the nodes 
representing these variables can be linked9. 
Suppose the sensor corresponding to a 
variable, say S5, suddenly becomes 
unavailable (say, due to a sensor failure) 
and the value of S5 has to be inferred from 
the sensor readings corresponding to one or 
more of the remaining variables. In this 
case, the performance maps/data relating S5 
to all possible combinations of those variables must be available. For instance, suppose, 
based on the domain expert‘s opinion, the value of the variable S5 can be best estimated 
using the value of the variable S3. With a structure as shown in Figure 4-2 (a), to infer the 
value of S5 from S3, only data relating S3 to S5 as represented by the S3->S5 link is needed 
(i.e. P(S5|S3)   S5 and S3). In Figure 4-2 (b), to infer S5 from S3, data representing two 
relations, S3->S4 and S4->S5 i.e. P(S4|S3)   S4, S3, and P(S5|S4)   S5, S4) are needed. In 
                                                 
8 Specifically, the manner in which the data has been grouped in different combinations of control, 
reference and dependent parameters as described in [Ashok and Tesar, 2007] 
9 Here the links between nodes only serve to indicate the dependence between the variables as determined 
by the domain expert based on the available data and not necessarily a cause-effect type of relation. Many 
structure learning algorithms exist in literature to determine the network structure from available data and 
depending on the different metrics to evaluate the resultant intermediate results, these algorithms can result 







Figure 4-2: Different Network Structures 
Based on Available Data 
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Figure 4-2 (c), in addition to the data relating S3->S5, the data representing the relations 
S1->S5, S2->S5, and S4->S5 are also needed simultaneously (i.e. P(S5|S1, S2, S3, S4)   S5, 
S1, S2, S3 and S4) to produce the best estimate of the value of S5 given the available data.  
The availability of these different relations is determined by the number as well as 
the type of experiments that need to be conducted in order to collect the requisite data. 
Ideally, if the data corresponding to all the nodes is acquired synchronously during 
system certification (when the ‗as-built‘ performance maps are generated), the relation 
between any pair of variables/nodes in the network (i.e. the CPTs containing P(Si|Sj) 
where i ≠ j, and i, j=1,2…5) can be developed relatively easily. However, in certain 
situations this may not be possible. Since the process of experimentation is time and 
resource intensive, it may be practical only to perform a few experiments to measure only 
the most critical parameters needed for system certification [Janardhan and Tesar, 2008]. 
There may also be cases where all the sensors used during the testing process may not be 
available when the system is deployed outside a test setup thereby rendering some of the 
generated maps unusable (because they cannot be accurately updated). In some cases, the 
testing protocol or the hardware used during system certification may be such that the 
variables of interest can be measured only one at a time or in specific groups based on the 
changes in certain control parameters (for example, as described in [Janardhan and Tesar, 
2008] in generating maps for a brushless DC motor), etc. In the extreme case where 
neither empirical data nor accurate analytical relations are accessible relating certain 
combinations of variables, then such variables cannot be linked to each other in the 
network. Thus, the constitution of available data can influence the network structure.  
4.3.6. Causality 
 The topology of a Bayesian network is highly influenced by the ordering of the 
nodes that represent the variables in the system under consideration. Strictly speaking, the 
links in a Bayesian network only represent the conditional independencies between the 
connected nodes and need not necessarily represent causal relationships between those 
nodes. However, using causal relations to represent the link between the nodes can help 
 
 111 
attribute physical meaning to the values that are obtained using the network, making it 
more intuitive for the user to comprehend those values and use them in decision making.  
For instance, consider a network with two nodes, current and torque, representing 
a motor. Assume that comprehensive experimental data regarding both the variables is 
available over the entire operating range in an application where the motor is used and 
can be used to create the required CPTs. The relation between them can be represented as 
two possible network structures as shown in Figure 
4-3 (a) and (b). From a mathematical perspective, both 
the above networks are equally valid since both 
forward and inverse probabilistic reasoning based on 
available information i.e. P(Torque|Current) or 
P(Current|Torque)) are possible by simply using the 
CPT or Bayes‟ theorem, as the case may be. But for 
both experts (who are involved in designing the system and its Bayesian network 
representation) and non-experts (who may be the end users making the final decisions for 
operating the system), the structure shown in Figure 4-3 (a) will provide a greater 
intuition in decision making since it represents what actually happens in a motor i.e. the 
current applied across the motor windings results in torque generated by the motor (due 
to the air-gap magnetic field) and not the other way around; with the torque generated 
being directly proportional to the magnitude of the supplied current.  
Various authors including [Pearl, 1988], [Korb and Nicholson, 2004], 
[Neapolitan, 2003], etc., have highlighted the opinion that more often than not, a causal 
model underlies any real-world joint probability distribution and typically results in a 
Bayesian network that can be considered practically useful. [Pearl, 1988] emphasizes that 
use of such causal schema minimizes the number of relationships that need to be 
considered to model any system, thus resulting in compact networks (i.e. one displaying 
more independencies than a non-causal representation) with lesser interlinking between 
the nodes (no unnecessary or redundant links). The simpler structure in turn, has a 










in general). [Kenny, 2004] outlines the three conditions which may be used to determine 
whether a variable A causes another variable B or not (and hence also examine the 
direction of the link between A and B in a Bayesian network): 
i. Precedence in time: For a variable A to cause a change in a variable B, A must 
temporally happen before B. This implies that the causal relation is asymmetric. 
ii. Functional relationship: There must be a function relationship between the cause 
and the effect parameters (B=f (A)). If the knowledge of one variable does not 
provide any additional information regarding the other variable, then they can be 
considered as independent of each other. If not, then they are related. 
iii. Non-spuriousness: The relation between A and B should not be influenced by the 
presence of a third variable C that causes both A and B, such that if C is 
controlled, then A and B become independent10  
4.3.7. Discretization of Data 
An important factor that determines the quality of information inferred using the 
Bayesian network is the discretization of the data encoded within each node in the 
network. The aspects to be considered in discretizing a random variable corresponding to 
a node include the number of states (discrete levels) or bins that the available data has to 
be divided into as well as the limits/sizes of the individual bins. The number of states is 
typically determined by the range of interest for each variable in the application. The 
nodes in a network usually have a differing number of states, since physical variables 
tend to vary at different scales. Evidently, the greater the number of bins, the more 
detailed is the information regarding the variables of interest and greater is the resolution 
of values that can be inferred using the network. The limits of the bins for each node also 
need to be relevant in terms of the application being considered. These limits represent 
the acceptable range of deviation from the steady state value for each state of every node. 
It is evident that with a smaller level of discretization (i.e. discretizing into a large 
number of bins/states), the size of the CPTs that need to be stored and manipulated each 
                                                 
10 Note that this is different from intervention, where A causes C and in turn, C causes B. [Kenny,2004] 
states that spuriousness explains away causality whereas intervention elaborates the causal chain. 
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time an inference is drawn increases. This leads to greater memory/storage requirements 
which could be an important factor in applications where the network may consist of a 
large number of highly interconnected nodes (large and possibly sparse CPTs for all the 
non-root nodes). It may also result in slower execution times for the probabilistic 
inferencing algorithms, as more data needs to be parsed through ([Liu, 2008] presents the 
use of a self-organizing map to address this issue very effectively). 
Consider a discrete random variable 
A, such that 0 ≤ A ≤ 3. Figure 4-4 shows 
two possible ways in which the CPT can be 
discretized. In each case, a uniform 
distribution has been assumed for A. If ε is 
the acceptable deviation from the steady 
state value A=a, then the bin limits are 
defined as [a- ε, a + ε]. The size of the bin 
is 2ε. As described in [Mehranbod, et. al. 
2003], the smallest value of ε is dictated by 
the accuracy (β) of the sensor corresponding 
to A (i.e. ε ≥ β and in most cases, ε = mβ, where m=1, 2, 3,…). It can be seen that the 
increments with which the value of A can be inferred using the network is much better in 
table (b) which has a greater granularity in discretization, as compared to table (a)11. 
Suppose the sensor for A (with an accuracy of ±0.05) indicates a value of A=2.125. Then 
according to table (a), this value falls in the bin 2≤ A ≤ 3. Hence, from the Bayesian 
network perspective the state A=2.5 will be considered as the value for node A (for 
instance, when the value of A has to be set as evidence during inference). However, 
according to table (b), the value indicated by the sensor falls in the bin 2≤ A ≤ 2.25, 
which results in a value of A=2.25. Thus discretization can have a significant impact on 
how closely the actual value of the variable (measured by a sensor) is represented in the 
                                                 
11 It must also be noted that with the smaller discretization, the accuracy of the sensor used also needs to be 





A=0.5   => p(0≤ A ≤1) 0.3333 
A=1.5   => p(1≤ A ≤2) 0.3333 





A=0.25   => p(0≤ A ≤0.5) 0.16666 
A=0.75   => p(0.5≤ A ≤1) 0.16666 
A=1.25   => p(1≤ A ≤1.5) 0.16666 
A=1.75   => p(1.5≤ A ≤2) 0.16666 
A=2.25   => p(2≤ A ≤2.5) 0.16666 
A=2.75   => p(2.5≤ A ≤3) 0.16666 
 
Figure 4-4: Discretization 
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network for inference purposes and needs to be carefully determined by the domain 
expert who designs the network. Depending on the application, a large discretization may 
result in inferred values that are ambiguous for decision-making, especially if such values 
are intended for precision system control. 
4.3.8. Sensor Reliability 
 Sensors can be affected by a number of factors in their operational environment. 
Factors like heat/temperature cycling, mechanical shock/vibrations, humidity, power-on/ 
power-off cycling, etc can sometimes have detrimental effects on the on-board signal 
processing electronics (for instance, oxidation and failure in solder joints, fretting leading 
to unreliable contacts, etc. [Fraden, 2004][Denton, 2010]). For sensors not based on a 
non-contact operating principle, the sensing element may itself undergo wear and tear 
due to physical contact. In most cases, the data from sensors is sent to a remote data 
acquisition device or a computer, where it is transformed into useful information (for 
instance, performance maps) that may be used for decision making. In this process, data 
from sensors may become unavailable due to a fault in intermediate connectors or wiring 
that conveys the sensor output signal to the processor (the analogous situation in case of 
wireless sensors would be a fault in the transmission link). Most sensors also need a 
power supply; a fault in the power leads may cause the sensor to become inoperative. All 
the factors described above may be taken together as representative of how reliable a 
sensor is.  
[Fraden, 2004] defines the reliability of a sensor as its ability to perform its 
required function under specified conditions for a stated period12. Reliability is often 
expressed as the probability that the sensor will function without failure over a certain 
time or a specified number of cycles of use. A common metric for specifying reliability 
indirectly is in terms of mean time between failure (MTBF) which is the average 
                                                 
12 Reliability in the present context is not purely a judgment on the quality of the sensor itself since it also 
encompasses other factors that may cause the sensor data to become unavailable nor does it refer to the 
extent to which the sensor output can be considered representative of the actual measurand. It only 
indicates whether or not data is consistently available from a sensor. 
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expected time between failures of like units under like conditions (as specified in the 
MIL-HDBK-217 standard ) [Denton, 2010]. It is typically calculated based on installed 
equipment (MTBF = total time exposure for all installed units/ number of failures). Such 
information is rarely provided in the sensor specifications from manufacturers due to 
factors like the lack of a standard measure for reliability, the need for accelerated life 
testing under extreme environmental conditions, etc. [Fraden, 2004].  
However, if such data is available for any system, for example, based on the 
operational history of the system and the various sensors integrated into it, the knowledge 
may be used to refine the structure of the Bayesian 
network for future versions of the system. The nodes 
corresponding to sensors which are traditionally found 
to be extremely reliable may be connected to as many 
other nodes as possible, representing other sensors 
which may be less reliable, in order to provide a 
greater assurance of back-up information being 
available in case of a loss of information from the 
unreliable sensors. In Figure 4-5 (a) and (b) suppose, 
the sensor corresponding to the node S3 is considered 
to be the most reliable amongst all the available 
sensors. In case one of the sensors S1, S2…etc. becomes unavailable, then the network 
structures shown can help infer the value of those sensors using the value of S3 within 
acceptable limits (depending on the quality of data used to generate the CPTs). 
4.3.9. Memory Requirements  
By exploiting the conditional dependencies/independencies between the different 
random variables of interest (embedded explicitly in the network structure in the form of 
the links between the nodes corresponding to the variables), a Bayesian network allows 
compact storage of their joint probability distribution locally in the form of CPTs for all 














available13 then there are multiple ways in which the nodes may be connected based on 
the domain experts‘ opinion
14
. However, in doing so, caution must be exercised since 
different types of connections can result in different CPT configurations for various 
nodes. The resultant form of the CPTs can have a significant impact on the usefulness of 
the overall network in addressing the system‘s operational goals.  
Consider two possible network structures that relate variables of interest in a 
system A, B, C, D. Assume that each variable has 
two states True or False. In Figure 4-6 (a) the total 
number of parameters in the CPTs
15
 of A, B and D 
is 2 each whereas the number of parameters in the 
CPT of C is 4. In Figure 4-6 (b), the number of 
parameters in the CPTs of A, B and D is again 2 
each but the number of parameters in the CPT of C 
is now 16. If one unit of memory is required to store each parameter, the total memory 
required in the first case is 10 units but increases to 22 units in latter case. With a more 
complex network, there may be several nodes with a large number of parents, a high 
degree of interlinking among the nodes, and a large number of individual states for each 
node. The size of the CPT for a node grows exponentially in terms of the number of 
parents. For a node with n states and i =1, 2, 3….k parents, if Si is the number of states for 
the i
th 
parent, the size of the CPT for that node is n rows and m=    
 
    columns and the 
total number of parameters in the CPT is n x m. Thus, the size of the individual CPTs and 
the total memory requirements can spiral out of control quickly.  
Even though the cost of memory/storage may not be expensive compared to the 
cost of other components in the system (and continues to decrease at a rapid rate), the on-
board memory available for storing the CPTs may be limited due to factors like storage 
                                                 
13 For variables X1, X2, …Xn, for every value of Xi, a corresponding value of Xj (i≠j) is also available 
14 This may not be applicable when causality is also taken into account in creating the network structure 
15 The number of parameters required to specify the conditional probability distribution of a node is said to 












requirements for other programs/functions that are needed for effective system control 
and operation, for logging data for CBM, etc. Large CPTs can also prove to be a 
computational hindrance for applications where real-time operation is critical (due to the 
longer times needed to parse and extract values from the CPTs in inferencing algorithms, 
especially if the CPT is sparsely populated, or individual state probabilities are low and 
widely spread, etc.). The memory requirements must therefore be taken into account 
while designing the network16. Various techniques may be used to modify both the 
structure of the network (and the resultant size of CPTs as well memory required to store 
and manipulate them). These include the judicious selection of the number of levels of 
discrete states that are needed for every node in the network (especially for nodes which 
are connected to a child node with many other parent nodes), use of canonical models 
such as noisy-OR, noisy-MAX, etc. which reduces the number of parameters required to 
completely specify the CPTs [Diez and Druzdel, 2007], the introduction of intermediate 
nodes to ‗divorce‘ parent nodes and partition their configurations [Jensen and Nielsen, 
2007] which has the result of reducing the number of parent nodes associated with a 
given node, the use of decision trees or graphs, propositional rules (if-then), deterministic 
CPTs (with only 0 or 1 as probability values) [Darwiche, 2009],  etc. 
4.3.10. Intended Use 
With the development of a variety of inferencing algorithms and advances in 
computational power, the use of Bayesian networks as a tool for both modeling and 
decision making has been increasing in many domains for objectives like diagnosis, fault 
detection and classification, etc. The extent to which a system is accurately represented 
by the model and the quality of results obtained using the model are direct functions of 
the network structure. For instance, [Speigelhalter, et. al., 1993] demonstrate that 
                                                 
16 Although the size of the individual CPTs and the total size of the state space, as defined in terms of the 
total number of parameters (a similar approach is also found in [Jitnah and Nicholson, 1998]), gives a good 
idea of the network complexity and memory requirements, more sophisticated measures such as those 
discussed in [Gelly and Teatud, 2005] may be used by the domain expert while designing the network to 
decide on suitable network structures (or compare between alternative structures when the total number of 
parameters involved are the same) that can enable more efficient usage of available memory. 
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inferencing algorithms are as sensitive to the network structure as the probability values 
encoded in the different node CPTs. [Nadkarni and Shenoy, 2004] state that the most 
effective networks are those that combine sound expert knowledge to define the network 
structure (qualitative) and use extensive data to identify/refine the probability values of 
the variables represented by the nodes in the network (quantitative). However, despite the 
value of such a knowledge-based approach [Nadkarni and Shenoy, 2004], there is no 
prescribed method to construct the network structure when done by domain experts17.  
The process of creating the network structure based on expert opinion is iterative. 
A basic structure is first created and then refined based on feedback from other experts 
(often the direction of links that result from this process imply causality). Then, using the 
preliminary structure, the network may be implemented under real-world conditions 
(with components like a graphical user interface, visualization tools, etc. added) to carry 
out a particular task. This is done to verify its ease of use and intuitiveness in conveying 
the system characteristics to the end user. Based on user feedback, the network may once 
again be modified, if necessary, for better usability. If it is found that the results obtained 
using the network are not satisfactory (or worse, contradictory to those expected based on 
expert opinion or user experience), its structure may need further refinement. At each 
iteration, links or nodes may be added to the network or they may be pruned, the 
direction of some links may be reversed, etc. These small changes may or may not 
always be beneficial. In some cases, may possibly diminish the efficacy of the network in 
achieving its intended purpose (since each change may affect factors like the size of node 
CPTs, type of data / experimentation needed to estimate the CPT parameters, etc).18 
                                                 
17 [Nadkarni and Shenoy, 2004] present one possible method to formalizing the process of construction of 
Bayesian networks by adopting a causal mapping approach 
18 When there are few domain variables involved it may be possible to systematically enumerate all the 
possible network configurations for example as presented in [Dean, 2006]. As seen in Chapter 2, the 
structure of a Bayesian network represents the Markov condition. Two networks may said to be Markov 
equivalent if they consist of the same set of variables (i.e. they represent the same joint probability 
distribution) and they represent the same conditional independence relationships between the variables 
[Korb and Nicholson, 2004]. The problem of then choosing the best possible structure to describe the 
dependencies between the variables represented by available data is referred to as ‗model selection‘ 
[Neapolitan, 2003]. To do so, various scoring functions such as the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), 
Akaike‘s Information Criterion (AIC), Minimum Description Length (MDL), Bayes‘ factor etc. are used  
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Consider a case where a domain expert creates a network for a system with a set X 
of critical variables and a set Y of variables of secondary importance. In such a case, it 
would be imperative to represent all the variables in X as 
nodes in the network but the expert has to make 
subjective choices regarding how many/which specific 
variables from Y also need to be included in the 
network, if these variables are measurable, their 
relevance to the variables in X as well as to the goals of 
creating the network, etc. If such a network is intended 
to be used for real-time operation19, then the insertion of 
numerous additional nodes into the network or a high 
degree of interlinking between the nodes in X and Y may 
render it too intractable to satisfy the real-time operation 
criterion (due to large CPTs resulting slower execution times for inferencing algorithms).  
In other cases, it may be necessary to introduce additional nodes into the network 
to increase its effectiveness in achieving the application objectives. Consider the network 
in Figure 4-7 (a) designed for decision making in a condition monitoring application. 
Assume that each node in the network represents a sensor corresponding to a domain 
variable of interest and each link represents a physical process that transforms the 
variable represented by the parent node to the one represented by the child node. With 
any unexpected deviations in sensor readings, the challenge facing the decision maker 
who operates the system is to decide if the variations indicate a potential fault in one or 
more sensors or whether they are indicative of a fault in the monitored system. If the 
variations are inadvertently attributed to faulty sensors when in reality, they may be the 
result of degradation in one of the system‘s sub-components, it can result in a false alarm 
from the condition monitoring algorithm that utilizes this network (either calling for 
unscheduled system maintenance or in the extreme case, leading to complete catastrophic 
                                                                                                                                                 
are often used to especially when the structure/parameters of the network are learnt from extensive datasets 
[Korb and Nicholson, 2004]. [Kjaerulff and Madsen, A.L., 2008] [Speigelhalter, et. al., 1993].  
















system failure). Section 5.4 presents the development of a novel Bayesian network based 
algorithm to detect and isolate the cause of such deviations (sensor vs. system/process). 
However, as will be seen in Section 5.5.4, the algorithm requires the addition of nodes 
(representing redundant sensors) to distinguish between sensor and system faults at 
extremities of the network (root and leaf nodes and the links attached to them). Even 
though the size of the network increases marginally, the addition of the redundant nodes 
is critical to achieve the desired functionality in the fault detection and isolation 
algorithm. Thus, the intended use of the network must always be taken into consideration 
while designing and before finalizing the structure of the network. 
4.4. OPERATIONAL CRITERIA 
  Once the system design has been completed (with the requisite sensors integrated 
into the system) and a representative Bayesian network has been designed for it, the next 
step is to determine suitable criteria that may be used for managing information from all 
the sensors while the system is in operation. The objective is to make the best use of the 
information available from the finite set of sensors and the network in conjunction with 
the available computational resources at any given time. These operational criteria may 
be used to make decisions regarding how the available sensors may be prioritized to 
adapt to varying task demands, determine the best options for sensors that may serve as 
alternatives used to infer the value of failed sensors, what sort of information can be 
gleaned from the network, account for constraints that may arise during operation like 
limited bandwidth/power, decide on algorithms that are best suited to meet the 
application constraints, etc. The following section describes some such criteria (Note that 
these are general criteria applicable to many applications. They are intended to motivate 
the definition of more application-specific criteria along similar lines in the future.)  
4.4.1. Sensor Characteristics  
During the testing and certification process for any system, high quality data (i.e. 
with good discretization and low uncertainty) is used to generate equally exceptional 
performance maps over the entire operation range for all the variables of interest. The 
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CPTs for the nodes in the network are also derived from the same dataset. These as-built 
maps and CPTs represent the baseline standard against which any variation in those 
variables will be benchmarked when the system is deployed. Thus, they represent the best 
possible resource of knowledge as to how a particular variable is likely to behave under 
specific operating conditions.  
The sensors used in the 
system certification process (the 
‗gold-standard‘ sensors) tend to 
be of better quality (better 
accuracy, resolution, good 
linearity, low noise, etc.) than 
some of those that are actually 
integrated into the system. This 
situation arises when based on 
certain design criteria (like cost, 
geometry constraints, etc. 
described in Section 4.3), a 
compromise is made with respect to the type or the quality of such sensors that are finally 
selected (or designed), to enable their seamless integration into the system. In some cases, 
the sensors may not perform equally well over the entire operating regime that the system 
is designed for. For instance, a high resolution incremental encoder may be used to 
calculate motor speed fairly accurately (by differentiating its output) at low to moderate 
speeds, but missed counts at may lead to significant errors in the calculated speed when 
the motor operates at high speeds. In such cases, it may be beneficial to use the Bayesian 
network to infer the value of the nodes corresponding to those variables, by using 
information from other sensors in the system as evidence20. If however, the sensor 
                                                 
20 The sensors corresponding to these nodes of interest can then be used to corroborate the inferred values. 
In a way, they provide hardware redundancy for the inferred value. These sensors then are used as the 
primary source of information only in scenarios when the sensors used to set the evidence for inference 
themselves become unavailable and it is not possible to carry out the process of inferencing effectively. 
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corresponding to the node of interest is as good as the one used during certification, then 
the value of the variable corresponding to it would be determined using the sensor 
reading directly. The choice of which information source to use is made by the system 
operator. 
Consider the network in Figure 4-821. Suppose there are three types of sensors S1, 
S2 and S3 (based on different operating principles) available for the variable represented 
by the node D. Assume that all three sensors satisfy the requirements in order to be 
integrated into the system, but each has a different level of accuracy. For instance, let the 
accuracy of the three sensors be ±1.5, ±1.2 and ±0.4 (with respect to the absolute values) 
respectively over the entire measurement range. 
These values represent the uncertainty in the measured value of D when the 
readings are obtained directly from the sensors. Now, the value of D can also be obtained 
by using the reading from sensor corresponding to A, to set the corresponding state of A 
as evidence to the network and using probabilistic inference. From Figure 4-8, it is 
observed that the average uncertainty22 over the entire range when the value of D is 
inferred in this manner is ±0.86 which is better than the accuracy obtained using the 
sensors S1 or S2. Thus, in this case, if either of these sensors is actually integrated into the 
system for measuring D, it may be a better option to infer its value using the network23. 
However, if S3 is the sensor integrated into the system to measure D, then the value of D 
may be directly obtained from the sensor itself, given that it provides a better accuracy as 
compared to the inferred value.  
                                                 
21 The range of the physical variables represented by the nodes A, B, C, and D are [1, 5], [2, 10] [1, 5] and 
[1.2, 8] respectively. For this hypothetical example, it is assumed that the variables can be related by simple 
analytical relationships of the form B=2A+ εA->B, C= 0.5B+ εB->C, D= 1.2C+s εC->D; εA->B, εB->C and εC->D 
represent the uncertainty in the processes A->B, B->C and C->D respectively. The probability distributions 
in the CPTs are generated using standard normal distributions with a standard deviation of 0.15. 
22 The values of all the nodes in the network are in the form of discrete distributions. For the present work, 
the term ‗uncertainty‘ as used here refers to the spread /range of the states for a given node where the 
cumulative probability value of the marginal posterior distribution ranges from 0.05 to 0.95   
23 This would be feasible provided the system does not suffer any degradation in the long run, which in 
turn would render the maps/ CPTs involved in inferring the desired value inaccurate. The same caveat 
would also need to hold true for the sensors that are used to set evidence during the inferencing process. 
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4.4.2. Node Distance 
Correlating all the variables of interest in the system using a Bayesian network 
allows the use of any variable to infer the value of any other variable in the network (by 
setting the former as evidence and using probabilistic propagation to infer the latter). 
However, the inferred value (and the uncertainty in it) can be heavily influenced by the 
number of intermediate links between the evidence node and the query node. Consider 
the network in Figure 4-9 (a). Suppose the sensor corresponding to node S3 has failed but 
all the other sensors are operating correctly. Given the network structure, it is possible to 
use the data from any of the remaining sensors S1 to S5 to set a state of their 
corresponding nodes as evidence and infer the value of S3. Intuitively, it can be expected 
that the uncertainty in the inferred value of S3 
will be the least when the value of S2 is used 
as evidence as there is only one intermediate 
link between S2 and S3. In this case, the 
uncertainty in the inferred value is dictated by 
the uncertainty in the process S2->S3. This 
relation between S2 and S3 is encoded in the 
CPT of S3 i.e. P(S3|S2). Now, if the data from 
the sensor corresponding to the node S1 is 
used to infer the value of S3, then the final value is influenced by the uncertainties in two 
intermediate processes i.e. S1->S2 and S2-> S3. In this case, the value of the node S3 will 
be calculated using the chain rule of probability as P(S3|S1)= P(S3|S2).P(S2|S1).P(S1). Since 
0≤ P(.|.)≤1, the value of P(S3|S1) ≤ P(S3|S2). In general, in the latter case, the probability 
distribution is spread over more states of the node S3 with a lower probability value for 
each individual state. Thus, the farther the away the evidence node SE is from the query 
node SQ, the greater is the potential uncertainty in the inferred value of SQ since each 
local inference introduces additional uncertainty/deviation in the final value24. This effect 
                                                 
24 The actual uncertainty will depend on the level of discretization, CPTs, etc. of the intermediate nodes 
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may be quantified by using the concept of Node Distance (ND) for a single evidence 
node and query node. 
 
Definition 4.1: Node Distance (ND) may be defined as the shortest possible path25 
between an evidence node SE and a query node SQ along a directed path between the two.  
 
Using the notation NDSE, SQ the value of node distance can be calculated in terms of the 
number of intermediate links connecting the sequence of adjacent node pairs between SE 
and SQ. For instance, in Figure 4-9 (a) considering the nodes S3 and S5, the node distance 
is NDS3, S5=2. Similarly, NDS4, S5=1. As the value of ND increases, the greater is the 
potential uncertainty in the inferred value. This may be a guideline used by the system 
operator when determining which of the operational sensors may be used to infer an 
unavailable value.  
However, caution must be exercised since the concept of ND may not work well 
for certain types of network structures. Consider the network in Figure 4-9 (b). Suppose 
the sensor corresponding to S3 is determined to be faulty. Any of the remaining sensors 
may be used to determine the value of S3. In this case, it must be noted that even though 
there is only one link connecting any of the nodes Si, where i=1, 2, 4, 5 to S3 (i.e. NDSi, 
S3=1) the uncertainty in the final value of S3 will be different depending on which of the 
nodes is used as evidence. In this case the uncertainty in the inferred value would be 
dictated by the uncertainty in the relations S3->Si encoded in the respective conditional 
probability distributions i.e. P(Si|S3). For such network structures, the concept of link 
strength (Section 4.4.6) is more suitable. 
4.4.3. Sensor Health Status 
The primary goal of integrating sensors into any system is to provide real-time 
feedback on the measurands of interest for control purposes and enable the system to 
successfully accomplish its task (for instance, a quality joint position sensor is crucial for 
a robot to achieve the desired positioning accuracy in high precision manufacturing 
                                                 
25 Similar to the concept of geodesic distance in graph theory 
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tasks). An equally important task for both the essential and optional sensors in intelligent 
systems is to enable monitoring of variations in parameters over an extended time by 
providing reliable and accurate data to periodically update the relevant performance 
maps. The goal is to track the overall health of the system using condition based 
maintenance algorithms [Hvass and Tesar, 2004] [Shakkari and Tesar, 2008] to ensure 
continued availability of the system as well as to assist the human decision maker in 
determining the ability of the system to accomplish the required tasks. The implicit 
assumption for the above objectives is that all sensors are operating as per their 
design/operational specifications and the data obtained from them is always dependable.  
A sensor can be considered ‗healthy‘ if it produces an output signal proportional 
to the input stimulus, within an acceptable amount of deviation as dictated by the sensor 
physics, resolution, accuracy, application requirements, etc. However, as mentioned 
earlier, the output from the sensors can be affected during regular operation by a number 
of factors. The effects of these are manifested as undesirable deviations in the sensor 
output like drift, bias, excessive signal noise, etc. Such phenomena may be considered as 
faults in a sensor that occur intermittently or they may occur consistently over an 
extended period indicating the development of gradual sensor faults. In the extreme case, 
there may be a complete loss of information from a sensor due to an abrupt failure of the 
sensing element or its peripherals like power/signal transmission lines, connectors, faults 
in the onboard signal processing circuits, etc. When the required sensor readings become 
unavailable or when erroneous sensor readings are used for control purposes, it may lead 
to undesirable system behavior.  
Furthermore, using data from faulty sensors to update performance maps, without 
checking for their validity will result in corruption of the stored maps. This in turn, may 
lead to false alarms and missed detection of system faults from the system-level CBM 
algorithms. In each situation, the health of all the sensors must therefore be taken into 
account by the system operator in deciding whether or not to utilize the data from a 
particular sensor. To this end, Chapter 5 presents the development of a novel Sensor and 
Process Fault Detection and Isolation (SPFDI) algorithm that can help quantify the 
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trustworthiness of the information from a sensor. This is achieved by correlating, via a 
Bayesian network, the information from all the sensors monitoring the system and 
calculating an intuitive metric representing the health of each sensor, that the decision 
makers can then use in their assessment. 
4.4.4. System Health Status 
An unanticipated deviation in a sensor‘s readings from its expected values under 
specific operating conditions may not necessarily be due to a fault in the sensor itself or 
in any of its peripherals for that matter, but may be indicative of a more serious, potential 
fault in the monitored system itself. For instance, consider an electric motor used in a 
harsh environment and monitored using accelerometers and a torque sensor as optional 
sensors, in addition to position, current and voltage sensors as the essential sensors for 
control and commutation. In such applications, there may be a high potential for dirt and 
other debris entering into the motor shaft bearings and causing damage to the rolling 
elements within a relatively short duration of time. A damaged bearing within the motor 
may lead to significant ripple in the output torque as well as excessive vibrations and 
acoustic noise. The effect of the flawed bearing would thus be observed as large spikes in 
the readings from the accelerometers and the torque sensor. Although such a fault would 
be eventually detected by the higher level CBM algorithms monitoring the motor, such a 
diagnosis would be obtained only after a more extended period of monitoring, by which 
time the fault may have seriously affected the system capability and life. Without any 
knowledge of the system status, the unusual sensor readings may wrongly be construed as 
potential faults in the associated sensors (for instance, if simple limit checking is used to 
validate the sensor readings). Hence it is necessary to make at least a preliminary 
assessment of the system‘s health status, based on the sample of data available at a given 
instant from all the sensors monitoring the system.  
A solution to this issue is again provided by using the Bayesian network 
framework to model the system and correlate the measurands. The SPFDI algorithm 
presented in Chapter 5 can not only provide a quantitative measure of a sensor‘s health 
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(to enable a correct judgment by the operator in deciding whether or not to utilize the data 
available from the sensor), but can also provide a similar quantitative measure for the 
various processes that occur in the system. These processes, symbolized by links in the 
network, represent the roles played by the different components of the system in the 
transformation of one variable to another. Hence, any undue change in a particular 
process can be deemed to be indicative of a potential fault with the components of the 
system associated with that process. The challenge here is to distinguish if the deviations 
in the sensor readings are due to a change in the nature of one or more processes or if it is 
the result of flawed sensors. If it can be determined with some degree of belief that the 
cause of undue variation in the sensor readings is a process in the system and not the 
sensor, this can help alert the system operator to monitor the outputs from the system 
level CBM algorithm more closely to determine the system availability. 
4.4.5. Resource Availability 
In most applications, following some preliminary processing at the sensor-level, 
the signals from all the sensors monitoring the system are sent to a central location for 
further processing or for use in deriving higher level information. This configuration is 
commonly observed in PC-based data acquisition and control of systems like EMAs, 
mobile robots, etc. With a limited number of sensors, a point-to-point connection 
technique is sufficient to connect the sensors directly to the PC without significant design 
or hardware overhead. However, such an arrangement requires complex cabling 
arrangements. Hence a bus topology is often utilized wherein all the sensors use a 
common set of resources for data transmission [Frank, 2000]. In a digital fieldbus system, 
multiple sensors are connected via shared digital communication lines (thereby reducing 
the number of cables) to transmit/receive data more efficiently on an as-needed basis 
[Potter, 1998][Pal and Rakshit, 2004] [Pitzek and Elmenreich, 2003]. When such an 
arrangement is utilized, the cumulative data bandwidth and latency26 required for all the 
                                                 
26 The term bandwidth here refers to the amount of sensor data that is transmitted in a specified time period 
whereas latency refers to how quickly the data transfer occurs. 
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sensors being considered plays a significant role in the selection of the appropriate bus27. 
This is largely dictated by factors like the type of the sensor output, the quantity of output 
data generated in a specific time period, the sampling rate used for the different sensors, 
mode of acquisition from multiple sensors (simultaneous/multiplexed), etc.  
Consider for example, a motor equipped with an incremental encoder producing 
10,000 counts per revolution (cpr) and rotating at a moderate speed, say, 600 rpm. This 
yields an output signal frequency of 0.1 MHz28. As the motor speed increases, the volume 
of output data from the encoder also increases. In addition, the motor may be 
instrumented with other sensors like current, voltage, temperature, etc. which may 
generate additional volumes of data.  To acquire all this information accurately, it needs 
to be sampled at a high rate29.  Hence, in addition to the transmission bandwidth, the data 
acquisition hardware also needs to be capable of handling the frequency requirements for 
sampling.  
With fewer sensors, the total bandwidth requirements are moderate and it may be 
possible to sample all the sensors simultaneously with the available data bus and 
acquisition hardware resources. However, if the system has a large number of sensors 
which also need to be sampled at high rates, the number of high-speed data acquisition 
channels required increases (to accommodate the increased bandwidth/sampling 
requirements) which typically leads to a higher overall costs. Often as a compromise 
between cost and performance requirements, a limited number of data acquisition 
channels are used (capable of handling large amounts of data at high frequencies) and the 
available resources are distributed across all the sensor channels, by using a lower 
sampling rate, polling the sensors periodically instead of continuous acquisition, etc.  
                                                 
27 A variety of sensor level communication buses, each with different bandwidth and data transmission 
capabilities, are used in industry. These range from serial interfaces such as RS-232, RS-422 and RS-485  
to more advanced buses such as PCI,  PXI, USB, Actuator Sensor-interface (AS-i), Local Operating 
Network (LON) [Pratt, 2004], Controller Area Network (CAN) [Zhang et al., 2004], Bidirectional 
Synchronous-Serial sensor interface (BiSS)  [Quasdorf, 2003], Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) [Zhou and 
Mason, 2002], Highway Addressable Remote Transducer (HART) protocol [Helson, 2004], etc. 
28 Based on f = [(cpr) x(rpm)]/60 
29 To accurately measure this data, it needs to be sampled at a rate greater than at least twice the highest 
frequency of interest, based on the Nyquist sampling criterion. This is done to prevent phenomena like 
aliasing where false frequency components may appear in the sampled signals 
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The use of a Bayesian network to model the system allows the flexibility of 
inferring value of any node/variable in the network (query) using the value of any other 
node/variable (evidence) in an inferencing process (Section 2.6). This capability can be 
exploited for managing the available resources (bandwidth/sampling rate capability) in 
certain operating regimes of the system, where it may not be possible to accurately 
acquire data from sensors with demanding requirements (i.e. those that require a high 
bandwidth/sampling rate). For instance, in the example cited earlier, if the motor rotates 
at 6000 rpm, the output frequency from the encoder rises to 1 MHz. If the associated data 
bus and acquisition hardware are capable of accommodating only 0.5 MHz, it might be 
more prudent to allocate the available resources to sensors with modest resource 
requirements, say, the voltage sensors which need to be sampled at only 1kHz to acquire 
their output data with the best possible resolution/sampling rates. This data may then be 
used to infer the values of other variables that have higher bandwidth/sampling rate needs 
such as motor speed and position (within reasonable accuracy) using a Bayesian network 
that includes the motor terminal voltage, speed and position as nodes30.  
4.4.6. Strength of Relationship between Nodes 
The structure of the Bayesian network explicitly represents the conditional 
dependencies/independencies between the different variables of interest in the system 
(nodes). The strength of these conditional relationships is encoded in the conditional 
probability parameters of the CPTs for all the non-root nodes in the network. However, in 
any system, a particular set of physical variables, say X, may have a greater influence on 
a set of variables Z than another set of variables Y. For instance, consider the effect of the 
components of the magnetic flux density Br (radial) and Bt (tangential) on the torque 
generated by the switched reluctance motor (Section 3.3.5). Both the components have a 
combined effect on the production of motor torque. However, Bt has a greater 
contribution as compared to Br towards producing useful motor torque whereas the radial 
                                                 
30 The caveat in using such an approach is that it assumes that the relations between the different variables 
as encoded in the parameters of the node CPTs (which are created from high quality performance maps 
data) remain the same even when the motor operates at high speeds. 
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component Br has a parasitic effect in that it contributes more towards the generation of 
acoustic noise rather than usable motor torque (Section 3.3.4). In such cases, in the 
scenario that information one or more sensors corresponding to the variables in Z 
becomes unavailable, it would be desirable to use the information available from the 
sensors corresponding to the variables in X rather than in the set Y, in order to infer the 
values of the variables of interest in the set Z. 
An approach using which the extent of such influence may be quantified is by 
using the concept of link and connection strengths. These measures were first introduced 
by [Boerlag, 1993] for Bayesian networks with binary nodes (two states). The connection 
strength measures the strength between any two nodes in the network (without 
accounting for the path between the two) whereas link strength (also referred to as arc 
weight by [Nicholson and Jitnah, 1999]) specifically calculates the strength along a 
particular link between two adjacent nodes31.   
Both these ideas were introduced initially as a way to improve the visualization of 
the network structure when learnt from data (for instance, using thicker links to represent 
stronger relationships) but were also later used to improve the efficiency of inferencing 
algorithms (for instance, by eliminating links arcs with insignificant weights) [Nicholson 
and Jitnah, 1999] [Ebert-Uphoff, 2007].  The connection and link strength are based on 
the information theory concepts of entropy and mutual information. The entropy and 
conditional entropy of a discrete random variable are given by [Ebert-Uphoff, 2007] as 
follows: 
            
  
          
              
  
        
Eq. (4-1) 
[Ebert-Uphoff, 2007] defines the connection strength between any two 
nodes/variables A and B in the network, as how strongly the knowledge of the state of A 
                                                 
31 [Jitnah and Nicholson, 1999] extended the basic idea of arc weight to include measures like the weight 
of a connected set or a cluster of nodes, the weight of a chain of nodes, the weight of a loop, etc. 
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affects the state of B and vice versa and quantifies it using the concept of mutual 
information as follows: 
                                       
      
        
 
   
 
Eq.(4-2) 
The link strength is defined specifically for the relation A->B (i.e. A is the parent and B is 
its child). If C represents the set of other parents of B where C={C1, C2…Cn} and c 
represents the set of states of all the nodes Ci, then the link strength is defined as 
[Nicholson and Jitnah, 1999]32 
                      
 
             
        




where Ppr is an approximation of the prior probability of the node being in a particular 
state and is approximated by averaging the conditional probabilities of that node over all 
its parent state combinations.  
For any application, the values of link strengths and connection strengths may be 
calculated between different sets of variables and used to determine the most appropriate 
sensors to use (i.e. if the corresponding nodes have high link/connection strengths 
indicating that the associated variables are strongly correlated) to infer the information 
corresponding to faulty or degrading sensors. 
4.4.7. Type of Query 
The Bayesian network compactly represents the joint probability distribution of 
all the variables represented by the nodes in the network. In other words, the network 
structure and the CPTs for the different nodes, represent a comprehensive database that 
can be queried in different ways to obtain different types of information regarding the 
system and its sensors. Depending on the application and the operating regime of the 
system, choosing the right type of query can provide information that is of greater value 
to the system operator for decision-making under the given circumstances. [Pearl, 1988] 
classifies these different types into two broad categories as belief updating and belief 
                                                 
32 [Ebert-Uphoff, 2007] refers to this measure as the ‗true average link strength‘ 
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revision. In belief updating, a measure of belief is associated with each individual 
proposition for every variable in the network and based on the available evidence, 
whereas in belief revision, the goal is to identify from each variable of interest, a 
composite set of propositions that can best explain the available evidence [Pearl, 1988]. 
The output of a belief revision process is thus a set of instantiations of the query 
variables, a list that may change as more and more evidence becomes available [Pearl, 
1988]. Thus, belief updating provides a local summary of the network whereas belief 
revision provides a more global explanation of the network.  
For any Bayesian network, it is possible to define four different types of queries 
as stated in [Darwiche, 2009]: probability of evidence, prior and posterior marginal 
distributions, Maximum Aposteriori Hypothesis (MAP), Most Probable Explanation 
(MPE). The probability of evidence query refers to the probability of an instantiation e, 
for a set of evidence variables E and given as P(E=e) [Darwiche, 2009]. Such a query 
may be used to address the duty cycle characteristics of the variables of interest 
(typically, these are the control variables) in the system. For instance, in the Bayesian 
network shown in Figure 3-2, this query may help answer operator questions of the type 
‗what is the probability of the PWM duty cycle being 5 %‘. 
For a joint probability distribution of n variables, given by P(X1=x1, X2=x2, 
…Xn=xn) = P(x1, x2,…xn), the marginal distribution is a projection of this distribution on 
a smaller set of variables (i.e. P(x1, x2,…xm) where m ≤ n ) and is given by [Darwiche]: 
                          
       
 
Eq.(4-4) 
In belief updating, the most common type is the posterior marginal query 
P(Q=q|E=e) where Q represents one or more query nodes whose values are to be 
determined and E is the set of evidence nodes whose values are observed and instantiated 
to the values e33. This value can be calculated by modifying Eq.(4-4) as follows 
[Darwiche, 2009]: 
                                                 
33 If the marginal distribution is calculated in the absence of evidence, it is called a ‗prior marginal‘. 
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Eq.(4-5) 
For instance, in the network shown in Figure 3-2, such a query may help answer operator 
questions of the form ‗what is the probability of the motor producing 1.2 Nm torque for a 
PWM duty cycle of 5 % and PWM frequency of 10 kHz?‘; i.e. the query enables the 
calculation of P(T=1.2 |DC=5, FR=10). Such queries are important when the operator is 
concerned only about a specific physical variable in the network for decision making. 
For a set of variables X, the MAP query determines the most probable 
instantiations for a specific set of query variables Q (where Q   X), given the evidence 
E=e and is defined as [Darwiche, 2009]: 
                       Eq.(4-6) 
where, argmaxq f(q) indicates the assignment of values of q for which f(q) is maximal 
(note that this is not the same as maximizing the posterior marginals of individual nodes). 
However, it must be noted that there may be more than one such possible set of 
instantiations which has the maximum probability. In Figure 3-2, such a query may help 
answer operator questions of the form ‗what level of torque and acoustic noise level is the 
motor likely to produce for a PWM duty cycle of 5 % and PWM frequency of 10 kHz?‘. 
MAP queries are important when the operator is concerned about multiple objectives 
simultaneously and needs to judge if the behavior of a specific group of variables in the 
network is consistent with other available knowledge for the purpose of decision making.  
For instance, in an application such as an EMA used in submarines, the system operator 
may be concerned with commanding the EMA to generate maximum torque while 
producing minimum acoustic noise at the same time. Based on other measurements like 
current, voltage, etc. the operator may be able to decide using the MAP query on a 
Bayesian network of the system if the projected torque and noise values are plausible. 
The MPE query is a special case of the MAP query, where the goal is to determine 
the most probable instantiations for all the non-evidence variables (i.e. the query 
variables are all the unobserved, non-evidence variables). In other words, given a set of 
evidence values E=e, the objective is to find a consistent set of values for all the other 
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variables in X i.e. {X1=x1, X2=x2,…Xn=xn} which represent most probable instantiations 
of those variables. The instantiation x1, x2,…xn is then referred to as the most probable 
explanation given the evidence e. The MPE query can be defined as [Darwiche, 2009]: 
                       Eq.(4-7) 
Again, there may be more than one set of instantiations x that maximize the posterior 
probability. In general, MPE queries are simpler to determine algorithmically than MAP 
queries [Darwiche, 2009]34. MPE queries are important when the system operator would 
like to determine the most probable behavior for all the variables of interest in the system, 
considered simultaneously, given the knowledge of specific variables (typically the 
control variables) in the network and examine if they are consistent with the available 
information for decision making. This may be important in a task like updating multiple 
performance maps for CBM of the different components in an EMA based on limited 
sources of measurable information.  
4.4.8. Computational Complexity 
As seen in Section 4.3, when a Bayesian network is developed for any 
application, the resultant topology depends completely on which criteria are accorded 
importance for that application. For very large or complex systems like aircraft, it may be 
simpler to design separate networks for each subsystem and analyze them separately, to 
avoid an overwhelmingly complex network structure for the whole system. When 
software like AMOS (Appendix C) is developed for Bayesian networks based decision-
making [Ashok and Tesar, 2007], a diverse suite of inferencing algorithms is therefore 
typically incorporated into it for utmost flexibility in handling different network 
topologies and other application-specific operational constraints.   
                                                 
34 Although the inference algorithms presented in Chapter 2 may be used to compute MAP instantiations 
(by computing posterior marginals and selecting the instantiation with the maximum probability), as 
described in [Darwiche, 2009], such an approach has exponential complexity as the number of MAP 
variables increases. For a detailed description of the different algorithms that may be used to calculate the 




For a simple casual chain (Figure 4-10 (a)), the values for different nodes may be 
calculated by repeated application of Bayes‘ theorem. For polytrees (Figure 4-10(b)), 
exact inferencing may be performed by local computations and message passing between 
nodes (Pearl‘s algorithm). For multiply connected networks (Figure 4-10(c)), exact 
inferencing may still be applied by using clustering, conditioning, variable elimination, 
etc. 
Although exact algorithms 
provide the greatest precision, applying 
such algorithms to even moderately 
complex or densely connected networks 
may require an exorbitant amount of 
computation/time and memory or in 
some cases may be unable to even 
complete [Cheng and Druzdel, 2000]. In 
such cases, approximate inferencing is 
used. Approximate algorithms (stochastic simulations, model simplification, etc.) provide 
a tradeoff for speed against precision and for very complex networks may be the only 
viable option. Stochastic simulation methods like Likelihood Weighting generate an 
imprecise answer quickly and refine it iteratively. The accuracy of results obtained from 
such algorithms generally improves as the number of samples generated increases35.  
In some applications, real-time operation is a binding constraint. In such cases, 
the utility of a computed result is estimated not only on the basis of its accuracy but also 
on the timeliness with which it is obtained. The utility is considered to degrade (even if 
the result is highly accurate) as time progresses beyond a predetermined deadline 
(application-specific) [Guo and Hsu, 2002]. The extent to which such real-time 
constraints can be satisfied is, in turn, dictated by factors like choosing the most suitable 
algorithm for a particular network topology (for instance, both exact and approximate 
                                                 
35 For instance, if the KL divergence is used as a measure of convergence, then its value decreases as the 







Figure 4-10: Computational Complexity for 
Different Network Structures 









algorithms may be used for the structure in Figure 4-10(b)), the granularity of 
discretization for the different nodes (for instance, see [deSantana, et. al. 2007]), the 
efficiency of implementation (coding) of different algorithms in the operational software 
(optimized implementations with efficient coding tend to have faster execution times), 
etc. An important factor in most cases are the computational resources (time/space) 
available to execute these algorithms36. 
Though stochastic sampling algorithms are largely impervious to network size or 
topology, the number of samples that need to be generated to achieve the desired 
accuracy while satisfying real-time operational constraints may still be a challenge for 
large networks (the execution time tends to be directly proportional to the number of 
samples as well as the number of nodes and their interconnections)[Cheng and Druzdel, 
2000]. For laboratory test set-ups, it may be possible to implement inferencing algorithms 
on computers with fast, dedicated processors and ample memory. Alternatively 
inferencing code may be implemented via parallel processing on multiple processor cores 
or distributed/cloud computing. In such cases, it may be feasible to provide real-time 
operation even for very large networks with highly discretized nodes. However, the same 
may not be true if the algorithms have to be executed on a system with restricted/ shared 
computational resources (for instance, a mobile robot where the available on-board 
computation resources have to be shared and allocated between many navigation, control, 
and communication functions). To account for such scenarios, the decision maker may 
use one of the many approaches described below to decide on an appropriate compromise 
between the available computational resources and the operational requirements. 
Stochastic sampling algorithms are considered to be anytime algorithms. They 
can be interrupted at any point in time to yield an approximate result. If these are the 
algorithms of choice based on the network topology, then the decision-maker may vary 
the number of samples needed (based on suitable convergence criterion like the KL 
divergence) to satisfy the real-time execution constraint at the expense of some loss of 
                                                 
36 The available computational resources and the resulting time/space tradeoff in the efficiency of 
algorithm execution can also be considered as an important criterion that may be used while designing the 
network topology (in addition to others described in Section 4.3) 
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accuracy. Alternatively, the decision-maker may also use domain characterization metrics 
as proposed by [Jitnah and Nicholson, 1998] as a basis to compare the execution 
characteristics of different inferencing algorithms on an existing network structure to aid 
in the selection of the most appropriate one. These include metrics for individual nodes 
(CPT skewness, maximum and average distance of a node from other nodes, node 
distance from query nodes) as well as for the entire network (size of state space, number 
of nodes and links, maximum and average state space size, connectedness = 
#arcs/#nodes, maximum and average CPT size, maximum and average number of parents 
etc.). The metrics may be used to generate a look up table beforehand characterizing the 
performance of the available suite of algorithms and then used by the decision-maker to 
select the most appropriate algorithm based on the task requirements at any given time37. 
A similar approach to prior offline compilation of algorithm execution profiles and their 
associated mapping to domain characteristics is also proposed by [Borghetti, 1996] 
Other techniques may also be used to adaptively allocate the available computing 
time/memory when the system is in operation. Techniques such as recursive conditioning 
[Allen and Darwiche, 2003] provide an any-space approach (where the performance of an 
algorithm improves with increasing memory beyond a minimum requirement) to exact 
inferencing by utilizing conditioning to decompose a network into smaller sub-networks 
that are again solved independently and recursively. [Ramos and Cozman, 2005] provide 
another alternative approach termed as the adaptive conditioning framework to provide a 
tradeoff between time, space and quality of results obtained by decomposing the network 
into sub-networks and allocating different exact/approximate algorithms to process the 
sub-networks. 
4.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
With the use of multiple sensors to monitor a system like an intelligent EMA, 
there is a clear need for a criteria-based resource management framework that can help 
                                                 
37 This may also be represented as performance map (for a specific algorithm like Likelihood weighting). 
For example, a map may be generated with algorithm execution time, memory required and state space size 
of network as the three axes. 
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decide upon and best utilize the available sensing resources at any given time, without 
compromising on the overall system performance. 
This encompasses facets like deciding on the sensors needed to respond to 
changes in the monitored system and its environment, correlating multiple sources of 
information in the best possible manner, providing redundancy to ensure constant 
availability of information (under partial or complete sensor failures) and adapting the 
usage of available sensing and computational resources to changing task requirements 
while concurrently keeping the costs and complexity involved to a minimum. Based on 
the choice of a Bayesian network based methodology to address the above issues, this 
chapter explored some criteria that could be utilized to improve both the design as well as 
operational use of such networks. 
To enable the domain expert involved in designing the Bayesian network for a 
system to develop a compact, more usable and efficient network topology, a preliminary 
list of ten design criteria were described in the different sub-sections of Section 4.3 and 
are summarized in Table 4-2. More such criteria may be defined for future applications 
based on the domain-specific requirements. 
  Once a representative Bayesian network for a system has been formulated (with 
the requisite sensors integrated into the system), to assist the system operator make the 
best use of the available set of sensors and network topology in concert with the available 
computational resources (prioritizing sensors to adapt to varying task demands, 
accommodate failed sensors, limited bandwidth availability, inferencing algorithms best 
suited to meet operational constraints, etc.), a preliminary list of eight operational criteria 
were discussed in the different sub-sections of Section 4.4 and are summarized in Table 
4-3.  
  Two of these criteria (viz. sensor health status and system health status) will be 
explored in greater detail in Chapter 5. As in the case of design criteria, numerous other 




Table 4-2: Design Criteria (for a system and its Bayesian network representation) 





Any application environment consists of sensors that are essential for 
operation as well as additional optional sensors. The total number of 
nodes in the Bayesian network is dictated by the number of sensors 






The number of sensors used in any application is dictated by the form 
factor of available sensors, cabling, etc. that satisfy the size and 
volume constraints imposed by the application. These design 
constraints thus play a vital role in determining the size of the 
Bayesian network by influencing the sensors that can be actually used 
in the application. 
4.3.2 
3 Overall Costs 
The overall costs associated with sensors and peripheral equipment 
like data acquisition hardware, power supplies, etc. may influence 
which sensors are integrated into a system and hence influence the 






The relative importance of a sensor or a subset of sensors in any 
application may be used to determine the direction and number of the 
links between the nodes. This allows the manipulation of network 




Type of Data 
Available 
The availability of data in specific formats (for instance, due to 
experimental constraints) influences the manner in which the 
conditional independencies between variables can be represented (i.e. 
which nodes in the network may be linked as well as the direction of 
the arcs) and how the CPTs for different nodes can be populated 
4.3.5 
6 Causality 
Causal relations between physical variables can be used to determine 
the node ordering, the direction of links and the level of 
interconnectedness in a Bayesian network. The use of causality can 






The number of distinct states into which each node in the network can 
be discretized is driven by application requirements. The granularity 
of discretization in turn influences the quality of results obtained 
using the network, speed of execution of inferencing algorithms, 





All the sensors are not equally reliable (different susceptibility to 
temperature, shock/vibrations, etc.). The operational history for 
sensors may be used to direct links from nodes representing the most 
reliable sensors to ensure constant availability of information in case 





The size of CPTs grows exponentially in the number of node parents, 
degree of interlinking and the granularity of discretization of node 
states. The associated memory requirements must be considered to 
satisfy constraints on availability of resources (storage), real-time 
operation requirements, etc. 
4.3.9 
10 Intended Use 
Modifications such as adding additional nodes or links (or pruning 
existing nodes/links) in a network structure may be needed to satisfy 
specific requirements for the application (for example, fault detection 




Table 4-3: Operational Criteria (for a system and its Bayesian network representation) 




Depending on the accuracy of the sensor used for a specific 
measurand, the operator may choose to use the value of sensor 
reading directly or infer the value of the measurand via the 
Bayesian using the readings from the other sensors as evidence. 
4.4.1 
2 Node Distance 
The uncertainty in the inferred value of a variable is influenced by 
the number of intermediate nodes/links between the evidence 
node/s and the query node. In general, the greater the separation, 





With any unforeseen variations (drift, bias, excessive noise) in the 
readings from a sensor or a subset of sensors, the system operator 
needs to be able to determine if the readings are indicative of one or 






Unanticipated deviations in sensor readings may not necessarily be 
due to a faulty sensor but may be indicative of a more serious, 
potential fault in one or more of the monitored system‘s sub-
components. A preliminary assessment of system health is therefore 





Different sensors may need to be used in different system operating 
regimes (to provide the value for a specific variable via direct 
measurement or by inferencing using the Bayesian network) in 
accordance with the bandwidth, sampling rates, etc. that are 






Some variables/nodes in the network may be more strongly 
correlated (or may have a direct causal influence) as compared to 
others. The strength of these relationships (quantified using the 
concepts of link strength and connection strength) may be used to 
determine which set of nodes are more appropriate for use as 
evidence for a particular set of query variables. 
4.4.6 
7 Type of Query 
The topology of the Bayesian network along with the conditional 
probability distributions of the different nodes represents a 
comprehensive database for a system which can be queried in 
multiple ways (probability of evidence, prior and posterior 
marginals, MAP, MPE) to obtain different types of information 





Based on the network topology, discretization of the nodes, 
available computational resources, real-time operation 
requirements, etc. the operator may decide on the appropriate exact 
or approximate inferencing algorithm to use, number of samples to 





Chapter 5. Sensor and Process Fault Detection and Isolation 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 The benefits of employing performance maps and envelopes for human-directed 
decision-making in complex systems1 with multiple inputs and multiple outputs (like 
industrial and mobile robots, aircraft, electric vehicles, manufacturing cells, etc.), have 
been described in-depth in [Tesar, 2009][Ashok and Tesar, 2007][Yoo and Tesar, 2006]. 
The system level controllers as well as the human operator, who makes the final 
decisions regarding the system operation, rely on these maps and envelopes to guide their 
choices. The maps are also used to continuously track the health of the system for 
condition based maintenance [Hvass and Tesar, 2004] and hence need to be periodically 
updated (ideally in real-time) in order to accurately reflect the extant operating 
conditions. To achieve the aforementioned capabilities, often a suite of multiple sensors 
is integrated into such systems in order to track the many physical parameters associated 
with regular operation. The use of any erroneous data in the updating process may result 
in corruption of these maps, which in turn may lead to incorrect operational decisions 
being made by the operator or result in false alarms being raised during condition 
monitoring. It may also result in unpredictable system behavior with potentially 
damaging consequences.  
 Accurate and dependable sensor data is thus of vital importance. With any 
unexpected deviations in the sensor readings from their theoretical or predicted values, 
the challenge is thus to determine if it simply indicates a change in the operational state 
of the system, if they are the result of an anomaly in any of the sensors or if they are 
indicative of a more serious issue in the monitored system itself. If the source of variation 
in the sensor readings can be determined with some level of certainty, then it is possible 
to quantify and incorporate this knowledge to provide additional guidance in decisions 
like whether or not a particular sensor can be considered operational, if a particular 
sensor is trustworthy enough for updating the maps or inferring other related parameters, 
                                                 
1 In this report, the system refers to an intelligent EMA 
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whether the source of variation can be localized to a particular component of the system, 
etc. The Bayesian causal network framework developed thus far allows the different 
system parameters to be correlated in a physically meaningful way, while also explicitly 
accounting for the uncertainties in each of them. In addition, the framework also allows 
the use of prescribed methods to quantify, propagate and combine these uncertainties. All 
these characteristics can be harnessed to achieve the objectives mentioned above. Section 
5.2 aims to provide the motivation for fault detection and isolation. Section 5.3 discusses 
the types of faults in the context of the present work and outlines the typical steps needed 
for any fault detection and isolation procedure, followed by a review of different existing 
approaches. In Section 5.4, a novel procedure based on Bayesian networks is presented to 
help distinguish between deviations in readings caused by faults in the sensors and those 
caused by faults in the monitored system. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 demonstrate the 
application of the algorithm using different examples, including some special cases which 
require specific modifications to the algorithm. Section 5.7 highlights some factors which 
may affect the working of the algorithm and its final results. Finally, Section 5.8 briefly 
addresses the significance of the algorithm results in updating the available information 
regarding the system operation (i.e. performance maps/decision surfaces). 
5.2. SENSOR ISSUES 
Sensor outputs are based on specific changes in the physical/ electrical properties 
of their primary sensing elements, proportional to a physical input (for instance, a change 
in the resistance of strain gages in response to load). Typically, most sensors produce an 
analog voltage or current output. Inbuilt circuits in the sensors or in data acquisition 
systems have some form of signal conditioning, A/D conversion, digital signal 
processing, etc. that digitizes this output for use by the system controller. Although the 
integrity of data finally obtained depends on each of the above steps, with most state of 
the art sensors, the final signal is a realistic representation of the original signal.  
However, any change in the characteristics of the sensing element itself (due to 
wear, aging, etc.) may cause the sensor readings to deviate from their ideal values (i.e. 
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values that should be obtained under a given input as per the calibration). In addition, 
despite significant advances in technology, many sensors still remain vulnerable to 
factors like drastic changes in the operating environment, loose connectors, excessive 
temperatures etc. Another common source of variation in sensor readings is electrical 
noise that is picked up during transmission from the sensor to the data acquisition system 
or as a result of close proximity to components like electric prime movers, switching 
power supplies, etc. The effect of such noise is observed in the form of random, high 
frequency fluctuations in the sensor output signal. The resultant deviation in sensor 
readings can be classified into one of the following categories [Brignell and White, 1996] 
 Bias or Offset: Bias is the difference between the theoretical and the actual sensor 
output value under the specified operating conditions. It can be considered as a 
constant value that gets added to the output value at every instant. Offset is the 
sensor output that exists when it should actually be zero. 
 
 
    
 Bias Drift Precision Degradation 
(or Noise) 
Complete Failure 
Figure 5-1: Types of Sensor Faults 
 Drift: Drift is the gradual increase or decrease in the sensor readings (compared to 
its theoretical output) over an extended period. Drift usually occurs due to slow 
changes in the sensing element itself due to factors like wear, aging, improper 
installation, etc.  
 Cross Sensitivity: This is the result of the sensing element responding to some 
physical phenomenon in addition to its primary measurand. The most common 
form of this behavior is with temperature. Other types of cross-sensitivities may 













































careful design ensures that only the response to the desired measurand is 
maximized. 
 Failure: A failure can be further classified into gradual, abrupt/complete or 
intermittent failure. Gradual failure may be seen in the form of increasing drift or 
bias in the readings. An abrupt failure is an obvious fault mode where there is no 
change in the sensor output in accordance with the input stimuli or there is no 
output from the sensor even in the presence of an actual input. This may be the 
result of a sudden shock impact on the sensor or a spike in the sensor supply 
voltage either of which may damage its internal components permanently. A 
failed connector may also be the cause of abrupt loss of sensor data even though 
the sensor itself may not be faulty. Intermittent failure is often referred to as 
‗precision degradation‘ in the literature. The effect of this is observed in the form 
of excessive noise in the sensor readings in certain operating regimes. 
5.3. FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION 
A sensor may be potentially faulty2 if its output exhibits a behavior similar to 
those shown in Figure 5-1. The simplest way to ensure no sensor faults occur in a 
laboratory set-up is by regular recalibration. But this is often not feasible in systems like 
an EMA once it is deployed in an application environment. Another approach would be 
one of fault prevention through over-design. In the simplest form, this takes the form of 
physical hardware redundancy (using multiple sensors of the same kind) and the use of a 
majority voting scheme to rule out flawed sensors and to use the data from the ones that 
are not faulty (assuming that all the sensors do not develop faults at the same time).  
Again, this is typically not a favored option in many cases due to factors like 
increased system complexity, size limitations, increased cost, etc. If multiple sensors 
cannot be used for each measurand, then the next best option could be to make each 
sensor intelligent enough to monitor its own characteristics and provide good data at all 
times. The SEVA (Self-Validation) concept proposed by [Henry, et. al. 1993] is based on 
                                                 
2 The term ‗sensor fault‘ as used in the context of this work is defined in detail in section 5.3.4. 
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the idea that, given sufficient on-board processing capabilities, a sensor can be made 
intelligent enough to provide more useful information than a simple measured value. 
SEVA devices are stand-alone in the sense that they monitor their own performance, 
validate the quality of data and provide a standard, formatted quality index for every 
measurement value. Such a device can provide enormous flexibility. With such sensors, 
the algorithms at the system level become much simpler since the liability of the data has 
already been assessed and characterized in a standardized fashion. It can also help in 
early detection and accommodation of recoverable sensor failures (with a reduced 
potential for permanent damage). However, such devices are far and few between and not 
very widely available. Thus, it is clear that there is a need for an analytical method to 
detect the occurrence and identify the source of faults in sensor data.  
5.3.1. Issues in Fault Detection and Isolation Procedures 
The underlying assumption in many approaches used for sensor fault detection is 
that the monitored system is operating normally and the unusual sensor readings are 
purely due to a sensor fault e.g. [Ibarguengoytia, 2003]. However, there may be cases 
where the fault doesn‘t lie in the sensor and its atypical behavior is caused by unforeseen 
changes in the monitored system (or any of its components). For instance, a fault in a 
motor winding increases its resistance which may be reflected in the form of a drop in the 
current drawn for a given supply voltage (V=IR). This situation would be reflected as a 
drop in the output of the current sensor which may be misinterpreted as a bias even 
though the sensor is operating correctly.  
On the other hand, condition based maintenance algorithms that are used at the 
system level e.g. [Hvass and Tesar, 2004], while estimating the existing condition of the 
system, make the implicit assumption that all the sensors that are monitoring the system 
are operating correctly3. In such cases, using data from sensors with faults can result in 
incorrect estimates of the monitored system‘s capabilities and cause false alarms with 
regards to its estimated health or remaining useful life. In the worst case scenario, a 
                                                 
3 Many CBM algorithms try to accommodate the presence of noise in sensor readings, typically as a zero 
mean, normally distributed value that is added to the actual reading 
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sensor as well as the system it is monitoring may be developing incipient faults and it 
may be impossible to distinguish between the two. Finally, a change in sensor readings 
might be simply due to a regular change in the operating conditions of the system e.g. 
change in the output of the speed sensor, when a motor controller ramps up the motor 
speed from standstill to its rated speed. But abnormal sensor behavior may sometimes be 
masked by such subtle changes in operating conditions, especially for anomalies like 
drift. The conundrum for any analytical procedure that is used to identify and mitigate 
faulty sensor data is thus to distinguish between these different scenarios and identify 
with some level of confidence the precise source of abnormality in the sensor readings 
when they occur.  
5.3.2. Steps in a Fault Detection and Isolation Procedure 
[Aradhye and Heger, 2002] define the phrase ‗sensor fault detection, isolation and 
accommodation‘ to encompass the different facets of fault detection in sensors and 
summarize the requirements of the procedure as follows: 
 Identifying a fault in the sensor/s within the shortest period  
 Isolating the faulty sensor/s from the group of sensors in a system 
 Classifying the type of fault affecting the faulty sensor/s 
 Providing alternative values or estimates for the parameter under consideration, 
whose associated sensor is deemed to have failed 
The steps mentioned above are also collectively referred to as ‗sensor validation‘ by 
many researchers. From the perspective of the present work, the prime objective is to 
essentially determine whether or not the available sensor information can be used to 
update the stored performance maps. If it can be determined with some certainty that a 
deviation in a particular sensor‘s reading is due to a fault in the sensor, then data from 
that sensor will not be used to update a corresponding map. On the other hand, if it can be 
determined that a deviation in readings is due to a fault in the system, this would serve as 
additional knowledge that can be used by the higher level CBM algorithms (e.g. to 
increase the accuracy in localizing the cause of a fault to a particular system component) 
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and the sensor readings can still be used to update the stored maps to accurately reflect 
the extant system status. While the classification of the type of sensor fault may be 
important in some applications, it is considered of secondary importance in the present 
work and is not addressed here4. The framework adopted for fault detection and isolation 
is also capable of providing alternate estimates for physical parameters whose sensors are 
identified as being faulty. 
Identification of a potential fault in the sensor readings is usually done by 
monitoring the variable of interest, generating residuals between its theoretical value (i.e. 
the value that should ideally be indicated by the sensor under normal conditions) and the 
observed values (the value that is actually indicated by the sensor) and monitoring these 
residuals with respect to pre-defined thresholds that represent the acceptable range of 
values for these residuals e.g. [Abdelghani and Friswell, 2007]. In other cases, residuals 
are not calculated and other methods like comparing means or hypothesis testing are used 
[Ibarguengoytia, 2003] [O‘Reilly, 1998]. The estimation of the ideal value may be done 
in many ways based on the application- using look-up tables relating all the parameters of 
interest, tracking the measurand of interest over different time windows and using 
estimation algorithms like Kalman filtering (for sensors whose outputs can be modeled 
accurately) to create a validation gate or the region within which the sensor reading is 
expected to lie e.g. [Alag, et. al, 2001], or when multiple sensors are present in a system, 
by correlating the different measurands at various sampling instants, etc.  
In each case, the approach used is one of analytical redundancy via inferential 
sensors i.e. using sensors other than the primary sensor to infer the measurand under 
consideration [Xu and Kwan, 2003]. In its most intuitive form, such an approach requires 
the development of comprehensive mathematical models representing the relationships 
between the monitored parameters, which is not always feasible (due to the highly 
nonlinear and coupled nature of the physical variables involved) and in some cases may 
not be even possible. With multiple and diverse sensors in the system, the number of 
                                                 
4 Although it is possible to extend the Bayesian network based fault detection and isolation framework 
presented in Section 5.4 to do this. 
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relations that are needed to correlate them and that are needed to be evaluated 
simultaneously also increases5. In addition, the models are susceptible to errors (e.g. 
errors that may be introduced as a result of simplifying assumptions made during the 
modeling process) and may provide incorrect estimates of the parameter of interest. This 
may result in missed faults or false alarms. These models are often developed for a 
system under a specified set of conditions. Any change in the system characteristics may 
entail significant changes to be made to these models, which requires considerable time 
and expertise. 
5.3.3. Review of Existing Methods in the Use of Bayesian Belief Networks for Fault 
Detection and Isolation  
Different researchers have explored a diverse range of techniques to approach the 
problem of fault detection and isolation using analytical redundancy. These include fuzzy 
logic [Frolik, et. al. 2001], using the Nadaraya Watson statistical estimator [Wellington, 
et.al, 2002], Kalman filtering [Alag, et. al, 2001], using Principal Component Analysis 
[Dunia and Qin, 1997], using subspace model identification [Jiang, et. al., 2007]. 
Although each method has its own advantages (speed, accuracy, ease of implementation, 
etc.) and weaknesses (need for a system of mathematical models/equations, inability to 
detect multiple sensor faults, inability to distinguish between sensor and system faults, 
need to integrate different approaches together in the same application in order to 
accomplish different tasks like modeling, fault detection, fault isolation, etc.), the focus 
of this work is to use the Bayesian causal network framework developed in earlier 
chapters to accomplish these goals. This approach can provide a unified, data-driven 
framework for correlating the system variables in a physically meaningful manner (that 
can also be represented graphically for intuitive understanding) as well as perform fault 
detection, isolation and fault accommodation using the same framework. In addition, the 
existence of a well developed mathematical formalism based on probability theory, helps 
account for the nonlinearities and uncertainties associated with the system under 
                                                 
5 Even with the computing resources presently available, evaluating these models to produce estimates of 
the measurand of interest may be a computationally challenging task  
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consideration. The use of Bayesian networks in conjunction with or to augment other 
techniques for fault detection has been explored by researchers [Castanon, et. al., 2008], 
[Verron, S., et. al., 2008]. But the use of Bayesian causal networks seems to be more 
widespread in the area of fault diagnosis (with fault sources modeled explicitly) than in 
fault detection e.g. [Liu and Zhang, 2002], [Riascos, et. al, 2006], [Yongli et.al, 2006], 
[Mast, et.al, 1999]. The following section provides a brief overview of the use of 
Bayesian belief networks by researchers in various domains to address the issue of sensor 
fault detection and isolation. 
5.3.3.1. Approach I  
 [Bickmore, 1994] combined empirically derived mathematical relations with 
Bayesian belief 
networks to provide 
real-time validation 
capability for 
multiple channels of 
sensor data. The goal 
was to develop 
software to detect 
sensor failures on 
rocket engines in real 
time and avoid the 
engine controller 
from erroneously 
shutting down the 
engine by 
misinterpreting sensor failures as engine failures. The author presents an approach based 
on converting an undirected validation network, consisting of a set of sensors and the 









Figure 5-2 (a), for instance, shows the relation between pressure and flow sensors using 
the standard formula for fluid line resistance. The relations involving each sensor are 
evaluated and by thresholding on the residuals (between the calculated and the actual 
measured values) based on normal engine firing test data, the probabilities of the relations 
holding true are calculated. A sensor is then flagged as faulty or operating correctly based 
on the number of relations that involve the sensor under consideration and that hold true 
concurrently.  
The main characteristic of this approach is that it relies on the availability and 
accuracy of the analytical relations which are derived based on initial testing data which 
only represent the normal engine operating conditions. The results presented in this work 
demonstrated that successful distinction between a sensor and plant anomaly could be 
achieved only if all the relations held true and no single engine anomaly rendered all the 
relations involving a particular sensor to be invalid.   
5.3.3.2. Approach II  
[Aradhye, 1997] demonstrated the use of Bayesian networks (with both discrete 
and continuous-valued nodes for systems under steady state and using dynamic Bayesian 
networks, again with discrete and continuous-valued nodes, in conjunction  with different 
schemes like observers, neural networks, etc. for dynamic systems respectively) for 
sensor fault detection, isolation and accommodation using the basic model as shown in 
Figure 5-3. The three nodes represent the sensor status node (which indicates whether the 
sensor is faulty or operational), the process variable node (representing the theoretical or 
expected value of the measurand) and the measured sensor reading node (which 
represents the actual value of the measurand indicated by the sensor). The sensor readings 
available at any instant are set as evidence in the network and using standard propagation 
techniques, the probabilities of the two parent nodes are updated. If the objective is only 
to perform fault detection, two states {faulty, operational} are suggested for the sensor 
status node. To classify the specific type of fault occurring in the sensor, the use of four 
states for the sensor status node {normal, bias, precision degradation and complete 
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failure} was suggested. The distinctive choice of prior probabilities for each of these 
states was based on their mutually exclusive effects on the probability distribution of 
process variable node. As in the earlier case, the sensor readings available at any instant 
are instantiated as evidence and the updated probabilities of the various states of the 
sensor status node are used to identify and classify faults. The main feature of this 
approach is that the one-to-one mapping between the different modes of operation like 
normal, bias, etc. may not be always possible [Aradhye, 1997]. 
In addition, the use of continuous valued nodes required the linearization of the 
process model and the assumption of Gaussian distributions for all the continuous 
variables (both of which are not needed in case of discrete valued nodes which are purely 
based on available data). The use of observer and neural networks augmented schemes 
were also subject to errors arising from the accuracy of the observer, estimates of partial 
derivatives in the neural network, etc. as described in [Aradhye, 1997], thus necessitating 
the need for the parallel existence of 
multiple such schemes. For 
simultaneous detection of sensor and 
process faults, [Aradhye, 1997] 
suggests the use of additional nodes 
to model those faults. Since this 
means explicitly representing the 
fault as part of the network, it 
requires knowledge of the actual 
faults that affect the process and the effect of those faults on the process variables 
(reflected as a change in the conditional probability distributions of those variables). For 
instance, [Aradhye, 1997] uses a known analytical relation to model a leak fault that 
changes the relation between input and output temperatures in a chemical stirring 
process. However, such relations may not be always easily available to model the faults 
apriori. Despite these issues, this work presented a unified framework to perform sensor 
 
[Aradhye, 1997] 
Figure 5-3: Basic Bayesian Belief Network 
Unit for Sensor Fault Detection, 
Identification and Isolation  
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fault detection and classification as well as detecting a fault in the monitored system 
using Bayesian networks. 
5.3.3.3.Approach III  
 [Ibarguengoytia, et. al, 2005] identify and isolate the faulty sensors using two 
separate Bayesian networks. To identify a faulty sensor, the authors used the concept of 
an Extended Markov Blanket (EMB) i.e. the set of nodes consisting of the sensor being 
checked for fault and all the other 
sensors in its Markov Blanket (or 
MB- the set of nodes consisting of 
all the direct parents of a node, all 
the direct children of the node and 
all the spouses of the node i.e. the 
other direct parents of the direct 
children of the node). Each 
individual sensor is validated by 
instantiating the other sensors in its 
MB with the measured values 
indicated by those sensors. The order in which the sensors are evaluated is based on the 
contribution of each sensor to the overall entropy (in an information theory sense) of the 
system. By using two fault detection criteria (p value and mean) to compare measured 
and estimated values of the variables obtained by probabilistic propagation, a list of 
potentially faulty sensors is obtained. This set of potentially faulty sensors is then 
compared with a table of EMBs for each sensor and based on different levels of matching, 
one or more sensors may be identified as being faulty. 
The authors also outline the conditions, wherein multiple faults can be diagnosed 
or where the faults may be indistinguishable. Since the algorithm yields a list of 
potentially faulty variables only after a complete cycle of validation, to facilitate any time 
behavior, the authors propose the use of a second Bayesian network based on a canonical 
 
[Ibarguengoytia, et. al, 2005] 
Figure 5-4 : Use of Bayesian Networks for 
Sensor Validation in Gas Turbines  
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noisy-OR model [Pearl, 1988] and consisting of two levels of nodes- a root node level 
representing each individual variable and the real faults in them and a level representing 
apparent faults in the sensors (i.e. a sensor which may have been incorrectly deemed as 
faulty because of the existence of a real fault in one or more of the other sensors that were 
used to estimate its value during the fault detection process) with arcs from every root 
node to all the nodes in its EMB (Figure 5-4). For any-time validation, the authors 
develop and pre-compile a binary decision tree, where the links are again based on the 
variable that gives the best improvement in the average entropy of the system. The final 
result of validation is also validated using an entropy-based function. The authors 
demonstrate the effectiveness of their method by using it to validate a set of 21 
temperature sensors in the start-up phase of a gas turbine.  
The main features of the approach presented in [Ibarguengoytia, et. al, 2005] are 
its ease of implementation, the ability to detect multiple sensor faults under some 
conditions, and its any-time capability. However, the procedure assumes that any 
deviation in the sensor readings is exclusively due to a sensor fault and there are no 
changes in the monitored system itself. 
5.3.3.4. Approach IV  
 [Mehranbod, et. al. 2003] present the use of Bayesian belief networks (BBN) to 
perform sensor fault detection as well as identification. The authors propose a new single 
sensor BBN model similar to the model proposed by [Aradhye, 1997] and use it as a 
building block to develop a complete model for multiple sensors. The functional 
mathematical model used is Ra = Xa + Ba where Ra represents the sensor reading, Ba 
represents the bias and Xa is the actual value of the measurand (Figure 5-5). For the nodes 
Xa and Ra the use of five states is suggested {very low (L2), low (L1), normal (N), high 
(H1) and very high (H2)}. For the Ba node, again the use of five states {very negative (n2), 
negative (n1), zero (z), positive (p1), very positive (p2)]} is suggested. The distinguishing 
characteristic of this model is the number of states used for the Ba node (corresponding to 
the sensor status node of [Aradhye, 1997]) and its use to identify the type of fault, which 
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presents a more realistic representation of the variation in sensor readings as compared to 
the one-to-one mapping between the different modes of operation (normal, bias, etc) as 
presented in [Aradhye, 1997]. The model design characteristics like bin sizes for the 
different types of nodes, prior and conditional probability data, etc. are derived 
systematically taking into account the acceptable range of deviations in the sensor 
readings, the sensor accuracy, etc. by using an optimization process and Monte Carlo 
simulations.  
The authors define the concept of Probability Absolute Difference (PAD) i.e. the 
difference between the updated probability 
distribution of the Ba node, and its 
distribution under known, normal operating 
conditions to define a novel threshold setting 
procedure that can be used to signal faults for 
all the sensors in the system. The PAD and 
the sum of PAD (or SPAD) are used to define 
a normalized fault detection index Di to 
identify a faulty sensor ([Mehranbod, et. al. 
2003] emphasize threshold setting for detection of faults based on this value to avoid 
false alarms and missed faults) and a fault identification index Ii to help classify the exact 
type of fault (drift, bias, etc.). [Mehranbod, et. al. 2005] also introduce the concept of 
adaptable nodes to extend the framework discussed above to perform fault detection and 
identification in a transient process. In both cases, the authors demonstrate the 
capabilities of the model to detect and identify different types of sensor faults such as 
bias, drift and precision degradation in sensor readings for both single and simultaneous 
multiple faults by considering several scenarios involving the behavior of different 
sensors integrated in applications like polymerization reactors and liquid-level systems. 
However, the main characteristic of this work as in the earlier approaches is the 
underlying assumption that there are no shifts in the system operating characteristics.  
 
[Mehranbod, et. al. 2003] 
Figure 5-5: Single Sensor Bayesian 
Belief Network Model for 
Sensor Fault Detection 





5.3.3.5.Approach V  
[Mengshoel, et. al., 2008] investigate the use of Bayesian networks to perform 
sensor validation in spacecraft electrical power systems using the Advanced Diagnostics 
and Prognostics Testbed (ADAPT) at the NASA Ames Research Center as a case study. 
The Bayesian network model (Figure 5-6) consists of discrete nodes to represent the 
different components in the system like relays in an electrical power system (CR and SR 
represent the command to the relay and the relay status) and sensors used to monitor 
them (FS represents the relay‘s feedback sensor) with the addition of explicit nodes (HS  
and HR) to represent the health status of the 
sensors as well as the other components (e.g. 
relays). The method used is to dynamically 
provide inputs to the network using the sensor 
readings and commands to the relays and 
posing a joint probabilistic query (e.g. MAP-
Maximum A Posteriori) instead of analyzing 
marginal distributions of the individual nodes 
separately for validation.  
By choosing the appropriate evidence 
nodes and query nodes (in this case, the health nodes for the different sensors and relays), 
the authors demonstrate that it is possible to isolate and distinguish between component 
faults and sensor faults. The use of reasoning about the joint probability of all the nodes 
in the network also allows diagnosis of multiple sensor faults. The Bayesian network is 
compiled into an arithmetic circuit that enables fast inferencing for the purpose of real-
time operation. [Ricks and Mengshoel, 2009] extend the work described above which 
included only abrupt discrete faults, to include cases with abrupt continuous (or 
parametric) faults such as continuous stuck faults and continuous offset faults, using 
explicit fault nodes.  
Although both [Mengshoel, et. al. 2008] and [Ricks and Mengshoel, 2009] 
demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach by testing on networks with hundreds of 
 
[Mengshoel, et. al. 2008] 





sensor and component nodes, the use of explicit health nodes (with a specific number of 
normal and abnormal states) to modify the behavior of the nodes representing the sensor 
and the component health nodes is a potential drawback. It assumes a finite number of 
operational fault modes and that data regarding the behavior of the system components 
and sensors in their faulty conditions is available. However, such information is often 
hard to come by or even difficult to estimate since typically all the potential fault modes 
may not be known in advance. 
 For instance, consider a current carrying conductor with a specific voltage 
applied across it and being monitored by a current sensor. A fault in the internal sensing 
element or a change in the conductor resistance may both cause a change in the reading 
from a current sensor but a drop in the supply voltage level will also affect the reading, 
albeit differently. Different failure modes may also have different effects; for instance, a 
bias fault may affect a sensor reading differently from a drift fault.  
Table 5-1: Literature Review of Research Using Bayesian Networks for Sensor Fault 
Detection and Isolation 




 Realtime operation 
 Ability to handle large number of 
sensors 
 Provides analytical redundancy, well-
defined error rates (based on MTBF, 
cycle time, standard deviation, etc.) 
 
Potential disadvantages: 
 Requires invariant analytical relations 
(derived from empirical data obtained 
under normal operating conditions) 
between all variables of interest 
 Cannot robustly handle multiple 
sensor failures 
 Distinction between sensor/system 






























Table 5-1: Literature Review of Research Using Bayesian Networks for Sensor Fault 
Detection and Isolation (continued) 
Method Features Representative Network 
[Aradhye, 1997] Potential advantages: 
 Ease of implementation (demonstrated 
for both continuous and discrete data, 
in steady state and under transient 
conditions) 
 Unified framework for fault detection 
(sensor as well as system) as well as 
classification (normal, bias, precision 
degradation, complete failure) 
 Allows incorporation of system 
specific qualitative knowledge  
 
Potential disadvantages: 
 Explicit modeling of faults (with 
known effects on variables of interest) 
required to detect as well as 
distinguish between sensor and system 
faults 
 One-to-one mapping of modes of 
sensor operation for fault classification 
not realistic 
 Potential for false alarms due to rigid 





 Ease of implementation, demonstrated 
for both steady state and transient 
conditions 
 Novel threshold setting procedure, fault 
detection and identification index to 
enable effective fault identification as 
well as classification (bias, drift , 
precision degradation) 
 Ability to handle multiple sensor faults  
 
Potential disadvantages: 
 Assumes no variation in system 
condition (cannot detect system faults) 
 May result in large CPTs for variables 
that have a wide operating range 
 Thresholds determined for variables 
with spread out distributions (i.e. low 
probability values for different states) 


























































Table 5-1: Literature Review of Research Using Bayesian Networks for Sensor Fault 
Detection and Isolation (continued) 
Method Features Representative Network 
[Ibarguengoytia, 
et. al., 2003] 
Potential advantages: 
 Anytime algorithm (in conjunction 
with a pre-compiled binary decision 
tree) 
 Ability to detect multiple sensor faults 
under specific conditions 
 Ability to isolate faults to a specific 
cause (using quality measures based 
on information theory) 
 
Potential disadvantages: 
 Assumes no variation in system 
condition (cannot detect system faults) 
 Requires two separate  networks  
 Model learned from data for specific 
operating conditions and may not be 
applicable over the entire operating 




 Real-time operation (fast inferencing 
by compiling the Bayesian network 
into arithmetic circuits) 
 Proven for very large networks 
(hundreds of nodes) 
 Enables distinction between sensor 
and system faults 
 
Potential disadvantages: 
 Explicit modeling of faults required 
(requires apriori knowledge of all fault 
modes and their effect on associated 
variables) 
 Intricate network structures are needed 
even for moderately complex systems 
 
 
Table 5-1 shows a comparison of the different approaches described thus far. 
Each row in the table contains an illustrative network, representing the structure 
equivalent to the simplified network discussed in Section 5.6 that would result by 
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section presents a new approach to sensor fault detection and isolation using Bayesian 
networks that can take into account single or multiple sensor failures as well as deviations 
in sensor readings that may be caused due to issues with the monitored system.  
5.3.4. Definition of Sensor and Process Faults 
With multiple sensors in the system, if a single sensor indicates values that seem 
to be out of line whereas the rest of the sensors indicate their expected values, it is likely 
that there could be a potential issue with that particular sensor. Hence, the connotation of 
the term ‗sensor fault‘ as used in the context of the present work only indicates the 
disagreement between the ideal or theoretical value that the sensor is supposed to indicate 
under the prevalent operating conditions and the measured value it actually indicates at 
the sampling instant under consideration and does not necessarily mean that the sensor 
itself is flawed. This difference may be caused by a temporary drift, bias or noise in the 
reading. Hence, the output from the particular sensor would need to be tracked over 
multiple sampling instants to declare with certainty that the sensor itself is faulty. Such 
tracking may also help in classifying the specific type of sensor fault e.g. as described in 
[Mehranbod, et. al., 2003].  
If however, at the given sampling instant, the readings for most of the sensors in 
the system seem to be deviating from their expected values, then it might be indicative of 
a potentially more serious problem than faulty sensors (the logic here being that the 
sensors are by and large very reliable and it is an unusual event when multiple sensors are 
failing simultaneously). Such changes might be a result of incipient faults in one of the 
system components. As seen earlier, the different nodes in a Bayesian network represent 
the physical variables (e.g. torque, speed, etc.) pertinent to the system and its 
components. Thus, the link between every pair of nodes can be considered to be a 
‗process‘ that converts the physical parameter represented by the parent node into the 
parameter represented by the child node. For discrete variables, the strength of the 
correlation between the variables represented by a parent node-child node pair can be 
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said to be quantified by the conditional probability table (CPT) of the child node [Korb 
and Nicholson, 2004].  
Consider a Bayesian network (Figure 5-7) consisting of two nodes A and B 
corresponding to some physical variables measurable by using appropriate sensors. For 
instance, A can represent the voltage applied across a wire and B may represent the 
current flowing through it. The link A->B between the two nodes indicates that they are 
causally related6 i.e. B= f(A) and thus represents the ‗process A->B’. The parameters or 
the entries in the CPT of B represents the conditional probability distribution 
P(B=bi|A=aj), where i=1…m and j =1…n, are the number of states of B and A (the states 
represent the distinct values that these two 
variables can assume) respectively. If there is 
simply a change in the operating conditions 
of the system, the conditional distribution for 
the child node given the value of its parents 
would still hold valid but a fault in any 
system component would essentially render 
the relation between A and B as encoded in 
the CPT of B invalid. In other words, this 
would be reflected as a change in the 
parameters of the CPT of the child node B. 
Hence, the term ‗process fault‘ in the context 
of this work can be defined as any such change in the relations between pairs of variables 
represented in the network.  
Figure 5-7 shows two states each for A and B (the values are illustrative). The 
subscripts denote different operating conditions. Under normal circumstances, for the 
condition A=a1 it can be seen from the CPT, that a value of b1 is most likely to be 
obtained for B. If the operating condition changes to A=a2, then the corresponding most 
                                                 
6  This does not necessarily mean that a closed form analytical equation must exist that between  A and B, 
although there may be one. 
 
Original CPT for B 
 A=a1 A=a2 
B=b1 0.9 0.2 
B=b2 0.1 0.8 
 
Modified CPT for B 
 A=a1 A=a2 
B=b1 0.2 0.7 
B=b2 0.8 0.3 
 
Figure 5-7:  Example Bayesian 




likely value for B is b2. The A->B process can be said to be perfect or non-faulty under 
these conditions. If however, the relation between A and B changes due to some fault in 
the system components, as shown in the modified CPT for B, for the operating condition 
A=a1, a value of B=b2 is most likely to be obtained as per the modified relation. This will 
be construed as a process fault in the A->B link. 
 The Bayesian network representation of any complex system would include a 
number of processes representing the relation between the physical variables relevant to 
its different components. A fault in one or more of these components will be manifested 
as a change in the relations between the variables associated with it. Thus identification 
of a process fault can be indicative of a potential system fault. For instance, a reduced 
current reading may be because of a decrease in the external load acting on the motor 
(requiring the control system to generate a lower torque to maintain a specific command 
speed) or it may be the result of a winding fault thereby causing an increase in the motor 
phase resistance, thus decreasing the current I drawn for a fixed supply voltage V. The 
first case would simply be considered a change in the operating conditions. The latter 
case can be considered a process fault occurring in the V->I process which occurs in the 
motor windings, thereby indicating a potential problem in the windings.  
5.4. SENSOR AND PROCESS FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION (SPFDI) 
ALGORITHM 
The stored performance maps are periodically updated only after it is ensured that 
the system and all its sensors are perfectly operational7. Thus, the last updated set of 
maps (or for a new system, the certification maps), represent the latest known 
information available to the operator regarding the system status before information from 
a new set of sensor readings becomes available. The CPT for every node in the network 
(between consecutive updates) contains data derived from these maps. Any value 
deduced using the network represents the value that should ideally be obtained from the 
sensor corresponding to that node if there are no new or unknown problems in either the 
                                                 
7 Any faults or change in the system condition until that point have been assumed to be accounted for and 
the system is deemed worthy of continued performance to accomplish the task at hand (via CBM). 
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sensors or in any of the system components that have not already been accounted for. On 
the other hand, the sensors are sampled at a much faster rate compared to the pace at 
which maps are updated. The values indicated by the sensors at any sampling instant 
indicate the extant status of the system at that instant and will be therefore be influenced 
by any possible issues that have occurred since the maps were last updated.  
The premise of the proposed algorithm is that by sequentially instantiating 
different nodes in the Bayesian network (referred to as ‗Nodes Instantiated‘ or NI), 
performing probabilistic propagation, and examining the resultant values of other specific 
nodes in the network (referred to as ‗Node of Interest‘ or NoI), it may be possible to 
estimate the validity of the sensor readings obtained. The readings from the sensors 
corresponding to NI are used to set specific states of such nodes as evidence to the 
network. Every node in the network can be considered as a NoI sequentially one at a 
time, until all the nodes in the network have been traversed. For each NoI, multiple values 
can be estimated by considering different combinations of other nodes in the network as 
NI and calculating its posterior probability distribution. The values inferred for the NoI 
are compared with the actual values indicated by their corresponding sensors to 
determine if the sensors are indicating what they are supposed to under the prevalent 
system operating conditions. 
For each of the many NI and NoI, if the values indicated by the sensors and the 
inferred values concur (for the NoI), then it indicates that the system has not changed 
significantly from its last known condition. Hence, the assurance in the fact that the 
sensors are operating normally and the CPT parameters for each node in the network 
continue to maintain the same values as before (i.e. the presumed relations between the 
different physical variables, referred to as ‗processes of interest‘ or PoI henceforth, 
remains the same) increases. Conversely if these values do not match, the assurance 
decreases. By assigning a numerical measure to this level of assurance in the different 
sensors and different links in the network, and incrementing or decrementing the measure 
suitably each time the measured and estimated values are compared for different nodes of 
interest, it is possible to estimate the cause of undesirable deviations in the sensor 
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readings when they occur. This can help identify potential sensor faults. In addition, it 
can also help verify if the presumed conditional relations between the different variables 
in the network, encoded in the CPTs of all the non-root nodes still hold true8 to help 
identify system faults. 
5.4.1. Sensor and Process Fault Detection and Isolation- A Thought Experiment 
Consider a network with two nodes of the form A->B. Assume that the 
probability distributions for both the nodes are appropriately discretized into the required 
number of states of the form A= ai and B=bj, where i=1…p and j =1…q; the bin sizes ∆a 
and ∆b are determined taking into account the sensor accuracy and the application 
requirements9. The values indicated by the sensors for A and B would then be taken to 
correspond to one of their states ai and bj respectively. Suppose the readings am and bn are 
indicated by the two sensors respectively.  
The value of the random variable represented by node B can be determined using 
the network, by setting the measured value A=am as evidence (NI) and performing 
probabilistic propagation10. The state of B (NoI) with the highest probability should 
ideally be the same as bn (only the posterior marginal distribution of the NoI is 
considered) if the system has not changed since its parameters were last updated. The 
value B=bn will be obtained after propagation if and only if the correct value of A was set 
as evidence (i.e. one which corresponds to the appropriate column in the CPT of B) and 
the relation between A and B has not changed (i.e. the values in the CPT for B are still 
valid). If that is indeed the case, then it can be said that the assurance in the fact that the 
sensor for A is operating correctly is now increased since it produced the desired value 
for B. Similarly, the assurance in the fact that the A-> B process still maintains the 
presumed relation between A and B is also now increased since the desired value for B 
was obtained as per the conditional distribution presently available in its CPT. Finally, 
                                                 
8 The structure of the model remains unchanged throughout the process 
9 [Mehranbod, et. al, 2003] provides a detailed description of this process for a chemical engineering 
application but their suggested methodology is generally applicable to any domain. 
10 Probabilistic propagation generates a distribution for the different values of B based on its CPT. The term 
‗value‘ as used here refers to the state of node B with the highest probability of occurrence. 
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assurance in the fact that the sensor for B is operating normally is also increased since it 
indicates a value that was expected. If however, by setting a value of A= am as evidence 
to the network and after propagation, the value obtained is B= bo ≠ bn, then it could mean 
one of three possibilities: 
a) A wrong value was set as evidence to the network. This would imply that the 
sensor for A is potentially faulty as the reading for A is incorrect (as A=ao ≠ am). 
b) The relation A->B has changed and the CPT for B no longer accurately represents 
its conditional dependency with respect to A.  For a given value of A= am, a value 
of B=b cannot be obtained because the parameters of the conditional distribution 
have changed due to some change in the system or it components. 
c) The sensor for B is faulty, resulting in an incorrect value (B=bo≠ bn), even though 
the correct value was set as evidence and the conditional distribution is still valid.  
In the situations described above, the assurance in the fact that the sensor for A is 
operating correctly, the process A->B maintains the original relationship, and the sensor 
for B is operating correctly can be said to have decreased respectively because of the 
discrepancies in the expected and observed values for the sensors. In this particular 
example, with two sensors and one process, it is not possible to distinguish between a 
sensor fault and a process fault since there is no additional information, using which, one 
can estimate and cross-examine the values for A and B, it is not possible to isolate which 
of the three factors mentioned above are responsible for the mismatch in values.  
5.4.2. Steps in the SPFDI Algorithm 
The SPFDI method described above can now be extended to a more general 
Bayesian network with complex structures or a larger number of nodes. The first step is 
to decide the types of instantiations that can be done considering different nodes in the 
network as NI and determine the NoI and PoI associated with each such instantiation. The 
second step is to quantify the level of assurance in the different NoI and PoI represented 
in the network using an appropriate measure, and modifying it based on the results of 
comparing the measured and the inferred values for a particular NoI. The intention is to 
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provide an intuitive metric to enable the operator to make a judgment regarding the status 
of different sensors and processes (i.e. whether they are potentially faulty or not) at the 
end of a fault detection and isolation procedure. 
5.4.2.1.Generating the Instantiation Table 
 Consider again, a simple network A->B. With this structure, there are two 
possible types of reasoning possible ―Given the value of A what is the value of B‖ or 
―Given the value of B what is the value of A‖. The former can be described as deductive 
or predictive reasoning [Korb and Nicholson, 2004] and represents a cause-to-effect 
reasoning where A is the evidence node and B is the query node. The latter is referred to 
as abductive or diagnostic reasoning [Korb and Nicholson, 2004] and represents an 
effect-to-cause reasoning where B is the evidence node and A is the query node.  
As described in [Ashok and Tesar, 2007], the decision-making methodology in 
EMAs adopts a Bayesian causal network approach where the arrows depict causality as 
well as conditional independence (the network is a D-map and an I-map). Although 
mathematically the flow of information in the process of conditioning on the evidence 
nodes and updating the belief of the query nodes can happen in either direction, it is 
important to factor in the physical relevance of the variables represented in the network to 
decide the type of reasoning to adopt. For instance, in Figure 5-7, suppose the node A 
represents the total current drawn by the motor and the node B represents torque 
produced by the motor. It indicates that the domain expert, who designed the network, 
has made use of the knowledge that in a motor, the current drawn causes the resultant 
motor torque and not the other way around. Hence, in order to judge how good the 
process of conversion of current to torque is, a logical method would be to consider 
current as the input or the control variable which is manipulated in order to observe the 
variation in the response variable i.e. torque. Extending the argument to the larger 
network case, in the proposed algorithm, the NI are always chosen from the set of 
ancestral nodes for a given NoI. This provides an intuitive starting point to implement the 
proposed SPFDI algorithm. 
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Consider the network in Figure 5-8. The system represented by this network has 
four sensors corresponding to the physical variables represented by A, B, C, D and three 
processes A->B, B->C, and C->D. There are six possible instantiations that can be done 
ancestrally with this network. Note that, when 
the NI and the NoI are separated by a number 
of intermediate nodes, all the intermediate 
links are included as the processes of interest 
in that instantiation step. Considering node D 
as the NoI, the NI can be {A, B, C}, with the processes A->B, B->C, and C->D as the 
PoI. With C as the NoI, the NI can be {A, B}. The two processes A->B and B->C are the 
PoI. A comprehensive list of all such possible instantiations (considering different 
nodes/sensors in the network either as NI or NoI, and all the intermediate processes as 
PoI) can be represented as a table referred to as the ‗instantiation table‘ for that network 
(Table 5-2).  
Table 5-2: Example of an Instantiation Table 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 
1 NI NoI   PoI   
2 NI  NoI  PoI PoI  
3 NI   NoI PoI PoI PoI 
4  NI NoI   PoI  
5  NI  NoI  PoI PoI 
6   NI NoI   PoI 
 
As will be seen later, the composition of the instantiation table plays an important 
role in determining the efficacy of the algorithm in isolating sensor and process faults. 
The process of probabilistic propagation considering each row of the instantiation table 
until all the rows have been exhausted is called a ‗fault detection and isolation cycle‘11.  
                                                 
11 There are additional possibilities which include use of abductive reasoning by setting descendent nodes 
as NI and considering ancestral nodes as the NoI, or setting only the nodes in the Markov blanket of a NoI 
as the NI nodes, etc. These cases are not presently considered and may be pursued at a future stage. 
 
Figure 5-8: Example Bayesian Network 
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5.4.2.2.Using the Instantiation Table 
Suppose the readings indicated by the sensors for the nodes A, B, C, D are A=a, 
B=b, C=c, and D=d respectively. Let ainf, binf, cinf, dinf be the corresponding values (node 
states) that are obtained via probabilistic inference using the network12. The first row 
indicates that node A is the NI and the NoI is B. The value (state) A=a is set as evidence 
and an inference is drawn regarding the most probable value of B. If it is observed that 
binf =b, then the assurance that the sensor for A is operating correctly, the sensor for B is 
operating correctly and the process A-> B still maintains the presumed relation between A 
and B are all increased since the desired value for B was obtained as per the available 
conditional distribution in its CPT. If, on the other hand, if the values do not match, it 
could be indicative of a potential fault in any of the three network components i.e. the 
sensors for A, B or the process A->B.   
The second row in the table indicates node A as the NI and node C as the NoI. 
Thus the value A=a is again set as evidence but an inference is now drawn regarding the 
most probable value of C. If cinf = c, then the assurance that the sensors for A and C are 
operating correctly, the intermediate processes A->B and B->C maintain the relationship 
as specified by the CPTs of B and C are all increased. The agreement in the measured and 
inferred values of C implies that the value of A=a resulted in a correct value of B=b after 
probabilistic propagation, which in turn resulted in the correct value of C=c after the next 
level of probabilistic propagation. If the values cinf and c are different, then it can be said 
that the assurance in each of the network components mentioned above is reduced.  
A similar logic may be used to interpret the remaining rows of the instantiation 
table. Row 1 provides a judgment regarding the status of the sensors for A, B and the 
process A->B; row 2 provides a judgment regarding the status of the sensors for A, C and 
the processes A->B and B->C and so on. 
 
                                                 
12 When determining these values, the most probable values are considered, i.e. the state with the largest 
probability value in the posterior marginal distribution of nodes A, B, C, D.  
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5.4.2.3.Quantifying the Level of Assurance in Sensors and Processes 
One way to quantify the level of assurance in the different NoI and PoI is to 
assign unique weights to each node (sensor) and process in the network, to indicate the 
belief the operator has regarding their status as being faulty or not. Let these belief values 
be WS and WP respectively; where S represents a sensor corresponding to a node and P 
represents a process in the network.  
When a system and its sensors are newly deployed, the assurance that all the 
sensors and processes are operating correctly is quite high. But the same cannot be said 
for a system which has been operational for some time and its sensors have been exposed 
to the ambient and operating conditions. Hence, to provide an intuitive meaning to WS 
and WP, the range of values they can assume are defined to lie in the interval [0, 1]. The 
values tending to zero imply that the assurance in that element (i.e. node or process) of 
the network being ‗healthy‘ is very low. Conversely, the values tending towards 1 imply 
perfect health.  
A vital factor to be considered is the initial belief value assigned to each sensor or 
process. Precise sensor reliability information is often scarce as it is highly dependent on 
the conditions under which the sensor is used. Although most manufacturers do provide 
some guidelines on sensor life under specified conditions, it is prudent to judge the health 
of a sensor based on analyzing its output under the prevailing conditions. With respect to 
judging how good a process is, the situation is more complicated since the only sources 
of information about the process are the sensors that measure the constituent variables in 
the process. Hence, at the start of each new fault detection and isolation cycle, it is 
assumed that there is no knowledge of the status of sensors or processes.  
To account for this ignorance regarding the initial conditions, the beliefs for all 
the nodes and processes is initialized to a value of 0.5. This implies the assumption of an 
equal likelihood of the particular component being faulty or perfectly operational13.  
 
                                                 
13 An analogy can be drawn here considering the simple example of tossing a fair coin where the 




Figure 5-9: Flowchart for the Sensor and Process Fault Detection and Isolation (SPFDI) 
Algorithm 
 
The final element of the SPFDI algorithm is to decide the amount εS and εP by which WS 
and WP are modified respectively, after each step in the fault detection and isolation 
cycle. If the resultant value of the NoI (obtained by setting NI as evidence) is the same as 




Initialize Ws and Wp belief 




I <= number 
of rows in 
instantiation 
table?
Set NI as evidence to the 




value of NOI 
same as the 
measured 
value?
Increase the Ws and Wp
beliefs for the associated 
sensors and processes
Decrease the Ws and Wp





Output the final Ws and 






under consideration and all the intermediate PoI between the NI and NoI are increased by 
their associated εS and εP values. In the converse situation, all these belief values are 
decreased by the same amount. The magnitude of εS for a particular sensor is determined 
by the number of times (nS) it figures either as a NI or NoI in the instantiation table and is 
considered a fraction of the initial weight for that sensor. Similarly the magnitude of εP 
for a particular process is determined by the number of times (nP) it occurs in the 
instantiation table and is also a fraction of the initial weight for that process14. Thus,  
   
         
  
  and     




The final magnitudes of WS and WP for each sensor and each process at the end of a cycle 
will be considered representative of whether a particular sensor or a process is faulty or 
not.  The SPFDI algorithm can now be summarized as follows: 
 
Objective Given a Bayesian network B representing set of variables Vi and a set of 
processes Pj, set of measured sensor readings Si corresponding to each Vi 
(i.e. Si ≡ Vi ), isolate the cause of undesired deviation in sensor readings 
Inputs      Number of steps in the isolation cycle N (number of rows in the 
instantiation table)  
 Number of sensors, i=1,2,…..l (number of nodes in the network) and 
number of processes j=1,2,…..m (number of links in the network) 
 Nodes instantiated (NI,     ), node of interest (NoI,      ), 
processes of  interest (PoI,       ) at each step in the instantiation 
table 
 ns for each V (     , np for each P (      
Outcome   List of potentially faulty sensors and processes 
 
                                                 
14 Eq.(5-1) is valid for          =         = 0.5. If other initial belief values are used (for instance, when 
accurate sensor or process reliability data is available), the equation needs to be modified accordingly so 
that the condition 0≤ WS, WP≤1 is always satisfied at the end of the fault detection and isolation cycle, with 




Generate the instantiation table 
Initialize WSi = 0.5 for each Vi and WPj = 0.5 for each Pj  
Calculate εSi = 0.5/ nSi for each Vi and εPj = 0.5/nPj for each Pj  
Loop through number of steps in the isolation cycle Nic=1,2,….N 
Loop through i= 1,2,….l 
If(Node i  ≡ NI) 
Instantiate the state of NI with the corresponding measured value Si =s 
Exit loop i 
Update beliefs for all nodes in the network 
Determine value Vi = v of the NoI based on suitable criterion15 
Measure the value from the sensor corresponding to NoI as Si =s 
If (Vi = Si) for the NoI 
Loop through i= 1,2,….l 
If(Node i =NI) 
Increase WSi  for NI by εSi 
If(Node i =NoI) 
Increase WSi for NoI by εSi 
Exit loop i 
Loop through j= 1,2,….n 
Increase WPj  for each PoIj by εPi 
Exit loop j 
else 
Loop through i= 1,2,….l 
If(Node i =NI) 
Decrease WSi  for NI by εSi 
If(Node i =NoI) 
                                                 
15 Most Probable State, Expected Value, etc. 
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Decrease WSi for NoI by εSi 
Exit loop i 
Loop through j= 1,2,….n 
Decrease WPj  for each PoIj by εPi 
Exit loop j 
Exit Loop Nic 
Loop through number of sensors i = 1,2,3….l 
Sort WS descending 
Exit loop i 
Loop through number of processes j = 1,2,3…..m 
Sort WP descending 
Exit loop j 
Figure 5-10: Sensor and Process Fault Detection and Isolation (SPFDI) Algorithm 
 
 Figure 5-10 shows the pseudo-code 
for this algorithm. At the end of a 
single iteration of this algorithm, the 
sensor corresponding to the variable 
with WSmin or the process with WPmin 
can be identified as being the 
potentially faulty. Depending on the 
application, a suitable threshold may 
also be defined to indicate the lowest 
acceptable values for WS and WP, 
below which sensors or processes may be deemed faulty. For instance, when there are 
multiple sensor faults, comparing the sorted values of WS against such a threshold should 
provide an indication of which sensors are most likely to be faulty. This belief is further 
strengthened if the same results are obtained after multiple iterations of the algorithm.  
 











5.5. EXAMPLE OF SENSOR AND PROCESS FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION 
Consider the network in Figure 5-8 with the corresponding instantiation table 
shown in Table 5-2. As before, let the readings indicated by the sensors for the nodes A, 
B, C, D are A=a, B=b, C=c, and D=d respectively under regular conditions16 and ainf, 
binf, cinf, dinf be the corresponding values obtained via probabilistic inference using the 
network. The WS and WP values for each of the sensors and processes considered in the 
instantiation table (Table 5-2) are calculated based on Eq.(5-1) as follows: 
εA 
   
 
        εB 
   
 
        εC 
   
 
        εD 
   
 
        
εA->B 
   
 
        εB->C 
   
 
       εC->D 
   
 
         
5.5.1. Case 1: Sensor Fault 
Suppose the readings indicated by the sensors are A=a, B=b’≠b (where b’ 
indicates that, due to a sensor fault, the state of B corresponding to the value b’ is 
different from the state of B corresponding to the value b), C=c, and D=d respectively.  
The algorithm starts with an assumption of ignorance regarding the status of any 
sensor or process. This implies that there is an equal chance that any of the sensors or 
processes could be at fault. Therefore the initial beliefs in the different sensors and 
processes are: 
WA = 0.5 WB = 0.5 WC = 0.5 WD = 0.5 WA->B = 0.5 WB->C = 0.5 WC->D = 0.5 
Since the CPT parameters in the network are still unchanged after the last update 
when the all the sensors and processes were deemed to be working correctly, after the 
first instantiation, the value binf will not be the same as b’. Hence, the beliefs in the 
sensors for A and B and the process A->B will be decreased by their corresponding ε 
values. The revised belief values now become: 
WA = 0.5-0.1667 = 0.3333 WB = 0.5-0.1667 = 0.3333 WC = 0.5 WD = 0.5 
WA->B = 0.5-0.1667 = 0.3333 WB->C = 0.5 WC->D = 0.5  
                                                 
16 A=a, B=b….. implies that the value a correspond to one of the states of A, and so on. 
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After the second instantiation, since the sensor for C is not faulty and the 
processes A->B and B->C are also not faulty (as determined by the previous fault 
detection and isolation cycle), the value obtained after probabilistic propagation i.e. cinf is 
expected to be the same as the reading c from the sensor for node C. Thus, the beliefs in 
the sensors A and C and the beliefs in the intermediate the processes A->B and B->C are 
increased by their respective ε values. The revised beliefs after the second instantiation in 
the cycle are: 
WA = 0.3333+0.1667 = 0.5 WB = 0.3333 WC = 0.5+0.1667 = 0.6667 WD = 0.5 
WA->B = 0.3333+0.1667 = 0.5 WB->C = 0.5 +0.125 = 0.625 WC->D = 0.5 
Repeating the above procedure for each step in the instantiation table, the results obtained 
are shown in Table 5-3. Thus, after the complete cycle, the belief in the sensor for node B 
is zero whereas the belief in the other sensors and processes are higher, as they should be.  
Table 5-3: Change in WS and WP Values with a Faulty Sensor 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 
0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
1 0.3333 0.3333 0.5 0.5 0.3333 0.5 0.5 
2 0.5 0.3333 0.6667 0.5 0.5 0.625 0.5 
3 0.6667 0.3333 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 0.750 0.6667 
4 0.6667 0.1667 0.5 0.6667 0.6667 0.625 0.6667 
5 0.6667 0.0000 0.5 0.5 0.6667 0.5 0.5 
6 0.6667 0.0000 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 0.5 0.6667 
 
These beliefs are calculated after a single sample of data. If the same result is 
obtained in consecutive isolation cycles, then it is indicative of a confirmed fault in the 
sensor for node B17. However, at this point, these values may be used by the system 
operator to decide whether or not to continue using the data from the sensor for node B. 
                                                 
17 The number of cycles required is based on the application requirement and operator judgment. Once a 
sensor fault has been determined with certainty, the operator can also choose to modify the instantiation 
table by eliminating the steps involving the sensor for node B either as an instantiated node or as a node of 
interest (steps 1, 4, and 5). Although this does not provide any additional information, with the remaining 
instantiations, since all the other sensors and processes are operating correctly, the corresponding belief 
values will ideally attain a value of 1 in the subsequent isolation cycles.  
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5.5.2. Case 2: Process Fault 
Since the Bayesian network represents the causal relations between all the 
variables of interest in the system, in case of a process fault, the effect of the fault is 
noticed in all the variables downstream of the process and not confined just to the 
variables in the process itself. This is manifested as a variation in the readings of all the 
associated sensors. In other words, a fault in the process B->C will be reflected as 
deviations in the readings of the sensors for nodes B, C and D from their ideal values (as 
obtained from the network). Thus, in this case, after the first instantiation in the 
instantiation table, since the process A->B is not faulty and the sensors for A and B are 
also not faulty, the value binf will agree with the reading b from the sensor for node B. 
Thus the beliefs in the sensors and processes are revised as follows:  
WA = 0.5+0.1667 = 0.6667 WB = 0.5+0.1667 = 0.6667 WC = 0.5 WD = 0.5 
WA->B = 0.5+0.1667 = 0.6667 WB->C = 0.5 WC->D = 0.5 
In the next four instantiations, when A or B is the instantiated node, since the faulty 
process B->C is involved as a process of interest, the values c and d indicated by the 
sensors will be different from the inferred values cinf and dinf. In the last step of the 
isolation cycle, only sensors for C and D and the process C->D are involved. Since none 
of these components are faulty, the measured and the inferred values d and dinf are found 
to be in agreement. The variation in all the beliefs in this scenario is shown in Table 5-4.  
Table 5-4: Change in WS and WP Values with a Faulty Process 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 
0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
1 0.6667 0.6667 0.5 0.5 0.6667 0.5 0.5 
2 0.5 0.6667 0.3333 0.5 0.5 0.375 0.5 
3 0.3333 0.6667 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.25 0.3333 
4 0.3333 0.5 0.1667 0.3333 0.3333 0.125 0.3333 
5 0.3333 0.3333 0.1667 0.1667 0.3333 0.0000 0.1667 
6 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.0000 0.3333 
 
It is observed that the belief in the process B->C is reduced to zero whereas the 
beliefs in all the other sensors and processes are higher. These belief values can be used 
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to alert the operator that a potential fault may exist in the system. As in the earlier case, 
the process B->C can be declared as being faulty with certainty only if the same results 
are obtained after multiple samples have been analyzed (i.e. after a certain number of 
fault detection and isolation cycles). Thus, the algorithm is able to correctly distinguish 
between a sensor and a process fault (i.e. it does not interpret the deviations in the sensors 
corresponding to the nodes B, C and D as multiple sensor faults). The final belief values 
are indicative of the trustworthiness of a specific sensor or process. This knowledge can 
be immensely useful when updating the model parameters (i.e. CPT values of the various 
nodes) and eventually the stored performance maps. 
5.5.3. Special Cases  
The methodology described above can also be used to isolate multiple sensor 
faults as well. Consider an example where the sensors for nodes B and C are both faulty 
but the sensors for A and D are operating normally and there are no faults in any of the 
intermediate processes. In this case, the variation in the beliefs following the instantiation 
table (Table 5-2) is shown in Table 5-5.  
Table 5-5: Change in WS and WP Values with Multiple Sensor Faults 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 
0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
1 0.3333 0.3333 0.5 0.5 0.3333 0.5 0.5 
2 0.1667 0.3333 0.3333 0.5 0.1667 0.375 0.5 
3 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.6667 0.3333 0.5 0.6667 
4 0.3333 0.1667 0.1667 0.6667 0.3333 0.375 0.6667 
5 0.3333 0.0000 0.1667 0.5 0.3333 0.25 0.5 
6 0.3333 0.0000 0.0000 0.3333 0.3333 0.25 0.3333 
 
At the end of the fault detection and isolation cycle, it can be observed that the 
belief values for the sensors corresponding to nodes B and C are zero whereas the beliefs 
in the other sensors and processes are higher. There are however certain scenarios in 
which the algorithm produces inconsistent or incorrect results. With any unforeseen 
deviation in the values from a sensor corresponding to a root node in the network, 
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applying the algorithm results in the associated sensor as well as all the processes that 
originate from that node (relating the node to its immediate child nodes) identified as 
being faulty18.  
Table 5-6: Change in WS and WP Values with a Fault in a Sensor Corresponding to a Root 
Node  
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 
0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
1 0.3333 0.3333 0.5 0.5 0.3333 0.5 0.5 
2 0.1667 0.3333 0.333 0.5 0.1667 0.375 0.5 
3 0.0000 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.0000 0.25 0.3333 
4 0.0000 0.5 0.5 0.3333 0.0000 0.375 0.3333 
5 0.0000 0.6667 0.5 0.5 0.0000 0.5 0.5 
6 0.0000 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 0.0000 0.625 0.6667 
Table 5-7: Change in WS and WP Values with a Fault in a Sensor Corresponding to a Leaf 
Node  
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 
0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
1 0.6667 0.6667 0.5 0.5 0.6667 0.5 0.5 
2 0.8334 0.6667 0.6667 0.5 0.8334 0.6667 0.5 
3 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 0.3333 0.6667 0.5 0.3333 
4 0.6667 0.8334 0.8334 0.3333 0.6667 0.6667 0.3333 
5 0.6667 0.6667 0.8334 0.1667 0.6667 0.8334 0.1667 
6 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 0.0000 0.6667 0.6667 0.0000 
 
In the case of a deviation in the readings from a sensor corresponding to a leaf 
node, the algorithm is again not completely reliable in identifying whether the departure 
from the expected values is due to a fault in the sensor corresponding to the node or if it 
is the result of a change in one or more of the processes linking the leaf node to its 
immediate parents. These two cases are shown in Table 5-6 and Table 5-7 respectively 
which show the variation in beliefs when there is a fault in the sensor corresponding to 
node A and node D respectively. There are also some additional cases wherein the 
                                                 
18 This may be partially attributed to instantiating only ancestral nodes. With the present algorithm and 
network structure, the root nodes are never examined as a NoI.  
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algorithm may produce inconsistent results. The following section aims to provide an 
explanation for all these inconsistencies.  
5.5.3.1.The Subset Problem   
Before delving into details, the terms ‗subset‘ and ‗superset‘ as used in the 
context of this discussion need to be defined using a 
simple example. In Figure 5-12, for every shaded cell in 
column X, the corresponding cell in the same row of 
column Y is also shaded, but column Y has other 
additional shaded cells. Column X will be referred to as a 
subset of column Y (   ) or Y can be said to be a 
superset of X (   ). In a similar vein, the column Y is a 
subset of the union of columns X and Z (     )  i.e. 
for every shaded cell in column Y, a corresponding cell in 
the same row is also shaded in either column X or column Z19. These concepts can now be 
extended to an instantiation table to explain the results in the previous section. 
Consider the instantiation table in Table 5-8. Let ColS and ColP represent the 
columns in the instantiation table corresponding to a particular sensor or process, where S 
= {A, B, C, D} and P = {A->B, B->C, C->D}.  In each step of the fault detection and 
isolation cycle where the root node A is involved as NI, the process relating A to its 
immediate child B i.e. the link A->B is also involved in that step, irrespective of the NoI 
(with A as NI the nodes B, C, D are NoI in rows 1-3 of the table). 
This is observed in Table 5-8 where the shaded cells in ColA->B  and ColA are the 
same. It can be said that ColA->B  ColA. Thus, a subset may be formed between the 
columns corresponding to a root node and a process originating from that node, when the 
root node is considered as NI and its descendents are sequentially considered as NoI, with 
the process always included in the path between the NI and the NoI at every instantiation. 
                                                 
19 The term ‗subset‘ is used to also include the case when the number of shaded cells in any two columns 
are identical 
X Y Z 
   
   
   
   
   
 




Such overlap results in WA and WA->B to be incremented or decremented by the same 
amount throughout the cycle (nS and nP are the same, resulting in the same values of εS 
and εP). 
Table 5-8: Instantiation Table for the Network A -> B -> C -> D 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
6        
 
 Nodes Instantiated  Node of Interest  Process of Interest 
 
 
Similarly, it is observed that ColC->D  ColD i.e. at every step when node D is the 
NoI then the process C->D that terminates at that node is also involved. Thus, a subset 
may be formed between the columns corresponding to a terminal leaf node and a process 
terminating at that node, when the leaf node is considered as NoI and its different 
ancestral nodes are considered as NI, with the process again always included in the path 
between the NI and the NoI at every instantiation. 
There may be other cases when columns corresponding to certain sensors or 
processes in the network (say, ColS-I and ColP-I) form a subset of the columns that 
correspond to other sensors or processes that occur in the network (say, ColS-II and ColP-
II), either individually or by considering a union of those columns. For instance, some 
possible combinations could be ColS-I   ColS-II or ColS-I   ColP-II or ColP-I   ColS-II or 
ColP-I   ColP-II or ColS-I   ColS-II   ColP-II or or ColP-I   ColS-II   ColP-II or ColS-I   ColP-
I   ColP-II, etc. Note that, in each combination, the union is typically defined for a column 
corresponding to a sensor and a process (or set of processes) that terminates or originates 
at the node corresponding to that sensor in the network.  
For the instantiation table (Table 5-8), consider a case where the process B->C is 
faulty and there is also a fault in the sensor corresponding to node C. It is seen that 
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ColD  (ColC   ColB->C) and ColC->D  (ColC   ColB->C). In this case, the change in the 
beliefs for all the sensors and processes are shown in Table 5-9. It is observed that in 
addition to faults being signaled for the process B->C and the sensor corresponding to 
node C, the final belief values result in false alarms with the sensor corresponding to 
node D and the C->D process also being diagnosed as faulty.  
Table 5-9: Change in WS and WP Values when Columns in the Instantiation Table Form 
Subsets 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 
0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
1 0.6667 0.6667 0.5 0.5 0.6667 0.5 0.5 
2 0.5 0.6667 0.3333 0.5 0.5 0.375 0.5 
3 0.3333 0.6667 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.25 0.3333 
4 0.3333 0.5 0.1667 0.3333 0.3333 0.125 0.3333 
5 0.3333 0.3333 0.1667 0.1667 0.3333 0.0000 0.1667 
6 0.3333 0.3333 0.0000 0.0000 0.3333 0.0000 0.0000 
 
In each of the cases described above, if a fault occurs in a sensor or a process 
whose columns form the superset of columns corresponding to other sensors or processes 
in the network, then the algorithm also incorrectly flags the sensors or processes 
corresponding to columns in the subset as faulty. This situation is termed as the ‗subset 
problem’. As evident from the discussion above, the structure of the network plays an 
important role in this issue. Some network structures may reduce the possibility of such 
subsets being formed whereas others may worsen the problem20. The extent to which the 
subset problem occurs determines the ability of the SPFDI algorithm to uniquely identify 
and isolate different sources of faults. This aspect is discussed further in Section 5.7.1. 
5.5.4. Use of Redundant Nodes 
To enable the SPFDI algorithm to overcome the complications created by the 
subset problem, it is desirable to eliminate the possibilities of subsets being formed as far 
                                                 
20 The practice of instantiating only the ancestral nodes (in the present version of the algorithm) may also a 
contributing factor to the subset problem. Future research in exploring additional types of instantiations 
may help alleviate this issue to some extent. 
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as possible (especially if a particular sensor or a process is critical from the application 
point of view). One way to do this would be to explore additional instantiations using 
abductive inferencing, which would add additional possibilities for the NI and NoI 
thereby resulting in additional rows in the instantiation table which would make every 
column of Table 5-8 distinct. Another possible approach to resolve these issues is by 
using redundant sources of information for the root and leaf nodes in order to distinguish 
between sensor and process faults. 
In the simplest form, these redundant nodes can represent additional physical 
sensors for the same measurand. For instance two sensors may be used to measure the 
variable D, one of which is highly accurate and is relied upon as the primary sensor used 
to update the performance maps and for decision-making (say, the sensor corresponding 
to node D in Figure 5-13) and the second sensor may be somewhat less accurate but can 
still be used to corroborate the health of the first sensor (for instance, the sensor 
corresponding to node D2 in Figure 5-13). The redundant nodes could also represent other 
sources of information like additional performance maps for the same measurand, or an 
expert operator‘s judgment of its value based on experience, etc.  
Figure 5-13 shows the 
addition of two such redundant 
nodes, representing additional sensors 
corresponding to the variables A and 
D, respectively. Since the sensors 
corresponding to the redundant nodes 
measure the same variables as the 
sensors corresponding to the nodes in 
the original network, the CPT for 
these nodes (D2 and A in the present 
case) takes a form similar to an 
identity matrix. In Figure 5-13, the 
sensors corresponding to nodes A and A2 measure the same physical variable. Hence, the 
 
 
Figure 5-13: Addition of Redundant Nodes 
 
Figure 5-14 : CPTs for Redundant Nodes 
A B C DA2 D2
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process A2->A does not represent a real physical process and as such can be considered to 
be a ‗perfect‘ process which never fails. With the additional nodes, more instantiations 
can be introduced to make the columns in the instantiation table distinct. This would 
allow nodes which were formerly root nodes to be now considered as NoI during the fault 
detection and isolation cycle. The same holds true for the former leaf nodes which now 
have additional child nodes that can now be considered as NoI. With the additional 
sensors and intermediate processes, the list of additional instantiations21 that can now be 
added are shown in Table 5-10.  
Table 5-10: Instantiation Table with the Addition of Redundant Nodes 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A2 A B C D D2 A2->A A->B B->C C->D D->D2 
1 NI NoI     PoI     
2 NI  NoI    PoI PoI    
3 NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI   
4 NI    NoI  PoI PoI PoI PoI  
5 NI     NoI PoI PoI PoI PoI PoI 
6  NI NoI     PoI    
7  NI  NoI    PoI PoI   
8  NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI  
9  NI    NoI  PoI PoI PoI PoI 
10   NI NoI     PoI   
11   NI  NoI    PoI PoI  
12   NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI 
13    NI NoI     PoI  
14    NI  NoI    PoI PoI 
15     NI NoI     PoI 
 
The WS and WP values for the sensors and processes are calculated as before.  However, 
in modifying the values WP for the process relating the redundant nodes, there is a crucial 
difference. Since such processes are assumed to be perfect, their belief values are always 
set to 1. Note that the columns for the sensor corresponding to the node A and the process 
A->B are now distinct. Thus, with any unforeseen deviations in the readings from the 
sensor corresponding to node A, it is now possible for the algorithm to isolate the fault in 
                                                 
21 With NS number of sensors in the network a total of (NS-1)! instantiations are possible (the number of 
rows in the instantiation table) 
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the sensor A without misdiagnosing a fault in the A->B process. The change in the belief 
values are shown in Table 5-11. Similarly with any unforeseen deviation in the readings 
from the sensor corresponding to node D, the algorithm can isolate the cause of deviation 
to a faulty sensor or to a fault in the C->D process. 
Table 5-11: Change in WS and WP Values with a Faulty Sensor and the Addition of 
Redundant Nodes  
 Sensors Processes 
Step A2 A B C D D2 A2->A A->B B->C C->D D->D2 
0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.000 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.000 
1 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.000 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.000 
2 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.000 0.5625 0.5 0.5 1.000 
3 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.000 0.625 0.5556 0.5 1.000 
4 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 1.000 0.6875 0.6112 0.5625 1.000 
5 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.000 0.75 0.6666 0.625 1.000 
6 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.000 0.6875 0.6666 0.625 1.000 
7 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 1.000 0.625 0.6112 0.625 1.000 
8 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.000 0.5625 0.5556 0.5625 1.000 
9 0.8 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.000 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.000 
10 0.8 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.000 0.5 0.5556 0.5 1.000 
11 0.8 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 1.000 0.5 0.6112 0.5625 1.000 
12 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.000 0.5 0.6666 0.625 1.000 
13 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.000 0.5 0.6666 0.6875 1.000 
14 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 1.000 0.5 0.6666 0.75 1.000 
15 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.000 0.5 0.6666 0.75 1.000 
 
Note that even though the columns corresponding to the sensor for node A2 and 
the process A->A2 are still identical, because of the assumption of an ideal process, a fault 
in the sensor corresponding to A2 can still be isolated (WA->A2 remains unchanged 
throughout the fault detection and isolation cycle). With the additional nodes in the 
network ColD  (ColC   ColB->C) but ColC->D  (ColC   ColB->C). Hence, again 
considering the example where process B->C and the sensor corresponding to node C are 
both faulty, the algorithm would no longer flag the sensor corresponding to node D as 
being faulty but would still wrongly identify the C->D process as being faulty.  
Also from Table 5-10, it is seen that ColB  (ColA->B   ColB->C). Thus, if multiple 
process faults exist in the processes A->B and B->C, the SPFDI algorithm would 
misdiagnose the sensor corresponding to node B as faulty. In all such cases, the only 
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recourse with the present version of the algorithm is to introduce additional instantiations 
to make the columns in the instantiation table completely distinct. This may be done as 
demonstrated above by including redundant nodes for the appropriate nodes in the 
network (say, node B2 representing a sensor in addition to the original sensor 
corresponding to node B, in the latter example). 
5.6. APPLICATION OF THE SENSOR AND PROCESS FAULT DETECTION AND 
ISOLATION ALGORITHM FOR THE TEST SETUP 
Figure 5-15 represents a Bayesian network of the test set up used in this work (a 
detailed description and relevant specifications of the various components is presented in 
Appendix B). It represents a simplified version of the detailed network developed in 
Chapter 3, using some of the criteria presented in Chapter 4 (such as the sensors 
available, memory and computational requirements, etc.).  
The nodes DC and FR represent the duty cycle and frequency of the PWM signal 
used to modulate the supply voltage Vs. These are the control parameters set by the 
operator and sent as commands to the H-bridge amplifiers to control the motor terminal 
voltage. The nodes V and I represent the total voltage applied and the total current drawn 
across all the four motor phases at any instant. The node τ represents the total torque 
produced by the motor. The node S is the motor speed (under known loads acting on the 
motor shaft and applied using a hysteresis brake). The node N represents the acoustic 
noise generated by the motor.  
Suppose the control parameters are set at values of DC = 1% and FR= 5 kHz for a 
constant supply voltage of Vs =20V, then the voltage available across the motor terminals 
should ideally be 0.2 V, which should be the reading indicated by the voltage sensor. The 
corresponding values of current (1.2 A), torque (0.8 Nm), speed (400 rpm) and noise (74 
dB) under these conditions are shown in Figure 5-15. 
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Table 5-12: Instantiation Table for the Testbed Bayesian Network  
 
Sensors Processes 
Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 
1                             
2                             
3                             
4                             
5                             
6                             
7                             
8                             
9                             
10                             
11                             
12                             
13                             
14                             
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The various steps in the fault detection and isolation cycle for the above network are as 
shown in Table 5-12. Note that ColDC, ColFR, ColDC->V and ColFR->V are all similar. ColN, 
ColI->N and ColS->N also form subsets. The variation in the weights WS and WP for the 
different sensors and processes are shown in Table 5-13. When all the sensors are 
operating correctly and there is no change in the relationships between the different 
variables, all the belief values tend to a value of 1 (row 15).  




Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
1 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
2 0.700 0.700 0.600 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.700 0.700 0.563 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
3 0.800 0.800 0.600 0.571 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.800 0.800 0.625 0.556 0.500 0.500 0.500 
4 0.900 0.900 0.600 0.571 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.900 0.900 0.688 0.611 0.500 0.563 0.500 
5 1.000 1.000 0.600 0.571 0.600 0.600 0.600 1.000 1.000 0.750 0.667 0.600 0.625 0.600 
6 1.000 1.000 0.700 0.643 0.600 0.600 0.600 1.000 1.000 0.813 0.667 0.600 0.625 0.600 
7 1.000 1.000 0.800 0.643 0.700 0.600 0.600 1.000 1.000 0.875 0.722 0.600 0.625 0.600 
8 1.000 1.000 0.900 0.643 0.700 0.700 0.600 1.000 1.000 0.938 0.778 0.600 0.688 0.600 
9 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.643 0.700 0.700 0.700 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.700 0.750 0.700 
10 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.714 0.800 0.700 0.700 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.889 0.700 0.750 0.700 
11 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.786 0.800 0.800 0.700 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.944 0.700 0.813 0.700 
12 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.857 0.800 0.800 0.800 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.800 0.875 0.800 
13 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.857 0.900 0.900 0.800 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.800 0.938 0.800 
14 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.929 1.000 0.900 0.900 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.900 1.000 0.900 
15 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Now, consider a scenario where there is some factor affecting the behavior of the 
voltage sensor (e.g. a degradation in the sensor core causing a bias fault in the sensor) and 
it indicates a value other than 0.2 V (say, 0.4 V as shown in Figure 5-16). All the other 
sensors continue to indicate their expected values (Figure 5-15. In this case, only the Ws 
corresponding to the voltage sensor decreases to zero (Table 5-14), indicating that the 
likely source of deviation in the voltage reading is due to a potential issue with its sensor. 
It can also be seen that the weights for all the other sensors as well as the processes 
remains unchanged or have increased from their initial value. If the deviation in the 
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voltage reading was due to an increased supply voltage level (which would be considered 
as a ‗fault‘ under the present terminology), then it would be reflected in the form of 
potentially increased readings in all the other variables as well.   
 
  
Figure 5-16: Faulty Voltage Sensor Figure 5-17: Faulty Speed Sensor 
Table 5-14: Variation in Ws and Wp values with a faulty voltage sensor 
 
Nodes Processes 
Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
1 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
2 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.563 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
3 0.600 0.600 0.400 0.571 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.600 0.600 0.625 0.556 0.500 0.500 0.500 
4 0.700 0.700 0.400 0.571 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.700 0.700 0.688 0.611 0.500 0.563 0.500 
5 0.800 0.800 0.400 0.571 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.667 0.600 0.625 0.600 
6 0.800 0.800 0.300 0.500 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.800 0.800 0.688 0.667 0.600 0.625 0.600 
7 0.800 0.800 0.200 0.500 0.500 0.600 0.600 0.800 0.800 0.625 0.611 0.600 0.625 0.600 
8 0.800 0.800 0.100 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.600 0.800 0.800 0.563 0.556 0.600 0.563 0.600 
9 0.800 0.800 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.800 0.800 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
10 0.800 0.800 0.000 0.571 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.800 0.800 0.500 0.556 0.500 0.500 0.500 
11 0.800 0.800 0.000 0.643 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.800 0.800 0.500 0.611 0.500 0.563 0.500 
12 0.800 0.800 0.000 0.714 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.800 0.800 0.500 0.667 0.600 0.625 0.600 
13 0.800 0.800 0.000 0.714 0.700 0.700 0.600 0.800 0.800 0.500 0.667 0.600 0.688 0.600 
14 0.800 0.800 0.000 0.786 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.800 0.800 0.500 0.667 0.700 0.750 0.700 
15 0.800 0.800 0.000 0.857 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.500 0.667 0.800 0.750 0.800 
 
Consider another example with a fault in the motor speed (calculated from the encoder 







































































































350 rpm and the remaining sensors are operating correctly. In this case, only the Ws value 
for the speed sensor decreases to zero (Table 5-15).  
Table 5-15:  Variation in WS and WP Values with a Faulty Speed Sensor 
 
Nodes Processes 
Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
1 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
2 0.700 0.700 0.600 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.700 0.700 0.563 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
3 0.800 0.800 0.600 0.571 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.800 0.800 0.625 0.556 0.500 0.500 0.500 
4 0.700 0.700 0.600 0.571 0.600 0.400 0.500 0.700 0.700 0.563 0.500 0.500 0.438 0.500 
5 0.800 0.800 0.600 0.571 0.600 0.400 0.600 0.800 0.800 0.625 0.556 0.600 0.500 0.600 
6 0.800 0.800 0.700 0.643 0.600 0.400 0.600 0.800 0.800 0.688 0.556 0.600 0.500 0.600 
7 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.643 0.700 0.400 0.600 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.611 0.600 0.500 0.600 
8 0.800 0.800 0.700 0.643 0.700 0.300 0.600 0.800 0.800 0.688 0.556 0.600 0.438 0.600 
9 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.643 0.700 0.300 0.700 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.611 0.700 0.500 0.700 
10 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.714 0.800 0.300 0.700 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.667 0.700 0.500 0.700 
11 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.643 0.800 0.200 0.700 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.611 0.700 0.438 0.700 
12 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.714 0.800 0.200 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.667 0.800 0.500 0.800 
13 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.714 0.700 0.100 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.667 0.800 0.438 0.800 
14 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.786 0.800 0.100 0.900 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.667 0.900 0.500 0.900 
15 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.714 0.800 0.000 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.667 0.800 0.500 0.800 
 
Similar results are observed even with multiple faulty sensors. Table 5-16 shows 
an example with faulty voltage and speed sensors. Table 5-17 shows an example with an 
additional faulty torque sensor22. In both these cases, it can be seen that deviation in the 
sensor readings is correctly identified as being caused by a potentially faulty sensor 
instead of being classified as a process fault. Note that, with multiple faulty sensors, the 
WS values for all the faulty sensors does not reduce to zero. However, these values are 
still relatively low as compared to the WS or WP values for the other operational sensors 
and processes, indicating the possibility of a potential fault in these components. As the 
number of faulty sensors increases, it is observed that the potential for false alarms also 
increases. In simulations with various such combinations of faulty sensors, it was found  
                                                 
22 The torque sensor is assumed to indicate a value of 1Nm as compared to the expected value of 0.8 Nm as 
shown in Figure 5-15 
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Table 5-16:  Variation in WS and WP Values with Faulty Voltage and Speed Sensors 
 
Nodes Processes 
Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
1 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
2 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.583 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.563 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
3 0.600 0.600 0.400 0.583 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.600 0.600 0.625 0.556 0.500 0.500 0.500 
4 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.583 0.600 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.563 0.500 0.500 0.438 0.500 
5 0.600 0.600 0.400 0.583 0.600 0.400 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.625 0.556 0.600 0.500 0.600 
6 0.600 0.600 0.300 0.500 0.600 0.400 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.563 0.556 0.600 0.500 0.600 
7 0.600 0.600 0.200 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.600 0.500 0.600 
8 0.600 0.600 0.100 0.500 0.500 0.300 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.438 0.444 0.600 0.438 0.600 
9 0.600 0.600 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.300 0.500 0.600 0.600 0.375 0.389 0.500 0.375 0.500 
10 0.600 0.600 0.000 0.583 0.600 0.300 0.500 0.600 0.600 0.375 0.444 0.500 0.375 0.500 
11 0.600 0.600 0.000 0.500 0.600 0.200 0.500 0.600 0.600 0.375 0.389 0.500 0.313 0.500 
12 0.600 0.600 0.000 0.583 0.600 0.200 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.375 0.444 0.600 0.375 0.600 
13 0.600 0.600 0.000 0.583 0.500 0.100 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.375 0.444 0.600 0.313 0.600 
14 0.600 0.600 0.000 0.667 0.600 0.100 0.700 0.600 0.600 0.375 0.444 0.700 0.375 0.700 
15 0.600 0.600 0.000 0.667 0.600 0.000 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.375 0.444 0.600 0.375 0.600 
 




Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
1 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
2 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.583 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.563 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
3 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.583 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.444 0.500 0.500 0.500 
4 0.300 0.300 0.400 0.583 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.300 0.300 0.438 0.389 0.500 0.438 0.500 
5 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.583 0.400 0.400 0.600 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.444 0.600 0.500 0.600 
6 0.400 0.400 0.300 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.600 0.400 0.400 0.438 0.444 0.600 0.500 0.600 
7 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.600 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.600 0.500 0.600 
8 0.400 0.400 0.300 0.500 0.500 0.300 0.600 0.400 0.400 0.438 0.444 0.600 0.438 0.600 
9 0.400 0.400 0.200 0.500 0.500 0.300 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.375 0.389 0.500 0.375 0.500 
10 0.400 0.400 0.200 0.417 0.400 0.300 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.375 0.333 0.500 0.375 0.500 
11 0.400 0.400 0.200 0.333 0.400 0.200 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.375 0.278 0.500 0.313 0.500 
12 0.400 0.400 0.200 0.417 0.400 0.200 0.600 0.400 0.400 0.375 0.333 0.600 0.375 0.600 
13 0.400 0.400 0.200 0.417 0.300 0.100 0.600 0.400 0.400 0.375 0.333 0.600 0.313 0.600 
14 0.400 0.400 0.200 0.333 0.200 0.100 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.375 0.333 0.500 0.250 0.500 




that the algorithm reliably isolates the potentially faulty sensors as long as the number of 
faulty sensors was less than the number of operational/normal sensors in the system. 
Now consider as an example of a fault in the V->I process. Such a fault may be 
the result of a change in the resistance of the motor windings (in other words, 
confirmation of this fault could indicate the existence of a potential winding fault). Such 
a fault can cause a complete change in the operational characteristics of the motor. For 
instance, for the same level supply voltage (VS) and control parameter (DC and FR) 
conditions, the corresponding values of all the variables (Figure 5-15) are now decreased.  
Suppose the sensors now indicate 0.2 V for the voltage (same as before) but 0.9 
A, 0.6 Nm, 350 rpm and 72 dB for current, torque, speed and acoustic noise respectively. 
It can be seen that although the readings for four of the sensors deviates from their 
normal or expected values, the SPFDI algorithm is still able to correctly distinguish the 
cause of deviations as a fault in the V->I process as evident from the minimum WP value 
for that process when compared to all the other WS and WP values (Table 5-18). 
Consider another example where the load torque acting on the motor suddenly 
increases. This implies that for a given motor torque, the motor speed will decrease23. 
Thus the relation T->S as encoded in the CPT of node S, no longer holds true. The 
sudden increase in the load torque can therefore be thought of as a fault in the T->S 
process (or conversely if a T->S process fault is determined from the algorithm results, 
the operator may use the WT->S value and interpret it to be the effect of a change in the 
load torque). The reduction in speed also causes a reduction in the acoustic noise 
generated (primarily due to reduced windage effects). Thus both the speed and acoustic 
noise sensors would indicate readings lower than their expected values under regular 
operating conditions.  
Suppose all the sensors indicate the same values as before, with the speed value 
now at 350 rpm and a noise level reading of 71 dB.  
 
                                                 
23 Assuming the absence of any other control action to maintain the speed at its command value 
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Table 5-18:  Variation in WS and WP Values with a V->I Process Fault 
 
Nodes Processes 
Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
1 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
2 0.500 0.500 0.600 0.417 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.438 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
3 0.400 0.400 0.600 0.417 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.375 0.444 0.500 0.500 0.500 
4 0.300 0.300 0.600 0.417 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.300 0.300 0.313 0.389 0.500 0.438 0.500 
5 0.200 0.200 0.600 0.417 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.200 0.200 0.250 0.333 0.400 0.375 0.400 
6 0.200 0.200 0.500 0.333 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.200 0.200 0.188 0.333 0.400 0.375 0.400 
7 0.200 0.200 0.400 0.333 0.300 0.400 0.400 0.200 0.200 0.125 0.278 0.400 0.375 0.400 
8 0.200 0.200 0.300 0.333 0.300 0.300 0.400 0.200 0.200 0.063 0.222 0.400 0.313 0.400 
9 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.333 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.200 0.200 0.000 0.167 0.300 0.250 0.300 
10 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.417 0.400 0.300 0.300 0.200 0.200 0.000 0.222 0.300 0.250 0.300 
11 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.200 0.000 0.278 0.300 0.313 0.300 
12 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.583 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.200 0.200 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.375 0.400 
13 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.583 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.200 0.200 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.438 0.400 
14 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.667 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.200 0.200 0.000 0.333 0.500 0.500 0.500 
15 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.667 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.200 0.200 0.000 0.333 0.600 0.500 0.600 
 
Table 5-19:  Variation in WS and WP Values with a T->S Process Fault 
 
Nodes Processes 
Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
1 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
2 0.700 0.700 0.600 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.700 0.700 0.563 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
3 0.800 0.800 0.600 0.571 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.800 0.800 0.625 0.556 0.500 0.500 0.500 
4 0.700 0.700 0.600 0.571 0.600 0.400 0.500 0.700 0.700 0.563 0.500 0.500 0.438 0.500 
5 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.571 0.600 0.400 0.400 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.444 0.400 0.375 0.400 
6 0.600 0.600 0.700 0.643 0.600 0.400 0.400 0.600 0.600 0.563 0.444 0.400 0.375 0.400 
7 0.600 0.600 0.800 0.643 0.700 0.400 0.400 0.600 0.600 0.625 0.500 0.400 0.375 0.400 
8 0.600 0.600 0.700 0.643 0.700 0.300 0.400 0.600 0.600 0.563 0.444 0.400 0.313 0.400 
9 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.643 0.700 0.300 0.300 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.389 0.300 0.250 0.300 
10 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.714 0.800 0.300 0.300 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.444 0.300 0.250 0.300 
11 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.643 0.800 0.200 0.300 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.389 0.300 0.188 0.300 
12 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.571 0.800 0.200 0.200 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.333 0.200 0.125 0.200 
13 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.571 0.700 0.100 0.200 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.333 0.200 0.063 0.200 
14 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.600 0.100 0.100 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.333 0.100 0.000 0.100 




If these values are considered individually, then they would be construed as being 
indicative of a fault in both the speed and the noise sensor. However, by correlating these 
values with the values indicated by the other sensors in the Bayesian network, the 
algorithm is correctly able to isolate the cause of variation as being a change in the T->S 
process rather than dual sensor faults or other process faults (e.g. I->N or S->N). Table 
5-19 shows the changes in the belief values for the different sensors and processes in the 
network in this case. 
If, for a commanded value of DC and FR, the voltage is not what it is supposed to 
be, but the values for all the other variables are consistent with the measured value of V, 
then it could mean that there is potentially a fault in the DC->V<-FR processes (process 
fault). This may be due to some issue with the power amplifiers that convert the PWM 
commands to the desired voltage. Alternatively, it could also mean that there is no issue 
with the amplifiers; the sensors may be indicating abnormal values because a wrong 
command was received by the amplifiers (e.g. due to an inconsistent PWM signal as a 
result of a fault in the line relaying the user commands from the main controller/PC to the 
amplifiers) and the motor is not actually operating at the conditions it was supposed to 
(this would be akin to a ‗sensor‘ fault). Considering the case of a DC->V process fault24, 
suppose the value of DC is now 5% but all the other sensors continue to indicate the same 
values shown in Figure 5-15 (ideally all these values should now be higher because of the 
higher supply voltage). The changes in the WS and WP values are shown in Table 5-20.  
It is seen that the WP values for both the DC->V and FR->V processes are reduced 
to zero. In addition, the WS weights for both the control parameter nodes are also reduced 
to zero indicating that both are potentially faulty, which is an incorrect result. Thus, as 
explained earlier, with a deviation in the values corresponding to a root node/process, the 
algorithm cannot reliably distinguish between sensor and process faults.   
 
                                                 
24 Physically, it is not very intuitive to distinguish a deviation in the value of V as being caused by a fault in 
the DC->V or the FR->V process considering them separately, since the resultant value of voltage depends 
on the values of both the PWM duty cycle and its frequency. 
 
 193 
Table 5-20:  Variation in WS and WP Values with a DC->V Process Fault 
 
Nodes Processes 
Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
1 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
2 0.300 0.300 0.400 0.429 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.300 0.300 0.438 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
3 0.200 0.200 0.400 0.429 0.400 0.500 0.500 0.200 0.200 0.375 0.444 0.500 0.500 0.500 
4 0.100 0.100 0.400 0.429 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.100 0.100 0.313 0.389 0.500 0.438 0.500 
5 0.000 0.000 0.400 0.429 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.333 0.400 0.375 0.400 
6 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.313 0.333 0.400 0.375 0.400 
7 0.000 0.000 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.375 0.389 0.400 0.375 0.400 
8 0.000 0.000 0.700 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.438 0.444 0.400 0.438 0.400 
9 0.000 0.000 0.800 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
10 0.000 0.000 0.800 0.571 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.556 0.500 0.500 0.500 
11 0.000 0.000 0.800 0.643 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.611 0.500 0.563 0.500 
12 0.000 0.000 0.800 0.714 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.667 0.600 0.625 0.600 
13 0.000 0.000 0.800 0.714 0.700 0.700 0.600 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.667 0.600 0.688 0.600 
14 0.000 0.000 0.800 0.786 0.800 0.700 0.700 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.667 0.700 0.750 0.700 
15 0.000 0.000 0.800 0.857 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.667 0.800 0.750 0.800 
Table 5-21:  Variation in WS and WP Values with a Faulty N Sensor 
 
Nodes Processes 
Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
1 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
2 0.700 0.700 0.600 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.700 0.700 0.563 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
3 0.800 0.800 0.600 0.571 0.600 0.500 0.500 0.800 0.800 0.625 0.556 0.500 0.500 0.500 
4 0.900 0.900 0.600 0.571 0.600 0.600 0.500 0.900 0.900 0.688 0.611 0.500 0.563 0.500 
5 0.800 0.800 0.600 0.571 0.600 0.600 0.400 0.800 0.800 0.625 0.556 0.400 0.500 0.400 
6 0.800 0.800 0.700 0.643 0.600 0.600 0.400 0.800 0.800 0.688 0.556 0.400 0.500 0.400 
7 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.643 0.700 0.600 0.400 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.611 0.400 0.500 0.400 
8 0.800 0.800 0.900 0.643 0.700 0.700 0.400 0.800 0.800 0.813 0.667 0.400 0.563 0.400 
9 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.643 0.700 0.700 0.300 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.611 0.300 0.500 0.300 
10 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.714 0.800 0.700 0.300 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.667 0.300 0.500 0.300 
11 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.786 0.800 0.800 0.300 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.722 0.300 0.563 0.300 
12 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.714 0.800 0.800 0.200 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.667 0.200 0.500 0.200 
13 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.714 0.900 0.900 0.200 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.667 0.200 0.563 0.200 
14 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.643 0.800 0.900 0.100 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.667 0.100 0.500 0.100 
15 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.571 0.800 0.800 0.000 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.667 0.000 0.500 0.000 
 
In the case of a deviation in the readings from a sensor corresponding to a leaf 
node, the algorithm is again not completely reliable as explained earlier. For example, 
 
 194 
suppose the acoustic noise sensor is faulty and indicates a reading of 70 dB for the N 
node instead of 74 dB, whereas all the other sensors continue to indicate the same values 
as before. It can be seen from Table 5-21, the WS weights for the leaf node N and the WP 
weights for both the S->N and I->N processes are reduced to zero, resulting in an 
ambiguous result. 
To accommodate the two cases mentioned above, redundant nodes (see Section 
5.5.4) are added to root and leaf level nodes. The list of additional instantiations obtained 
by adding such redundant nodes to the top is 
shown in Table 5-22. Note that even with the 
addition of redundant nodes ColDC->V   ColFR->V. 
The variation in WS and WP values with different 
types of sensor and process faults is shown in 
Table 5-23 to Table 5-28.  
In each case, it is observed that the 
SPFDI algorithm is able detect and isolate the 
exact source of faults. Due to the identical 
columns for DC->V and FR->V, when a fault is 
assumed in the DC->V process, the WP values 
for both the processes are reduced to zero. This 
can be still considered a meaningful result, since 
it confirms that the variation in the voltage 
sensor reading is due to a fault in the voltage 
amplification process and not due to a faulty 
voltage sensor. As explained in Section 5.5.4, the (ideal) processes DC2->DC, FR2->FR 
and N2->N are not real processes and their WP values are always set to 1 throughout the 
fault detection and isolation cycle. 
 





Table 5-22 : Instantiation Table for the Testbed with Redundant Nodes 
 
Nodes Processes 
Step DC2 DC FR2 FR V I T S N N2 DC2-DC FR2-FR DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N N-N2 
1                                         
2                                         
3                                         
4                                         
5                                         
6                                         
7                                         
8                                         
9                                         
10                                         
11                                         
12                                         
13                                         
14                                         
15                                         
16                                         
17                                         
18                                         
19                                         
20                                         
21                                         
22                                         
23                                         
24                                         
25                                         
26                                         
27                                         
28                                         
29                                         
  
 




Table 5-23 : Variation in WS and WP Values with No Sensor or Process Faults 




FR DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N N-N2 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
1 0.571 0.500 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
2 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
3 0.643 0.643 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.542 0.542 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
4 0.714 0.714 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.545 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.583 0.583 0.533 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
5 0.786 0.786 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.545 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.625 0.625 0.567 0.525 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
6 0.857 0.857 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.600 0.550 0.500 0.529 0.500 1.000 
7 0.929 0.929 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.708 0.708 0.633 0.575 0.542 0.559 0.542 1.000 
8 1.000 1.000 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.750 0.750 0.667 0.600 0.583 0.588 0.583 1.000 
9 1.000 1.000 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.792 0.792 0.667 0.600 0.583 0.588 0.583 1.000 
10 1.000 1.000 0.714 0.714 0.643 0.591 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.700 0.600 0.583 0.588 0.583 1.000 
11 1.000 1.000 0.786 0.786 0.643 0.591 0.643 0.571 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.875 0.875 0.733 0.625 0.583 0.588 0.583 1.000 
12 1.000 1.000 0.857 0.857 0.643 0.591 0.643 0.643 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.917 0.917 0.767 0.650 0.583 0.618 0.583 1.000 
13 1.000 1.000 0.929 0.929 0.643 0.591 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.958 0.958 0.800 0.675 0.625 0.647 0.625 1.000 
14 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.643 0.591 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.700 0.667 0.676 0.667 1.000 
15 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.714 0.636 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.867 0.700 0.667 0.676 0.667 1.000 
16 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.786 0.636 0.714 0.643 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.900 0.725 0.667 0.676 0.667 1.000 
17 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.857 0.636 0.714 0.714 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.933 0.750 0.667 0.706 0.667 1.000 
18 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.929 0.636 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.643 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.967 0.775 0.708 0.735 0.708 1.000 
19 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.636 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.800 0.750 0.765 0.750 1.000 
20 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.682 0.786 0.714 0.714 0.714 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.825 0.750 0.765 0.750 1.000 
21 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.727 0.786 0.786 0.714 0.714 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.850 0.750 0.794 0.750 1.000 
22 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.773 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.714 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.875 0.792 0.824 0.792 1.000 
23 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.818 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.900 0.833 0.853 0.833 1.000 
24 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.818 0.857 0.857 0.786 0.786 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.900 0.833 0.882 0.833 1.000 
25 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.864 0.929 0.857 0.857 0.786 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.925 0.875 0.912 0.875 1.000 
26 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.909 1.000 0.857 0.857 0.857 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.950 0.917 0.941 0.917 1.000 
27 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.955 1.000 0.929 0.929 0.857 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.975 0.958 0.971 0.958 1.000 
28 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.929 0.929 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
29 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Table 5-24: Variation in WS and WP Values with a Faulty Voltage Sensor 




FR DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N N-N2 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
1 0.571 0.500 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
2 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
3 0.500 0.500 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.458 0.458 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
4 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.545 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.533 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
5 0.643 0.643 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.545 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.542 0.542 0.567 0.525 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
6 0.714 0.714 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.583 0.583 0.600 0.550 0.500 0.529 0.500 1.000 
7 0.786 0.786 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.625 0.625 0.633 0.575 0.542 0.559 0.542 1.000 
8 0.857 0.857 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.667 0.600 0.583 0.588 0.583 1.000 
9 0.857 0.857 0.500 0.500 0.357 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.625 0.625 0.667 0.600 0.583 0.588 0.583 1.000 
10 0.857 0.857 0.571 0.571 0.357 0.591 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.700 0.600 0.583 0.588 0.583 1.000 
11 0.857 0.857 0.643 0.643 0.357 0.591 0.643 0.571 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.708 0.708 0.733 0.625 0.583 0.588 0.583 1.000 
12 0.857 0.857 0.714 0.714 0.357 0.591 0.643 0.643 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.750 0.750 0.767 0.650 0.583 0.618 0.583 1.000 
13 0.857 0.857 0.786 0.786 0.357 0.591 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.792 0.792 0.800 0.675 0.625 0.647 0.625 1.000 
14 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.357 0.591 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.700 0.667 0.676 0.667 1.000 
15 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.286 0.545 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.800 0.700 0.667 0.676 0.667 1.000 
16 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.214 0.545 0.571 0.643 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.767 0.675 0.667 0.676 0.667 1.000 
17 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.143 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.733 0.650 0.667 0.647 0.667 1.000 
18 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.071 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.700 0.625 0.625 0.618 0.625 1.000 
19 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.000 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.667 0.600 0.583 0.588 0.583 1.000 
20 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.000 0.591 0.643 0.571 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.667 0.625 0.583 0.588 0.583 1.000 
21 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.000 0.636 0.643 0.643 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.667 0.650 0.583 0.618 0.583 1.000 
22 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.000 0.682 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.667 0.675 0.625 0.647 0.625 1.000 
23 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.000 0.727 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.667 0.700 0.667 0.676 0.667 1.000 
24 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.000 0.727 0.714 0.714 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.667 0.700 0.667 0.706 0.667 1.000 
25 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.000 0.773 0.786 0.714 0.714 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.667 0.725 0.708 0.735 0.708 1.000 
26 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.000 0.818 0.857 0.714 0.714 0.714 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.667 0.750 0.750 0.765 0.750 1.000 
27 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.000 0.864 0.857 0.786 0.786 0.714 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.667 0.775 0.792 0.794 0.792 1.000 
28 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.000 0.909 0.857 0.857 0.786 0.786 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.667 0.800 0.833 0.824 0.833 1.000 
29 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.000 0.909 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.667 0.800 0.833 0.824 0.833 1.000 
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Table 5-25: Variation in WS and WP Values with Faulty Voltage and Speed Sensors 




FR DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N N-N2 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
1 0.571 0.500 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
2 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
3 0.500 0.500 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.458 0.458 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
4 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.545 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.533 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
5 0.643 0.643 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.545 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.542 0.542 0.567 0.525 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
6 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.545 0.571 0.429 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.533 0.500 0.500 0.471 0.500 1.000 
7 0.643 0.643 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.545 0.571 0.429 0.571 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.542 0.542 0.567 0.525 0.542 0.500 0.542 1.000 
8 0.714 0.714 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.545 0.571 0.429 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.583 0.583 0.600 0.550 0.583 0.529 0.583 1.000 
9 0.714 0.714 0.500 0.500 0.357 0.545 0.571 0.429 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.542 0.542 0.600 0.550 0.583 0.529 0.583 1.000 
10 0.714 0.714 0.571 0.571 0.357 0.591 0.571 0.429 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.583 0.583 0.633 0.550 0.583 0.529 0.583 1.000 
11 0.714 0.714 0.643 0.643 0.357 0.591 0.643 0.429 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.625 0.625 0.667 0.575 0.583 0.529 0.583 1.000 
12 0.714 0.714 0.571 0.571 0.357 0.591 0.643 0.357 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.583 0.583 0.633 0.550 0.583 0.500 0.583 1.000 
13 0.714 0.714 0.643 0.643 0.357 0.591 0.643 0.357 0.643 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.625 0.625 0.667 0.575 0.625 0.529 0.625 1.000 
14 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.357 0.591 0.643 0.357 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.700 0.600 0.667 0.559 0.667 1.000 
15 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.286 0.545 0.643 0.357 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.667 0.600 0.667 0.559 0.667 1.000 
16 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.214 0.545 0.571 0.357 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.633 0.575 0.667 0.559 0.667 1.000 
17 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.143 0.545 0.571 0.286 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.600 0.550 0.667 0.529 0.667 1.000 
18 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.071 0.545 0.571 0.286 0.571 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.567 0.525 0.625 0.500 0.625 1.000 
19 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.000 0.545 0.571 0.286 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.533 0.500 0.583 0.471 0.583 1.000 
20 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.000 0.591 0.643 0.286 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.533 0.525 0.583 0.471 0.583 1.000 
21 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.000 0.545 0.643 0.214 0.571 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.533 0.500 0.583 0.441 0.583 1.000 
22 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.000 0.591 0.643 0.214 0.643 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.533 0.525 0.625 0.471 0.625 1.000 
23 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.000 0.636 0.643 0.214 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.533 0.550 0.667 0.500 0.667 1.000 
24 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.000 0.636 0.571 0.143 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.533 0.550 0.667 0.471 0.667 1.000 
25 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.000 0.682 0.643 0.143 0.714 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.533 0.575 0.708 0.500 0.708 1.000 
26 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.000 0.727 0.714 0.143 0.714 0.714 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.533 0.600 0.750 0.529 0.750 1.000 
27 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.000 0.682 0.714 0.071 0.643 0.714 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.533 0.575 0.708 0.500 0.708 1.000 
28 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.000 0.636 0.714 0.000 0.643 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.533 0.550 0.667 0.471 0.667 1.000 
29 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.000 0.636 0.714 0.000 0.714 0.714 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.533 0.550 0.667 0.471 0.667 1.000 
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Table 5-26: Variation in WS and WP Values with a V->I Process Fault 




FR DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N N-N2 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
1 0.571 0.500 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
2 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
3 0.643 0.643 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.542 0.542 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
4 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.455 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.467 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
5 0.500 0.500 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.455 0.429 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.458 0.458 0.433 0.475 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
6 0.429 0.429 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.455 0.429 0.429 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.417 0.417 0.400 0.450 0.500 0.471 0.500 1.000 
7 0.357 0.357 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.455 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.375 0.375 0.367 0.425 0.458 0.441 0.458 1.000 
8 0.286 0.286 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.455 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.400 0.417 0.412 0.417 1.000 
9 0.286 0.286 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.455 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.375 0.375 0.333 0.400 0.417 0.412 0.417 1.000 
10 0.286 0.286 0.571 0.571 0.643 0.409 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.333 0.333 0.300 0.400 0.417 0.412 0.417 1.000 
11 0.286 0.286 0.500 0.500 0.643 0.409 0.357 0.429 0.429 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.292 0.292 0.267 0.375 0.417 0.412 0.417 1.000 
12 0.286 0.286 0.429 0.429 0.643 0.409 0.357 0.357 0.429 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.250 0.250 0.233 0.350 0.417 0.382 0.417 1.000 
13 0.286 0.286 0.357 0.357 0.643 0.409 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.208 0.208 0.200 0.325 0.375 0.353 0.375 1.000 
14 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.643 0.409 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.300 0.333 0.324 0.333 1.000 
15 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.571 0.364 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.133 0.300 0.333 0.324 0.333 1.000 
16 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.500 0.364 0.286 0.357 0.357 0.357 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.100 0.275 0.333 0.324 0.333 1.000 
17 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.429 0.364 0.286 0.286 0.357 0.357 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.067 0.250 0.333 0.294 0.333 1.000 
18 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.357 0.364 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.357 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.033 0.225 0.292 0.265 0.292 1.000 
19 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.364 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.200 0.250 0.235 0.250 1.000 
20 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.409 0.357 0.286 0.286 0.286 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.225 0.250 0.235 0.250 1.000 
21 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.455 0.357 0.357 0.286 0.286 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.250 0.250 0.265 0.250 1.000 
22 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.500 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.286 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.275 0.292 0.294 0.292 1.000 
23 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.455 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.214 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.250 0.250 0.265 0.250 1.000 
24 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.455 0.429 0.429 0.357 0.214 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.250 0.250 0.294 0.250 1.000 
25 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.500 0.500 0.429 0.429 0.214 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.275 0.292 0.324 0.292 1.000 
26 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.545 0.571 0.429 0.429 0.286 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.300 0.333 0.353 0.333 1.000 
27 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.591 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.286 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.325 0.375 0.382 0.375 1.000 
28 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.636 0.571 0.571 0.500 0.357 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.350 0.417 0.412 0.417 1.000 
29 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.636 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.350 0.417 0.412 0.417 1.000 
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Table 5-27: Variation in WS and WP Values with a DC->V Process Fault 




FR DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N N-N2 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
1 0.571 0.500 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
2 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
3 0.500 0.500 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.458 0.458 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
4 0.429 0.429 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.455 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.417 0.417 0.467 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
5 0.357 0.357 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.455 0.429 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.375 0.375 0.433 0.475 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
6 0.286 0.286 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.455 0.429 0.429 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.333 0.333 0.400 0.450 0.500 0.471 0.500 1.000 
7 0.214 0.214 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.455 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.292 0.292 0.367 0.425 0.458 0.441 0.458 1.000 
8 0.143 0.143 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.455 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.250 0.250 0.333 0.400 0.417 0.412 0.417 1.000 
9 0.143 0.143 0.500 0.500 0.357 0.455 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.208 0.208 0.333 0.400 0.417 0.412 0.417 1.000 
10 0.143 0.143 0.429 0.429 0.357 0.409 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.300 0.400 0.417 0.412 0.417 1.000 
11 0.143 0.143 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.409 0.357 0.429 0.429 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.125 0.125 0.267 0.375 0.417 0.412 0.417 1.000 
12 0.143 0.143 0.286 0.286 0.357 0.409 0.357 0.357 0.429 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.083 0.083 0.233 0.350 0.417 0.382 0.417 1.000 
13 0.143 0.143 0.214 0.214 0.357 0.409 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.042 0.042 0.200 0.325 0.375 0.353 0.375 1.000 
14 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.357 0.409 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.300 0.333 0.324 0.333 1.000 
15 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.429 0.455 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.357 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.300 0.333 0.324 0.333 1.000 
16 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.500 0.455 0.429 0.357 0.357 0.357 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.233 0.325 0.333 0.324 0.333 1.000 
17 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.571 0.455 0.429 0.429 0.357 0.357 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.267 0.350 0.333 0.353 0.333 1.000 
18 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.643 0.455 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.357 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.300 0.375 0.375 0.382 0.375 1.000 
19 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.714 0.455 0.429 0.429 0.429 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.400 0.417 0.412 0.417 1.000 
20 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.714 0.500 0.500 0.429 0.429 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.425 0.417 0.412 0.417 1.000 
21 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.714 0.545 0.500 0.500 0.429 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.450 0.417 0.441 0.417 1.000 
22 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.714 0.591 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.475 0.458 0.471 0.458 1.000 
23 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.714 0.636 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
24 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.714 0.636 0.571 0.571 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.500 0.500 0.529 0.500 1.000 
25 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.714 0.682 0.643 0.571 0.571 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.525 0.542 0.559 0.542 1.000 
26 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.714 0.636 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.500 0.500 0.529 0.500 1.000 
27 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.714 0.591 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.475 0.458 0.500 0.458 1.000 
28 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.714 0.545 0.571 0.429 0.500 0.357 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.450 0.417 0.471 0.417 1.000 
29 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.714 0.545 0.571 0.429 0.571 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.450 0.417 0.471 0.417 1.000 
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Table 5-28: Variation in WS and WP Values with a Faulty Acoustic Noise Sensor 




FR DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N N-N2 
0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
1 0.571 0.500 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
2 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
3 0.643 0.643 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.542 0.542 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
4 0.714 0.714 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.545 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.583 0.583 0.533 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
5 0.786 0.786 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.545 0.571 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.625 0.625 0.567 0.525 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 
6 0.857 0.857 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.600 0.550 0.500 0.529 0.500 1.000 
7 0.786 0.786 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.625 0.625 0.567 0.525 0.458 0.500 0.458 1.000 
8 0.857 0.857 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.600 0.550 0.500 0.529 0.500 1.000 
9 0.857 0.857 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.545 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.708 0.708 0.600 0.550 0.500 0.529 0.500 1.000 
10 0.857 0.857 0.714 0.714 0.643 0.591 0.571 0.571 0.429 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.750 0.750 0.633 0.550 0.500 0.529 0.500 1.000 
11 0.857 0.857 0.786 0.786 0.643 0.591 0.643 0.571 0.429 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.792 0.792 0.667 0.575 0.500 0.529 0.500 1.000 
12 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.643 0.591 0.643 0.643 0.429 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.700 0.600 0.500 0.559 0.500 1.000 
13 0.857 0.857 0.786 0.786 0.643 0.591 0.643 0.643 0.357 0.571 1.000 1.000 0.792 0.792 0.667 0.575 0.458 0.529 0.458 1.000 
14 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.643 0.591 0.643 0.643 0.357 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.700 0.600 0.500 0.559 0.500 1.000 
15 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.714 0.636 0.643 0.643 0.357 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.733 0.600 0.500 0.559 0.500 1.000 
16 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.786 0.636 0.714 0.643 0.357 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.767 0.625 0.500 0.559 0.500 1.000 
17 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.636 0.714 0.714 0.357 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.800 0.650 0.500 0.588 0.500 1.000 
18 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.786 0.636 0.714 0.714 0.286 0.643 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.767 0.625 0.458 0.559 0.458 1.000 
19 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.636 0.714 0.714 0.286 0.714 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.800 0.650 0.500 0.588 0.500 1.000 
20 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.682 0.786 0.714 0.286 0.714 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.800 0.675 0.500 0.588 0.500 1.000 
21 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.727 0.786 0.786 0.286 0.714 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.800 0.700 0.500 0.618 0.500 1.000 
22 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.682 0.786 0.786 0.214 0.714 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.800 0.675 0.458 0.588 0.458 1.000 
23 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.727 0.786 0.786 0.214 0.786 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.800 0.700 0.500 0.618 0.500 1.000 
24 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.727 0.857 0.857 0.214 0.786 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.800 0.700 0.500 0.647 0.500 1.000 
25 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.682 0.786 0.857 0.143 0.786 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.800 0.675 0.458 0.618 0.458 1.000 
26 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.727 0.857 0.857 0.143 0.857 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.800 0.700 0.500 0.647 0.500 1.000 
27 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.682 0.857 0.786 0.071 0.857 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.800 0.675 0.458 0.618 0.458 1.000 
28 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.727 0.857 0.857 0.071 0.929 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.800 0.700 0.500 0.647 0.500 1.000 
29 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.727 0.857 0.857 0.000 0.857 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.800 0.700 0.500 0.647 0.500 1.000 
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5.7. FACTORS AFFECTING THE SPFDI ALGORITHM  
There are different factors which may affect the efficiency of the algorithm 
described in section 5.4, as well as the correctness of the results that are obtained from it. 
The following section delves into some of these factors. 
5.7.1. Effect of Network Structure 
As seen in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2), the nodes in a Bayesian network can be linked 
in number of ways based on different criteria. The resultant network topology has a 
strong influence on the composition of the instantiation table. This, in turn can have a 
profound effect on the effectiveness of the SPFDI algorithm, in terms of how reliably it 
can identify and distinguish among faults.  
A false alarm in the present context is defined as a situation where a particular 
sensor or process may be inadvertently flagged as being faulty by virtue of its column in 
the instantiation table constituting a subset of other columns corresponding to one or 
more of the remaining sensors/processes where real faults have occurred. Different types 
of network structures may result in different instances of false alarms. Intuitively, it may 
be expected that as the number of subsets formed for different supersets of columns 
(individually or in combinations) increases, the number of false alarms that may be 
expected by using such an instantiation table will also be higher24.   
Consider a simple system consisting of four variables A, B, C, and D. Figure 5-19 
shows the different network structures that may arise, relating the nodes corresponding to 
these variables. Some elementary cases like a serial chain, diverging links, converging 
links, an acyclic loop, addition of redundant nodes, (Figure 5-19 (a)-(e) respectively) etc. 
have been considered for illustrative purposes; many other alternative structures are also 
possible. 
 
                                                 
24 As the number of faulty elements (sensors/processes) increase, it would be logical to expect that the 
instances of false alarms would increase (due to a greater number of unreliable sources of information as 
compared to reliable ones) except for the degenerate case when all the sensors/processes represented in the 





 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 
1 NI NoI   PoI   
2 NI  NoI  PoI PoI  
3 NI   NoI PoI PoI PoI 
4  NI NoI   PoI  
5  NI  NoI  PoI PoI 




 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B A->C A->D 
1 NI NoI   PoI   
2 NI  NoI   PoI  




 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->D B->D C->D 
1 NI   NoI PoI   
2  NI  NoI  PoI  




 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B A->C B->D C->D 
1 NI NoI   PoI    
2 NI  NoI   PoI   
3 NI   NoI PoI PoI PoI PoI 




 Sensors Processes 
Step A2 A B C D D2 A2->A A->B B->C C->D D->D2 
1 NI NoI     PoI     
2 NI  NoI    PoI PoI    
3 NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI   
4 NI    NoI  PoI PoI PoI PoI  
5 NI     NoI PoI PoI PoI PoI PoI 
6  NI NoI     PoI    
7  NI  NoI    PoI PoI   
8  NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI  
9  NI    NoI  PoI PoI PoI PoI 
10   NI NoI     PoI   
11   NI  NoI    PoI PoI  
12   NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI 
13    NI NoI     PoI  
14    NI  NoI    PoI PoI 
15     NI NoI     PoI 
 




















The instantiation tables for these different configurations are also shown. The objective is 
to determine the extent to which the network structure and the resultant instantiation table 
cause the subset problem to occur (Section 5.5.3).  
In Figure 5-19 (a), simply by observation, it can be seen that ColA->B  ColA25, 
ColD  (ColC   ColB->C), and ColC->D  (ColC   ColB->C). This implies that with either a 
fault in the sensor corresponding to A, or with a fault in the process A->B, the algorithm 
results indicate a potential fault in both the sensor and the process. Similarly, with a fault 
in the sensor corresponding to C and a simultaneous fault in the B->C process, in 
addition to flagging a possible fault in both these elements, the algorithm also wrongly 
signals a potential fault in the sensor corresponding to D and the process C->D.  
In Figure 5-19 (b), it is observed that ColB  ColA, ColC  ColA, ColD  ColA, 
ColA->B  ColA and ColB, ColA->C  ColA and ColC, and ColA->D  ColA and ColD. In this 
case, due to the numerous subsets, the potential for false alarms is quite high and without 
the addition of redundant nodes (representing additional sensors) or altering the network 
structure, the SPFDI algorithm cannot reliably distinguish between the different types of 
faults. Similarly, for Figure 5-19 (c), (d), it can be seen that the formation of subsets can 
hamper the algorithm in clearly distinguishing between sensor and process faults with 
any unanticipated deviations in sensor readings.   
The occurrence of false alarms may be reduced via careful construction of the 
instantiation table by the domain expert. This may be achieved, for instance, by 
introducing different types of instantiations (for instance, utilizing both predictive/ 
diagnostic reasoning), choosing the order in which the nodes are instantiated, performing 
an exhaustive examination of all possible combinations of columns and their subsets, etc. 
The goal is to modify the instantiation table structure to prevent subsets from being 
formed as far as possible. However, despite all these efforts, situations may still exist 
where it may not be possible to eliminate the potential for false alarms completely. In 
such cases, it would be desirable to calculate the risk associated with using the available 
                                                 
25 In this case, since the two columns are identical i.e. ColA->B ≡ ColA, the relation that ColA  ColA->B can 
also be considered to be equally valid 
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instantiation table structure with the SPFDI algorithm26.  This is particularly vital if there 
is a possibility that a key sensor or a process may end up being flagged as often faulty, 
despite no real faults occurring. Armed with this information, the domain expert may be 
able to alter the instantiation table before implementing the SPFDI algorithm, in order to 
ensure its maximum effectiveness and accuracy in detecting and isolating faults. The 
following section describes a possible approach to estimate beforehand, the risk of false 
alarms occurring based on the composition of the instantiation table. 
  Consider the network shown in Figure 5-19 (e). This network consists of six 
nodes or six sensors in an actual system. The network also has five different links 
representing the processes in the system. Thus, there are a total of eleven possible single 
sensor or process faults that may occur in the system represented by this network. With 
the addition of nodes A2 and D2 representing redundant sensors for the variables 
corresponding to the original root and leaf nodes A and D (Figure 5-19 (a)), the subset 
issue is alleviated to a large extent, especially for single faults in either the sensors or the 
processes since all the columns in the instantiation table are made distinct27. Excluding 
the ideal processes A2->A and D->D2, there are nine possible elements in which real 
faults may occur.  
Each of these elements may be considered potentially faulty or not. This results in 
a total of      
  
    combinations of faults, where r represents the number of faulty 
sensors and/or processes i.e. 512 possible combinations of faults (2
9
) ranging from no 
faults (i.e. r = 0 which occurs in only one combination) to the extreme situation when all 
the sensors and processes are faulty (r=9, which can again happen in only one 
combination).
                                                 
26 For instance, if results from the SPFDI algorithm are indicated to the operator via warning lamps on the 
system control panel, showing the existence of a fault, and if the light corresponding to a particular 
sensor/process flashes, the operator needs to be informed of the odds that the warning light is due to an 
actual fault in the sensor/process rather than a false alarm caused by the subset issue. 
27 As explained in Section 5.5.4, even though the columns corresponding to A2 /A2->A  are identical and the 
columns corresponding to D2 /D->D2, the processes A2->A and D->D2 represent ideal processes which can 
never be faulty; their belief values are always 1 and are never modified during the algorithm execution. 
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Table 5-29: All Possible Combinations for One, Two and Three Faulty Elements 
One 
Fault 
 Two Faults  Three Faults 
1 C->D  1 B->C C->D 
 
19 B D2  1 A->B B->C C->D 
 
22 B A->B C->D 
 
43 A D B->C 
 
64 A2 D B->C 
2 B->C  2 A->B C->D 20 B D  2 D2 B->C C->D 23 B A->B B->C 44 A D A->B 65 A2 D A->B 
3 A->B  3 A->B B->C 21 B C  3 D2 A->B C->D 24 B D2 C->D 45 A D D2 66 A2 D D2 
4 D2  4 D2 C->D 22 A C->D  4 D2 A->B B->C 25 B D2 B->C 46 A C C->D 67 A2 C C->D 
5 D  5 D2 B->C 23 A B->C  5 D B->C C->D 26 B D2 A->B 47 A C B->C 68 A2 C B->C 
6 C  6 D2 A->B 24 A A->B  6 D A->B C->D 27 B D C->D 48 A C A->B 69 A2 C A->B 
7 B  7 D C->D 25 A D2  7 D A->B B->C 28 B D B->C 49 A C D2 70 A2 C D2 
8 A  8 D B->C 26 A D  8 D D2 C->D 29 B D A->B 50 A C D 71 A2 C D 
9 A2  9 D A->B 27 A C  9 D D2 B->C 30 B D D2 51 A B C->D 72 A2 B C->D 
   10 D D2 28 A B  10 D D2 A->B 31 B C C->D 52 A B B->C 73 A2 B B->C 
   11 C C->D 29 A2 C->D  11 C B->C C->D 32 B C B->C 53 A B A->B 74 A2 B A->B 
   12 C B->C 30 A2 B->C  12 C A->B C->D 33 B C A->B 54 A B D2 75 A2 B D2 
   13 C A->B 31 A2 A->B  13 C A->B B->C 34 B C D2 55 A B D 76 A2 B D 
   14 C D2 32 A2 D2  14 C D2 C->D 35 B C D 56 A B C 77 A2 B C 
   15 C D 33 A2 D  15 C D2 B->C 36 A B->C C->D 57 A2 B->C C->D 78 A2 A C->D 
   16 B C->D 34 A2 C  16 C D2 A->B 37 A A->B C->D 58 A2 A->B C->D 79 A2 A B->C 
   17 B B->C 35 A2 B  17 C D C->D 38 A A->B B->C 59 A2 A->B B->C 80 A2 A A->B 
   18 B A->B 36 A2 A  18 C D B->C 39 A D2 C->D 60 A2 D2 C->D 81 A2 A D2 
           19 C D A->B 40 A D2 B->C 61 A2 D2 B->C 82 A2 A D 
           20 C D D2 41 A D2 A->B 62 A2 D2 A->B 83 A2 A C 




Table 5-29 shows some such possible combinations in which one (9), two (36) or three 
(84) faults may occur (similar combinations may be determined for a higher number of 
faults). Due to the completely distinct columns of the instantiation table in Figure 5-19  
(e), no subsets are formed for any of the columns when they are considered individually. 
Thus, if a single sensor or a single process fault occurs, the SPFDI algorithm, when 
applied to this network structure with the aforesaid instantiation table can always 
precisely identify the occurrence of those faults without false alarms being raised for any 
of the other sensors or processes. For instance, considering row 3 in the column 
corresponding to single faults in Table 5-29 when a real fault occurs in the A->B process,  
the SPFDI algorithm will be able to identify it uniquely, resulting in WA->B = 0, without 
signaling any false alarms.  
Now, consider row 9 in the column in Table 5-29 corresponding to the occurring 
of two faults in different elements of the network. This indicates the occurrence of a real 
fault in the sensor corresponding to D and the process A->B simultaneously.  Similarly 
row 8 (combination no. 29) in the column in Table 5-29, corresponding to the occurring 
of three faults, indicates the occurrence of real faults in the sensors corresponding to B 
and D and the process A->B simultaneously. In both these cases, in order to determine 
the possibility of false alarms for other sensors or processes, it is necessary to determine 
whether the columns corresponding to those remaining sensors or processes form a subset 
of ColD   ColA->B or ColB   ColD  ColA->B respectively. The algorithm shown below can 
help determine the subsets that would be formed for different combinations of faults. 
 
Objective Given a Bayesian network consisting of a set of nodes X = {X1, X2, .. Xn} 
= {Xi}, where i =1, 2,….n, n is the total number of nodes in the network  
Inputs  Number of sensors n, Number of processes m 
 Instantiation table based on the network structure with (n+m) columns 
Outcome The different subsets formed by the columns in the instantiation table 





//    Function to determine whether a column (say, col_1) in an instantiation table is a  
      subset of another column (say, col_2) 
function is_subset  (col_1, col_2) 
{ 
Loop through r the number of rows in the instantiation table 
a. Determine if the {r, col_1}th cell in col_1 and the {r, col_2}th cell in 
col_2 are both occupied  (by a NI, NoI or  PoI corresponding to that 
column as the case may be)  
b. If so, store the row number r 
End loop r 
If  the stored row numbers are such that they are exactly the same as the row 
numbers corresponding to the occupied cells in col_1, then col_1 can be said to 
be a subset of col_2 
} 
Main (): 
Loop through k =1, 2, …n+m  i.e. the number of columns in the instantiation table 
Loop through i =1, 2, …n, the number of columns corresponding to sensors/nodes in 
the network (i ≠ k) 
Determine if the k
th
 column is a subset of the i
th
 column using the function  
is_subset (k, i) 
Store the result 
End Loop i 
Loop through j =1, 2, …m the number of columns corresponding to processes/links 
in the network other than the ideal processes (j ≠ k)  
Determine if the k
th
 column is a subset of the j
th
 column using the function  
is_subset (k, j) 
Store the result 
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End Loop j 
Loop through i =1, 2, …n; i ≠ k 
Loop through j =1, 2, …m; j ≠ k 
a. Determine all possible combinations in which the i and j columns can be 
combined. The number of columns in these combinations range from 2 to n+m-1 
b.Merge the columns in each combination into a temporary t
th
 column  
c. Determine if the kth column is a subset of the tth column using the function  
is_subset (k, t) 
d.Store the result 
End Loop i 
End Loop j 
End Loop k 
 
Implementing the algorithm described above, Table 5-30 shows the different possible 
combinations of columns corresponding to real faults in different sensors/processes 
(supersets) and the subsets of columns that may be formed when these columns are 
combined. Certain combinations of faults shown in Table 5-29 may not cause any false 
alarms if a combination of the columns corresponding to those faulty sensors/processes 
does not have any subsets in the instantiation table. For instance, in the example 
considered earlier, with two simultaneous faults in the sensor corresponding to D and the 
process A->B, the combination of columns ColD   ColA->B has no subsets in the 
instantiation table (Figure 5-19 (e)). Thus, this combination of faults does not generate 
any false alarms in any of the other elements. However, with three simultaneous faults in 
the sensors corresponding to B and D as well as the process A->B, it can be seen from 
Table 5-30 that the combination of the columns corresponding to these elements has one 
subset in the instantiation table i.e. ColB->C  {ColB   ColD   ColA->B}. Thus, with this 




Table 5-30: Combinations of Multiple (Two or Three) Faults for which Subsets are Formed in the Instantiation Table 
Fi = Faults, i =2, 3…9  Three Faults 
SS = Subset    F1   F2   F3 SS   F1   F2   F3 SS   F1   F2   F3 SS   F1   F2   F3 SS 
     
1 A->B B->C C->D 
B  
14 C D C->D 
D2  
28 B C A->B 
B->C  44 A2 A->B C->D A 
Two Faults  C  B->C  C->D  45 A2 D2 C->D D 
 F1   F2 SS  
2 D2 B->C C->D 
C  
15 C D B->C 
D2  29 A B->C C->D C  46 A2 D2 A->B A 
1 B->C C->D C  D  C->D  30 A A->B C->D A2  47 A2 D C->D D2 
2 A->B B->C B  3 D2 A->B C->D D  
16 C D D2 
B->C  
31 A A->B B->C 
A2  48 A2 D A->B A 
3 D2 C->D D  4 D2 A->B B->C B  C->D  B  49 A2 D D2 C->D 
4 D C->D D2  
5 D B->C C->D 
C  
17 B B->C C->D 
C  32 A D2 C->D D  50 A2 C C->D B->C 
5 D D2 C->D  D2  A->B  33 A D2 A->B A2  51 A2 C B->C C->D 
6 C C->D B->C  6 D A->B C->D D2  
18 B A->B C->D 
C  34 A D C->D D2  52 A2 C A->B A 
7 C B->C C->D  7 D A->B B->C B  B->C  35 A D A->B A2  
53 A2 B B->C 
A 
8 B B->C A->B  
8 D D2 
B->C C  19 B D2 C->D D  36 A D D2 C->D  A->B 
9 B A->B B->C   C->D  20 B D2 B->C A->B  37 A C C->D B->C  
54 A2 B A->B 
A 
10 A A->B A2  9 D D2 A->B C->D  21 B D2 A->B B->C  38 A C B->C C->D  B->C 
11 A2 A->B A  
10 C A->B C->D 
B  22 B D C->D D2  39 A C A->B A2  55 A2 A C->D A->B 
12 A2 A A->B  B->C  23 B D B->C A->B  
40 A B B->C 
A2  
56 A2 A B->C 
B 
     
11 C A->B B->C 
B  24 B D A->B B->C  A->B  A->B 
     C->D  25 B D D2 C->D  
41 A B A->B 
A2  57 A2 A D2 A->B 
     
12 C D2 C->D 
D  
26 B C C->D 
A->B  B->C  58 A2 A D A->B 
     B->C  B->C  42 A2 B->C C->D C  59 A2 A C A->B 
     
13 C D2 B->C 
D  
27 B C B->C 
A->B  
43 A2 A->B B->C 
A  
60 A2 A B 
A->B 
     C->D  C->D  B  B->C 
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For the network shown in Figure 5-19 (e), from Table 5-30, it can be seen that the 
number of supersets formed when columns corresponding to two faults (sensors and/or 
processes) are combined is 12. Similarly the number of supersets formed for 
combinations of three faults is 60. The number of such supersets formed can be used to 
define the effectiveness of the SPFDI algorithm, by estimating probability of false alarms 
that occur as a fraction of all possible combinations of faults.  
Two types of errors that may occur during the fault detection and isolation 
process are: a non-faulty sensor/process may be classified as faulty, or a faulty 
sensor/process may remain undetected. These are referred to as type I and type II errors 
respectively in the literature [Cohen, 1995]. The definitions are based on statistical 
hypothesis testing using the null hypothesis. Formally, type I error (false positive) refers 
to the rejection of the null hypothesis when it is true and type II error (false negative) 
refers to the acceptance of the null hypothesis when it is actually false. For the SPFDI 
procedure, the null hypothesis is that a particular sensor or a process is operating 
correctly. The discussion so far, thus pertains to the calculation of type I errors28. 
   














0 1 0 0.00 
1 9 0 0.00 
2 36 12 0.33 
3 84 60 0.71 
4 126 110 0.87 
5 126 119 0.94 
6 84 79 0.94 
7 36 34 0.94 
8 9 9 1.00 
9 1 0 0.00 
 
Figure 5-20: Probability of False Alarms 
                                                 




Table 5-31 and Figure 5-20 show the probability of false alarms that may occur 
with different number of faults in the elements of the network shown in Figure 5-19 (e). 
Thus, it can be seen that the SPFDI algorithm is very effective when there are single 
sensor or process faults (excluding the cases where all or none of the sensors and 
processes are faulty). In scenarios with multiple sensor and/or process faults, it is clear 
that the probability of false alarms increases as the number of faulty elements increases. 
In such cases, the probability of false alarms for individual sensors or processes may be 
calculated as described below. 
Since a particular sensor or a process may actually be faulty or it may be wrongly 
classified as being faulty due to the subset issue, all such cases must be taken into 
account while estimating the probability of false alarms for any given sensor or process.  
In order to do so, the columns in Table 5-30 may be re-arranged by grouping together the 
common elements in a given combination of sensor/process faults as shown in Table 5-32  
and Table 5-33. Consider rows 1, 2 and 3 in Table 5-32 representing the combinations of 
two faults and the corresponding subset. Each time a fault occurs in any two of the three 
elements i.e. the two processes B->C, C->D or the sensor corresponding to C, the SPFDI 
algorithm will also generate a false alarm for the third element due to the formation of a 
subset. Hence, the probability for each of these elements being actually faulty and the 
probability of a false alarm can be calculated as follows: 
       
    
         
               
                
Eq. (5-2) 
where Z represents a particular sensor or process,      is the number of times the element 
Z occurs in Table 5-32 due to an actual fault, and      is the number of times Z occurs in 
Table 5-32 due to a false alarm for Z,        is the probability that Z is actually faulty 
and        is the probability of a false alarm being raised for Z. The probability of actual 
faults and false alarms when two simultaneous faults occur are as shown in Table 5-34 




Table 5-32 : Combinations of Two Faults 
 Actual Faults Subset   Actual Faults Subset 
1 B->C C->D C  7 D2 C->D D 
2 C C->D B->C  8 D C->D D2 
3 C B->C C->D  9 D D2 C->D 
         
4 A->B B->C B  10 A A->B A2 
5 B B->C A->B  11 A2 A->B A 
6 B A->B B->C  12 A2 A A->B 
Table 5-33 : Combinations of Three Faults 
 Actual Faults Subset   Actual Faults Subset   Actual Faults Subset 
1 A->B B->C C->D 
B  
21 A2 A->B B->C 
A  
41 C D2 C->D 
D 
C  B  B->C 
2 B C B->C 
A->B  
22 A2 A B->C 
B  
42 C D2 B->C 
D 
C->D  A->B  C->D 
3 B C C->D 
A->B  
23 A2 A B 
A->B  
43 C D C->D 
D2 
B->C  B->C  B->C 
4 B C A->B 
B->C  
24 A2 B B->C 
A  
44 C D B->C 
D2 
C->D  A->B  C->D 
5 B B->C C->D 
C  
25 A2 B A->B 
A  
45 C D D2 
B->C 
A->B  B->C  C->D 
6 B A->B C->D 
C  
26 A A->B B->C 
A2  
46 D2 B->C C->D 
C 
B->C  B  D 
7 C A->B C->D 
B  
27 A B B->C 
A2  
47 D B->C C->D 
C 
B->C  A->B  D2 
8 C A->B B->C 
B  
28 A B A->B 
A2  
48 D D2 B->C 
C 
C->D  B->C  C->D 
                 
9 D2 A->B C->D D  29 A B->C C->D C  49 A C A->B A2 
10 D A->B C->D D2  30 A C C->D B->C  50 A2 A C A->B 
11 D D2 A->B C->D  31 A C B->C C->D  51 A2 C A->B A 
                 
12 B D2 C->D D  32 A D2 C->D D  52 A2 B->C C->D C 
13 B D C->D D2  33 A D C->D D2  53 A2 C C->D B->C 
14 B D D2 C->D  34 A D D2 C->D  54 A2 C B->C C->D 
                 
15 B D2 B->C A->B  35 A D2 A->B A2  55 A2 A->B C->D A 
16 B D2 A->B B->C  36 A2 D2 A->B A  56 A A->B C->D A2 
17 D2 A->B B->C B  37 A2 A D2 A->B  57 A2 A C->D A->B 
                 
18 B D B->C A->B  38 A D A->B A2  58 A2 D2 C->D D 
19 B D A->B B->C  39 A2 D A->B A  59 A2 D C->D D2 
20 D A->B B->C B  40 A2 A D A->B  60 A2 D D2 C->D 
 
Considering the first row in Table 5-34 and Table 5-35, the values may be interpreted as 
follows (Only the shaded cells denote elements which are faulty): If a simultaneous fault 
occurs in any two of the three elements- the sensor corresponding to node C, and the 
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processes B->C and C->D, then the probability that there is an actual fault in any of them 
is 0.6667 and the probability that the indicated fault is a false alarm is 0.3333 (note that 
these values are valid only for the specified combination of faults). Similar values can be 
calculated for three or more faults. For three simultaneous faults, Table 5-36 shows the 
probability of occurrence of actual faults and Table 5-37 shows the probability of false 
alarms. 
Table 5-34: Probability of Actual Faults for Combinations of Two Faulty Elements 
P(A2)AF P(A)AF P(B)AF P(C)AF P(D)AF P(D2)AF P(A->B)AF P(B->C)AF P(C->D)AF 
   0.6667    0.6667 0.6667 
  0.6667    0.6667 0.6667  
    0.6667 0.6667   0.6667 
0.6667 0.6667     0.6667   
Table 5-35: Probability of False Alarms Combinations of Two Faulty Elements 
P(A2)FA P(A) FA P(B) FA P(C) FA P(D) FA P(D2) FA P(A->B) FA P(B->C) FA P(C->D) FA 
   0.3333    0.3333 0.3333 
  0.3333    0.3333 0.3333  
    0.3333 0.3333   0.3333 
0.3333 0.3333     0.3333   
Table 5-36: Probability of Actual Faults for Combinations of Three Faulty Elements 
P(A2)AF P(A)AF P(B)AF P(C)AF P(D)AF P(D2)AF P(A->B)AF P(B->C)AF P(C->D)AF 
  0.625 0.625   0.625 0.5 0.625 
0.625 0.625 0.625    0.5 0.625  
   0.625 0.625 0.625  0.625 0.5 
    0.6667 0.6667 1.000 1.000  
  1.000  0.6667 0.6667   0.6667 
  0.6667   1.0000 0.6667 0.6667  
  0.6667  1.0000  0.6667 0.6667  
 1.0000  0.6667    0.6667 0.6667 
 1.0000   0.6667 0.6667   0.6667 
0.6667 0.6667    1.000 0.6667   
0.6667 0.6667   1.0000  0.6667   
0.6667 0.6667  1.000   0.6667   
1.0000   0.6667    0.6667 0.6667 
0.6667 0.6667     0.6667  1.000 




Table 5-37: Probability of False Alarms Combinations of Three Faulty Elements 
P(A2) FA P(A) FA P(B) FA P(C) FA P(D) FA P(D2) FA P(A->B) FA P(B->C) FA P(C->D) FA 
  0.375 0.375   0.375 0.5 0.375 
0.375 0.375 0.375    0.5 0.375  
   0.375 0.375 0.375  0.375 0.5 
    0.3333 0.3333 0 0  
  0  0.3333 0.3333   0.3333 
  0.3333   0 0.3333 0.3333  
  0.3333  0  0.3333 0.3333  
 0  0.3333    0.3333 0.3333 
 0   0.3333 0.3333   0.3333 
0.3333 0.3333    0 0.3333   
0.3333 0.3333   0  0.3333   
0.3333 0.3333  0   0.3333   
0   0.3333    0.3333 0.3333 
0.3333 0.3333     0.3333  0 
0    0.3333 0.3333   0.3333 
 
As the values for probability of false 
alarms can be generated beforehand, if a 
particular combination of faults occurs 
during operation, then based on the 
output of the SPFDI algorithm and such 
charts, the system operator can make an 
informed decision about the fault status 
of a particular set of sensors/processes. 
Once a network structure has been 
designed for the system, and its 
associated instantiation table has been 
created, the values shown in Table 5-31, 
Figure 5-20 and Table 5-34 to Table 
5-37, may be generated. If it is found 
that the proportion of false alarms is 
unusually high, then the domain expert 
may revise the composition of the 
 
Figure 5-21: Reducing false alarms 
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instantiation table to reduce the chances of false alarms (Figure 5-21). 
5.7.2. Reducing Instantiations  
Although the SPFDI algorithm described thus far can be considered an anytime 
algorithm in that it gives 
an indication of the health 
of the different sensors 
and processes in the 
system at any given 
instant, as seen in Sections 
5.5 and 5.6, a number of 
instantiations as well as 
inferences have to be done 
even to complete a single 
validation cycle that 
essentially deals with only 
one sample of data. To 
declare a particular sensor 
or a process to be faulty 
with some certainty 
requires the analysis of 
multiple samples over a 
given period of time, 
which may require 
considerable computation 
time and resources. This 
issue may be greatly 
alleviated if the time taken 
for each individual validation cycle can be reduced somehow.  
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A potential approach to this is to reduce the number of instantiations in the 
instantiation table. The following section describes one possible approach that can be 
followed. Consider an instantiation table with n rows (Table 5-38). Starting with the first 
row and working down towards the end of the instantiation table (represented by the 
counter I =1, 2…n in Figure 5-22), a row may be eliminated only after ensuring that both 
the following conditions are satisfied:  
a) There are no identical columns and the columns do not form subsets of other columns  
b) In each column of the instantiation table, there is at least one row that includes the 
sensor or the process represented by that column as a NI, NoI or PoI as the case may be. 
If either of the above conditions is not satisfied then that row cannot be eliminated 
from the instantiation table, since it may potentially lead to false alarms from the fault 
detection and isolation algorithm. 
The first condition addresses the issue of being able to uniquely identify potential 
faults in various sensors and processes. The second condition ensures that even after 
removing certain rows in the instantiation table, the algorithm still retains the ability to 
identify every faulty sensor or process that is a part of the instantiation table. Table 5-39 
shows the result of eliminating some rows from the original instantiation table (more 
rows could be potentially eliminated provided the two conditions mentioned earlier are 
always satisfied).  
Although having a smaller instantiation table may lead to a faster fault detection 
and isolation cycle, there may be potential pitfalls in reducing the number of 
instantiations as described above. Since the values of    and   , the incremental values by 
which the WS and WP belief values in the condition of the sensors and processes are 
modified, depend on the number of rows a particular sensor or process occurs in the 
instantiation table i.e. nS or np, the granularity of change in the belief values is reduced by 
reducing the number of instantiations (since the values of nS or np decrease, the belief 
values change by larger amounts as given by Eq.(5-1)).  
Depending on the threshold values (or bin sizes corresponding to the different 
states of a node) that are used to determine whether an observed deviation in the sensor 
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reading is acceptable or not, or whether it is the result of a sensor or a process fault, such 
a change might result in more instances of false alarms, even after multiple samples have 
been analyzed29. The tradeoff, in terms of speed of execution and the potential for false 
alarms, between using a full instantiation table and a reduced instantiation table needs to 
be investigated further in the future. 
Table 5-38: Original Instantiation Table 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A2 A B C D D2 A2->A A->B B->C C->D D->D2 
1 NI NoI     PoI     
2 NI  NoI    PoI PoI    
3 NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI   
4 NI    NoI  PoI PoI PoI PoI  
5 NI     NoI PoI PoI PoI PoI PoI 
6  NI NoI     PoI    
7  NI  NoI    PoI PoI   
8  NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI  
9  NI    NoI  PoI PoI PoI PoI 
10   NI NoI     PoI   
11   NI  NoI    PoI PoI  
12   NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI 
13    NI NoI     PoI  
14    NI  NoI    PoI PoI 
15     NI NoI     PoI 
Table 5-39: Example of a Partially Reduced Instantiation Table 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A2 A B C D D2 A2->A A->B B->C C->D D->D2 
1 NI NoI     PoI     
6  NI NoI     PoI    
7  NI  NoI    PoI PoI   
8  NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI  
9  NI    NoI  PoI PoI PoI PoI 
10   NI NoI     PoI   
11   NI  NoI    PoI PoI  
12   NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI 
13    NI NoI     PoI  
14    NI  NoI    PoI PoI 
15     NI NoI     PoI 
 
                                                 
29 If the thresholds are too restrictive or the bin sizes are too small, then even with a small deviation in the 
sensor reading outside of these limits, the corresponding belief value would be penalized heavily 
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5.7.3. Effect of Sensor Characteristics  
The operational characteristics like accuracy, resolution, etc. of all the sensors in 
the system can play an important role in determining the overall efficacy of the SPFDI 
algorithm. The terms resolution and accuracy are often used interchangeably. However, 
the two quantities are quite distinct. The resolution of a sensor is the smallest incremental 
change in the physical input that can be reliably detected by the sensing element to 
produce a detectable change at the output [Pallas-Areny and Webster, 2001]. Resolution 
is dictated mainly by the sensor physics i.e. a sensor cannot discern any input signals that 
occur between its smallest subdivisions to produce a corresponding output. It is a fixed 
value typically specified in absolute terms in the same units as the measurand or in terms 
of bits (especially for sensors with digital output).  
For instance, consider an incremental encoder that produces a digital output signal 
of 1024 counts per revolution. The 
resolution for this sensor may be 
specified as 10 bits (2
10
) or 360/1024= 
0.3515
o
. In some cases, to enable 
interfacing with data acquisition 
equipment, the analog voltage or 
current output from a sensor is 
converted to digital form using an A/D 
converter which may dictate the 
resolution. For example, a 
potentiometer (as a voltage divider) to measure voltage theoretically has an infinite 
resolution since any motion of the slider will change the output voltage. However, if it is 
used in conjunction with a 10 bit resolution A/D converter in the 0-10V range, the 
resolution would be in steps of 9.76 mV30.   
                                                 
30 The limit to how exactly the output voltage can be measured is also determined by the limit to which the 
resolution can be discretized. Over the 0-10V range, a measurement made using such an arrangement can 
be no more accurate than 1 LSB or 9.76 mV (or ±1/2 LSB i.e. ±4.88 mV) 
 
















The accuracy of a sensor is defined as the maximum difference between the ‗true‘ 
or ideal value of the measurand and the actual/measured sensor output [Fraden, 2004]31. 
Accuracy can be specified in numerous ways depending on the type of sensor- in bits, as 
a % of the actual sensor output, as a % of the full scale range of the sensor, or in absolute 
terms in measurement units (for simplicity, only the sensor accuracy is considered in the 
present discussion32). It must be noted that sensor accuracy is just one part of the overall 
accuracy of the complete data acquisition system. Additional errors may be introduced by 
other components in the data acquisition system).  
In general, accuracy and resolution are not directly related. An inaccurate sensor 
may have a high resolution, and vice versa. The accuracy of a sensor is determined 
through calibration against a known standard or against a gold-standard reference sensor. 
Hence, although the sensor accuracy is not directly related to the sensor resolution, the 
accuracy level can never be better than the resolution of the sensor (because the sensor 
can measure a value only to the limit of granularity imposed by its resolution33). 
Typically, the resolution of a sensor, by design, is many times better than the accuracy 
(sometimes an order of magnitude).  
The quality of sensors corresponding to the NI determines which state of these 
nodes is set as evidence. This, in turn dictates the value of the NoI inferred by inferencing 
(the discretization as well as the conditional probability distributions of the intermediate 
nodes between the NI and the NoI are other factors that also influence the final inferred 
value). Similarly the quality of sensors corresponding to the NoI influences the results of 
comparison of the inferred value and the indicated value (when a decision is made if the 
observed deviation in the sensor value is within acceptable limits or not, in order to alter 
                                                 
31 In the present discussion, accuracy is taken to encompass a region around the sensor reading with 95% 
confidence value. 
32 The accuracy of a sensor may also be influenced by other characteristics like hysteresis, linearity, etc. It 
also depends to some extent on the type of input signal. If the input contains a lot of random noise, a 
significant averaging time may be needed (to collect adequate data points) to produce an accurate estimate. 
[Fraden, 2004] provides a description of various such random effects (Type A) and systematic effects 
(Type B) that dictate the resultant accuracy. 
33 The quality of the calibration standard used also has a role to play in determining the accuracy. For 
instance, if the only available calibration standard is 10 times the resolution of the sensor, then it is not 
possible to obtain accuracy better than that.  
 
 221 
the belief values for a particular sensor or a process). The following section examines the 












































Figure 5-24: Effect of Sensor Characteristics on Inferencing 
Consider the network in Figure 5-24. Suppose the ranges of the physical variables 
represented by the nodes A, B, C, and D are [1, 5], [2, 10], [1, 5] and [1.2, 6] 
respectively34. Each node is assumed to be discretized into eight states, based on the 
acceptable range of variation in each of the node states. The instantiation table for this 
network is the same as the one shown in Table 5-2. Considering the step where node B is 
the NI and node D is the NoI, the inferred value of D is obtained by setting the state of B, 
corresponding to the reading indicated by the sensor for B as evidence to the network.   
                                                 
34 For this hypothetical example, it is assumed that the variables can be related by simple analytical 
relationships of the form B=2A, C= 0.5 B and D= 1.2C. Taking into account the intermediate process 
uncertainties, the relations may be written as B=2A+ εA->B, C= 0.5B+ εB->C, D= 1.2C+ εC->D; where the 
values εA->B, εB->C and εC->D represent the uncertainty in the processes A->B, B->C and C->D respectively. 
The conditional probability distributions are generated using a standard normal distribution centered on the 
states with a standard deviation of 0.15, 0.15 and 0.3 respectively. 
A B C D
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Suppose there are two possible sensor options that may be used for measuring B, 
say B1 and B2 both of which have good resolution based on the bin sizes into which the 
probability distribution of B has been discretized (i.e. both sensors can measure any 
incremental change in the value of the variable B that falls within the individual bin 
limits) but the B1 sensor has an accuracy of ±0.1 and the B2 sensor has an accuracy of 
±0.3 (both accuracy specifications refer to absolute values in measurand units).  
Suppose the actual value of the physical parameter corresponding to B is 5.8. 
Ideally, this reading would correspond to the bin 5.0≤ B ≤ 6.0 and to infer the value of D, 
the state B=5.5 should be instantiated in the network. If the sensor B1 is used, then the 
actual output of the sensor based on which this instantiation would be done can range 
anywhere from 5.7 to 5.9, based on its accuracy. These values still fall within the bin 
5.0≤B ≤ 6.0 and hence, the correct state of B can be instantiated. In this case, instantiating 
B=5.5 results in a value of D=3.3, as expected. However, with the sensor B2, the sensor 
output may range from 5.5 to 6.1. Hence there is the possibility that any output greater 
than 6.0 from the sensor B2 would lead to the state B=6.5 (corresponding to the bin 6.0≤ 
B ≤ 7.0) to be instantiated, which in turn would lead to a value of D=3.9 as shown. Thus, 
the accuracy of the sensor corresponding to the instantiated node is crucial and must be 
taken into account along with the other application requirements when a sensor is being 
selected or designed for the system.  
The above requirement may be stated as a rule of thumb as follows:  ‗The reading 
from a sensor may be used to instantiate a particular node state only if the possible range 
of variation in the value (calculated using the relation actual reading ± sensor accuracy) 
lies within the bin limits of the state that is being considered for instantiation.‘ In other 
words, if SRU and SRL represent the possible range of variation in the sensor reading after 
accounting for accuracy and if BU and BL represent the bin limits of the node state being 
considered for instantiation, then BL < [SRU , SRL] < BU. 
The significance of the accuracy of the sensor corresponding to the node of 
interest can also be similarly illustrated. Suppose there are two sensors D1 and D2 that 
may be used to measure the variable D (with sufficient resolutions to measure any 
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incremental changes within any of the bins into which the probability distribution of D 
has been discretized) and accuracies of ±0.1 and ±0.2 for D1 and D2 respectively. Based 
on the presumed relations, a true value of B= 5.8 should result in a true value of D= 3.48. 
If the sensor D1 is used to measure the value of D, then its actual output can range 
anywhere from 3.38 to 3.58, based on its accuracy. This would still correspond to the 
state D = 3.3 (bin 3.0≤ B ≤ 3.6) which is the value (most probable state) obtained via 
inferencing. Thus the measured and the inferred values can be considered to be in 
agreement in this case, which would reinforce the beliefs in the sensor for D and the 
associated processes B->C and C->D in the instantiation table.  
If however, the sensor D2 is used to measure the value of D, then its actual output 
can range anywhere from 3.28 to 3.68. This means that there is a possibility that the 
output of the sensor may be considered as corresponding to the state D =3.9 (bin 3.6≤ B ≤ 
4.2). In this case, the measured and the inferred values would be considered to be 
conflicting, reducing the belief values for the sensor and the processes B->C and C->D in 
the instantiation table. Such situations may be avoided by careful selection of sensors 
with suitable accuracy based on the application requirements (or using redundant sensors 
with very high accuracy when possible). 
 Based on the accuracy of the different sensors corresponding to the different 
nodes in the network, that are actually integrated into the system and are responsible for 
monitoring it, various rules of thumb may be created to determine whether or not the 
reading from a particular sensor can be used to set a state of its corresponding node as 
evidence, or whether or not the reading from a sensor can be considered to be concurring 
with the inferred value for that measurand, during the fault detection and isolation 
algorithm implemented when the system is in operation. 
 For instance, in the example discussed, one such rule may be as follows: if the 
sensor B1 is being used and if the actual value of the measurand B is between 5.9 and 6.1 
(considering a band of readings that correspond to the accuracy of sensor B1 and centered 
on the common bin limit 6.0 for the two adjacent states of the node B), a prudent choice 
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would be to avoid instantiating any evidence to the network with values that are indicated 
by the sensor within this range35.  
5.7.4. Effect of Discretization on Choice of Thresholds 
 In the fault detection and isolation procedure, the reading from the sensor 
corresponding to the NI is used to set a particular state of that node closest36 to the 
measured value, as 
evidence to the network. 
The value indicated by 
the sensor corresponding 
to the NoI is then 
compared to the value 
that is obtained for the 
same node via 
probabilistic propagation 
and a binary decision is 
made as to whether these 
two values are in 
agreement or not. In 
order to determine which 
state of the NoI to 
associate with the sensor reading for comparison purposes, there is a need to define 
specific thresholds within which the sensor reading values would be considered as 
acceptable.  
                                                 
35 If the duty cycle of operation for the system is such that the value for the variable B lingers around 5.8 
for a significant range of operation, such a rule might lead to a situation where the readings from this sensor 
are continuously rejected. This, in turn, may lead to false alarms from the SPFDI algorithm. If the readings 
are not used to update the performance maps (due to the accuracy restrictions), it may also have 
ramifications on the higher level CBM algorithms. Thus, it is also critical to take into account the expected 
range of values that a sensor is expected to encounter, in addition to its accuracy, while framing such rules.  
36 For instance, by calculating the difference between the value indicated by the sensor and the different 
state values of the instantiated node 
State Prob. 
A = 0.25 => p(0 ≤ A ≤0.5) 0.2 
A = 0.75 => p(0.5≤ A ≤1.0) 0.37 
A =1.25  => p(1.0≤ A ≤1.5) 0.295 





A = 0.125 => p(0≤ A ≤0.25) 0.075 
A = 0.375 => p(0.25≤ A ≤0.5) 0.125 
A = 0.625 => p(0.5≤ A ≤0.75) 0.22 
A = 0.875 => p(0.75≤ A ≤1) 0.15 
A = 1.25   => p(1≤ A ≤1.25) 0.215 
A = 1.375 => p(1.25≤ A ≤1.5) 0.08 
A = 1.625 => p(1.5≤ A ≤1.75) 0.09 























The data available for each node/measurand is discretized into a number of states 
based on the application requirements. The acceptable upper and lower limits of variation 
in the node states are used to determine the sizes of the bins into which the values can be 
discretized. The smallest possible bin size that can be achieved is typically dictated by the 
accuracy of the sensor corresponding to that node (for example, [Mehranbod, et. al., 
2003] uses a bin size which is twice the sensor accuracy). As a general rule, the bins can 
be defined centered on the state values with the size defined as the sensor accuracy 
multiplied by some factor (for instance, ±3σ, where σ is the accuracy of the sensor 
corresponding to that node).  
Consider, for example, a random variable A, which can take the values in the 
range [0, 2] i.e. 0 ≤ A ≤ 2. Figure 5-25 shows two possible ways in which A can be 
discretized with different number of states (Note: The states and probability values used 
here are purely for illustrative purposes). It can be seen that with a smaller number of 
states/larger bin sizes (as shown in Figure 5-25 (a)), there is a potential for a larger range 
of values of A falling under the same bin, which leads to a more skewed and a narrower 
distribution of the probabilities of each state occurring.  
As a result, there will be certain states with a distinctly higher value of probability 
than the others. This allows the use of the bin limits corresponding to the state with the 
highest probability value (or the ‗most probable state‘) as the threshold limits for a 
particular node to help to slot the reading indicated by the sensor corresponding to that 
node into one of the discretized states and enable comparison between measured and 
inferred values for that node. For instance, suppose that A is the NoI in a particular row of 
the instantiation table and by instantiating other nodes in the network, the node state A= 
0.75 is obtained as the most probable state. The bin corresponding to this state of A is 
given by 0.5 ≤ A ≤ 1.0. Thus, the values 0.5 and 1.0 which are the bin limits will be used 
as thresholds. Now, if the sensor corresponding to A indicates a reading of Ameasured =0.85, 
this value would be considered acceptable (i.e. Ameasured ≡ Ainferred) since it falls within the 
limits of the bin which corresponds to the most probable node state. 
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When the values of A are discretized into a greater number of states, it can be seen 
that the probability values are also more evenly distributed across the different states as 
shown in Figure 5-25 (b). In such cases, often it becomes difficult to isolate a single state 
of the node, whose probability value is distinctly higher than those of all the other node 
states. For instance, the probability values for the states A=0.625 and A=1.25 are very 
close to each other. With any additional variations in these probability values that are 
introduced for instance due to rounding errors or due to approximate inferencing 
algorithms, it may not be possible to accurately determine the most probable state and 
hence the threshold values based on it. In such cases, some alternatives might be to:  
a) Calculate the expected value of the posterior distribution as well as its variance or 
standard deviation, and use these values to determine the thresholds. For instance, 
the threshold limits may be specified in the form of µ ± n*σ, n=1, 2, 3 where µ is 
the mean and σ is the standard deviation  
b) Add the bin size to the expected value. For instance, in Figure 5-25 (b), 
E(A)=0.91. So, the thresholds may be set based on the bin size of 0.25 as [0.785, 
1.035]. Any sensor reading that falls within these limits would then be considered 
acceptable. 
c) Specify a certain number of bins centered around the expected value (this would 
typically result in generous thresholds). For instance, in Figure 5-25 (b), the 
expected value E(A)=0.91 falls in the bin 0.75≤ A ≤1. Choosing the two adjacent 
bins as threshold limits would correspond to the bins 0.75≤ A ≤1.0 and 1≤ A 
≤1.25. Thus, if the sensor corresponding to A indicates a reading of Ameasured =1.1, 
this value would be considered acceptable (i.e. Ameasured ≡ Ainferred) since it falls 
within the threshold limit.  
Again, the question of how restrictive the thresholds need to be is dictated primarily by 
the application requirements. 
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5.8. USING WS AND WP VALUES IN LEARNING THE MODEL PARAMETERS 
When the Bayesian network for a system is initially constructed, the model 
parameters (conditional probability distribution entries in the CPTs) for the different 
nodes are determined based either on an expert‘s opinion regarding how the system is 
likely to behave under different scenarios or they are based on data collected from 
extensively testing the system over its entire operational range (i.e. from the performance 
maps). In order to represent the status of the system at any instant as accurately as 
possible there is a need to refresh or update the CPT values (and hence the corresponding 
maps) with fresh sensor data on a periodic basis. This is referred to as ‗learning‘ the 
model parameters [Cohen, et. al, 2001]. However, care must be taken to ensure that: 
a) The data used to update the CPTs is reliable enough, so as to avoid corrupting the 
existing information, and 
b) The process of updating is quick enough to accurately represent the prevalent 
system conditions, without the need to wait for a large number of data samples.  
The SPFDI procedure described in the earlier sections provides valuable 
information in the form of beliefs (WS and WP) as to how trustworthy the sensors are as 
well as an indication of the health/status of the different components of the monitored 
system. These beliefs can now be used to determine if a particular sensor can be used to 
update the model parameters and also the rate at which the parameters of the various 
conditional probability tables in the network can be updated. The following section 
provides an adaptation of the online learning algorithm initially presented by [Bauer, 
1997] and later refined by [Cohen, et. al, 2001]. 
The notation used in the following discussion is similar to that of [Bauer, 1997] 
and [Cohen, et. al., 2001]. Let Xi be any node in the network consisting of N nodes that 






}. Let the different configurations that the set of parents 
PAi of the node Xi can assume37 be represented as {   
      
 …..   
 
}. Then, every value 
in the CPT of the node Xi can be represented succinctly using the notation:  
                                                 
37 Each configuration represents a particular column in cpt of the node Xi 
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  Eq. (5-3) 
The objective is to update the value of     
 for the CPTs of the different nodes at a 
given sampling instant T, to a new value     
   , based on the results of an isolation cycle 
(when the beliefs in the sensors and the processes have been calculated) and a new  set of 
samples is obtained DT+1 = {x1, x2….xN}, to accurately represent the updated system 
conditions that would be used in the next isolation cycle. Note that, in this case it is 
assumed that all the nodes are observable i.e. there is a sensor or a source of information 
associated with every node and there is no missing data i.e. at every sampling instant the 
value for each node in the network is available from its corresponding sensor.38  
[Bauer, 1997] describes the problem of updating of the network parameters as a 
maximization problem that takes the form  
    
                            Eq. (5-4) 
where LD (θ) represents the normalized log likelihood of the data given the network, d is 
the distance between the models at the two sampling instants and η is the learning rate. 
[Bauer, et. al. 1997] use the χ
2
 distance and provide a solution to the maximization 
problem under the constraint that ∑θijk =1   i, j and refer to it as the EM (η) algorithm.  
[Cohen, et. al, 2001] provided an extension to this algorithm, termed the Voting 
EM algorithm for the online learning case. The authors state that in online learning, each 
new data sample represents a single instance of the network and present the following 
rule for updating the network parameters when all the nodes are observed: 
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Eq. 
(5-5) for xi ≠   
  in DT+1 i.e. P(   
 | DT+1) = 0 and  
P(   
 
| DT+1) = 1 
otherwise 
                                                 
38 The situations with hidden nodes, or cases where a node Xi is observed and its parents are not observed 
or vice-versa are not considered. The approach to learning in these cases can be found in the work of [Lim 
and Cho, 2006], [Zhang, et. al, 2003]  
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With each new sample of data, if the observed values of the child and the parent 
nodes are in an appropriate configuration, it represents an increase in the confidence for 
the observed state of the child node and the corresponding importance of that state in the 
overall distribution is increased (while the importance of the other states are decreased by 
the same amount) by a value that is proportional to the learning rate η. [Cohen et. al, 
2001] provide an explanation for the update rule in Eq. (5-5) as follows: when a new 
sample of data D is available for all the nodes in the network and it is observed that the 
parents of a node Xi are in the j
th
 configuration and if, for this configuration, the 
corresponding value of Xi should be its k
th
 value, and if the observed value of Xi in D is 
indeed   
 , then increase the value of θijk. If it is observed that the parents of Xi are in the 
j
th
 configuration but the corresponding observed value of Xi in D is not   
 , then decrease 
the present value of θijk. Finally, if the parents of Xi are not observed to be in the j
th
 
configuration in D, then the value of θijk remains unchanged. As more and more data 
samples are analyzed, the estimated probabilities converge to their true values. 
The value of η determines the amount by which the past data is weighted in order 
to update the parameters. As the value of η approaches zero, the value of past data is 
weighted significantly and the model parameters remain practically unchanged. With a 
smaller value of η, the rate of convergence is slower but smoother and not very sensitive 
to the new sample of data; the final variance (a finite, non-zero value) of the estimate is 
also smaller [Cohen et. al, 2001]. Conversely, as the value of η approaches 1, the newly 
available or present data is assigned a higher importance in determining the updated 
value of the parameters. A value of η=1 provides the fastest convergence, but also results 
in a high variance [Cohen et. al, 2001]39. Thus, the value of η affects the rate of 
convergence as well as the variance in the final estimated value. Although a variance 
around the estimated probability value may seem undesirable, [Cohen et. al, 2001] state 
that it allows the algorithm to adapt to changing environments (in conjunction with the 
                                                 
39 The magnitude of variance also depends on the true probability value θijk and decreases as it approaches 
1 or 0. [Cohen, et.al, 2001] demonstrate that the variance is highest for a true probability value of 0.5 
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appropriate values) as well as escape from local maxima (when the estimated probability 
converges towards the true value) when new evidence becomes available.  
The work of [Cohen, et.al. 2001] indicates the use of a fixed learning rate η and 
the use of the same η for all the network parameters as the shortcomings of the Voting 
EM algorithm. Using the same η for all the network parameters results in good estimates 
for certain values but may perform poorly for others. Hence, the authors devised a 
modified version of the Voting EM algorithm using an adaptive learning rate, with 
different learning rates for the different columns of the CPT for a given node (similar to 
the maximum likelihood estimation for CPT entries as described by the authors). Starting 
with an initially high value, the value of η is reduced when the estimated parameter value 
is close to convergence and is increased when there is a large error between an estimated 
value and its mean  [Cohen, et.al. 2001]. This change allows the algorithm to adapt to 
changes in the network parameters (due to a change in the modeled environment) as well 
as break out of any local maxima during the estimation process. For the present 
discussion, let the adaptive learning rate for a node Xi whose parents are in the j
th
 
configuration be represented as ηPAj,Xi  i.e. the value of η used in the set of equations in 
Eq. (5-5) is unique to every column (corresponding to PAj) in the CPT of node Xi. The 
application of these rules to update the node CPTs can now be explained using a simple 
example.  
Consider a system consisting of four variables of interest and represented by the 
Bayesian network in Figure 5-26. Suppose the range of the physical variables represented 
by the nodes A, B, C, and D are [0, 4], [0, 8] [0, 4] and [0, 12] respectively. For this 
hypothetical example, it is assumed that the variables can be related by simple analytical 
relationships of the form B=2A+ εA->B, C= 0.5B+ εB->C, D= 3C+ εC->D; where εA->B, εB->C 
and εC->D represent the uncertainty in the processes A->B, B->C and C->D respectively. 
Each of the nodes is discretized into four states each40. The discretization, the conditional 
probability tables for these nodes and the learning rates for the three processes ηAj,B, ηBj,C 
                                                 
40 The discretization of states for the distribution of node A represents p(0≤ A ≤1) = 0.25, p(1≤ A ≤2)=0.25, 
and so on. A similar explanation is valid for the other nodes as well 
 
 231 
and ηCj,D are also shown in Figure 5-26. The subscript j for the learning rates denotes the 




A=0.5 0.25    
A=1.5 0.25    
A=2.5 0.25    
A=3.5 0.25    
 
 A=0.5 A=1.5 A=2.5 A=3.5 
B=1 0.9 0.05 0.0 0.0 
B=3 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.0 
B=5 0.0 0.05 0.9 0.1 
B=7 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.9 
 
 B=1 B=3 B=5 B=7 
C=0.5 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 
C=1.5 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.0 
C=2.5 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.2 
C=3.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 
 
 C=0.5 C=1.5 C=2.5 C=3.5 
D=1.5 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 
D=4.5 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.0 
D=7.5 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.3 
D=10.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 
 
Figure 5-26: Learning Rates for Processes in the Network 
 
Suppose at a sampling instant T, the values indicated by the sensors for the nodes 
A, B, C, and D are A=1.8, B=3.4, C= 1.6 and D =4.8 respectively. Now, consider only the 
process B->C. Based on the readings from the sensors for nodes B and C it can be 
determined at the end of the preceding fault detection and isolation cycle that the process 
B->C and the sensors for B and C are not faulty. Thus, for the parent configuration of 
B=3, the corresponding observed value of the child node C should be C=1.5. Based on 
the discretization of the nodes as shown in the CPTs in Figure 5-26, this is indeed the 
case. Hence the value of θijk corresponding to C=1.5 in the CPT of node C needs to be 
increased and the values of θijk for all the other states of C need to be decreased. For a 
value of B=3.4, the learning rate to be used is the value of ηB corresponding to the column 










C, by applying the rules in Eq. (5-5), for three distinct values of ηBj,C =0, 0.5 and 1 are 
shown in Figure 5-2741. 
 
As mentioned earlier, η controls the rate of convergence and the extent to which 
past or newly available data is relied upon. It can be seen that for a value of ηB=3,C =0, 
there is no change in the probability distribution of C; i.e., there is no learning; the past 
data is relied upon completely and the newly available data is not used in updating the 
parameters of C. When ηB=3,C =1, it can be seen that the column corresponding to B=3 in 
the CPT of node C has now changed, indicating that the newly available data has been 
completely relied upon in updating the parameters of C as compared to past data, which 
is completely forgotten42. For all other intermediate values, faster convergence is 
obtained with the learning process with the values of η closer to 1, and conversely slower 
convergence with values of η closer to 0. The choice of an appropriate value for η is thus 
crucial. The following section explores how the beliefs in the different sensors and 
processes in the network can be used to determine the values of η and provides some 
guidelines.  
                                                 
41 ηBj,C =0   j implies that ηB=1,C =0, ηB=3,C =0, and so on. 
42 As mentioned in [Cohen, et. al, 2001], for a value of η=1, the estimated probability oscillates between 0 
and 1 based on whether the value for the node Xi is equal to its k
th
 value in the sample of data being 
analyzed 
 
 B=1 B=3 B=5 B=7 
C=0.5 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 
C=1.5 0.2 0.8 0.1 0 
C=2.5 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.2 
C=3.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 
 
 
 B=1 B=3 B=5 B=7 
C=0.5 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 
C=1.5 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.0 
C=2.5 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.2 
C=3.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 
 
 
 B=1 B=3 B=5 B=7 
C=0.5 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 
C=1.5 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.0 
C=2.5 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.2 
C=3.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 
 
 
 B=1 B=3 B=5 B=7 
C=0.5 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 
C=1.5 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.0 
C=2.5 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.2 
C=3.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 
 
 
 B=1 B=3 B=5 B=7 
C=0.5 0.8 0.05 0.0 0.0 
C=1.5 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.0 
C=2.5 0.0 0.05 0.8 0.2 
C=3.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 
 
 
 B=1 B=3 B=5 B=7 
C=0.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
C=1.5 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.0 
C=2.5 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.2 
C=3.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 
 
ηB=3,C = 0 ηB=3,C = 0.5 ηB=3,C = 1.0 
Figure 5-27: Effect of Different Learning Rates 
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In order to set the learning rate adaptively, certain factors need to be considered: 
a) The starting value of η for all the nodes in the network needs to be known.  
b) When a new sample of data is obtained and analyzed, a decision has to be made 
whether the learning rate has to be increased, decreased or maintained the same. 
c) Finally, the magnitude by which the learning rate is increased or decreased also 
needs to be determined.  
The initial values of ηPAj,Xi for the different nodes may be determined by the user 
based on the number of samples that have been analyzed previously for a given node Xi, 
for each of its different parent configurations PAj. For instance, if the system is new and 
relatively untested, there is inadequate information to estimate the CPT parameter values 
that would represent that node accurately. In such cases, it would be desirable to have a 
high value of η (closer to 1, say 0.8) for faster convergence to estimate the parameters as 
quickly as possible and gradually reduce the rate as more and more data becomes 
available, which in turn would help reduce the variance in the estimated values.  On the 
other hand, if the system has been operational for a while, then it is likely that a large 
quantum of data samples is already available that can be used to estimate the CPT 
parameters quite accurately. In such a case, a low starting value of η might be sufficient 
(closer to 0, say 0.01?). The number of samples based on which this judgment is made is 
highly application-specific. For a system that does not change very quickly, a lower 
number of samples (say, 1000) may be sufficient to estimate the CPT parameters 
accurately, but for a highly dynamic system or for a system that degrades quickly, a large 
number of samples (say, 10000) might be needed in order to make an accurate estimation 
of the CPT parameters for the various nodes. 
In order to decide when and by how much to modify the learning rate, [Cohen et. 
al., 2001] use the mean and the variance of the estimated parameters in conjunction with 
user-defined thresholds as the decision criteria and an exponential increase/decrease in 
the learning rate respectively. In this research, the use of the values of beliefs in the 
sensors for each of the nodes in the network, obtained at the end of the fault isolation 
cycle, is proposed both as the decision criterion to modify the learning rate and also to 
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determine the magnitude of this change. In the situation that all the sensors and processes 
are found to be operating correctly (as indicated by WS and WP values which are ~1 or 
above certain user-defined thresholds at the end of the fault isolation cycle), the learning 
rates need to be adjusted to update the parameters based on the data sample analyzed. Let 
      
  and       
  be the lowest and the highest learning rates respectively for a particular 
combination of node value Xi and its parents in the configuration PAj. If NS is the number 
of data samples that have been previously analyzed to determine the learning rate, the 
new value of ηPAj,Xi  for the next learning cycle can be calculated as follows: 
             
  
      
        
 
    
 Eq.(5-6) 
The very first time there is a modification in the learning rate, the value of NS is zero and 
the learning rate is set to its highest value. Note that as the number of data samples 
increases, the learning rate decreases, theoretically attaining a value of       
  (or zero if 
      
 = 0) after an infinite number of samples have been analyzed. Practically, the 
learning rate keeps decreasing but remains a finite value (similar to the heuristic used in 
[Cohen, et. al., 2001]).  
If, however, the sensor corresponding to a particular node Xi in the network is 
identified as being potentially faulty at the end of the fault isolation cycle preceding the 
latest data sample (indicated by its WS value approaching a value of zero or lesser than a 
user-defined threshold), then  
a) The ηPAj,Xi for all the columns in the CPT of that node is set to a value of zero 
immediately.  
b) Since the values indicated by this sensor determine the parent configurations PAr 
for all the child nodes of Xi, say Yk, the learning rates for all those nodes, ηPAr,Yk,, 
are also set to zero immediately.  
This is done to prevent the corruption of the existing parameter values in the CPT of Xi, 
in the situation that the corresponding sensor is actually faulty. If however, after 
subsequent fault isolation cycles, it turns out that the sensor is not faulty (or if a faulty 
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sensor has been replaced with one that is operating correctly), the learning rate may be 
reset to a value that was used just preceding the fault isolation cycle in which an alarm 
for the faulty sensor was first raised.  
Now consider a situation where at the end of the fault isolation cycle it is 
determined that all the sensors are operating correctly (all the WS values are ~1 or above 
certain user-defined thresholds) but there is a process fault (one or more WP values are ~0 
or below certain user-defined thresholds). In this case, if the learning rate is too low, then 
the CPT parameters cannot be updated quickly enough to represent the variation in the 
system dynamics. Hence, the learning rate needs to be increased. In order to do this, once 
again the WS and Wp values can be used to determine the magnitude by which the 
learning rates can be changed. Suppose PAj ≡{  
 ,   
 ,…   
 
} represent the particular 
configuration of the parents P1, P2, …Pm of the node Xi,   and there is a fault in the k
th
 
process Pk-> Xi. Once all the sensors have been deemed trustworthy based on their Ws 
values, the new increased learning rate for the particular combination of PAj and Xi may 
be calculated as follows: 
      
          
                        
        
         Eq.(5-7) 
where       is the average of the WP values obtained by considering all the processes, 
namely, P1-> Xi, P2-> Xi,.. Pm-> Xi that terminate at Xi.. It can be seen that the new value 
of the learning rate is determined by the condition of the system. Since all the sensors are 
deemed to be operating correctly, the faultier the system is (indicated by low WP values 
for one or more processes), the higher is the learning rate. This is desirable since it will 
help update the parameters quickly and can help improve the output from the higher level 
condition-based maintenance algorithms. For instance, if at the end of an fault isolation 
cycle it is determined that all the processes that terminate at the node Xi are operating 
correctly, and all the sensors are also operating normally, it was observed earlier that all 
the WS and WP values attain a value of 1. From the above equation, it can be seen that in 
this situation, the learning rate remains unchanged (as       is also 1). In the extreme 
scenario when it is known that all the processes are faulty (     ≈0), then the learning 
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rate is set to its highest value. For any other intermediate condition (0<       ≤ 1), the 
learning rate is increased from its present value43.  
5.9. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the development of a novel Bayesian network based 
algorithm for detection and isolation of sensor faults, and distinguishing sensor faults 
from process faults. Using illustrative examples (including the test set-up described in 
Appendix B), the performance of the proposed Sensor and Process Fault Detection and 
Isolation (SPFDI) algorithm was demonstrated by considering different types of faults. 
These demonstrations showed that the proposed method has the following advantages: 
 The proposed method complements the overall Bayesian network based decision 
making framework for intelligent systems developed in [Ashok and Tesar, 2007]. 
Thus, there is no need for multiple/alternative methodologies to exist in parallel in 
order to achieve different objectives like system modeling, data validation, etc.  
 The same Bayesian network structure used for decision-making at the system 
level (for instance, combining appropriate performance maps into performance 
envelopes) can also be used to examine the validity of the readings obtained from 
the sensors that monitor the system. This obviates the need for creating multiple 
networks to address different objectives like detection of faults, isolation of fault 
sources, etc. 
 The algorithm does not require the existence of explicit closed form relationships 
between the different variables of interest. Fault detection and isolation is 
performed solely on the basis of the knowledge of how the system is likely to 
behave as indicated by the performance map data (and encoded in the CPTs of the 
different variables) and the data obtained from all the sensors monitoring the 
system at a given instant. 
                                                 
43 In the discussion above, the probabilities of false alarms (Section 5.7.1) are not taken into account while 
updating the model parameters. The modification of Eq.(5-6)and Eq.(5-7) in order to accommodate those 
probabilities is a topic of future research. 
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 The algorithm also results in a relatively simple network structure. Since explicit 
nodes modeling the health of the different system components (processes) or the 
sensors are not required, the total number of nodes/size of the network is 
reduced44.  
 The algorithm does not require apriori knowledge of all the fault modes and their 
effect on the behavior of the different sensors and process in the system.  
 The algorithm does not require the assumption of the system condition remaining 
unchanged (i.e. no degradation in system health) in order to detect and isolate 
faulty sensors or vice-versa. This is a significant advantage over many other 
approaches (Section 5.3.3), as it enables the algorithm to distinguish between 
potential faults that occur in the sensors versus those that may occur in one of the 
system components. 
 The algorithm can handle single as well as multiple faults in sensors as well as 
processes, to the extent permissible by the subset issue (Section 5.5.3).  
 The belief values for the sensors and process (WS and WP) provide an intuitive 
indication regarding the health of any sensor or process in the system, with low 
values indicating potential faults and high values indicating regular operation. 
These belief values can be interpreted easily by the system operator to make 
decisions regarding which sensors to use to achieve the system‘s performance 
goals in the best possible manner or whether or not to use certain sensors to 
update the stored maps/decision surfaces, etc. 
 The algorithm is an any-time algorithm i.e. beginning with an assumption of no 
knowledge regarding the condition (faulty/operational) of a particular sensor or a 
process in the system, with each subsequent step in the instantiation table, the 
knowledge becomes more and more certain. The belief values obtained at the end 
of a single fault detection and isolation cycle, provide a clear indication of the 
potential source/s of variation in the sensor reading/s based on the sample of data 
                                                 
44 This may also result in more compact CPTs (depending on the application) since the number of parent 
nodes corresponding to any node in the network is restricted. 
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available at that point (if the same results are obtained over multiple samples, then 
it is indicative of a definite fault in that particular sensor or process). 
Table 5-40: Benefits of Sensor and Process Fault Detection and Isolation Algorithm 
 Benefit Description 
1. 
Complements overall decision-
making framework for intelligent 
systems 
The same Bayesian network used for decision 
making is also used for fault detection/isolation 
2. 
Obviates the need for multiple 
methodologies to exist in parallel  
For system modeling, operational decision-
making, fault detection/isolation, etc. 
3. Simpler network structures 
Does not require explicit modeling of health of 
various components of the system 
4. 
No need for apriori knowledge of 
fault modes 
Enables CPTs to be generated relatively easily 
with available data 
5. Purely data driven 
Does not require existence of closed form 
equations between variables of interest 
6. 
No need for assumption of 
invariant system health 
Enables detection of any issues in the system 
components in addition to detection and isolation 
of faulty sensors 
7. 
Can detect multiple faults in 
sensors and processes 
The algorithm can reliably detect faults in 
multiple sensors and processes in the system (to 
the limit imposed by the subset issue in the 
instantiation table) 
8. 
Easy interpretation of WS and WP  
belief values for decision making  
The range of values 0≤ WS, WP≤ 1 provides a 
clear indication of fault to the system operator 
9. Anytime algorithm 
The knowledge of the status of a particular 
sensor or process (i.e. whether it is faulty/non-
faulty) becomes more certain with time 
10. Applicable to variety of domains 
Flexibility in the choice of thresholds, potential 
ability for fault classification, ability to perform 
both predictive and diagnostic inferencing, given 
the Bayesian network structure allows 
implementation of the algorithm with relative 
ease 
 
 Although the issue of fault classification (into categories like drift, bias, precision 
degradation etc.) has not been addressed in the present work, the use of the most 
probable state as a comparison criterion for the node of interest may allow such 
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functionality (for instance, by tracking the most probable state continuously over 
multiple cycles of validation as proposed in [Mehranbod, et. al., 2003]) 
 Given a Bayesian network representation for a system (with sensors to measure all the 
nodes), the framework for the proposed algorithm (Section 5.4) allows great flexibility 
in the choice of thresholds, in the choice of nodes for instantiation (as NI) and 
comparison (as NoI), type of inferencing (predictive/diagnostic) to generate the 
instantiation table, in accommodating variables that vary on  different scales (for 
instance, as shown in Section 5.6), etc. This implies that the algorithm may be 
potentially implemented with relative ease across a wide variety of application 








Chapter 6. Applications 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The work presented thus far has primarily been focused on intelligent EMAs. 
However, the same concepts are applicable across a wide spectrum of other areas. The 
common defining characteristic of these applications is that they involve complex 
systems monitored by multiple heterogeneous sensors; where multiple performance 
objectives have to be met with human choices involved in the operational decision 
making process. The following sections examine the relevance of the work presented in 
the earlier chapters by considering some potential scenarios in four broad classes of 
applications. Section 6.2 briefly outlines the different application classes, with some 
representative applications for each class. This is followed by in-depth analysis of a 
selected application for each class in Sections 6.3-6.6, demonstrating the applicability of 
the Sensor and Process Fault Detection and Isolation (SPFDI) algorithm developed 
earlier. 
6.2. CLASSES OF APPLICATIONS 
The Sensor and Process Fault Detection and Isolation (SPFDI) algorithm 
developed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4), was applied to a system comprised of a four phase 
switched reluctance motor, instrumented with current, voltage, torque, speed and acoustic 
noise sensors. The effectiveness of the algorithm in distinguishing between sensor and 
process faults as well as in isolating the potential sources of those faults was 
demonstrated by considering different combinations of single and multiple faults. The 
methodology demonstrated is however, general in nature and applicable to a wider range 
of application domains beyond intelligent EMAs. The main requirements to implement 
the algorithm for any system are the ability to develop an accurate Bayesian network 
representation of the system (based on the knowledge of domain experts or based on 
learning from a database of the variables of interest in the system) and the ability to 
measure the physical phenomena represented by each of the nodes in the network, in real-




The utility of the SPFDI algorithm can be better understood by examining its relevance to 
four broad classes of applications (Table 6-1).  
Table 6-1: Four Classes of Applications 
 Class Example Applications 




2 System availability 
Battlefield robots   
Submarines 
Nuclear power plant  
3 High cost of system failure 
Manufacturing line 
Remotely operated vehicles 
Wind turbines (gearbox) 
4 Performance maximization 
Ground combat vehicle 
Serial /Parallel manufacturing cell 
War fighter monitoring  
6.2.1. Human Safety at Stake 
This class encompasses applications where the decision maker has to decide on a 
particular course of action for the overall system operation, based on an estimation of the 
system capability using the information obtained from the sensors monitoring it.  In doing 
so, the decision maker has to determine the trustworthiness of the available information 
in order to determine the ramification of making a particular choice. This is critical in 
situations where a significant degradation in the performance capability of the system (in 
reality or perceived due to its misrepresentation by faulty sensors) may jeopardize the 
safety of the humans interacting with or utilizing the system. If all the sensors indicate the 
values as expected for their measurands under the extant operating conditions, the 
decision process becomes straightforward (the system is operating normally and there is 
no associated risk). However, if a particular sensor or a subset of sensors indicates values 




maps for those measurands), the decision maker needs to be able to determine whether 
the values are indicative of faulty sensors or if it indicates a potential issue with the 
system. This can be achieved by applying the SPFDI algorithm.  The belief values for the 
different sensors and processes obtained from the algorithm can not only help provide a 
clear guidance to the decision maker regarding the status of the different components of 
the system but also help determine what alternative data sources may be used if it is 
found that a particular sensor is faulty and needs to be taken out of service. The following 
paragraphs provide two example scenarios where the availability of such information can 
prove to be life-saving. 
There has been an increased emphasis on all-electric systems in next generation 
aircraft designs, replacing conventional hydraulic actuation systems (used to drive control 
surfaces, landing gear, etc.) with electromechanical (EMA) or electrohydraulic 
actuators(EHA) [Brown, et. al, 2009] [Koran and Tesar, 2008 ] [Byington, et. al, 2004] 
due to their increased reliability, lower maintenance and overall life cycle costs. 
Actuation systems, especially those that operate the flight control surfaces (ailerons, 
flaps, elevators, stabilators, etc) are critical not only from the aircraft performance point 
of view [Koran and Tesar, 2008] but also from perspective of pilot safety and 
survivability. Hence the area of fault detection and isolation (detection, identification and 
accommodation of sensor and actuator failures) and fault tolerant flight control has been 
an active area of research [Heredia and Ollero, 2010][Brown, et. al, 2009][Hajiyev and 
Caliskan,2005][Kobayashi, 2003][Napolitano, et. al, 2000]. It is evident from such 
research that loss of control of such flight control actuators due to faulty sensors is as 
serious an issue as failure of the actuator itself1.  
Consider for instance, a linear EMA driving the stabilator in a fighter aircraft. The 
EMA should be capable of producing sufficient moment to overcome inertia as well as 
external load forces due to gravity and aerodynamics [Koran and Tesar, 2008]. Suppose 
the force exerted by the EMA is measured using a force sensor and in addition, current 
and linear position sensors (to determine the ram motion) are also used to monitor its 
                                                 
1 Such critical flight control systems are often equipped with quadruplex hardware redundancy (in sensors 




performance. If the pilot (or the flight control computer) notices an unusually high 
reading from the force sensor, then using a Bayesian network model of the system (for 
instance consisting of nodes like current, linear position, sensed force, EMA ram force, 
ram position, etc.) and the data from the three sensors, the SPFDI algorithm can help 
determine if the anomaly is due to a faulty force sensor or due to an increased load acting 
on the stabilator itself (for instance, due to high turbulence).  In a combat scenario, if it 
can be determined that the high force reading is due to an inadequately performing 
stabilator EMA, it may provide the pilot valuable information to reconfigure the other 
flight control surfaces to increase the chances of survivability of the aircraft. 
Minimally invasive surgery using robotic systems is another example pertinent to 
this class of applications. These procedures are becoming popular due to the benefits they 
offer- reduced pain, faster rehabilitation/recovery time, better cosmetic results, etc. 
Typically such systems consist of a master-slave arrangement of robotic arms, where the 
surgeon remotely controls the master system using consoles with haptic and visual 
feedback. The slave system consists of multi degree of freedom robotic arms which 
introduce slender surgical instruments into the human body through small incisions 
[Tesar, et. al, 2006][Camarillo, et. al, 2004][Deml, et. al., 2004]. The gross hand motions 
of the surgeon at the master controller (after filtering tremors) are translated to actuation 
commands for fine motions of the slave surgical robot using suitable kinematic model 
transformations.  
In this process, with no direct tactile feedback, the haptic feedback experienced by 
the surgeon plays a dominant role in the surgeon‟s ability to determine the necessary 
forces required to be applied between the surgical instruments and the human body. To 
accurately determine the interaction forces between human tissue and the instruments, 
miniature force sensors are integrated into the instruments themselves [Kuebler, et. al, 
2005]. The reading from these sensors is scaled and used by the master controller to 
provide the suitable haptic cues to the surgeon to enable them to determine the 




Consider a scenario where the surgeon experiences a significant force from the 
haptic feedback system. In such a situation, if the surgeon attempts to counteract the high 
feedback force with a significant instrument force there is a potential risk of trauma to the 
patient as well as damage to the delicate surgical instruments. Thus, it becomes 
imperative for the control system to determine if this behavior is due to a high 
friction/cutting force between the surgical instrument and the human tissue at the point of 
insertion (for instance, as described in [O‟Leary et. al, 2003]) or if it is due to a biased 
force sensor in the instrument.  
Using an appropriate Bayesian network representation of the entire system 
(potentially consisting of nodes like sensed force, interface friction, instrument angle, 
joint angles of the slave surgical robot, etc.) and the data from the various sensors in the 
system, the SPFDI algorithm can help the master controller determine if the anomaly is 
due to a faulty force sensor or due to an abnormal angle of entry of the surgical tool 
leading to the increased operating forces. If it is found that the force sensor is operating 
correctly, this information may be then used to send a warning signal to the surgeon who 
can then take the corrective action required to reduce the risk of injury to the patient. 
6.2.2. System Availability 
This class of applications encompasses situations where a decision has to be made 
by the decision maker whether or not the system in its present condition is capable of 
performing the tasks required of it, before being deployed. This is termed as „availability‟ 
of the system. The decision is made based on the information available from the sensors 
monitoring the system following a start-up/system performance check process that puts 
the system through a series of selected operational maneuvers representative of its actual 
duty cycle (with the SPFDI algorithm also being executed simultaneously). The goal is to 
avoid a costly shutdown of the system once it is deployed (for instance, due to a false 
alarm) or a catastrophic complete failure in the worst case if some potential sources of 
single point component faults remain undetected before the system is put into operation.   
Included under this category would be applications wherein there are multiple 




made regarding which is the best option available at hand (the system with the greatest 
availability) to accomplish those goals.  
A typical example of such a situation can be found in a battlefield scenario where 
a soldier may have different configurations of mobile robots at his/her disposal for 
detecting and disposing of explosives. The soldier may run each of these robots through a 
system check process that may involve running the robots through a specific motion plan 
(for instance, like the ones described in [Kulkarni and Tesar, 2009]), in order to 
determine which of the robots is most suitable, in terms of its „availability‟ to do the task.  
During this process, the performance of each of the different subsystems in the 
robots may be monitored using the appropriate sensors. For instance, this may be done 
for the drive wheels using sensors like current, voltage, temperature, etc. integrated into 
the drive wheel actuators. If the current sensor for one of the drive wheels indicates an 
unusual value, the soldier may be able to interpret the results of the SPFDI algorithm and 
determine that the cause of the abnormal reading is a faulty sensor and the drive wheel 
actuator itself is not faulty and that the robot is still capable enough to accomplish its 
mission. If the robot is deployed with the faulty sensor in place, such knowledge can be 
factored in, while providing a performance level assessment of the system (i.e., a measure 
of its effective availability) while it is in operation and the other operational sensors may 
be used to infer the unavailable measurand by using them as evidence in Bayesian 
inferencing algorithms (Section 2.5.2). 
Another example application in this class may include a system that has been 
dormant or shutdown for a period and a decision has to be made whether to bring it back 
into active service. A typical example may be a submarine or a ship that is in the docks 
for scheduled maintenance and the vessel commander has to make a decision based on a 
series of sea trials if the vessel can be deemed to be seaworthy enough to return to active 
service and accomplish its mission objectives. For instance, in a submarine, the initial 
trials may consist of determining the range of motion of all the control surfaces that are 
used to maneuver the vessel during actual missions. The generation of acoustic noise 




during the initial trials it is observed that the acoustic noise levels are higher than normal, 
then using all the available sensor readings (from the sensors for various measurands like 
current, voltage, position, acoustic noise, etc. integrated into the actuators for these 
control surfaces [Tesar, et. al, 2010]) and implementing the SPFDI algorithm may help 
the vessel commander decide whether the abnormal readings are due to a faulty acoustic 
noise sensor or if the additional noise is being generated from one of the active control 
surfaces, the main bearing for which may be potentially damaged. Such knowledge, 
combined with the commander‟s experience can enable the accurate assessment of the 
risk involved in deploying the vessel with the faulty component (sensor, bearing or 
actuator) or indicate a clear need to replace it. 
6.2.3. High Cost of System Failure 
This class encompasses applications that can be divided into two sub-categories. 
The first category includes applications where the decision maker (who is remotely 
monitoring and controlling the system) may decide to temporarily shut down a system 
and take remedial action, due to a perceived inability of the system to accomplish a 
desired task.  However, such a decision could be the result of a wrong assessment of the 
system capability due to potential faults in one or more sensors monitoring it, when in 
reality the system is fully capable of performing its required task. The second category 
constitutes the other end of the spectrum, where the system capability is similarly 
misestimated due to faulty sensors and the system is made to operate well beyond its 
design limits for extended time. Doing so might cause irreparable damage to the system 
or complete catastrophic loss of the system in the extreme situation.  
In either case, the effect of the inability to distinguish a potential sensor fault from 
a potential system fault would be tangibly felt in terms of its economic impact (for 
instance, in terms of a dollar value signifying the lost productivity from the system or the 
overall cost of the system itself). Thus, also in this class of applications, quantifying the 
dependability of the available information (via belief values for the sensors and processes 
using the SPFDI algorithm presented in Chapter 5) can help the decision maker evaluate 




A manufacturing line for food products can be considered as a good example of 
the first category in this class of applications.  Given the need to manufacture high quality 
products while having to comply with several rigorous requirements for quality and 
safety, this application tends to be a sensor-rich environment. A variety of sensors are 
used for process control at different points along the manufacturing line to ensure a high 
quality end product.  
For instance, [Neethirajan et. al., 2009] state that food packaging is often carried 
out in a modified atmosphere consisting of gases like CO2 in order to prevent microbial 
food spoilage. A decrease in the concentration of CO2 is taken as indicative of leakage 
which may affect the freshness of the end product. On the other hand, very high 
concentrations may also adversely affect the quality of the end product. Hence, various 
types of CO2 sensors are used to accurately monitor the concentration of the gas used. 
The demand for high standards for food safety has also led to a proliferation of sensors 
used for monitoring food quality [Connolly and O‟Reilly, 2005]. For instance, different 
types of sensors are used to detect the presence of pathogens, chemical toxins and 
pesticide residues in food as described in [Patel, 2002]. Other types of sensors could 
include like viscosity/ flow meters, density meters, temperature sensors, pH level sensors, 
etc.[Singh, et. al., 1997];  machine vision systems are commonly used during the final 
packaging step for ensuring consistency or grading of product size. 
The sensors used in such food manufacturing applications are often subject to 
extreme conditions (factors like high pressure, temperature, etc. are common in many 
processes). Fouling problems are also sometimes observed if there is direct contact of the 
sensors with the food product. To remove the fouling, concentrated or heated solutions of 
chemicals are pumped through the system [Winquist, et. al., 2005] which may also affect 
some of the sensors used in the application. If the readings from such degraded sensors 
deviate drastically from the anticipated values the manufacturing plant supervisor may be 
inclined to halt production temporarily to ensure that product quality is not being 
hampered (for instance, if the reading from the CO2 concentration sensor is high in the 




In such situations, time is often of essence since the raw materials for the food 
products need to be processed in a timely fashion to avert any degradation in their 
quality. A temporary shutdown of the production line can not only result in reduced 
output volume of the end product but can also result in a significant cost incurred due to 
the perishable nature of the raw materials. For instance, consider the pasteurization 
process used in the dairy food industry. Suppose the process utilizes a voltammetric 
electronic tongue or a taste sensor to monitor quality changes of milk (as described in 
[Winquist, et. al., 2005]) in addition to sensors that monitor the temperature and viscosity 
of milk. If the taste sensor indicates a very low reading (indicating that the quality of the 
milk is not up to the mark for it to be considered pasteurized to the acceptable degree) but 
the temperature and viscosity sensors indicate their expected values, then using a 
Bayesian network model of the system and the SPFDI algorithm, the plant supervisor can 
confirm that the fault lies with the taste sensor and continue to process the present batch 
of products until completion before deciding to shut down the line temporarily to replace 
the faulty sensor.  
An example of the second category of applications in this class may be a system 
like an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) [Heredia and Ollero, 2010] or a remotely 
operated vehicle (ROV) [Yuh, 2000] or a mobile robot operating in an urban environment 
[Lewis, et. al., 2007]. In each case, all information about the system as well as its 
surroundings is relayed to the controllers via internal sensors that monitor the different 
system components as well as via external sensors that survey the operating environment.   
Consider for example ROVs which are used for a variety of applications like 
ocean floor surveying and mapping, environmental monitoring and cleanup, construction 
and inspection of underwater structures like pipelines, etc. [Yuh, 2000]. The vehicles are 
instrumented with a variety of sensors like video cameras, sonar systems, gyroscopic 
systems, temperature sensors, etc. intended for different purposes like navigation, 
mission-specific requirements, diagnostics of the on-board systems, etc. Additional 





These systems may be tethered to a mother ship via umbilical cables which 
supply power to the different subsystems on the vehicle and also enable bi-directional 
communication (for sending control signals and receiving video/sensor data) or they may 
be untethered with onboard power supplied from batteries. The vehicles are remotely 
controlled by pilots on the ship. Since the ROV operates in unstructured underwater 
environments, there is always the risk of the umbilical cables being snagged on unknown 
underwater features and getting damaged or completely severed. [Yuh, 2000] estimates 
that about ten percent of all ROVs are lost due to such broken tethers2.  
Consider a hypothetical example where the tether is snagged in a location not 
completely observable by the onboard video camera, thereby impeding the speed with 
which the ROV moves underwater. Suppose data available from sensors monitoring the 
speed of the ROV thrusters, due to a bias fault, falsely indicates that they are operating 
below their intended speed. The pilot may assume that the ROV thruster speed needs to 
be boosted and in doing so, may risk severing the tether completely and losing the whole 
vehicle underwater. In such a situation, applying the SPFDI algorithm using a Bayesian 
network model of the system correlating the thruster speed information with other 
onboard sensor information like temperature of the thruster pods, current drawn by the 
thruster motors, the tether orientation available from the video camera, etc., may help the 
pilot identify the cause of the low speed to be a faulty speed sensor and a snagged tether 
(for instance, as indicated by an increased current draw and overheating of the thruster 
motors as indicated by the current and temperature sensor readings) 
6.2.4. Performance Level Maximization 
The objective in this class of applications is to enable the system to provide the 
best possible (maximum) performance to address unstructured task requirements or 
requirements that change while the system is in operation. The systems categorized under 
this class therefore tend to be highly reconfigurable with additional resources/capabilities 
                                                 
2 There may be many other factors that may lead to eventual loss of an ROV. For instance, [Griffiths and 
Brito, 2008] present a Bayesian belief network approach to investigate the risk of such losses occurring for 




that can be employed to satisfy application demands that lie beyond its nominal 
design/operating (or duty cycle) specifications when the need arises (without the need for 
significant retooling or for multiple systems to coexist in tandem to meet specialized 
needs). The question of what constitutes „maximum performance‟ is dictated by the 
application. For instance, a connotation of this term in the context of specifying 
performance for a luxury vehicle, could be in characterizing the body roll (which needs to 
be kept to a minimum) while traversing around sharp turns.  
To ensure a desired level of performance, data from the sensors in the application 
(to monitor the system as well as its operating environment) is used to actively 
reconfigure and allocate the available system resources to meet the task requirements at 
any given time. However, if during this procedure, the readings from a particular subset 
of sensors deviate from their projected values, the decision maker has to determine the 
dependability of the available values before allocating the available resources. A decision 
based on faulty sensor data may obstruct the system from performing at its optimum 
level, even though it has sufficient capability to do so. Or if it is determined that the 
system capabilities have changed to the extent that it can no longer operate at the desired 
level of performance, the decision maker may be able to use this information to alter the 
strategy of reallocating resources to still try and achieve the desired performance goals. 
The belief values for the different sensors and processes, obtained from the SPFDI 
algorithm can help address both these issues as described in the following examples.  
The emphasis on replacing hydraulic systems and the need for more versatile, 
light-weight equipment with commonality of platforms to create different types of 
manned and unmanned ground combat vehicles (GCVs)3,4 for different battlefield 
requirements5 has led to extensive use of EMAs in such vehicles [Tesar, 2010][Tesar, 
2008][Thornhill, et. al., 2003][Doell, 2001].  EMAs are used on advanced GCVs for 
diverse uses such as drive actuators (wheels/tracks), weapons handling, turret drives, etc. 
                                                 
3 For greater reconfigurability, rapid technology upgrades, reduced logistics trail, etc. 
4 Ranging from 30lb to 20 tons, and assembled on demand from a set of standard modules [Tesar, 2010] 
5 For instance, vehicles with articulated geometry to address supply, personnel and surveillance needs in 




A demanding area of application of EMAs is in active suspensions for these vehicles 
[Tesar, 2010] where reliable information from sensors is vital for both control as well as 
condition monitoring. 
Most military vehicles are typically overloaded (with armor, equipment, etc.) and 
cannot adequately perform evasive maneuvers with passive suspension systems. Hence 
there is a real need for an actively driven suspension system to stabilize the vehicle under 
severe maneuvers and unfavorable road conditions. Using a suite of sensors to infer the 
suspension characteristics, vehicle state, and road conditions, active suspensions provide 
forces that counteract the system dynamics that occur as a result of the transfer of forces 
from the unsprung mass of the suspension (occurring due to wheel contact with the road 
surface, sudden maneuvers, road profile etc.) to the sprung mass of the vehicle chassis. 
By adapting to varying driving conditions (via real-time compensation to the vehicle 
chassis motions) active suspensions can provide better vehicle handling. They have been 
an active area of research in applications ranging from passenger cars [Jones, 2005] to 
future lunar rovers [Bluethmann, et. al., 2010].  
Different designs have been explored that utilize linear actuators [Martins, et. al, 
2006] [Jones, 2005], rotary actuators in combination with roller screws [Tesar, 2010] 
[Bluethmann, et. al., 2010], etc. In all such designs a variety of sensors are integrated into 
the suspension system. Accelerometers are used on the wheels/ chassis (to measure roll, 
pitch, yaw), absolute linear position sensors are used to gauge the suspension travel; 
current, voltage and position sensors (rotary/linear) are needed to control the electric 
prime mover that determines the force generated as well as suspension travel, force 
sensors to estimate the forces generated from the road profile, etc. [Bluethmann, et. al.,  
2010][Tesar, 2008] [Jones, 2005][Fischer, et. al. 2003]. The data from all the sensors is 
sent to the main vehicle controller where algorithms can be implemented to determine the 
state of the vehicle and road features to determine the force/travel that needs to be 
generated by each of the suspension actuators.   
Consider a situation where a four wheeled Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) 




accurately determine the rapid motion of the suspension arms on each wheel of the 
vehicle and the resultant force from the terrain profile acting on the vehicle to produce 
the necessary compensating forces and keep the vehicle wheels in contact with the road 
(maintain the chassis as steady as possible).  Suppose, the vehicle control system receives 
readings from the linear position sensors for two of the suspension arms (on the same 
side of the vehicle) that vary slightly from a steady state value but the sensors for the 
other two wheel suspensions indicate a large amount of travel. The control system needs 
to be able to determine if the readings indicate that two wheels of the vehicle are on a 
relatively smoother section of the terrain and the other two wheels are traversing over a 
pothole; or if it is indicative of dual failed sensors and if so, on which side of the vehicle.  
Using the data from all the sensors involved and relating them using a Bayesian 
network model for the whole vehicle (consisting of nodes like motor current, motor 
voltage, linear position for the suspension arms for all the wheels, chassis roll, pitch, yaw 
orientations, etc.), the SPFDI can help resolve the conflict in the readings. The belief 
values for the sensors and process (Section 5.4) can help the vehicle control system 
accurately identify the appropriate course of action.  
If the belief values indicate that all the sensors are operating correctly, the vehicle 
controller can accurately amount of suspension force/travel needed for the wheels in the 
pothole to keep the chassis level and thus maximize the handling performance of the 
vehicle. On the other hand, if it is determined that two of the position sensors are faulty6 
then appropriate fault codes to the onboard computers (that may later be used to 
repair/replace the sensors during scheduled maintenance) while information from the 
remaining sensors may still be used to generate the appropriate suspension forces to once 
again provide the best possible vehicle handling performance. 
Another relevant example for performance maximization is in the area of 
manufacturing systems. The demand for a range of high quality affordable products has 
considerably reduced product life cycle times in many industries (for example, the 
automobiles sector). With the use of monolithic systems in manufacturing lines, it is not 
                                                 
6 For example, the two sensors which output a low value, indicating that two wheels of the vehicle are on a 




easy to respond to sudden changes in product portfolios or market demands. For instance 
jigs/fixtures designed to aid in the manufacturing of a specific aircraft component may 
not be usable at all for a different component or a similar component for another aircraft 
model. This has led to the concept of agile manufacturing.  
The defining characteristic is the flexibility of the manufacturing system to 
reconfigure itself in the shortest possible time (reusing available hardware/software)  to 
respond to unique demands/product needs in a timely manner while simultaneously 
ensuring an acceptable cost and quality of the end products from such a system [Tesar, 
2010][Chen, 2001][Newman, et. al, 2000]. [Gunasekaran and Yusuf, 2002] emphasize 
that such speed of response to new market opportunities is more relevant to specialty 
products where quality is also an important consideration in addition to the product cost 
and throughput, as compared to commodity products which compete solely on the basis 
of price. Reconfigurable manufacturing cells represent the most common embodiment of 
such agile manufacturing systems.  
The concept of manufacturing cells grew out of metal-machining systems 
assembled using dedicated precision machines (NC/CNC machines, conveyors, etc.) 
[Tesar, 2010]. With the advancement in robotics, reliable industrial robots (~100,000 
hours of service life [Tesar, 2010]) became the de-facto standard for flexible 
manufacturing, due to their ability for reprogramming and integration of hardware with 
relative ease to perform a variety of tasks (like robotic drilling, welding, assembly, etc.) 
for new product lines.  
A typical manufacturing cell includes several such robots working alongside (in 
parallel) each other to accomplish different steps in the manufacturing process. However 
with conventional industrial manipulators, the flexibility is still restricted to some extent 
by the degrees of freedom, hardware/software interfaces of the individual robots (which 
are usually fixed), lack of absolute accuracy and cell configurations. The use of modular, 
intelligent EMAs with standard hardware and software interfaces (representing plug and 
play component technology) can vastly expand this level of flexibility. These EMAs in 




sensors etc. can be assembled into different configurations (multiple robots) with 
different degrees of freedom (DOF) on demand [Tesar, 2010].  
For instance, a manufacturing cell used for airframe assembly may contain up to 
40 DOF composed of two active assembly robots (7 DOF each), two supporting force 
robots (5 DOF each) and four rigidized fixturing robots (4 DOF each)[Tesar, 2010]. The 
associated software modules to control these different robots (usually in the form of a set 
of object oriented libraries like Operational Software Components for Advanced Robotics 
(OSCAR) developed by [Kapoor and Tesar, 1996]) may also be reprogrammed according 
to the physical configuration of the manufacturing cell. 
A manufacturing cell is a sensor-rich environment since a variety of sensors are 
integrated into it both for control (for instance, sensors integrated into the joint actuators 
of the robots that constitute the cell) as well as for safe and reliable operation (for 
example, sensors that monitor the work area to enable motion planning for multiple 
robots operating in a common work area, collision avoidance, human safety, etc.).  Some 
of the many types of sensors that may be typically found in an advanced manufacturing 
cell include optical and ultrasonic sensors, proximity sensors, eddy current and magnetic 
sensors, contact sensors, machine vision systems, laser-based distance measurement 
systems, force/torque sensors, rotary and linear displacement sensors, current and voltage 
sensors, etc. [Tesar, 2010] [Pires and Costa, 2002] [Chen, 2001][Newman, et. al, 2000]. 
These sensors are used for proximity detection, for precision positioning, robot motion 
control, obstacle avoidance assembly tasks, etc. 
Consider a manufacturing cell with three robots A, B, C where A and B are used to 
position the workpiece while C performs a drilling operation on it. Assume that only 
proximity sensors are used to detect the distance between each robot. Suppose the 
workcell configuration manager software indicates two plausible warnings that a collision 
has occurred between all the robots. The collision between robots A and C was signaled 
based on a zero reading from the proximity sensor monitoring the distance between them 
but the joint configurations of these robots indicate that a collision should not have 




the two robots (as measured by the different joint position sensors) but the proximity 
sensor reading indicates that the two robots are still at a safe distance away from each 
other. In these unresolved data conflicts, the challenge confronting the supervisor of the 
workcell is to determine what is actually happening inside the workcell in order to 
resolve the issue and make a decision on whether or not to proceed with the machining 
operation in progress.  
Using a Bayesian network representation of the complete workcell (with nodes 
representing the proximity sensors, the joint angles for each robot, the current and voltage 
for each joint actuator of each robot, drilling force, drilling speed, etc.), the SPFDI 
algorithm can determine belief values for the different sensors and processes in the 
workcell. These values may indicate that the collision between robots A and C was a false 
alarm caused by a faulty proximity sensor and the collision between robots B and C was a 
real collision caused by dual faults in the proximity sensor as well as a process fault that 
caused an error in the joint motion of one of the robots (for instance, due to a joint 
actuator failure resulting from overheated motor windings). With this knowledge, the 
workcell supervisor may be able to reprogram the control software to take into account 
these faulty sensors and processes and determine the best possible method to reconfigure 
the remaining available resources to accomplish the drilling operation. 
6.3. HUMAN SAFETY AT STAKE 
Conventional braking systems used in most automobiles have been comprised of 
mechanical friction brakes actuated by a system of links and hydraulic actuators that 
amplify the input brake pedal force applied by the driver. With the advent of anti-lock 
braking systems, in addition to the decision by the driver as to when and how to apply the 
brakes, the brakes are also partly computer controlled using a suite of sensors and an 
electronic brake control unit (EBCU) to prevent the locking-up or slipping of wheels 
during emergency maneuvers. These advances in braking systems, the developing trend 
towards regenerative braking in hybrid and electric vehicles, the growing emphasis on 




hydraulic systems in general7 have led to electromechanical braking systems (referred to 
as „brake-by-wire‟ systems) gaining in popularity [Winkler, et. al, 2005]  
A typical brake-by-wire system consists of individual units attached to the 
different wheels. All the units are controlled and coordinated by a central EBCU, in order 
to provide self-sufficient brake control to each wheel of the vehicle (Figure 6-1). Each 
braking unit includes an EMA with an 
electric prime mover (typically a three 
phase brushless DC motor) coupled to a 
reduction geartrain. This arrangement is 
then connected to a ball screw to 
convert the rotary motion into linear 
motion that can then generate required 
actuation/braking forces on the brake 
calipers [Saric, et. al, 2008]. Each of 
the units can act independently and are 
instrumented with a suite of multiple 
sensors for feedback control of the 
rotary prime mover, the ball screw, 
measuring the clamping force, etc. The multiplicity of sensors used also increases the 
inherent diagnostic capabilities afforded by the system.  
The prime advantage of brake-by-wire systems is their quicker responsiveness 
compared to traditional hydraulic systems. With independent braking units, there is 
potential to implement sophisticated active braking programs to improve the vehicle 
handling and performance when it is traveling over different types of terrains (for 
instance, improved fuel economy in city driving, better handling on icy roads, etc.). The 
fewer parts required for such systems, also results in an overall reduced life cycle cost. 
Then, significant maintenance costs are restricted to only the brake pads and discs.  
                                                 
7 Higher weight for hydraulic cylinders adding to the overall weight at each wheel which affects the overall 
vehicle weight as well as its fuel economy and handling, the need for complicated hydraulic lines to run 
through the vehicle, regular replenishment of hydraulic/braking fluids, maintenance, etc 
 



























Each time the driver applies a force on the brake lever, the EBCU requires 
feedback from the pedal to determine the user intent (how much force needs to be applied 
based on the brake lever position and the urgency based on how fast the brake lever has 
moved). Feedback is also required from the individual brake units to determine the 
amount of travel needed for each of the calipers to apply the desired braking force and 
distribution of the braking forces on each individual wheel to maintain control of the 
vehicle and avoid skidding, slipping, etc. The action of the driver‟s foot on the brake 
pedal is used to modulate the control signals that move the EMAs at each wheel to 
actuate the friction surfaces. Position and force sensors are typically integrated with the 
pedals in brake-by-wire systems to gauge the user intent. To determine the magnitude and 
distribution of forces to be applied at each wheel, wheel speed sensors, motor current and 
position sensors, and brake caliper force sensors are typically used [Doriben and 
Durkopp, 2003][Pisu, et. al, 2003][Fleming, 2001].  
As with any system where human safety is paramount, there is a need to 
guarantee fault-free operation for all brake-by-wire systems or identify a fault as soon as 
it occurs so that remedial action is possible. For instance, [Pisu, et. al., 2003] investigate a 
model-based fault detection and isolation scheme to detect and identify faults in the 
caliper force and current sensors using a residual generation methodology. With different 
types of sensors available in a brake by wire system, it is possible to reduce the 
dependence on additional hardware and rely on the information redundancy that is made 
possible by these sensors to provide this assurance. For instance, [Saric, et. al., 2008] 
demonstrate the use of position and motor current sensors instead to determine the brake 
clamping force, which can prove valuable in case of a failure of the force sensor or if a 
decision is made to leave out the sensor altogether from the brake module (primarily for 
cost reasons). By employing similar synergy between the sensors the SPFDI algorithm 
can not only identify faulty sensors but also potential faults in one or more of the other 
components of the braking system as discussed in the example below. 
Consider a single brake module. Figure 6-2 shows the Bayesian network 




reasoning as explained in Chapters 2, 
3 and 4. Using feedback information 
regarding the brake pedal position 
(PP), the pedal force with which it is 
moved (PF), and the wheel speed 
(WS), obtained from the respective 
sensors, the EBCU modulates the 
current applied to the EMA prime 
mover, measured by the current 
sensor (MI). This, in turn determines 
the rotation of the motor as 
determined by the rotor position 
sensor (MP). The motor rotation controls the linear motion of the ball screw and in turn 
the position of the caliper, indicated by the linear motion position sensor (SP). Finally, 
the braking force as determined by the position of the ball screw is measured using the 
caliper force sensor (CF).  
Table 6-2: Example of an Instantiation Table (for Figure 6-2) 
PP PF WS MI MP SP CF PP->MI PF->MI WS->MI MI->MP MP->SP SP->CF 
NI NI NI NoI    PoI PoI PoI    
NI NI NI  NoI   PoI PoI PoI PoI   
NI NI NI   NoI  PoI PoI PoI PoI PoI  
NI NI NI    NoI PoI PoI PoI PoI PoI PoI 
   NI NoI      PoI   
   NI  NoI     PoI PoI  
   NI   NoI    PoI PoI PoI 
    NI NoI      PoI  
    NI  NoI     PoI PoI 
     NI NoI      PoI 
 
Table 6-2 shows an example of an instantiation table that may be generated for 
this network (Section 5.4). If during a braking operation, all the sensors and processes are 
operating correctly, the WS and WP belief values would attain a value of 1 as shown in 
Table 6-3 (starting with values of 0.5, as explained in Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2).  
 
PP =Pedal position sensor 
PF = Pedal force sensor 
WS = Wheel speed sensor 
MI = Motor current sensor 
MP = Motor rotor position 
sensor 
SP =  Ball screw/brake caliper 
linear position sensor 
CF = Caliper force sensor 
 
Figure 6-2: Representative Bayesian Network 










Table 6-3: WS and WP Values with No Sensor/Process Faults (for Figure 6-2) 
PP PF WS MI MP SP CF PP->MI PF->MI WS->MI MI->MP MP->SP SP->CF 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
In this situation, since all the critical components have been determined to be 
operating normally, the EBCU can decide on the appropriate distribution of the braking 
forces between the different braking units and indicate, for instance using a green lamp 
on the car dashboard, that the system is working normally. This information can then be 
utilized by the driver who can then factor in the assurance that the braking system is 
operating normally, while deciding on how to steer or accelerate the vehicle. Suppose, the 
WS and WP belief values obtained under the same situation as above are now as follows:  
Table 6-4: WS and WP Values with a Sensor Fault (for Figure 6-2) 
PP PF WS MI MP SP CF PP->MI PF->MI WS->MI MI->MP MP->SP SP->CF 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.000 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.6666 0.75 0.75 
 
A WS value of 0.000 for the linear motion sensor SP indicates a possible fault in it 
(confirmed after multiple iterations of the SPFDI algorithm). However, since all the other 
WS and WP belief values are higher, the EBCU may use this information to indicate that 
the brake system is functioning normally overall but also indicate via a separate warning 
light on the car dashboard (or a suitable maintenance diagnostic code) that the caliper 
force sensor requires maintenance. This information is again useful to the driver since it 
provides advance warning that a particular component of the system needs repair though 
it does not critically affect the system performance immediately. In such a case, as a 
back-up provision, the value of the caliper force may be inferred by the EBCU using the 
values from the other sensors (for instance, MP or CF which have higher belief values, 
and the processes MP->SP and SP->CF are also deemed to be working correctly as 
indicated by their belief values) as evidence in an appropriate inferencing algorithm.  
Now consider a situation where the driver presses on the brake pedal but notices that the 
braking action is not adequate to bring the vehicle to halt quickly. In such a situation, 




Table 6-5: WS and WP Values with a Process Fault (for Figure 6-2) 
PP PF WS MI MP SP CF PP->MI PF->MI WS->MI MI->MP MP->SP SP->CF 
0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.250 0.25 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.333 0.000 0.25 
 
In this situation, it can be seen that that the WP value for the MP->SP process attains a 
value of zero whereas the belief values for all the other sensors and processes in the 
system are higher. This implies that for a given rotation of the motor the brake pad 
caliper has not advanced the distance it was supposed to in order to generate the required 
braking force. This could be indicative of excessive wear of the brake pad friction 
material which may be causing it to lose contact with the brake disc, leading to the 
potential loss of braking ability. The vehicle driver may be able to again access this 
valuable information from the EBCU to diagnose the root cause of the problem. 
6.4. SYSTEM AVAILABILITY 
The following section presents an in-depth scenario analysis for system 
availability. Consider a nuclear power plant, that is powered down for maintenance 
purposes and a decision has to be made regarding whether or not to ramp it up to its 
optimum capacity again. But before doing so, it must be ensured that all the parts of the 
plant are operating as intended by running a series of prescribed system checks.  
The reactors in a typical nuclear power plant generate heat (by a fission reaction) 
that is removed by circulating a coolant around it; the process is also used to convert the 
generated heat into electrical power. In the simplest form, a conventional coolant 
circulation system consists of a pump and a series of flow regulating valves. Any 
reduction or a complete loss of coolant flow may be due to an actual fault in the pumps 
used in the coolant circulation system (for instance, if the pump is unable to operate at its 
rated volumetric output due to a damaged bearing or lubrication system [Duran, 2003]). 
In other cases, the reduction may be due to a control system action triggered by a 
false alarm from the flow sensors that are used to monitor and determine the valve 
positions to control the flow (for instance, fouling of the sensing element may occur due 




may result in overheating of the core rods. This can not only damage the core of the 
reactor but is also considered one of the potential modes of complete failure for a nuclear 
reactor. Hence, it is necessary to ensure proper functioning of the coolant circulation 
system before the plant generation capacity can be ramped up.  
Ensuring a steady flow of 
coolant is not only crucial for safety but 
also for efficient operation as the coolant 
flow rate is used in thermal power 
calculations that determine the per unit 
cost of energy [Gross et. al, 1997]
8
. To 
avoid such occurrences, every power 
plant is outfitted with a number of 
emergency systems, both passive 
(inherently built into the reactor design) 
as well as multiple active safety systems 
(representing multiple levels of 
redundancy).  
However, in addition to adding 
to the overall cost, the back-up systems 
are themselves subject to some of the same issues facing the primary coolant circulation 
system. With any unanticipated deviations in the readings from the monitoring sensors, it 
is necessary to determine whether there is an actual issue with one of the circulation 
system components or if they are the result of fouled sensors. By utilizing the different 
sensors already incorporated into the primary and the back-up circulation systems it may 
be possible to avoid false alarms and enable condition based maintenance of any 
degrading components and thereby avoid any unforeseen system shutdowns. This 
approach is also emphasized by [Kang and Golay, 1999] who stress the need for an 
advisory system geared towards ensuring operational availability, in addition to safety. 
                                                 
8 [Gross et. al 1997] estimate that 2%  power derating  due to reduction in flow rate may cost as much as 
$7.3 $M  per  year,  in lost revenue for an typical power plant  
 
[USNRC, 2010] 





Consider a simplified situation where the flow to the reactor core and hence the 
core temperature is influenced only by the operation of the pump and the flow valves 
(Figure 6-3). It is assumed here that the performance of the pump in terms of its 
operational speed is 
determined solely based on 
the condition of its bearings. 
The volumetric output from 
the pump is determined by its 
operating speed and the 
amount of coolant flowing 
into the pump, controlled by a 
valve based on signals from a 
flow sensor. The output of the 
pump is similarly controlled 
by another valve that uses a 
second flow sensor. The total amount of coolant that flows around the reactor core, and 
hence its resultant temperature is then determined by the pump output. The Bayesian 
network for this system is shown in Figure 6-49.  
Suppose that a temperature sensor (BT) is used to evaluate the lubricant viscosity 
in order to assess the condition of the bearings in the pump10. In addition, a speed sensor 
(S) and an acoustic noise sensor (N) are also used to monitor the condition of the pump. 
The flow to the pump and the pump output are controlled by two valves (FS1 and FS2). 
The pump output is measured by the sensor PO. The core temperature is monitored by 
another temperature sensor (CT).   
                                                 
9 Similar approaches,  some with more comprehensive Bayesian networks spanning more subsystems in a 
power plant have also been proposed by [Heo, et. al., 2005], [Duran, 2003 ], [Kang and Golay, 1999], etc. 
However, in each case the goal was to create a knowledge base for fault diagnosis purposes rather than for 
fault detection and isolation (i.e. there was no distinction between sensor faults and system faults) 
10 Any issue in the bearing rolling elements due to pitting or misalignment creates additional friction which 
leads to higher temperatures. This changes the lubricant quality (reduced viscosity) and makes film 
formation more difficult. This, in turn, sets up a cycle of higher friction and further temperature rise. The 
temperature rise also affects bearing clearances [Kang and Tesar, 2004] 
 
B T = Bearing temperature 
A   = Accelerometer (vibration) 
N   = Acoustic noise 
S    = Pump operating speed 
PO = Volumetric pump output 
CT  = Reactor core temperature 
FS1, FS2 = Flow sensors 
Figure 6-4: Representative Bayesian Network for a 











Table 6-6 shows one possible instantiation table that may be generated for this 
network. If at the end of a series of fault detection and isolation cycles that are executed 
during the start-up process, all the sensors and processes represented in the validation 
table above are operating normally, then the WS and WP belief values would attain a value 
of 1 (Table 6-7) (Section 5.4.2.3). 
Table 6-6: Example of an Instantiation Table (for Figure 6-3) 













NI NoI       PoI       
NI  NoI      PoI PoI      
NI   NoI     PoI   PoI    
NI      NoI  PoI  PoI     
NI       NoI PoI  PoI   PoI  
 NI NoI       PoI      
 NI  NoI        PoI    
 NI     NoI    PoI     
 NI      NoI   PoI   PoI  
    NI  NoI      PoI   
    NI NI  NoI     PoI PoI PoI 
     NI NI NoI      PoI PoI 
Table 6-7: WS and WP Values with No Sensor/Process Faults (for Figure 6-3) 
BT S A N FS1 FS2 PO CT 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
BT->S S->A S->PO S->N FS1->PO PO->CT FS2->CT 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
In this situation, the decision maker has complete confidence to proceed with the 
remainder of the start-up procedure for the plant since all the critical components have 
been determined to be operating normally. Now consider a situation where the WS and WP 
belief values for the sensors and processes obtained are as follows: 
Table 6-8: WS and WP Values with a Sensor Fault (for Figure 6-3) 
BT S A N FS1 FS2 PO CT 
0.800 0.000 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000 0.75 0.75 
 
BT->S S->A S->PO S->N FS1->PO PO->CT FS2->CT 




These values indicate a definite fault in the pump speed sensor (as indicated by 
WS =0). But since the other WS and WP belief values are higher, the decision maker may 
now use the confirmed knowledge that the speed sensor is indeed faulty and may decide 
to replace/fix it (if it can be done relatively quickly) or may choose to continue operating 
with the faulty sensor if it is not deemed to be critical at that moment, before proceeding 
with the remainder of the power plant start up procedure. If the decision maker decides to 
take the faulty sensor out of service, then the pump speed may still be estimated using the 
other sensors (BT, A, N as long as they are determined to be non-faulty) by using their 
values as evidence in inferencing algorithms11
.
  
Table 6-9: WS and WP Values with a Process Fault (for Figure 6-3) 
BT S A N FS1 FS2 PO CT 
0.600 0.600 1.000 1.000 0.500 1.000 0.500 0.500 
 
BT->S S->A S->PO S->N FS1->PO PO->CT FS2->CT 
0.600 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 0.500 1.000 
 
Now consider the situation where the operator notices a drop in the coolant flow 
and a slightly higher core temperature than expected. The challenge then would be to 
determine if the corresponding CT and PO sensors are faulty or if there is some other 
problem that is causing the variation in the readings. Suppose the WS and WP belief 
values for the sensors and processes obtained are as shown in Table 6-9 .A value of zero 
for the S->PO process in the above case indicates that for a given operating speed, the 
pump is unable to produce the desired output (for instance, due to an internal blockage) 
but based on the valve positions FS1 and FS2 and the actually available output PO, the 
core temperature CT is what it is supposed to be based on the relationships encoded in the 
network. In this set of results, however, there is a clear indication to the system operator 
to immediately halt the operation and rectify any issues with the pump before proceeding, 
in order to avoid more serious consequences once the plant is operating at its full 
capacity. 
                                                 
11As explained in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.4), the uncertainty in the inferred values of S would depend on the 
quality of the test data/performance maps that are used to create the conditional probability tables 




6.5. HIGH COST OF SYSTEM FAILURE 
Energy production from renewable sources has gained greater traction over the 
past decades, to eliminate emissions that arise from other methods using hydrocarbons. 
Wind energy has been proven to be one of the more 
successful and commercially viable alternatives. With 
longer, lighter, efficient and aerodynamic blades, better 
structural designs, etc. the output from wind turbines has 
been increasing constantly. Large turbines (producing 
energy of the order of MW) are usually installed in large 
groups in offshore locations or other remote locations to 
harness the wind. These wind farms represent a high 
value investment (with the cost for each unit running 
into hundreds of thousands of dollars). Figure 6-5 shows 
the schematic for a typical horizontal axis turbine. The 
pitch and yaw of the rotor blades are continuously tuned 
by computers to best align them with the wind direction 
and control the power generated [White et. al., 2009]. The blades are attached to a hub on 
the input shaft of the gearbox which amplifies the blade rotation speed to the speed 
required by the generator (from ~25-60 rpm/high torque to 1000-1800 rpm/low torque) 
[Rensselar, 2010]).  
The different components of a turbine i.e. rotor blades, gearbox, generator, 
bearings, nacelle, the support column, etc. are all exposed to extreme environmental 
conditions. They are subject to severe temperature gradient changes, inclement weather, 
wind loads, icing, etc. Such exposure affects the life of all these components. Hence, 
despite all the advancements in design and manufacturing, reliability is still a critical 
issue for wind turbines, especially for all the rotational components of the system. These 
components operate under drastically varying dynamic loads that may result in different 
modes of failure in each of them [Hameed, et. al., 2009]. Minor faults (for instance, 
incipient wear in gear teeth, overheating of generator windings, etc.) that remain 
undetected may lead to faults in other sub-systems and eventually cause a catastrophic 
 












failure of the whole turbine. [Rolfes, et. al., 2007] estimate that wind turbines may sustain 
such serious unforeseen damage up to five times a year.  
The relative inaccessibility of these systems implies that regular inspection by 
experts to detect any faults or frequent maintenance is tricky to implement. With an 
unforeseen breakdown of any turbine component, the cost of repair may not only be 
prohibitively expensive (in terms of actual cost of parts as well as logistics required to 
carry out the repairs), but can also cause other significant financial losses in terms of lost 
capacity for power generation during the downtime. Hence there is a need for 
comprehensive remote condition monitoring that can detect the first signs of any faults 
that may develop in the turbine components. [Hameed, et. al., 2009] emphasize that 
proactive condition-based maintenance (CBM) can be more beneficial than any 
corrective maintenance. With CBM, the replacement of parts which are still functional 
may be avoided during scheduled maintenance and the time period between successive 
inspections may also be increased; thereby minimizing overall life-cycle costs12.  
For both effective control and CBM, a suite of sensors are needed as described by 
[Hameed, et. al., 2009], [Odgaard, et. al., 2009], [Wei, et. al., 2009], [Rolfes, et. al., 
2007], etc. The pitch angle of the rotor blades and the position/speed of the 
gear/generator shafts, etc. are measured using absolute position sensors. The vibrations 
induced in the nacelle by rotary components may be measured with accelerometers. 
Acoustic noise sensors may be used to measure windage noise generated by the same 
components. Temperature sensors may be used to assess lubricant quality (ensure that the 
existing temperature allows the sufficient lubricant viscosity), monitoring the generator 
windings (for hot spots), etc. The wind speed, load acting rotor blades, their resulting 
deformation, etc. may be monitored using fiber optic sensors, acoustic emission sensors, 
strain gages, accelerometers, inertial/ angular rate sensors etc. Current and voltage 
                                                 
12[Hameed, et. al., 2009] provide an inclusive review of a variety of methods (observer-based, expert 
systems, empirical methods, etc.) and their application to various parts of a turbine (rotor blades, gearbox, 
bearings, lubricating system, generator, etc.) for both condition monitoring and fault detection. 
[Rothenhagen and Fuchs, 2008] present a model-based approach to fault tolerant control of generators 
under sensor failures (using observers for current/ voltage). [Wei, et. al. 2009] also present an observer 




sensors may be used to monitor the electrical output from the turbine and the power 
electronics associated with the unit. A torque sensor may be used to control the 
generator/converter torque.  
However, one or more faulty sensors may result in a false alarm from the CBM 
algorithms; either calling for expensive and unscheduled maintenance or failing to detect 
the occurrence of an actual fault in a turbine component. If undue variations are observed 
in any of the sensor readings, and if it can be attributed to the occurrence of a specific 
sensor or process (system) fault with some certainty, the supervisor can decide if a 
maintenance operation is immediately needed to avoid a turbine failure or if the available 
resources in the sensor-rich environment can be reconfigured for continued operation. 
This can be achieved through the SPFDI algorithm as discussed below. 
  The cyclic wind loads on the rotor blades induces vibrations and oscillations in all 
the components. The resultant cyclic stresses may not only cause cracks to develop in the 
rotor hub/blades due to fatigue [White, et. al., 2009] but can also affect the gearbox. A 
large portion of wind turbines‟ downtime can be attributed to failed gearboxes 
[Rennselar, 2010] which represent a significant portion of the cost of parts as well as the 
operating cost of a turbine. [Musial, et. al, 2007] state that a bulk of wind turbine gearbox 
failures start off as bearing failures rather than the gear teeth failures. As the blades rotate 
and pivot, the resulting gyroscopic precession produces tremendous forces that can cause 
spalling of the rotor shaft bearings and result in cracked bearing races [Drewry and 
Georgiou, 2007]. The debris from the cracked races, in turn, may cause abrasion/cracks 
of other components like the gear teeth, shaft, etc., resulting in eventual failure of the 
whole gearbox. In addition, inadequate lubricant film formation (due to changes in 
viscosity characteristics at elevated temperatures or squeezing out of the lubricant due 
excessive bearing loads caused by strong winds) may also contribute to bearing damage.  
Figure 6-6 shows an example of a Bayesian network (based on causal 
relationships) that can be developed for a wind turbine gearbox by the domain expert (the 
variable represented by each node in the network is measurable using an appropriate 




the wind load on the rotor (RL). 
Taking into account the gear 
ratio, the gearbox output speed 
(GS) can be calculated. Assume 
that the vibration (GV), 
temperature (GT) and acoustic 
noise (GN) characteristics of the 
gearbox are monitored for CBM 
purposes. Table 6-10 shows a 
possible instantiation table that 
may be generated for this 
network (Section 5.4). If during 
regular operation of the turbine, all the sensors and processes represented in the network 
are operating correctly, the respective WS and WP belief values would attain a value of 1 
as shown in Table 6-11 (starting with initial values of 0.5, (Section 5.4.2)). The belief 
values in Table 6-11 indicate that all the components of the gearbox, including the 
sensors are operating correctly. The signs of bearing damage are typically manifested in 
the form of excessive ripples in the gearbox output/generator operating speed13
. 
Table 6-10: Example of an Instantiation Table (for Figure 6-6) 
BP RL RS GS GV GT GN BP->RS RL->RS RS->GS GS->GV GS->GT GS->GN 
NI NI NoI     PoI PoI     
NI NI  NoI    PoI PoI PoI    
NI NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI PoI   
NI NI    NoI  PoI PoI PoI  PoI  
NI NI     NoI PoI PoI PoI   PoI 
  NI NoI      PoI    
  NI  NoI     PoI PoI   
  NI   NoI    PoI  PoI  
  NI    NoI   PoI   PoI 
   NI NoI      PoI   
   NI  NoI      PoI  
   NI   NoI      PoI 
                                                 
13 As well as elevated levels of vibration, acoustic noise, and temperature 
 
BP = Blade pitch angle 
RL = Wind load acting on the 
rotor 
RS = Rotor speed 
= Gearbox input speed 
GS  = Gearbox output speed 
= Generator operating speed 
GV = Gearbox vibration 
amplitude 
GT = Gearbox temperature 
GN = Acoustic noise generated 
by the gearbox 
Figure 6-6: Representative Bayesian Network for a 









Table 6-11: WS and WP Values with No Sensor/Process Faults (for Figure 6-6) 
BP RL RS GS GV GT GN BP->RS RL->RS RS->GS GS->GV GS->GT GS->GN 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
If it is observed that the gear speed readings vary a lot from a steady speed 
required for efficient generator operation, the decision maker needs to decide if the 
variation is due to a faulty gear speed sensor or if it is due to an incipient fault in one of 
the gearbox bearings. Suppose the WS and WP belief values obtained from the SPFDI 
algorithm are as follows: 
Table 6-12: WS and WP Values with a Sensor Fault (for Figure 6-6) 
BP RL RS GS GV GT GN BP->RS RL->RS RS->GS GS->GV GS->GT GS->GN 
0.800 0.800 0.800 0.000 0.667 0.667 0.667 0.8 0.8 0.75 0.667 0.667 0.667 
 
If the values shown above are obtained after multiple iterations of the SPFDI algorithm, 
then the decision maker can be assured of the fact that the ripples in the gearbox output 
speed are a result of a faulty speed sensor (as indicated by WGS = 0). In this case, the 
decision maker may decide to hold off on repairing or replacing the sensor until the next 
scheduled maintenance operation if it is known (based on experience or other knowledge) 
that the faulty sensor does not hamper the operation of the turbine otherwise. The higher 
belief values for all the other sensors and processes in the system, also indicates that any 
of the other sensors may be used to infer the gearbox output speed if necessary. 
Now, consider a situation, where under a known set of operating conditions14, the 
turbine supervisor not only notices ripples in the gearbox output speed but also unusual 
readings from the accelerometer, temperature and acoustic noise sensors.  Suppose, the 
WS and WP belief values obtained in this case are as shown in Table 6-13. It can seen 
from the above values that the WP value for the RS->GS process attains a value of zero 
thereby indicating a potential fault in the process of speed amplification in the gearbox 
(which is most likely due to an incipient bearing fault as described earlier).  
                                                 
14 Where wind load, indicated by the corresponding sensor, is as per the value that could be expected under 





Table 6-13: WS and WP Values with a Process Fault (for Figure 6-6) 
BP RL RS GS GV GT GN BP->RS RL->RS RS->GS GS->GV GS->GT GS->GN 
0.200 0.200 0.200 0.600 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.200 0.200 0.000 0.400 0.400 0.400 
 
Subsequent iterations of the SPFDI algorithm can help confirm this fact and also 
provide assurance that the deviations in the values of multiple sensors are not indicative 
of multiple sensor faults (as indicated by their higher belief values). In this case, based on 
other factors like the pre-determined safety thresholds on actual amplitude of vibrations, 
acoustic noise temperature rise, etc. the decision-maker may decide to temporarily shut 
down the turbine to carry out an emergency inspection and perform the necessary repairs 
to avoid the risk of losing the whole turbine. 
6.6. PERFORMANCE MAXIMIZATION 
Soldiers are often engaged in harsh and long duration combat missions or rigorous 
non-combat training conditions where they are required to sustain high levels of 
performance15 under widely varying conditions. The demands imposed on them in such 
situations often approach or exceed the limits of their physical and mental capabilities. 
The availability of sophisticated equipment notwithstanding, the success or failure of any 
mission is largely dictated by the soldiers‘ ability to carry out the required duties. The 
goal is thus to maximize the performance of each soldier as a fundamental element 
critical to the effectiveness of the larger platoon as well as to the success of the missions 
in which they are deployed.  
The operational performance of warfighters in both combat and training 
conditions is influenced by a range of factors including (but not limited to) their prior 
conditioning, inherent cognitive and physical abilities, terrain, environmental factors 
(heat, rain/snow, altitude, etc.), command tactics, resting condition and nutrition, 
etc.[Valk and Veenstra, 2009]. Of these, the prime factors of interest for commanders are 
the physiological and cognitive capabilities of their troops.  
                                                 
15 Retain continuous situational awareness and vigilance, overcome sleep/nutrition deprivation, perform 
physically challenging tasks in extreme heat or cold conditions, make quick decisions under threat, carry 




Each soldier represents a highly trained, high-valued asset with an array of 
physical and cognitive skills acquired through years of training (representing the 
resources at the disposal of that individual). The commanders need to be able to 
accurately estimate the exact capabilities for each soldier in order to judge their ability to 
perform optimally under stressful combat or training conditions. If the commander can 
estimate accurately that specific abilities of a soldier are not up to the mark to achieve the 
desired proficiency for some task, then the commander can suggest a suitable 
‗reconfiguration‘ of the soldier‘s resources to maximize the soldier‘s performance for that 
task. Alternatively, such evaluation may also be used by commanders to decide how the 
soldiers in a platoon may be allocated to different combat functions based on their extant 
capability or to decide if certain individuals could be pushed harder during training.  
To assess a soldier‘s physiological or cognitive condition prior to a mission or 
training exercise, commanders have typically relied on their experience and available 
physical cues (obvious signs of injury, fatigue, dehydration, sleep deprivation, analysis of 
gait, slurred speech, dilation of pupils, etc.). There are many benefits that both the 
commanders and the soldiers themselves may be able to derive from these assessments 
(since they provide explicit and implicit signs of any incipient deterioration in the 
soldiers‘ performance) such as reduced risk of overuse injury, early detection of stress, 
exhaustion, detecting abnormal changes in body core temperature or glycemic levels, etc. 
[Friedl, 2007].  
However, with subjective evaluations, despite a commander‘s extensive 
experience there is always the potential for a wrong assessment (or purposeful 
misrepresentation) to occur, especially if some of the available physical cues are 
conflicting16. In some cases, by the time any visible symptoms for an issue that may 
affect the soldier‘s performance (say, dehydration or fatigue) are observed, it may already 
be too late and medical help may be required. This may not only put an individual soldier 
at risk but also compromise the effectiveness of the platoon. Also, once a mission or 
training exercise is underway, there is often little opportunity to reassess in detail the 
                                                 
16 It is entirely possible for the soldier to be unaware of an incipient critical condition, or if the soldier 




soldiers‘ condition and evaluate whether their performance capability has deteriorated in 
any manner.  
In order to address these shortcomings, there has been an increasing emphasis on 
real-time monitoring of soldiers‘ cognitive and physical abilities using an array of 
unobtrusive and noninvasive sensors [Tesar, 2010][Freund, B., 2008][Friedl, 2007]. 
Through continuous real-time monitoring of various physiological parameters, valuable 
data can be obtained as to how each individual responds during stressful and long 
duration operations. Such data may help the commander determine if a soldier is 
suffering from heat exhaustion or if a soldier is prone to accidents or errors due to sleep 
deprivation, etc. Since medical resources are limited in combat situations, an added 
benefit offered by such an approach is that it also may allow medics to monitor the vital 
signs of soldiers remotely.  
The data may be integrated with soldier performance prediction models/maps 
[McFarland and Tesar, 2010] to aid the commanders‘ strategy and decision-making on 
how to best utilize and maximize an individual soldier‘s performance capabilities, or how 
quickly any performance degradation may be detected for a particular soldier in future 
missions (Figure 6-7). It may also assist in other logistical aspects of mission-planning or 
training such as determining the needs for each soldier (nutrition, hydration, sleep, etc.) 
to enable them to function effectively in different environments or customize the training 
for individuals to address specific shortcomings in their skills and physical ability. 
The concept of using wearable sensors has been implemented in monitoring of 
vital signs of patients in hospitals (to provide warnings when the physiological signals 
vary significantly beyond the normal acceptable range) [Jafari., et. al., 2005], use of 
heart-rate monitors, pedometers etc. by athletes during training, etc. Equipping a soldier 
with multiple sensors and continuous monitoring to prevent a soldier ‗system‘ 
degradation (or complete collapse in the extreme case) is similar to CBM strategies 
adopted for military vehicles to allow them to function at optimum performance levels 
for long durations with nominal maintenance [Friedl and Allan, 2004].  




specific locations into a garment worn by 
the soldier (helmet-mounted, wrist-worn, 
and harness configurations are also 
possible), in addition to miniaturized 
batteries, data acquisition and signal 
processing electronics, radio transceivers, 
etc. Sensor data may be transmitted 
wirelessly either to field commanders or to 
commanders located remotely, who can 
monitor these parameters continuously and 
correlate them to assess the overall health 
and performance capability of the soldier.  
A number of such sensor suites 
have been proposed/ developed by R&D 
establishments as well as commercial 
suppliers. These include systems as 
suggested in [Tesar, 2010 (3)], the 
Warfighter Physiological Status Monitor 







NA, 2010], LifeGuard [Mundt, et. al. 
2005], MIThril[Sung, et.al., 2004], the 
Georgia Tech Smart Shirt [Gopalsamy, 
et.al.,1999], etc.  
The typical parameters monitored 
using such systems include the heart rate, 
blood pressure, galvanic skin response, 
body core temperature, skin temperature, body position/posture, blink rate, etc. The 
 
[Tesar, 2010 (3)] 
Figure 6-7: Conceptual Performance Map 
for Operational Soldier 
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sensors that are typically integrated into such systems include heart rate monitors 
(Electrocardiogram (ECG)), blood pressure, temperature sensors (in the form of pills 
swallowed by soldiers), accelerometers, actigraph sensors (for sleep monitoring), 
Electromyogram (EMG, for muscle activity), Electroencephalogram (EEG, for neural 
activity), acoustic sensors for voice stress analysis, pulse oximeters (for blood oxygen 
saturation levels), etc. [Tesar, 2010 (3)], [Pandian, et.al, 2008][Mundst, et. al, 
2005][Friedl and Allan, 2004] 
Decision making regarding warfighter readiness represents a unique scenario as it 
involves inputs from multiple physical sensors as well as humans (the soldier and the 
commander). In this case, the subjective/qualitative judgment provided by the soldier or 
the commander may be construed as a sensor reading for an abstract parameter (which 
cannot be directly measured) such as the prevailing threat level in a combat situation. 
Thus the soldier and the commander may themselves be considered as „abstract‟ higher-
level sensors as they represent the only sources through which knowledge of abstract 
parameters can be obtained.  
A wrong assessment of performance capability due to one or more faulty sensors 
(physical or abstract) may result in sub-par soldier performance. For instance, if the heart 
rate sensor indicates a very high reading, the soldier may be required to cease all activity 
until the value falls to an acceptable range but the existing combat situation may demand 
that the soldier execute a strenuous maneuver. The challenge facing the commander 
before making a call as to whether or not to instruct the soldier to proceed with the 
maneuver is to determine if the high reading is due to a faulty heart rate sensor or due to 
excessive stress faced by the soldier due to other factors. The following section now 
describes an example of how the SPFDI algorithm (Section 5.4) may be used to 




                                                 
17 [Borsotto, et. al., 2004]present another application of Bayesian networks for health assessment of a 
soldier based on the data obtained from a suite of physiological sensors worn by the soldier. The objective 
of their work was primarily to determine the Presence, Absence or Unknown (PAU) state of life-signs and 
communicate it to the medics who can then prioritize the urgency of medical care needed or recommend an 




Suppose the task performance (TP) level of soldiers for some task (say, shooting) 
is evaluated by a field 
commander as {good, 
acceptable, bad} based on 
their cognitive ability 
(CA), as perceived by the 
commander (say, on a 
scale of 1 to10, from low 
to high). The prevailing 
cognitive ability of a 
soldier is in turn, dictated 
by a host of internal and 
external factors. The threat 
level (TL) perceived by the soldier and the rest condition (RC) or sleep deprivation have a 
significant effect on the brain neural activity indicated by the Electroencephalography 
measure (EEG). A high perceived TL and low RC (signifcant sleep deprivation) may lead 
to a reduced level of EEG and hence CA. In addition, the combat load (total weight of the 
equipment) carried by the soldier (SL) and the ambient temperature (AT) play a 
significant role in regulating the soldier‟s core body temperature which in turn influences 
the soldier‟s CA. For instance, elevated values of SL and AT, may contribute to a higher 
value of BT and again lead to reduced level of CA. Figure 6-8 shows the representative 
causal Bayesian network that may be developed by a domain expert (for instance, based 
on the work of [McFarland and Tesar, 2010]). Table 6-14 shows an example of an 
instantiation table for this network. 
Consider a situation where the soldier is engaged in a combat and is under heavy 
fire. The commander may be unable to visually observe a soldier and the only 
information available to the commander is the data from the soldier‟s sensor suite and 
communication with the soldier. Based on the communication, the commander may judge 
the soldier‟s CA and TP to be in the favorable range. If in this case, all the other sensors 
 
TL   = Current threat level  
RC   = Rest condition  
SL   =  Soldier combat load 
AT   = Ambient temperature 
EEG = Electroencephalography 
measure 
BT   = Core body temperature 
CA   = Soldier‟s cognitive 
ability 
TP    = Task performance 
Figure 6-9: Representative Bayesian Network for 










and processes represented in Figure 6-9 are operating correctly, then starting from a value 
of 0.5, all the WS and WP belief values would attain a value of 1 when the SPDFI 
algorithm is executed based on the instantiation table. 
Table 6-14: Example of an Instantiation Table (for Figure 6-9) 















NI NI   NoI    PoI PoI      
NI NI     NoI  PoI PoI   PoI   
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      NI NoI       PoI 
Table 6-15: WS and WP Values with No Sensor/Process Faults (for Figure 6-9) 
TL RC SL AT EEG BT CA TP 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
TL->EEG RC->EEG SL->BT AT->BT EEG->CA BT->CA CA->TP 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
In this case, though the values for variables such as TL, SL, EEG, BT may be high, 
the commander can be assured that the soldier still maintains good cognitive ability to 
retain full situational awareness and provide maximum performance in the combat 
situation (increased chances of survivability). Now consider a combat scenario where the 
soldier confirms a high threat level TL and the RC sensor reading confirms that the 
soldier is well rested, but the commander notices that the readings received from the EEG 
sensor are unusually out of range, indicating neural activity not commensurate with the 
TL and RC values. This may potentially indicate a reduced cognitive awareness (CA), 
which may in turn make the soldier more vulnerable to enemy fire. However, based on 
communication with the soldier, the commander may judge the values of CA and TP to 




capability. Suppose the WS and WP belief values in this case are as follows: 
Table 6-16: WS and WP Values with a Sensor Fault (for Figure 6-9) 
TL RC SL AT EEG BT CA TP 
0.800 0.800 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.3333 0.800 0.800 
 
TL->EEG RC->EEG SL->BT AT->BT EEG->CA BT->CA CA->TP 
0.800 0.800 1.000 1.000 0.666 0.666 0.800 
 
A WS belief value of 0.000 for the EEG sensor indicates that there may be a 
potential fault in it but higher belief values for all the other sensors and processes 
indicates that everything else is operating correctly. If the same pattern is observed after 
multiple iterations of the SPFDI algorithm, then the commander can be assured that the 
soldier still retains good cognitive awareness and the unusual EEG readings could be the 
result of a faulty electrode in the sensor and not because of abnormal neural activity.  
Now under a similar combat condition, suppose the commander perceives that the 
CA for the soldier is low and the TP value is not up to the mark either. However, the 
readings from all the sensors indicate normal values and the TL as perceived by the 
soldier is also not significant, implying a high value of CA and hence normal/acceptable 
values of TP. Once again, the commander needs to be able resolve the contradiction 
whether the subjective values assessed by the commander are flawed or if there is more 
than one faulty sensor in the suite worn by the soldier (including a wrong TL assessment 
by the soldier). Suppose the WS and WP belief values from the SPFDI algorithm in this 
case are as follows: 
Table 6-17: WS and WP Values with a Process Fault (for Figure 6-9) 
TL RC SL AT EEG BT CA TP 
0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.333 0.333 0.200 0.200 
 
TL->EEG RC->EEG SL->BT AT->BT EEG->CA BT->CA CA->TP 
0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.000 0.333 0.400 
 
Based on the WS and WP belief values in the table above, it is seen that a process 




iterations of the SPFDI algorithm). This indicates that the mapping between the neural 
activity as indicated by the EEG to the cognitive awareness of the soldier has changed 
significantly. The reduced cognitive awareness could be the effect of post-traumatic 
stress from an earlier mission that remained undetected in the initial assessment of the 
soldier capability or the commander was unaware of before the soldier was deployed on 
the mission. With this knowledge, the commander may decide to re-assign the soldier to a 
different role in order to protect both the individual soldier as well as others working 
alongside, since a reduced CA may make the soldier more liable to commit errors that 
may compromise the success of the mission. Since the soldier possesses a variety of 
skills, the commander may re-assign the soldier to a task where the prevailing value of 
CA for the soldier may be acceptable, in lieu of the soldier‟s other capabilities, to produce 
the desired level of TP. 
6.7. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The goal of this chapter was to examine the applicability of the SPFDI algorithm 
developed in Chapter 5 in a variety of application domains, in order to demonstrate its 
usefulness in different scenarios. Four broad application classes, each consisting of a 
complex system equipped with multiple sensors for tracking different variables of interest 
in that domain, were considered for this purpose: a) applications where human safety is 
of paramount importance, b) applications where availability of the monitored system is 
the dominant requirement, c) applications with a high cost of system failure, and d) 
applications where performance maximization is the principal objective. The common 
thread linking all these application classes is the involvement of a human operator in the 
operational decision making loop. As observed in the different sections of this chapter, 
the function of the belief values obtained using the SPFDI algorithm is to aid the human 
operator in making the appropriate operational decision choices in each of the 
applications. Three representative examples were presented for each class of applications, 
with an in-depth description (development of a representative Bayesian network, creating 
an instantiation table, demonstration of a sensor fault and a process fault) of a selected 
example in each class, as summarized in Table 6-18. 
 
 279 
Table 6-18: Chapter Summary 









Automobile brake-by-wire system 
 
  
PP =Pedal position sensor 
PF = Pedal force sensor 
WS = Wheel speed sensor 
MI = Motor current sensor 
MP = Motor rotor position sensor 
SP =  Ball screw/brake caliper linear 
position sensor 













B T = Bearing temperature 
A   = Accelerometer (vibration) 
N   = Acoustic noise 
S    = Pump operating speed 
PO = Volumetric pump output 
CT  = Reactor core temperature 







































Table 6-18: Chapter Summary 
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BP = Blade pitch angle 
RL = Wind load acting on the rotor 
RS = Rotor speed 
 = Gearbox input speed 
GS = Gearbox output speed 
= Generator operating speed 
GV = Gearbox vibration amplitude 
GT = Gearbox temperature 












TL   = Current threat level  
RC   = Rest condition  
SL   =  Soldier combat load 
AT   = Ambient temperature 
EEG = Electroencephalography 
measure 
BT   = Core body temperature 
CA   = Soldier‟s cognitive ability 






































Chapter 7. Summary and Recommendations 
This goal of this chapter is to provide an executive summary of the research work 
presented in Chapters 1 to 6. Sections 7.1-7.5 of this chapter review the research 
objectives, details of the research methodology, the original contributions and results 
from this work. Based on the understanding gained from the research findings, Section 
7.6 of the chapter outlines some directions to be pursued for future research. 
7.1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The University of Texas Robotics Research Group (UT-RRG) has helped create 
the foundation for an open architecture of intelligent, reconfigurable systems with the 
intelligent Electro-Mechanical Actuator (EMA) at its core. An intelligent EMA has 
complete awareness of its operational capability at all times and the ability to reconfigure 
its available resources optimally to adapt to varying operational duty cycles or task 
requirements. The essential 
requirement of complete operational 
awareness is met through two key 
sources of information regarding the 
EMA capabilities. The primary 
source is comprehensive parametric 
models of the performance capability 
of a new (as-built) EMA over the 
complete range of its operating 
points, represented in the form of 
decision surfaces (performance maps 
and envelopes), used in conjunction 
with user-defined/application-specific 
performance criteria [Tesar, 2009] (Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1). The decision surfaces 
embody knowledge in a feedforward sense i.e. they represent how an EMA can be 































[Ashok and Tesar, 2007] 




range. To complete the decision cycle, this knowledge needs to be updated with reliable 
and accurate feedback information reflecting the actual existing conditions of the EMA 
(for control as well as for implementing Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) algorithms 
to track the health of the various EMA sub-components). This can be achieved by using a 
suite of multiple, in-situ sensors (Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2 and Appendix A). The 
combination of decision surfaces and real-time sensor feedback is used in a human-in-
the-loop approach to operational decision-making where decisions are made based on 
residuals between the decision surfaces and sensor-inferred values (Chapter 1, Section 
1.3). The supervisory role and operator judgment based on experiance enables more 
effective use of EMA resources in dynamic environments [Tesar, 2010 (4)]. 
   
 
Figure 7-2 : Decision making in Intelligent Electromechanical Actuators 
The quality of any human-in-the-loop decisions will only be as good as the 
information available to the decision maker. The available sensor data forms the basis for 
generating all the decision surfaces as well as in real-time evaluation of the EMA 
capabilities. The use of any erroneous data in updating the decision surfaces may result in 
corruption of these surfaces, leading to incorrect operational decisions being made by the 
operator or resulting in false alarms being raised during condition monitoring. It may also 
result in unpredictable system behavior with potentially damaging consequences. 
Accurate and dependable sensor data is thus of vital importance. 
Many factors, both internal and external affect the quality, availability and the use 


















element during operation, temperature, shock/vibrations, uncertainty introduced as a 
result of the inherent sensor physics or during the data acquisition process, partial or 
complete sensor malfunction caused due to a failure of the sensor itself or due to 
connector/wiring harness failures, etc. (Chapter 1, Section 1.4). But operational decisions 
still have to be made despite imprecise and uncertain sensor data. The objective of this 
work is therefore to develop computational tools to ensure ‗correctness‘ and usefulness of 
data and utilize information from all the sensors cohesively to provide information of 
greater value that can be used by the system operator for both control and diagnosis.  
Failure to identify an abnormal sensor or sub-system and take appropriate 
corrective action could result in expensive and unnecessary system shutdowns or, worse, 
accidents that endanger both system and personnel. Hence, some safeguard is needed to 
provide advanced warning of any form of sensor or system degradation or impending 
failure. With any unwarranted deviations in sensor readings from their expected behavior, 
the challenge is to determine if the variation indicates a change in the states of the 
monitored EMA or if it is the result of one or more malfunctioning sensors. 
The underlying assumption in many approaches used for sensor fault detection is 
that the monitored system is operating normally and the unusual readings are purely due 
to sensor faults.  However, there may be cases where the fault does not lie in the sensor 
and its atypical signal content is caused by changes in the monitored system (or any of its 
components). On the other hand, fault detection or condition based maintenance 
algorithms used at the system level, while estimating the existing condition of the system, 
make the implicit assumption that all the sensors that are monitoring the system are 
operating correctly. In such cases, using data from sensors with faults can result in 
incorrect estimates of the monitored system‘s capabilities, its estimated health or 
remaining useful life.  
The conundrum is thus to distinguish between these two distinct scenarios without 
making any assumptions regarding the condition of the sensors or the system and identify 
the precise source of abnormality in sensor readings. In order to address the above issues, 
the following research objectives were identified (Chapter 1, Section 1.5)  
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 Research Objectives: 
 Create a unified framework that can detect any system faults and sensor faults 
concurrently, independent of any assumptions regarding the health/condition of 
either the sensors or the monitored system (Chapter 5). 
 Use an empirical data-driven approach to functionally correlate the variables of 
interest in an EMA in a physically meaningful manner (Chapters 3). 
 Utilize well-defined mathematical principles to quantify, combine and propagate 
uncertainties resulting from different facets of the system operational decision 
making process, in a computationally tractable and scalable manner (Chapter 2).  
 Provide a visual representation of the relationships between the different physical 
variables to complement performance maps as well as preliminary quantitative 
indicators for the condition of different system components and sensors in order 
to enable a human-in-the-loop approach to operational decision making for 
optimal allocation of the available resources (Chapters 4 and 6). 
7.2. MODELING USING BAYESIAN NETWORKS 
To accomplish the aforementioned research goals, an inclusive model is needed to 
succinctly capture the interaction among different EMA parameters, using all the 
available measurands in a cohesive fashion. The model should allow assimilation of 
existing domain knowledge, with easy interpretability to enhance human understanding 
of the model as well as the confidence to use it during system operation. It should support 
quick evaluations (forward/inverse) and allow for easy updates when new information 
becomes available. In particular, its ability to account for uncertainty in data is important. 
Although conventional engineering analysis tends to be deterministic, in reality, every 
variable has some uncertainty associated with it; inherently introduced as a result of 
simplifying assumptions made during a modeling process as well as during measurement.  
Different methods exist to quantify uncertainties such as probability theory, fuzzy 
logic, Dempster-Shafer belief functions, etc. Each of these methods has been successfully 
used in different domains and each may be more suitable to a particular domain/objective 
than others (Chapter 2, Table 2-1). For the present work, since decision making for 
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intelligent EMAs is based on extensive empirical data (performance maps), a 
probabilistic approach has been deemed to be most suitable. This enables the system 
model to be updated regularly in dynamic environments and also encapsulates a large set 
of operating conditions in a concise manner. Both these factors are important for 
intelligent EMAs where performance maps need to be periodically updated to reflect the 
extant conditions.  
The use of Bayesian networks to model the intricate relationships among the 
variables in intelligent EMAs is proposed here. This approach is data-driven, provides an 
intuitive presentation based on physical principles and utilizes probability theory 
(Chapter 2, Section 2.3) for quantifying, combining and propagating uncertainties. It also 
provides functional redundancy for all the variables involved. The graphical nature of the 
technique provides a greater insight into the observed system behavior whereas in many 
other approaches such knowledge is not very easily accessible. The resulting model thus 
has the advantage of being easily used when humans are involved in the decision making 
process, as is the case in intelligent EMAs. The approach also complements the overall 
EMA decision-making methodology developed in [Ashok and Tesar, 2007].  
A Bayesian network is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) structure that consists of 
a set of nodes that represent discrete/continuous random variables X= {X1, X2,….Xn} 
pertinent to the domain. These nodes are connected in pairs by directed links that 
represent the probabilistic dependencies between the variables. The lack of an arc 
between two nodes explicitly represents their independence. The strength of the 
relationships and the inherent uncertainties in the relationships between the nodes is 
quantified using conditional probability distributions, encoded as Conditional Probability 
Tables (CPT) at each node. [Pearl, 1988] defines such a set of variables and a joint 
probability distribution defined over all the variables as a ‗probabilistic model‘.   
Developing a Bayesian network for a given application involves three main steps: 
 Identifying the pertinent variables to be represented as nodes along with their 
possible states that they may assume. 
 Identifying relationships between the variables and representing them graphically 
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by connecting the appropriate nodes with the links directed in a specific manner 
 Quantitatively characterize these relationships i.e. populate the CPTs for all the 
nodes in the network with the appropriate probability distributions. 
In the present work, a knowledge representation approach based on extensively 
available domain knowledge has been used to develop the qualitative structure of the 
Bayesian network (see Chapter 3, Sections 3.3.1-3.3.8). The parameterization of the 
different node CPTs is done using the same empirical data set used to generate of 
performance maps (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.3.2).  
Once the structure of the network has been finalized, the process of determining 
the updated posterior probability distributions of the nodes in the network with the 
knowledge of a subset of those nodes (by conditioning on observed values), is referred to 
as belief updating or probabilistic inferencing [Korb and Nicholson, 2004]. Essentially, 
this process allows for propagation and combination of uncertainties associated with the 
different variables. The nodes whose values are known or observed are called the 
evidence nodes. The subset formed by one or more nodes (other than the evidence nodes) 
whose posterior distribution values are calculated are referred to as query nodes.  
With simple causal chains the process of belief updating can be performed using a 
combination of the chain rule of probability and Bayes‘ theorem. However, for more 
complicated networks, various algorithms have been developed by researchers for belief 
updating. These algorithms can be broadly classified into two categories as exact and 
approximate inferencing algorithms. The choice of an appropriate algorithm is 
determined by factors like the structure of the Bayesian network (singly or multiply 
connected), available computational resources, timing constraints, etc. Three popular 
algorithms available in the literature were explored in detail in this work. All three 
algorithms have also been implemented as part of the AMOS C++ library (Appendix C). 
The first algorithm studied was the Pearl‘s belief propagation algorithm [Pearl, 
1988], an exact inferencing algorithm to propagate beliefs in polytree networks (Chapter 
2, Section 2.5.2.1.1). The algorithm makes use of the local independencies between the 
nodes as embodied by the structure of the network and Bayes‘ theorem to determine the 
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posterior probability distributions of the query nodes. To do this, two types of parameters, 
  and   values, are used in the conjunction with the CPT of a node to update its belief. 
The   and   values are calculated based on two types of messages sent and received by 
every node in the network. The   messages are sent from a child node to all its parent 
nodes. The   messages are sent from a parent node to all its child nodes.  
In addition, two stochastic simulation algorithms for approximate inferencing 
were also studied, viz. the Logic Sampling algorithm (Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2.2.1) and 
the Likelihood Weighting algorithm (Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2.2.2).  In these algorithms, 
inferencing is accomplished by sampling data for a number of trials based on the 
conditional probability distributions of the different nodes. The generated samples are 
used to determine the posterior probability distributions of the nodes of interest. As more 
and more cases are generated, the estimated posterior distributions of the different nodes 
converge to increasingly exact distributions based on the law of large numbers (based on 
user-defined convergence criteria for an application). The main drawback of the Logic 
Sampling algorithm is that it rejects cases for which the samples generated for evidence 
nodes are inconsistent with the observed values (especially when the probability of those 
values occurring is low). This leads to slower convergence times. To mitigate this issue 
when dealing with unlikely evidence values, and to make use of every generated sample, 
the Likelihood Weighting algorithm utilizes the fractional likelihood of occurrence of the 
evidence values (called as ‗score‘) while estimating the posterior probabilities. 











Requirements of modeling technique 
 Ability to accurately and compactly represent systems with a minimum 
of simplifying assumptions  
 Incorporate existing domain knowledge (available data) 
 Intuitive to understand 
 Support forward and inverse decision-making 
 Allow incorporation/ propagation of uncertainty in system parameters 
 Fast evaluation and modification/reconstruction  
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 Graphical modeling using Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs)  
 Based on well-developed concepts of probability theory 
 Compact representation of the joint probability distribution of a group of 
random variables (discrete/continuous) 
 Explicit representation of probabilistic dependencies (nodes connected by 
directed links, characterized by conditional probability tables or CPTs) 
 Updated knowledge of values of different variables in the network based 
on a subset of observed/evidence values obtained via belief updating  
 Use of inferencing algorithms to update beliefs 
― Exact Inferencing (Pearl‟s Belief Propagation Algorithm) 
― Approximate Inferencing (Logic Sampling, Likelihood Weighting) 
7.2.1. Bayesian Network for a Switched Reluctance Motor 
For many engineering systems, researchers explore specific aspects of the system 
in great detail while not accounting for other facets that may still play an important role 
in influencing the overall system behavior. However, when taken as a combination, these 
different fragments of knowledge can be used to develop a truly comprehensive model of 
the system that may be used for effective operational decision making.  
The primary component of the testbed in the laboratory at UT-RRG used in this 
work (Appendix B) is a four phase switched reluctance motor, the design and operational 
aspects of which have been studied widely by many researchers. Highly comprehensive 
and nonlinear models dealing with individual aspects of motor operation such as torque 
generation, generation of acoustic noise and vibrations, thermal characteristics, etc. are 
readily available in the literature and are widely used for both design and simulation 
purposes but there is a distinct paucity of comprehensive models that account for all these 
aspects simultaneously. The development of a detailed Bayesian network for the testbed 
was therefore pursued in Chapter 3 as a unified tool for graphical modeling of the 
interaction between the different physical phenomena occurring in the test system.  
To develop the network in its entirety, various sub-models depicting the causal 
influences among the control parameters (supply voltage, PWM duty cycle and frequency 
for each phase, phase status and turn-on/turn-off angles), the reference parameters (phase 
resistances, relative phase angles, brake load and ambient temperature), and the 
dependent parameters (phase currents, radial and tangential flux densities, torque, speed, 
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acceleration, noise, losses, etc.) are linked together. The combined model, the different 
sub-models, and the relevant sections are shown in Table 3-1. The causal network 
provides a compact and physically relevant visual representation of the correlations 
between the variables in the system to the end-user. The uncertainty associated with each 
variable is automatically taken into account by the empirical data used to populate the 
node CPTs while inferencing algorithms help propagate and combine these uncertainties.  
Table 7-2: Bayesian Network for a Switched Reluctance Motor 




  i   = 1…n = Number of motor phase, 
DC = PWM Duty Cycle, 
FR  = PWM Frequency, 
Vs     = Supply Voltage 
Influence of 
Control Parameters 






i      = 1…n = Number of motor phase, 
Vi     = Phase Voltage,  
Ri     = Phase Resistance, 
Θph = Rotor Angle Relative to Stator, 
PS   = Phase Status (On/Off) 
Θoni , Θoffi = Phase Turn-on/off Angles 
Ii        = Phase Current 
Relation between 
Phase Voltage, 







i      = 1….n= Number of motor phases, 
Ii       = Phase current 
BR   = Magnetic flux density, radial 
BT  = Magnetic flux density, tangential 
Relation between 






i     = 1….n = Number of motor phases, 
BR   = Magnetic flux density, radial 










i     = 1….n = Number of motor phases, 
BR   = Magnetic flux density, radial 
BT  =  Magnetic flux density, tangential 
τi    = Torque produced by a single phase 
Relation between 






τ    = Total Electromagnetic Motor Torque  
α   = Angular Acceleration of Rotor 
ω  = Angular Velocity of Rotor 
θr   = Rotor Position 





























Pin     = Input Electrical Power 
Pout  = Output Mechanical Power 
Ploss = Total Power Losses 










Tamb  = Ambient Temperature 
Ploss  = Total Power Loss 
T  = Average Motor Temperature 
Relation between 






Detailed Bayesian Network Model of a Four Phase Switched Reluctance Motor Obtained by Combining the 
Smaller Sub-models (Chapter3,Section 3.2) 
7.3. CRITERIA-BASED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
In many applications it may not be feasible to either design/develop an exhaustive 
network as discussed in the previous section or utilize it during system operation. 
Numerous constraints can render such detailed networks impractical for use in 
operational decision making. These include factors that can influence: 
 The physical design of the system itself —The factors in this category include the 










































































system and its environment, the number of sensors that can be integrated without 
requiring significant design modifications to the system, the sensors that are 
absolutely critical for system operation, the type and degree of physical and/or 
functional redundancy that can be achieved using a particular set of sensors, etc. 
 The features of the Bayesian network representation of the system —This 
category encompasses factors such as the number of nodes corresponding to the 
random variables of interest, the granularity of discretization (number of states) of 
each node, the type and the degree of interconnection between nodes, the size of 
CPTs for all the nodes, nodes representing variables that are measurable using the 
available sensors, nodes whose values can only be inferred, etc. 
 The manner in which the Bayesian network is used for decision making during 
system operation— Included in this category are factors such as the nodes which 
may be set as evidence during inferencing, the condition and accuracy of sensors 
that are used to determine which node states can be set as evidence, the influence 
of different evidence nodes on different variables, the type of information that can 
be gleaned using the available network structure and evidence, etc. 
Ideally, the design of a Bayesian network representation should be carried out in 
tandem with the physical system design. The process tends to be iterative as numerous 
constraints need to be balanced concurrently. Once the design of the physical system 
(with the requisite sensors) and its representative network is complete, the next step is to 
effectively manage the information that can be obtained while the system is in operation 
(for instance prioritizing a subset of sensors to address a specific objective, decide on 
alternative sensors  to infer the value of a deteriorating sensor/s, address constraints like 
limited bandwidth/power, decide on inferencing algorithms best suited to meet the 
computational constraints, etc.) 
There is an evident need for a criteria-based resource management methodology 
that can help decide upon and best utilize the available sensing resources at any given 
time. The goal is to define and use suitable criteria that can help provide guidelines to 
both the system designer and the end-user to use a finite set of sensors, empirical 
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data/decision surfaces, etc. in concert with available computational resources and 
maximize the utility of the information that can be obtained regarding the system at any 
given time. This can provide a synergy between different sources of information as well 
as influence the availability of information in situations where data from specific sensors 
becomes partially or completely unavailable. It can also help avoid overwhelming data 
transfer, computational and memory requirements in a multi-sensor system by ensuring 
that only the truly essential data is acquired and utilized. Different design criteria 
(Chapter 4, Sections 4.3.1-4.3.10) and operational criteria (Chapter 4, Sections 4.4.1-
4.4.8) were proposed to address the objectives outlined above and are summarized in 
Table 7-3 and Table 7-4 respectively. These representative criteria are intended to 
motivate the definition of more application-specific criteria in the future. 
Table 7-3: Design Criteria (for a system and its Bayesian network representation) 






Any application environment consists of sensors that are essential for 
operation as well as additional optional sensors. The total number of 
nodes in the Bayesian network is dictated by the number of sensors 








The number of sensors used in any application is dictated by their 
form factors, cabling, etc. that satisfy the size and volume constraints 
imposed by the application. These design constraints thus play a vital 
role in determining the size of the Bayesian network by influencing 




3 Overall Costs 
The overall costs associated with sensors and peripheral equipment 
like data acquisition hardware, power supplies, etc. may influence 
which sensors are integrated into a system and hence influence the 








The relative importance of a sensor or a subset of sensors may be 
used to determine the direction and number of the links between the 
nodes. This allows the manipulation of network topology to provide 





Type of Data 
Available 
The availability of data in specific formats (for instance, due to 
experimental constraints) influences the manner in which the 
conditional independencies between variables can be represented (i.e. 
which nodes in the network may be linked as well as the direction of 





Causal relations between physical variables can be used to determine 
the node ordering, the direction of links and the level of 
interconnectedness in a Bayesian network. The use of causality can 










The number of distinct states into which each node in the network 
can be discretized is driven by application requirements. The 
granularity of discretization in turn influences the quality of results 
obtained using the network, speed of execution of inferencing 







All the sensors used in monitoring are not equally reliable (different 
susceptibility to temperature, shock/vibrations, etc.). The operational 
history for sensors may be used to direct links from nodes 
representing the most reliable sensors to ensure constant availability 








The size of CPTs grows exponentially in the number of node parents, 
degree of interlinking and the granularity of discretization of node 
states. The associated memory requirements must be considered to 
satisfy constraints on availability of resources (storage), real-time 




10 Intended Use 
Modifications such as adding additional nodes or links (or pruning 
existing nodes/links) in a network structure may be needed to satisfy 
specific requirements for the application (for example, fault detection 




Table 7-4: Operational Criteria (for a system and its Bayesian network representation) 






Depending on the accuracy of the sensor used for a specific 
measurand, the operator may choose to use the value of sensor 
reading directly or infer the value of the measurand via the 




2 Node Distance 
The uncertainty in the inferred value of a variable is influenced by 
the number of intermediate nodes/links between the evidence 
node/s and the query node. In general, the greater the separation, 







With any unforeseen variations (drift, bias, excessive noise) in the 
readings from a sensor or a subset of sensors, the system operator 
needs to be able to determine if the readings are indicative of one 








Unanticipated deviations in sensor readings may not necessarily be 
due to a faulty sensor but may be indicative of a more serious, 
potential fault in one or more of the monitored system‘s sub-
components. A preliminary assessment of system health is needed 







Different sensors may need to be used in different system 
operating regimes (to provide the value for a specific variable via 
direct measurement or by inferencing using the Bayesian network) 
in accordance with the bandwidth, sampling rates, etc. that are 








Some variables/nodes in the network may be more strongly 
correlated (or may have a direct causal influence) as compared to 
others. The strength of these relationships (quantified using the 






determine which set of nodes are more appropriate for use as 
evidence for a particular set of query variables. 
7 Type of Query 
The topology of the Bayesian network along with the conditional 
probability distributions of the different nodes represents a 
comprehensive database for a system which can be queried in 
multiple ways (probability of evidence, prior and posterior 
marginals, MAP, MPE) to obtain different types of information 







Based on the network topology, discretization of the nodes, 
available computational resources, real-time operation 
requirements, etc. the operator may decide on the appropriate 
exact or approximate inferencing algorithm to use, number of 





7.4. SENSOR AND PROCESS FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION 
Evaluating the trustworthiness of available sensor data can provide guidance in 
many operational decisions. If it can be determined that a deviation in a sensor‟s reading 
is due to some issue with the sensor, then the operator can choose to ignore the data from 
that sensor for control purposes or to update a map. On the other hand, if it can be 
determined that the deviation is due to an issue with the system or its components, it 
could serve as additional knowledge of use for the higher level CBM algorithms (e.g. 
localizing the fault to a specific component) and the sensor readings can still be used to 
update the stored maps to accurately reflect the extant system status. The situations above 
are termed as „sensor fault‟ and „process fault‟ respectively and defined as follows.  
The term ‗sensor fault‘ in the context of this work indicates disagreement between 
the ideal value that a sensor is supposed to indicate under the prevalent operating 
conditions and the measured value it actually indicates at the sampling instant under 
consideration. The output has to be tracked over multiple sampling instants to declare 
with certainty that the sensor is faulty. The link between every pair of nodes in a 
Bayesian network can be considered as a process that converts the physical parameter 
represented by the parent node to the one represented by the child node. The correlation 
between the two is quantified by the CPT of the child node. If there is simply a change in 
the operating conditions of the system, the conditional distribution for the child node 
given the value of its parents would still hold valid. But a fault in any system component 
would alter the physical relations among the variables associated with that component. In 
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other words, this would essentially render the relation encoded in the CPT of the child 
node invalid. This is termed as a ‗process fault‘.  
7.4.1. The Sensor and Process Fault Detection and Isolation (SPFDI) Algorithm 
The principal focus of this work was to use the Bayesian network framework 
developed in earlier chapters to help distinguish between sensor and process faults 
concurrently. Although the use of Bayesian networks is more widespread in the area of 
fault diagnosis, different researchers have explored its use for fault detection and 
isolation as well. Due to the limitations posed by various existing approaches (Table 
7-5), a novel algorithm termed as Sensor and Process Fault Detection Isolation (SPFDI) 
algorithm has been developed in this work and represents the most significant 
contribution of this research.  
The value for any variable deduced using the Bayesian network represents the 
value that should ideally be obtained from its corresponding sensor if there are no 
unknown problems in either the sensors or the system components that have not already 
been accounted for when the system model (decision surfaces) was last updated. On the 
other hand, the values indicated by sensors at any sampling instant indicate the extant 
system status at that instant and will be influenced by any possible issues that have 
occurred since the maps were last updated. The premise of the SPFDI algorithm is that by 
sequentially instantiating different nodes in the network (‗Nodes Instantiated‘ or NI), 
performing inferencing, and examining the resultant values of specific nodes in the 
network (‗Node of Interest‘ or NoI), it is possible to examine the validity of the sensor 
readings obtained and distinguish between sensor and process faults.  
Table 7-5: Literature Review of Existing Approaches using Bayesian Networks for 







 Realtime operation and ability to handle large number of sensors 
 Provides analytical redundancy, well-defined error rates  
Potential disadvantages: 






 Cannot robustly handle multiple sensor failures 




 Ease of implementation (continuous/discrete data, steady state/transient) 
 Unified framework for fault detection (sensor as well as system) as well as 
classification (normal, bias, precision degradation, complete failure) 
 Allows incorporation of system specific qualitative knowledge  
Potential disadvantages: 
 Explicit modeling of faults (with known effects on variables of interest) 
required to detect as well as distinguish between sensor and system faults 
 One-to-one mapping of operating modes for fault classification not realistic 





-d, et. al., 
2003] 
Potential advantages: 
 Ease of implementation (steady state/transient conditions) 
 Threshold setting, fault detection/identification index, fault classification 
 Ability to handle multiple sensor faults  
Potential disadvantages: 
 Assumes no variation in system condition (cannot detect system faults) 
 May result in large CPTs for variables that have a wide operating range 
 Thresholds determined for variables with spread out distributions (i.e. low 





-ytia, et. al., 
2003] 
Potential advantages: 
 Anytime algorithm (pre-compiled binary decision tree) 
 Ability to detect multiple sensor faults under specific conditions 
 Ability to isolate faults (via quality measures based on information theory) 
Potential disadvantages: 
 Assumes no variation in system condition (cannot detect system faults) 
 Requires two separate  networks  
 Model learned from data for specific operating conditions and may not be 








 Real-time operation (compiling Bayesian network into arithmetic circuits) 
 Proven for very large networks (hundreds of nodes) 
 Enables distinction between sensor and system faults 
Potential disadvantages: 
 Explicit modeling of faults required 





The readings from the sensors corresponding to NI are used to set specific states 
of such nodes as evidence to the network. Every node in the network is considered as a 
NoI sequentially one at a time, until all the nodes have been traversed. For each NoI, 
multiple values are estimated by considering different combinations of other nodes as NI 
and calculating its marginal posterior probability distribution. The values inferred for the 
NoI are then compared with the values indicated by their corresponding sensors to check 
if the sensors are indicating what they are supposed to under the prevalent conditions. 
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For each of the many NI and NoI, if the measured and inferred values concur (for  
the NoI), then it indicates that the system has not changed significantly from its last 
known condition. Hence, the assurance in the fact that the sensors are operating normally 
and relations among the variables (‗processes of interest‘ or PoI) remain the same as 
before increases. Conversely if these values do not match, the assurance decreases.  
By assigning a numerical measure to this level of assurance in different sensors 
and processes in the network, and incrementing or decrementing it suitably each time the 
measured and estimated values are compared for different NoI (increasing it when the 
values agree and vice-versa), it is possible to identify potential sensor faults. It can also 
help verify if the presumed conditional relations among the different variables, encoded 
in the CPTs of all the nodes still hold true and help identify process/system faults. 
 
Figure 7-3: Bayesian Network 
Table 7-6: Example of an Instantiation Table 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 
1        
2        
3        
4        
5        
6        
 
 Nodes Instantiated  Node of Interest  Process of Interest 
 
The first step in implementing the SPFDI algorithm is to decide the instantiations 
of different nodes as NI and identify the NoI and PoI associated with each instantiation. 
In this work, the NI are always chosen from the set of ancestral/predecessor nodes for any 
NoI. An inclusive list of all such instantiations is referred to as the ‗instantiation table‘ 
for the network. The process of probabilistic propagation, considering each row of the 
table until all the rows have been exhausted is called a ‗fault detection and isolation 
cycle‘.  
Unique weights termed as ‗belief values‘ are assigned to each node/sensor (WS) 
and process (WP) in the network, to indicate the confidence the operator has regarding 
their status as being faulty or not. The values are defined to lie in the interval [0, 1] with 
values tending to one implying perfect health and values tending to zero indicating a 
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potential fault. At the start of each new cycle, it is assumed that there is no knowledge of 
the status of sensors or processes. To account for this ignorance regarding the initial 
conditions, the beliefs for all the nodes and processes is initialized to a value of 0.5.  
The amount εS and εP by which WS and WP are modified respectively, after each 
step in the fault detection and isolation cycle are determined by the number of times (nS  
or nP) a particular sensor or process figures either as a NI, NoI or PoI in the instantiation 
table and is considered a fraction of the initial weight for that sensor/process.  
 




Initialize Ws and Wp belief 




I <= number 
of rows in 
instantiation 
table?
Set NI as evidence to the 




value of NOI 
same as the 
measured 
value?
Increase the Ws and Wp
beliefs for the associated 
sensors and processes
Decrease the Ws and Wp





Output the final Ws and 






At the end of a single iteration, the sensor with WSmin or the process with WPmin 
can be identified as being potentially faulty. Depending on the application, a suitable 
threshold may also be defined to indicate the lowest acceptable values for WS and WP, 
below which sensors or processes may be deemed faulty. This belief is further 
strengthened if the same results are obtained after multiple iterations of the algorithm.   
The SPFDI algorithm is successful in isolating single sensor faults, process faults 
as well as multiple sensor faults, as shown in Table 7-7 to Table 7-9 for a simple 
hypothetical network as shown in Figure 7-3 (only a portion of the results are reproduced 
here, see Tables 5-3 to 5-5 for the complete results). However, certain special cases were 
identified where the algorithm produces incorrect or inconsistent results. 
Table 7-7: Change in WS and WP Values with a Faulty Sensor 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 

















6 0.6667 0.0000 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 0.5 0.6667 
Table 7-8: Change in WS and WP Values with a Faulty Process 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 

















6 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 0.0000 0.3333 
Table 7-9: Change in WS and WP Values with Multiple Sensor Faults 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 

















6 0.3333 0.0000 0.0000 0.3333 0.3333 0.25 0.3333 
 
With any unforeseen deviation in the values from a sensor corresponding to root 
or leaf nodes in the network, applying the algorithm results in the associated sensor as 
well as all the processes attached to that node. An explanation for this inconsistency was 
provided by identifying the ‗subset problem‘ (Section 5.5.3.1). In Table 7-6, where the 
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shaded cells in ColA->B  and ColA are the same, it can be said that ColA->B  ColA. Such 
overlap results in WA and WA->B to be incremented or decremented by the same amount 
throughout the cycle. Thus, a subset may be formed between the columns corresponding 
to a root node and a process originating from that node, when the root node is considered 
as NI and its descendents are sequentially considered as NoI, with the process always 
included in the path between the NI and the NoI at every instantiation. 
Similarly, it is observed that ColC->D  ColD i.e. a subset may be formed between 
the columns corresponding to a leaf node and a process terminating at that node, when 
the leaf node is considered as NoI and its different ancestral nodes are considered as NI, 
with the process again always included in the path between the NI and the NoI at every 
instantiation. There may be other cases when columns corresponding to certain sensors or 
processes in the network form a subset of the columns that correspond to other sensors or 
processes that occur in the network, either individually or by considering a union of those 
columns. For instance, in Table 7-6, it is seen that ColD  (ColC   ColB->C). In the above 
cases, if a real fault occurs in sensors/processes whose columns form the superset of 
columns corresponding to other sensors/processes in the network, then the SPFDI 
algorithm also incorrectly flags the sensors or processes corresponding to the columns in 
the subset as faulty. These situations are collectively termed as the ‗subset problem’.  
Table 7-10: Change in WS and WP Values with a Fault in a Sensor Corresponding to a 
Root Node  
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 

















6 0.0000 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 0.0000 0.625 0.6667 
Table 7-11: Change in WS and WP Values with a Fault in a Sensor Corresponding to a 
Leaf Node  
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 

















6 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667 0.0000 0.6667 0.6667 0.0000 
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Table 7-12: Change in WS and WP Values when Columns in the Instantiation Table Form 
Subsets (resulting in incorrect conclusions of faults which do not exist) 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A B C D A->B B->C C->D 

















6 0.3333 0.3333 0.0000 0.0000 0.3333 0.0000 0.0000 
 
The variations in the WS and WP values in these situations is shown in the tables 
above (only a portion of the results are reproduced here, see Tables 5-6, 5-7 and 5-9 for 
the complete results). To mitigate the complications created by the subset problem, it is 
desirable to eliminate the possibilities of subsets being formed as far as possible 
(especially if a particular sensor or a process is critical from the application point of 
view). A simple approach to do this was proposed by using additional nodes representing 
redundant sources of information (representing additional sensors, expert opinion, etc.) 
for the root and leaf nodes to distinguish between sensor and process faults (Section 
5.5.4). The effect of adding these additional nodes to the network adds additional 
possibilities for the NI and NoI thereby resulting in additional rows in the instantiation 
table which could potentially make every column of the instantiation table distinct.  
The two processes A2->A and D2->D do not represent real physical processes and 
are considered to be ‗perfect‘ processes which never fail (the WP belief values for such 
processes are always set to 1 during the 
execution of the SPFDI algorithm). With 
additional sensors and intermediate 
processes, the list of additional 
instantiations that can now be added are 
shown in Table 7-13. Note that this makes the individual columns distinct. From Table 
5-11, it can be seen that the SPFDI algorithm can now successfully isolate the fault in the 
sensor corresponding to the node A without misdiagnosing a fault in the A->B process (as 
demonstrated in Table 5-6).  
The application of the SPFDI algorithm thus developed to the test set-up was then 
studied in Section 5.6.  Figure 7-6 represents a Bayesian network of the test set up used in 
 
 
Figure 7-5: Addition of Redundant Nodes 
A B C DA2 D2
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this work (Appendix B). It represents a simplified version of the detailed network 
developed in Chapter 3, using some of the criteria presented in Chapter 4 (such as the 
sensors available, memory and computational requirements, etc.). Figure 7-7 shows the 
basic network augmented with additional nodes to overcome the subset problem. Table 
7-15 shows the instantiation table for the original network and Table 7-16 to Table 7-19 
show the variation in the WS and the WP values with different types of sensor and process 
faults (only a portion of the results are reproduced here, see Tables 5-13, 5-15, 5-16 and 
5-18 for the complete results). Table 7-20 shows the instantiation table for the augmented 
network and Table 7-21to Table 7-26 show the variation in the WS and the WP values 
with different types of sensor and process faults (only a portion of the results are 
reproduced here, see Tables 5-23 to 5-28 for the complete results). 
Table 7-13: Instantiation Table with the Addition of Redundant Nodes 
 Sensors Processes 
Step A2 A B C D D2 A2->A A->B B->C C->D D->D2 
1 NI NoI     PoI     
2 NI  NoI    PoI PoI    
3 NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI   
4 NI    NoI  PoI PoI PoI PoI  
5 NI     NoI PoI PoI PoI PoI PoI 
6  NI NoI     PoI    
7  NI  NoI    PoI PoI   
8  NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI  
9  NI    NoI  PoI PoI PoI PoI 
10   NI NoI     PoI   
11   NI  NoI    PoI PoI  
12   NI   NoI   PoI PoI PoI 
13    NI NoI     PoI  
14    NI  NoI    PoI PoI 
15     NI NoI     PoI 
Table 7-14: Change in WS and WP Values with a Faulty Sensor and the Addition of 
Redundant Nodes  
 Sensors Processes 
Step A2 A B C D D2 A2->A A->B B->C C->D D->D2 






























DC = PWM Duty Cycle 
FR = PWM Frequency 
V = Total Motor Terminal Voltage 
I = Total Current dran by the motor  
τ = Motor Torque 
S = Motor Speed 
N = Acoustic Noise 
 
Figure 7-6: Simplified Bayesian Network of the Testbed Figure 7-7: Network augmented with redundant sensors 
Table 7-15: Instantiation Table for the Testbed Bayesian Network 
 
Sensors Processes 
Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 
1                             
2                             
3                             
4                             
5                             
6                             
7                             
8                             
9                             
10                             
11                             
12                             
13                             
14                             





Node of Interest 
 
Process of Interest 
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Table 7-16: Variation in WS and WP Values when all Sensors/Processes are Operating Correctly 
 
Sensors Processes 
Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 































15 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Table 7-17:  Variation in WS and WP Values with a Single Sensor Fault 
 
Nodes Processes 
Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 































15 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.714 0.800 0.000 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.750 0.667 0.800 0.500 0.800 
Table 7-18:  Variation in WS and WP Values with Multiple Sensor Faults 
 
Nodes Processes 
Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 































15 0.600 0.600 0.000 0.667 0.600 0.000 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.375 0.444 0.600 0.375 0.600 
Table 7-19:  Variation in WS and WP Values with a Process Fault 
 
Nodes Processes 
Step DC FR V I T S N DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N 



































Table 7-20 : Instantiation Table for the Testbed with Redundant Nodes 
 
Nodes Processes 
Step DC2 DC FR2 FR V I T S N N2 DC2-DC FR2-FR DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N N-N2 
1                                         
2                                         
3                                         
4                                         
5                                         
6                                         
7                                         
8                                         
9                                         
10                                         
11                                         
12                                         
13                                         
14                                         
15                                         
16                                         
17                                         
18                                         
19                                         
20                                         
21                                         
22                                         
23                                         
24                                         
25                                         
26                                         
27                                         
28                                         
29                                         
                      Node instantiated as evidence   Node of interest   Process of Interest 
Table 7-21 : Variation in WS and WP Values with No Sensor or Process Faults 
Step DC2 FR2 DC FR V I T S N N2 DC2-DC FR2-FR DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N N-N2 











































29 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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Table 7-22: Variation in WS and WP Values with a Single Faulty Sensor 
Step DC2 FR2 DC FR V I T S N N2 DC2-DC FR2-FR DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N N-N2 











































29 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.000 0.909 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.667 0.800 0.833 0.824 0.833 1.000 
Table 7-23: Variation in WS and WP Values with Multiple Faulty Sensors 
Step DC2 FR2 DC FR V I T S N N2 DC2-DC FR2-FR DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N N-N2 











































29 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.714 0.000 0.636 0.714 0.000 0.714 0.714 1.000 1.000 0.667 0.667 0.533 0.550 0.667 0.471 0.667 1.000 
Table 7-24: Variation in WS and WP Values with a Single Process Fault 
Step DC2 FR2 DC FR V I T S N N2 DC2-DC FR2-FR DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N N-N2 











































29 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.636 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.167 0.167 0.000 0.350 0.417 0.412 0.417 1.000 
Table 7-25: Variation in WS and WP Values with Multiple Process Faults 
Step DC2 FR2 DC FR V I T S N N2 DC2-DC FR2-FR DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N N-N2 











































29 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.143 0.714 0.545 0.571 0.429 0.571 0.429 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.450 0.417 0.471 0.417 1.000 
Table 7-26: Variation in WS and WP Values with a Faulty Sensor Corresponding to a Leaf Node 
Step DC2 FR2 DC FR V I T S N N2 DC2-DC FR2-FR DC-V FR-V V-I I-T I-N T-S S-N N-N2 











































29 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.727 0.857 0.857 0.000 0.857 1.000 1.000 0.833 0.833 0.800 0.700 0.500 0.647 0.500 1.000 
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7.4.2. Factors Affecting the SPFDI Algorithm 
Chapter 5 also investigated the effects of four factors viz. the network structure 
(Section 5.7.1), size of the instantiation table (Section 5.7.2), sensor characteristics 
(Section 5.7.3), and the effect of node discretization on the choice of thresholds used for 
comparison (Section 5.7.4) on the effectiveness of the SPFDI algorithm.  
Effect of network structure: The network structure has a strong influence on the 
composition of the instantiation table, which in turn affects the effectiveness of the 
SPFDI algorithm. A sensor/process may be inadvertently flagged as being faulty by 
virtue of its column constituting a subset of other columns in the instantiation table, 
associated with sensors or processes where real faults have occurred. This is referred to 
as a ‗false alarm‘. The occurrence of false alarms may be reduced via careful construction 
of the instantiation table by the domain expert to prevent subsets from being formed as 
much as possible. However, situations may still exist where it may not be possible to 
eliminate the potential for false alarms completely. In such cases, it would be desirable to 
calculate beforehand the odds that a particular sensor/process flagged as faulty by the 
SPFDI algorithm is indeed faulty. This is vital if there is a possibility that a key 
sensor/process may end up being flagged as faulty often, despite no real faults occurring. 
With redundant nodes, the subset issue and false alarms for single sensor/process 
faults are largely alleviated as the columns in the instantiation table are made distinct. 
When multiple faults occur in different combinations of sensors/processes, Section 5.7.1 
described a procedure to determine the different subsets that may be formed in the 
instantiation table for combinations of columns corresponding to the sensors/processes 
where real faults have occurred. It was observed that not all combinations of real faults 
(supersets) resulted in the formation of subsets. An example is shown in Figure 7-8 for 
combinations of two faulty elements (see Table 5-31 and 5-32 for more detailed results). 
Intuitively, it can be expected that as the number of faulty elements increase, the number 
of false alarms would also increase (due to a greater number of unreliable versus reliable 





 Sensors Processes 
Step A2 A B C D D2 A2->A A->B B->C C->D D->D2 
1 NI NoI     PoI     





























Example of All Possible Combinations of Two Faults 
 
1 B->C C->D 
 
13 C A->B  25 A D2 
2 A->B C->D 14 C D2 26 A D 
3 A->B B->C 15 C D 27 A C 
4 D2 C->D 16 B C->D 28 A B 
5 D2 B->C 17 B B->C 29 A2 C->D 
6 D2 A->B 18 B A->B 30 A2 B->C 
7 D C->D 19 B D2 31 A2 A->B 
8 D B->C 20 B D 32 A2 D2 
9 D A->B 21 B C 33 A2 D 
10 D D2 22 A C->D 34 A2 C 
11 C C->D 23 A B->C 35 A2 B 
12 C B->C 24 A A->B 36 A2 A 
 
Combinations of Faults for which 
Subsets are formed  
(Fi= Faults, SS=subset) 
 
 
 F1   F2 SS 
1 B->C C->D C 
2 A->B B->C B 
3 D2 C->D D 
4 D C->D D2 
5 D D2 C->D 
6 C C->D B->C 
7 C B->C C->D 
8 B B->C A->B 
9 B A->B B->C 
10 A A->B A2 
11 A2 A->B A 
12 A2 A A->B 
 
Figure 7-8: Effect of Network Structure on the SPFDI Algorithm 
This was verified by the results 
shown in Table 7-27. It can be seen that the  
SPFDI algorithm is very effective when 
there are few sensor/process faults 
(excluding the cases where all or none are 
faulty). Once a network structure has been 
designed for a system, and its associated 
instantiation table has been created, values 
such as those shownin Table 7-27 may be 
generated. If it is found that the proportion 
of false alarms is unusually high, the 
domain expert may revise the composition of the instantiation table to reduce their 
A B C DA2 D2







(combinations  of 




0 1 0 0.00 
1 9 0 0.00 
2 36 12 0.33 
3 84 60 0.71 
4 126 110 0.87 
5 126 119 0.94 
6 84 79 0.94 
7 36 34 0.94 
8 9 9 1.00 





occurrence. With multiple sensor and/or process faults, the probability of each individual 
element being actually faulty and the probability of a false alarm is calculated as follows: 
       
    
         
   and                  Eq. (7-1) 
where Z represents a specific sensor or process,      is the number of times Z is 
classified by the SPFDI algorithm as being faulty due to an actual fault, and      is the  
number of times Z classified as faulty due to a false alarm for Z,        is the 
probability that Z is actually faulty and        is the probability of a false alarm being 
raised for Z (the values for      and      can be obtained from tables like Table 5-32). 
The probability of actual faults and false alarms when two simultaneous faults occur are 
shown below (shaded cells denote elements flagged as faulty by the SPFDI algorithm). 
Table 7-28 : Probability of Actual Faults and False Alarms for Combinations of Two 
Faulty Elements 
 Actual Faults Subset   Actual Faults Subset 
1 B->C C->D C  7 D2 C->D D 
2 C C->D B->C  8 D C->D D2 
3 C B->C C->D  9 D D2 C->D 
         
4 A->B B->C B  10 A A->B A2 
5 B B->C A->B  11 A2 A->B A 
6 B A->B B->C  12 A2 A A->B 
 
P(A2)AF P(A)AF P(B)AF P(C)AF P(D)AF P(D2)AF P(A->B)AF P(B->C)AF P(C->D)AF 
   0.6667    0.6667 0.6667 
  0.6667    0.6667 0.6667  
    0.6667 0.6667   0.6667 
0.6667 0.6667     0.6667   
 
P(A2)FA P(A) FA P(B) FA P(C) FA P(D) FA P(D2) FA P(A->B) FA P(B->C) FA P(C->D) FA 
   0.3333    0.3333 0.3333 
  0.3333    0.3333 0.3333  
    0.3333 0.3333   0.3333 
0.3333 0.3333     0.3333   
Since such values can be generated beforehand, if a particular combination of 
faults occurs while the system is in operation, then based on the output of the SPFDI 
algorithm and such charts, the system operator can make an informed decision about the 
fault status of a particular group of sensors or processes.   
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Effect of size of the instantiation table: The effect of the size of the instantiation table was 
discussed in Section 5.7.2. 
Although the SPFDI algorithm 
provides an indication of the 
health of the different elements at 
any given instant, numerous 
instantiations and inferences have 
to be done even to complete a 
single validation cycle that 
essentially deals with only one 
sample of data. To declare a 
definite sensor/process as faulty 
entails analysis of multiple 
samples, which may require 
considerable computation time 
and resources. This issue may be 
greatly alleviated if the time taken 
for each individual validation 
cycle is reduced. A potential 
approach to this is to reduce the 
number of instantiations in the 
instantiation table, using the 
procedure shown in Figure 7-9. 
However, the tradeoff in terms of 
speed of execution and the potential for false alarms, between using a full instantiation 
table and a reduced instantiation table needs further investigation. 
Effect of sensor characteristics: Sensor characteristics like accuracy, resolution, etc. can 
also play an important role in determining the overall efficacy of the SPFDI algorithm. 
These factors were explored in Section 5.7.3. The quality of sensors corresponding to the 
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NI nodes determines which state of these nodes is set as evidence, which in turn plays a 
role in the inferred value of the NoI. Similarly the quality of sensors corresponding to the 
NoI influences the results of comparison of the inferred and the indicated values (when a 
decision is made if the two values concur, in order to alter the belief values for a 
particular sensor/process). It is evident that when multiple choices in sensors are 
available for a specific measurand, characteristics like accuracy, resolution, etc. of the 
chosen sensor must be commensurate with the application requirements to ensure that the 
results of the SPFDI algorithm are not disproportionately affected by them (for instance, 
choosing a sensor with low accuracy may result in wrong node states being instantiated 
or compared during the execution of the SPFDI algorithm, resulting in more false alarms, 
while in reality, the sensor and the system may be perfectly healthy) 
Effect of sensor characteristics: Section 5.7.4 explored the effect of the level of 
discretization of the nodes on the choice of thresholds that may be utilized for the SPFDI 
algorithm. In the algorithm, there is a need to define specific thresholds within which a 
sensor reading would be deemed acceptable, in order to determine which state of the NI 
or the NoI node, to associate with the observed reading. The acceptable limits of variation 
in values (dictated by application requirements) are used to determine the number of 
states and bin sizes into which each random variable is discretized. It was observed that a 
smaller number of states/larger bin sizes allowed the use of bin limits corresponding to 
the most probable state as the threshold limits for a node; with good results from the 
SPFDI algorithm in successfully detecting and isolation single as well as multiple sensor 
or process faults. However, with a greater granularity of discretization, the use of the 
most probable state and its bin limits as the threshold criteria may result in false alarms. 
Hence, the use of alternative methods of setting thresholds such as using the expected 
values of the posterior distribution of a node in conjunction with its variation/standard 
deviation, using the expected value in conjunction with the bin sizes used to discretize the 
node states, specifying a certain number of bins centered around the expected value, etc. 
were suggested. Each of these alternatives would result in thresholds with varying levels 
of restriction and may be chosen accordingly based on the task being addressed. 
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7.4.3. Using the Results of the SPFDI Algorithm 
To represent the system status at any instant as accurately as possible the initial 
model parameter values must be regularly updated with fresh data. The objective is to 
update     
  for the CPTs of all nodes at a sampling instant T (where      represents the 
values in the CPT for any node Xi with k states and j configurations of parents PAi,) to 
new values     
   , when new sensor data DT+1 = {x1, x2….xN}, is obtained. This is known 
as ‗learning‘ the model parameters. In doing so, it must be ensured that: 
a) The data used is reliable enough, to avoid corrupting the existing information, and 
b) The process of updating is quick enough to accurately represent the prevalent 
system conditions, without the need to wait for a large number of data samples.  
Section 5.8 proposed an adaptation of the Voting EM algorithm (with adaptive 
learning rates) developed by [Cohen, et. al, 2001] using the following rule for updating 
the network parameters, when all the nodes are observable: 
    








           
 
 
         
 
    
 
  
for xi =   
  in DT+1 i.e. P(   
 | DT+1) = 1 and 
P(   
 
| DT+1) = 1 
Eq. 
(7-2) for xi ≠   
  in DT+1 i.e. P(   
 | DT+1) = 0 and  
P(   
 
| DT+1) = 1 
otherwise 
where 0≤η≤1. As η →0, the value of past data is weighted significantly and model 
parameters remain practically unchanged. Conversely, as η →1, newly available data is 
assigned a higher importance. Faster convergence to true probability values is obtained 
with values of η →1, and vice-versa. The choice of an appropriate η value is thus crucial.  
The initial values of η for different nodes may be determined by the user based on 
the number of samples (this value is application-dependent) that have been analyzed 
previously. For instance, for a new, relatively untested system, it would be desirable to 
have a high initial η value for fast convergence to estimate the parameters quickly. On the 
other hand, if the system has been operational for a while, it is likely that significant data 
has already been analyzed to estimate the CPT parameters. In such a case, a low starting 
value of η might be sufficient.  
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To decide when and by how much to modify the learning rate, the use of the WS 
and WP values obtained from the SPFDI algorithm was proposed both as the decision 
criterion to modify η and also to determine the magnitude of change. If all the sensors 
and processes are operating correctly (WS and WP values ≈1 or above user-defined 
thresholds), η can be modified as follows. For a particular combination of node value Xi 
and its parents in the configuration PAj, if       
  and       
  are the lowest and highest 
values of η respectively, NS are the number of data samples that have been previously 
analyzed, the new value of ηPAj,Xi  for the next learning cycle can be calculated as: 
             
  
      
        
 
    
 Eq.(7-3) 
As NS increases, η decreases from       
  and attaining a value of       
  after 
numerous samples. Practically, the learning rate decreases but remains a finite value.  
If, a sensor corresponding to a node Xi is identified as being potentially faulty at 
the end of the fault isolation cycle preceding the latest data sample (indicated by its WS ≈ 
0 or lesser than a user-defined threshold), then  
a) The ηPAj,Xi for all the columns in the CPT of Xi is set to a value of zero.  
b) As the sensor for Xi influences the parent configurations PAr for all its child nodes 
Yk, the learning rates for all those nodes, ηPAr,Yk,, are also set to zero (to prevent 
corruption of the existing CPT parameters of Xi, if the sensor is actually faulty) 
If it is found that all the sensors are operating correctly but there is a process fault 
(one or more WP values are ≈0 or below certain user-defined thresholds), ηPAj,Xi for that 
process needs to be increased to enable quick updating of the CPT parameters to 
represent the variation in system dynamics. If PAj represent the particular configuration 
of the parents P1, P2, …Pm of the node Xi,  and there is a fault in the k
th
 process Pk -> Xi, 
the new learning rate may be calculated as follows: 
      
          
                        
        
         Eq.(7-4) 
where       is the average of the WP values obtained by considering all the processes, 
viz. P1-> Xi, P2-> Xi,.. Pm-> Xi that terminate at Xi.. It can be seen that the new learning 
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rate is determined by the system condition; the faultier it is (low WP values for multiple 
processes), the higher is the learning rate. If all the processes that terminate at Xi and all 
the sensors are operating normally, ηPAj,Xi remains unchanged. In the extreme scenario 
when all the processes are faulty (     ≈0), then ηPAj,Xi is set to its highest value. For any 
other intermediate condition (0<      ≤ 1), ηPAj,Xi is increased from its present value.  
7.5. APPLICATIONS 
The SPFDI algorithm does not place any restrictions on the types of systems or 
sensors it can be applied to nor does it require assumptions to be made regarding the 
condition of the monitored system or the sensors. The prerequisites for implementing the 
algorithm are the existence of a Bayesian network representing the functional 
relationships/conditional independencies among the variables pertinent to the system and 
the ability to measure every node during operation using actual physical sensors or 
abstract sensors (like a knowledge base or human opinion). To demonstrate the spectrum 
of potential application avenues beyond intelligent EMAs, four broad application classes 
were studied as described below:  
 Human Safety at Stake (Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1): In such applications, a 
significant degradation in the system performance capability (real or perceived 
due to faulty sensors) may jeopardize the safety of humans interacting with it. If 
all sensors indicate expected values under the prevailing operating conditions, the 
operator has assurance in the fact that the system is operating normally. However, 
if values from one or more sensors deviate from the anticipated values, the 
decision maker needs to accurately estimate the system capability before making 
any operational decisions to gauge the risk associated with the decision.   
 System Availability (Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2): In these applications, the decision 
maker has to decide if a system in its present condition is capable of performing 
the tasks required, based on sensor data obtained during a start-up/ performance 
check process that puts it through a series of selected operational maneuvers 
representative of its actual duty cycle. This is termed as ‗system availability‘. The 
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goal is to avoid a costly system shutdown once it is deployed (for example, due to 
a false alarm) or a catastrophic complete failure if potential sources of single point 
component faults remain undetected before the system is deployed.  
 High Cost of System Failure (Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3): This class encompasses 
applications where the decision maker may temporarily shut a system down for 
remedial action, due to its perceived inability to accomplish a task or command it 
to operate well beyond its design limits for an extended time due to its apparent 
ability to do so. In either case, an erroneous decision resulting from inaccurate 
estimation of the system performance capability (for instance, due to faulty 
sensors) may result in a tangible economic cost in terms of lost productivity or in 
the extreme case, an irreparable damage or complete loss of the system itself. 
 Performance Level Maximization (Chapter 6, Section 6.2.4): The objective in 
this class of applications is to enable the decision maker to decide on the optimum 
allocation of the available resources in highly reconfigurable systems. The goal is 
to provide the best possible (maximum) system performance to address task 
requirements that may lie beyond nominal design/operation specifications or to 
overcome any significant deterioration in the system performance capability. 
Four representative applications were examined for each application class and one 
example from each class was explored in depth to demonstrate the use of the SPFDI 
algorithm to as well as the utility of the belief values obtained for the sensors and 
processes, for higher level decision-making by the system operator (Table 6-1). The 
unifying characteristic of all the application classes is that a complex system is monitored 
using multiple heterogeneous sensors with human choices involved in the operational 
decision making process. Implementing the SPFDI algorithm in all these applications can 
enable the decision maker to determine the reliability of the sensor values obtained at any 
given time and judge accurately using the WS and WP belief values obtained if any 
observed unanticipated variations in readings are due to regular system changes or if they 
are indicative of any potential faults.  
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Table 7-29: Four Potential Classes of Application Areas for the SPFDI Algorithm 




 Aircraft subsystems 
(Section 6.2.1) 















 Nuclear power plant 
(Section 6.4) 
Bayesian network for a 
coolant circulation system 
 
 
PP = Pedal position 
PF = Pedal force 
WS = Wheel speed 
MI = Motor current 
MP = Motor position 
SP =  Caliper position 
CF = Caliper force 
B T = Bearing temperature 
A   = Accelerometer  
N   = Acoustic noise 
S    = Pump operating speed 
PO = Volumetric pump output 
CT  = Core temperature 
FS1, FS2 = Flow sensors 
 
High cost of 
system 
failure 
 Manufacturing line 
(Section 6.2.3) 
 Remotely operated 
vehicles 
(Section 6.2.3) 
 Wind turbines 
(Section 6.5) 
Bayesian network for a 






 Ground combat vehicle 
(Section 6.2.4) 
 Manufacturing cell 
(Section 6.2.4) 
 War fighter monitoring 
(Section 6.6) 
Bayesian network 




BP = Blade pitch angle 
RL = Wind load  
RS = Rotor speed 
GS= Generator speed 
GV = Gearbox vibration  
GT = Gear temperature 
GN = Gearbox noise 
TL   = Threat level  
RC   = Rest condition  
SL   =  Soldier combat load 
AT   = Ambient temperature 
EEG = Electroencephalography  
BT   = Body temperature 
CA   = Cognitive ability 



























7.6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The Sensor and Process Fault Detection and Isolation (SPFDI) algorithm 
developed in this work represents a novel approach to simultaneous detection and 
identification of sensor and process faults using a Bayesian network-based approach and 
represents significant advancement of existing state-of-the-art approaches. The creation 
of a detailed Bayesian network for a switched reluctance motor and the specification of 
design and operational criteria for resource management are the other major research 
contributions from this work. Although many associated aspects were explored while 
developing the SPFDI algorithm, the work presented in this report is still nascent and can 
be considered as the foundation for future research that can further enhance the 
effectiveness as well as application of the SPFDI algorithm in numerous applications. 
The following section presents five potential avenues where in-depth future research can 
vastly help enhance the work presented in this report and may be organized as:  
 Short-term work i.e. tasks that follow directly from the present work (Items 1, 2, 
and 3; may be accomplished in a suggested timeframe of 1-3 years).  
 Long-term work that would draw from the various research threads at UT-RRG 
(and externally) to help advance the field of intelligent mechanical systems (Items 
4 and 5; may be accomplished in a suggested timeframe of 3-5 years).  
 
1. Refinement of the SPFDI Algorithm  
a. Improving the construction of the Instantiation Table: In the present version of the 
SPPFDI algorithm, only predictive reasoning has been considered in generating 
the instantiation table. The use of a physically relevant, causal basis for 
interpreting the relation between the variables provided an intuitive starting point 
for implementing the algorithm. However, the use of a Bayesian network 
framework allows the use of predictive as well as diagnostic reasoning by 
designating the appropriate nodes as evidence and query (Section 2.5). This 
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flexibility can be exploited to improve the construction of the instantiation table 
(Section 5.4.2.1) with many potential benefits. 
Given the conditional independencies encoded by the Bayesian network 
some of the instantiations included in the instantiation table can either be 
completely eliminated or combined into a single step. For instance, this could be 
achieved by considering all the nodes in the Markov blanket
1
of a specific node as 
the NI in a single step of the fault detection and isolation cycle. Reducing the size 
of the instantiation table in this manner can significantly improve the speed of 
execution of the algorithm. In other cases, it may be possible to almost completely 
eliminate the subset issue (Section 5.5.3.1) by introducing additional 
instantiations via abductive/diagnostic reasoning (setting descendent nodes as NI 
and considering ancestral nodes as the NoI). Both these possibilities need to be 
explored further. 
b. Exploring the Tradeoff Between Execution Time and False Alarms:  In Section 
5.5.4, the use of redundant nodes was proposed to overcome the subset issue. 
Although this enables additional instantiations to be introduced and reduces the 
potential for false alarms, it increases the size of the instantiation table. This in 
turn leads to a longer execution time for an individual iteration of the SPFDI 
algorithm. For an application with a complex network, this may even render the 
size of the instantiation table unmanageable to achieve any timing constraints that 
are imperative for the application. 
In Section 5.7.2 a procedure was proposed to reduce the size of the 
instantiation table and improve the speed of execution of the algorithm. Although 
a smaller table may lead to a faster algorithm cycle (and possibly meet the 
conditions required for real-time operation), there may be potential drawbacks in 
reducing the number of instantiations in this manner. Depending on the threshold 
                                                 
1 The Markov blanket of a variable/node may be considered as the set of variables/nodes that make it 
independent of the other variables/nodes. [Pearl, 1988] defines the Markov blanket for any node X in a 
Bayesian network as the union of three types of neighbors for X: the direct parents of X, the direct 
successors of X and all the direct parents of X‘s direct successors 
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values used to determine the acceptability of an observed deviation in the sensor 
reading, the larger granularity of change in the WS and WP belief values2 may 
result in more instances of false alarms for a sensor/process depending on which 
rows have been eliminated. If a sensor that is critical from the application point of 
view ends up being flagged as potentially faulty often as a result of such row 
eliminations, it may be necessary to introduce additional nodes or instantiations to 
overcome the situation. 
Thus, depending on the objectives of the application in which the SPFDI 
algorithm is intended to be used (for instance, avoiding false alarms in a process) 
and the available computational resources, the ramifications of using a full 
instantiation table (the original table augmented with additional instantiations 
resulting from redundant nodes) versus a reduced instantiation table (obtained by 
eliminating rows from the original or the full instantiation table) in terms of 
execution speed, potential for false alarms, etc. need to be explored in greater 
detail. Based on the specific application, it may be possible to define multiple 
levels of real-time operation depending on different operating regimes of the 
system for which different approaches described above may be suitable3.  
c. Comprehensive Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the SPFDI Algorithm: The issue 
of false alarms that may arise from the SPFDI algorithm due to the subset issue 
was addressed in Section 5.7.1. The false alarms primarily dealt with the situation 
of Type I errors wherein a non-faulty sensor or process is wrongly classified as 
being potentially faulty (false positive). The other type of errors, referred to Type 
II errors, represent the other end of the spectrum where a potential sensor or 
process fault remains undetected by the SPFDI algorithm (false negative). In the 
                                                 
2 The incremental amounts by which the WS and WP belief values are modified depend on the number of 
rows a particular sensor or process occurs in the instantiation table. 
3 It must be noted that the term ‗false alarm‘ as used throughout this work is primarily used in the context 
of sensor-level decisions. The goal of reducing misdiagnosis of faults at the sensor level is to reduce the 
potential for false alarms from CBM algorithms, which are primarily overall system-level decisions. In the 
latter context, the term ‗false alarms‘ are used to refer to a wrong estimation of system operational 
capability, or misestimating the remaining useful life of the system [Hvass and Tesar, 2004][Tesar, 2009] 
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present work, these errors were not encountered due to the nature of the faults that 
were artificially introduced into the sensor readings used as well as due to the 
thresholds that were used used to determine a sensor fault.  
In order to fine-tune the algorithm for any application, a detailed analysis 
of the latter type of errors is essential to prevent any undesirable consequences 
from occurring as a result of undetected faults once the system has been deployed. 
To provide an estimate of the possibility of such errors occurring requires 
extensive testing of the algorithm (via actual experimentation or simulations) for 
different fault scenarios for all the sensors in the application or processes that 
occur in the system (for instance, by defining varying degrees of faults such as 
mild, medium, severe for every sensor/process and exploring the effects of each 
fault level on the other variables individually as well as the overall system 
behavior), exploring the use of different types of thresholds in conjunction with 
the different fault scenarios (for instance, investigate the variation in the 
frequency of occurrence of type II errors as different thresholds are used or as the 
thresholds become more lenient or restrictive). 
d. Improving the Procedure for Updating of the Model Parameters: In Section 5.8, 
the discussion was centered on the use of the WS and WP belief values obtained 
from the algorithm in updating the model parameters (using Eq. (5-6) and Eq. (5-
7)). In the procedure described it was proposed that if a specific sensor X was 
found to be faulty, then, in order to avoid corruption of the existing decision 
surfaces by faulty data, the learning rate for X and all its child nodes were to be 
set to zero. However, a sensor may be mistakenly classified as being faulty due to 
the subset issue. Ignoring the data from the sensor in this case may result in the 
loss of valuable information which may be used to update the existing decision 
surfaces (for instance, utilizing the data could potentially assist the higher level 
CBM algorithm detect any degradation in the system performance more quickly). 
Thus, there is a need to explore some mechanism that can, instead of ignoring the 
data from a misclassified faulty sensor completely, take into account the known 
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probability of false alarms for that specific sensor (Section 5.7.1) arising from the 
subset issue, and modify the updating equations accordingly . 
 
2. Algorithm Implementation 
a. Understanding the Implications of Implementing the SPFDI Algorithm on 
Different Platforms: The present testbed configuration consists of a host PC 
connected to a cRIO-9112 chassis with a FPGA and a NI-9014 Real Time 
Controller (RTC) (see Appendix B for details). With this hardware configuration 
there are three execution platforms available to run different sections of the 
Actuator Management and Operation Software (AMOS) code for motor control, 
data acquisition (see Appendix C). In general, processes that need to be 
deterministic and quick such as data acquisition and control are programmed on 
the FPGA. Operations that are relatively less time critical such as data processing 
may be run on the RTC. The remaining operations are run on the PC like 
transferring data between the different AMOS modules, the graphical user 
interface for AMOS, Bayesian network inferencing algorithms, etc.  
The present version of the SPFDI algorithm was implemented on a 
standalone PC and in a non-synchronous mode (considering the execution time 
for the algorithm relative to the motor operational duty cycle, buffered data was 
used). Given the ample memory storage and processor capability, the algorithm 
was able to generate good results relatively quickly (with an execution time 
averaging less than 2 seconds for the network demonstrated in Chapter 5). 
However, in certain applications, the flexibility to partition the AMOS execution 
code to different processors may not be possible. As indicated in Chapter 4 
(Sections 4.3.9 and 4.4.5) the available computational resources (processing 
power as well as memory) may need to be shared between different operations 
that are needed for system operation. For instance, in a mobile robot, all the 
operations ranging from control, data acquisition to navigation and 
communication, are typically executed on an on-board computer. The present 
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version of the code for the Bayesian network inferencing algorithms as well as the 
overall logic for the SPFDI algorithm needs to be optimized further (for handling 
large networks with highly discretized nodes, generating a large number of 
samples quickly for approximate inferencing algorithms, etc.) to enable their 
execution on such embedded systems concurrently with other programs.  
b. Extension of the SPFDI Algorithm to Cover Transient Conditions: Based on the 
execution time required for the present version of the code for the SPFDI 
algorithm, a necessity in implementing it is that all the data samples used be 
collected after the values have stabilized since individual measured values are 
compared with the inferred values at every sampling instant. In other words, the 
data utilized for the algorithm is buffered during the actual operation of the test 
bed once the steady state values for all the variables have been attained (i.e. 
within acceptable limits of variation) . 
The algorithm needs to be extended to cover transient conditions as well 
where all the variables may be varying rapidly and some of them may never attain 
a true steady state value. In such a situation, the WS and WP values may fluctuate 
unpredictably (for instance, a sensor X may be flagged as faulty based on the 
sample at time T while it may be identified as being non-faulty based on the 
sample at time T+1). While this may be as simple as improving the execution 
time of the algorithm to such an extent that analyzing the data samples at every 
sampling instant becomes possible so that each sample can be considered to be a 
quasi-steady state. To incorporate the transient nature of variables, it may be 
necessary to explore the use of dynamic Bayesian networks. 
c. Providing a Better User Interface for the SPFDI Algorithm: Although the WS and 
WP belief values provided by the present version of the algorithm provide a good 
indication of the potential sources of unanticipated deviations in sensor readings, 
the comprehension of those values can still present a challenge to the average end 
user. Especially for a complex system represented by a network with a large 
number of nodes/sensors and links/processes, the sheer magnitude of the results 
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obtained from the algorithm can be overwhelming. Given the emphasis on the use 
of visual representation of decision surfaces, use of Bayesian networks for 
modeling, etc.; all with a view to improve human understanding of the system 
behavior for improved decision making, another future avenue to be explored is 
the design and use of a suitable, easy to comprehend graphical user interface for 
displaying the results of the SPFDI algorithm (for instance, generating graphs for 
the learning rate η or the WS and WP values for key decision variables for different 
types of sensor/process faults, etc.). The resultant interface could be integrated to 
work in concert with the other graphical display components of AMOS as 
described in [Ashok and Tesar, 2007] and [Yun and Tesar, 2006].   
 
3. Definition and Implementation of Additional Resource Management Criteria 
A number of criteria (design and operational) were proposed in Chapter 4 
as a basis for a criteria-based resource management framework to determine the 
optimal set of sensors to use at any given time. However, only the most basic 
criteria have been explored in this work. An exhaustive study of additional 
general criteria that could be applied across diverse application domains as well as 
more application-specific ones needs to be pursued in the future. 
For instance, a list of sensor-specific design criteria may be defined for 
each of the ten measurands recommended for intelligent EMAs (see Appendix A). 
These criteria could deal with the physical form of sensors (volume/dimensions, 
weight, individual modules/integrated package, etc.), performance specifications 
(resolution, accuracy, linearity, bandwidth, analog/digital output, voltage/current 
output, etc.), and other miscellaneous aspects (technological principle on which 
the sensing element operates, materials used in the sensor construction, hard-
wired or wireless, contact/non-contact, cost, degree of hardware redundancy 
needed based on the application, self-generating or requiring an external power 
source, communication protocol required and the associated data transfer rates, 
etc.). The creation of decision surfaces for characterizing sensor selection and 
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performance/utilization (like those used at the EMA level) is also a distinct 
possibility. The eventual goal of such an effort would be to create an interactive 
configuration management software tool (populated and regularly updated with a 
catalog of specifications for all the sensors of interest) that could be used to 
structure a sensor system for new applications or expand an existing one. Such a 
tool can enable a system designer to decide suitable sensors that can be integrated 
in an application, assist the domain expert to develop more usable Bayesian 
networks, and finally help the system operator make relevant decisions for 
prioritizing sensor, accommodating failed sensors, etc. 
Additionally, the suitability of the various operational criteria suggested in 
this work, for real-time operation also needs to be explored further. As an initial 
step, some criteria may be implemented as part of the AMOS sensor module 
(Appendix C) and tested on the test set up at UT-RRG (Appendix B). 
 
4. Exploring the Use of the SPFDI Algorithm in Additional Application Areas  
The use of the SPFDI algorithm was demonstrated for an EMA in Chapter 
5 and proposed for four different classes of applications in Chapter 6. This 
provides a starting point to further explore its use in a broader gamut of 
applications. Communication needs to be established with experts in various 
domains to refine the understanding and the intricacies of applying the algorithm 
to those domains (for instance, to develop accurate Bayesian networks, 
developing instantiation tables for unique monitoring of every sensor/process 
without encountering subset issues, appropriate thresholds to be used, etc).  
In all the applications discussed in this work, the sensors/processes 
considered for demonstrating the algorithm pertained to what could essentially be 
considered as a basic, standardized building block of higher level system of 
systems(such as an EMA, a brake-by-wire unit, a coolant circulating system, a 
gearbox and a soldier). In each application, these fundamental units work in 
concert with other similar units as well as other independent components which 
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may have their own set of sensors/processes. For instance, in a typical industrial 
robot, six or more independent EMAs may be used to actuate the joints, each with 
its own custom design and set of sensors. Other large systems like an automobile 
or an aircraft are also similarly composed of numerous lower level systems, each 
with a diverse array of sub-components and sensors. For effective operation of the 
complete system, it is imperative to ensure that each of the lower level systems is 
performing to its optimum potential. As a system increases in its complexity, it 
may become necessary to implement the SPFDI algorithm for each low level 
system; generating separate instantiation tables for each. The results from the 
individual SPFDI algorithms may then be analyzed individualy or as part of an 
overall higher level CBM algorithm to determine the effect of any potential 
sensor/process faults that may have occurred in any of the lower level systems on 
the health or operational capability of the overall system. It may become 
necessary to investigate methods other than those explored in this work for 
reducing the potential for false alarms even as the complexity of the networks 
increases. 
Another possibility is to extrapolate the philosophy of the SPFDI 
algorithm beyond the constituent sensors/processes that occur within each of the 
aforementioned standardized building blocks (say, for example, distributed 
EMAs) by considering the entire basic unit as directly analogous to ‗sensors‘ in 
the context of this work and the interaction between these units as the ‗processes‘ 
and using these definitions to generate the instantiation table for the complete 
system-of-systems. Such an approach could be used directly for fault detection 
and isolation in applications such as multi degree of freedom robotic workcells 
with multiple EMAs working in concert.  
 
5. Detailed development of AMOS modules 
While software code was developed during this work to address different 
goals like testbed operation and control, data acquisition, Bayesian inferencing, 
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implementing the SPFDI algorithm, etc. it was developed on an as-needed basis 
and can be considered as a starting point for a more structured approach to 
develop comprehensive as well as refined code that can be seamlessly integrated 
into the AMOS libraries. To enable AMOS to address the requirements of the 
widest possible range of applications and depending on the level of warranted 
operator intervention in the application being considered, there is a need to 
continuously refine the existing software development goals as well as define new 
objectives that can address more stringent real-time operating constraints, provide 
better user and application programming interfaces, determine the depth of detail 
required for the different modules as well as the level of code abstraction and 
encapsulation, etc. With different AMOS modules in varying stages of 
development presently, it is expected that the software could soon be deployed in 
numerous applications in the near term future. 
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Appendix A. Electromechanical Actuator Sensing Requirements 
To determine the minimum set of sensors that can be utilized across a broad range of applications, a detailed analysis of 
factors affecting the behavior of various EMA components (and in turn, the overall EMA performance) was carried out and a 
ten-sensor architecture (with measurands such as position, velocity, acceleration, torque, temperature, noise, vibration, current, 
voltage, magnetic field) was proposed in [Krishnamoorthy and Tesar, 2005] to provide complete awareness of variations in the 
different EMA characteristics, and summarized in the table below. 
Table A-1: Summary of sensing requirements for intelligent EMAs 
Note: The following table is reproduced partially from [Krishnamoorthy and Tesar, 2005] 







Compensation for lost motion due to 
backlash, deformation,  hysteresis etc. 
Frictional Nonlinearities 
Position, velocity, torque 
sensors 
To provide friction compensation 
capabilities in actuator control algorithms, 
monitor gear sliding losses  






Monitor transmission error, vibrations 




Fluting Current, voltage sensors 
To prevent bearing damage due to shaft 
currents, monitor lubricant viscosity,  




Losses Temperature sensors 
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Table A-1: Summary of sensing requirements for intelligent EMAs (contd.) 






Hall effect position 
sensor/encoder 
Determine the sequence of energizing 
stator phases (based on rotor position) 
Feedback 
Current, position, velocity, 
acceleration, torque 






Copper/ Ohmic Loss Current sensor 
Determine the overall prime mover 
efficiency as well as to monitor the 







Magnetic field sensor 
Hysteresis 
Loss 




Friction Velocity sensor 
Windage Velocity sensor 
Thermal Nonlinearities Temperature sensor Monitor temperature 
Electromagnetic Nonlinearities 
Current, magnetic field, 
temperature sensors 
Infer flux leakage, bearing damage etc. 
Saturation- Current/Voltage/Magnetic 
Current, voltage, magnetic 
field sensors 
Determine motor torque and speed 
Torque Ripple 
Torque, current, position 
sensors 
„Quality‟ of output torque; monitor 
vibrations and speed variations 
Internal Noise and Vibration Accelerometer, Microphone 










Monitor switching losses, I
2
R losses, 





Appendix B. EMA Software Development Testbed 
The test bed has been designed to be modular and easily expandable to 
accommodate different types 
of EMAs (with different prime 
movers such as a switched 
reluctance motor, brushless/ 
brushed DC motors, stepper 
motor, etc. in combination 
with different geartrains), 
sensors, loading devices 
(brakes, load motors), etc.  In 
the present configuration of the test bed (Figure B-2), a four phase Switched Reluctance 
Motor (SRM) drives a shaft coupled to a hysteresis brake. Voltage and current sensors 
measure the phase as well as line supply values. An in-line rotary sensor measures the 
motor torque. Hall-effect sensors are embedded in the motor phases for commutation as 
well as to determine the shaft speed. A quadrature incremental encoder is also used to 
calculate shaft position, velocity and acceleration. Vibration is measured using a 
piezoelectric accelerometer. An acoustic noise sensor is also used. The entire set-up is 
controlled using a National Instruments (NI) Compact Reconfigurable Input Output 
(cRIO) platform. The motor and brake are controlled using signals from a digital output 
module. The sensor signals are read using the analog or digital input modules. 
Calibration, hardware/ software signal conditioning of the sensor signals are also 
performed on the cRIO. The following sections provide a brief description of each 
component in the test bed. 
 
B.1 The Compact Reconfigurable Input Output (cRIO) Platform 
The cRIO platform is a reconfigurable embedded data acquisition and control 
system that can be used for applications that require a high performance and reliability. 
 


























































The chassis along with the real-time controller (NI-9014) acts as a stand-alone 
computer. The system has a small footprint, open embedded architecture and is very 
rugged (-40 to 70°C operating temperature and 50g shock rating) with hot swappable I/O 
modules [National Instruments, 2009]. It also has network connectivity and a host of 
sensor measurement capabilities. The C-Series measurement modules installed in the 
chassis (NI-9201 for analog inputs, NI-9472 for digital outputs, and NI-9411 for digital 
inputs) have built-in signal conditioning and allow for direct connection to a variety of 
sensors and I/O signals. The system also has nonvolatile memory for local data storage. 
The applications are deterministically executed on a Wind River VxWorks real-time 
operating system [National Instruments, 2009].  
The chassis also has a high-performance Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) 
providing dedicated bandwidth for high-speed data processing. It can be re-programmed 
using simple tools provided in LabView
TM
 software for custom timing, synchronization, 
control, and processing of analog and digital I/O signals. It consists of logic blocks (with 
digital components like multipliers, multiplexers, etc.), programmable interconnects, and 
I/O blocks. The bits are processed in these blocks to create programmatic results. They 
are connected with programmable interconnects that route signals from one block to the 
next as well as to the I/O blocks that are connected to the pins on the chip for two-way 
communication to external circuits (like H-bridge amplifiers) [National Instruments, 
2009]. LabView
TM
 generates VHDL code and passes it to a Xilinx compiler, which 
synthesizes it and routes all synthesized components into a bitfile. This bitfile is then 
downloaded to the FPGA on the cRIO to perform the desired task. The FPGA is used in 
lieu of a conventional hardwired motion control board as it accords greater flexibility in 
designing and implementing different motion control algorithms on demand, as compared 
to a predetermined set of algorithms provided by the motion controller manufacturer. In a 
FPGA based system, concurrent execution of parallel code is achievable since the code is 
implemented as parallel circuits in hardware (greater determinism in execution).  
The control set-up consists of a variable voltage DC power supply (the Lambda 
Genesys programmable DC power supply), H-bridge amplifiers, an opto-isolator bank (to  
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isolate the low power PC/cRIO side from the high power motor side) and the cRIO 
system. It is possible to communicate with the cRIO from any computer on a network. 
User inputs are acquired via the AMOS user interface (Appendix C) and communicated 
to the cRIO through an ethernet crossover cable. The number of H-bridge units used 
depends on the number of independent motor phases (four are used in the present test set-
up). Each H-bridge unit amplifies a 5 V TTL Pulse Width Modulated (PWM) signal from 
the cRIO digital output to a 20 V signal that is applied across the motor terminals. With 
the variable voltage power supply, the voltage supplied to the motor can vary from 0-48 
V based on PWM signals from the FPGA. 
 
B.2 Reconfigurable Chassis  
The NI cRIO-9112 is an eight-slot reconfigurable embedded chassis. It features a 
user-programmable Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA 
board [National Instruments, 2009]. Other units 
such as the real-time controller module and the 
analog and digital I/O modules are plugged into 
this chassis, which also provides low-level 
hardware access to all those modules. 
Additional modules (for specific 
communication protocols like CAN/serial 
communication, memory or motion control 
module for brushed DC motors) can be added to 
the chassis based on the application.  
 
B.3 Real-time Controller  
The NI-9014 embedded controller 
features an industrial 400 MHz Freescale 
MPC5200 real-time processor running 
LabView
TM
 Real-Time for deterministic tasks 
like control, data logging, and analysis [National Instruments, 2009]. 
 
[National Instruments, 2009] 
Figure B-3: cRIO-9112 Chassis  
Table B-1: cRIO-9112 Specifications 
[National Instruments, 2009] 
Manufacturer National Instruments 
Model No. NI cRIO-9112 
Parameter Value Units 
No. of flip-flops 19200  
No. of 6-input LUTs 19200  
No. of DSP48 slices 32  
Embedded RAM 1152 Kbits 
Timebase 40 MHz 






It is designed for extreme reliability, and 
low power consumption. The controller is 
especially suited for functioning for long 
periods of time in remote applications. 
The controller features built-in web (http) 
and file (ftp) servers to stream data from 
the controller to a PC for further 
processing, data logging, etc. It is also 
possible to connect external storage media to the controller for extended on-board data 
logging. The FPGA board in the cRIO chassis controls the I/O modules and passes data 
to the controller through a local PCI bus.  
Table B-2: Real Time Controller Specifications  
[National Instruments, 2009] 
Manufacturer National Instruments 
Model No. NI-9014 
Parameter Value Units 
Supply Voltage 9-35 V 
Operating Temperature -40 to 70 
o
C 
Connectivity 10/100BASE-T Ethernet port, RS232 Serial port 
 
Memory 2 GB nonvolatile, 128 MB DRAM memory 
 
 
B.4 Analog Input Modules 
The NI-9201 analog input modules provide high-quality, high-performance 
measurements for a variety of sensors. In the present test set-up the outputs from current 
and voltage sensors, torque sensor, accelerometer and acoustic noise sensor are connected 
to two such modules in the cRIO chassis. Each module includes built-in signal 
conditioning and integrated connector with screw terminals for flexible and easy wiring 
of signals.  The modules connect directly to FPGA hardware and provide a range of 
options for sampling rates, synchronization of sensor signals, etc. The modules are hot-
swappable during operation and have channel-to-earth ground double-isolation barriers 
for safety and noise immunity [National Instruments, 2009]. They also have a high 
common-mode voltage range. A partial list of specifications is provided in Table B-3. 
 
 
[National Instruments, 2009] 
Figure B-4: NI-9014 Real Time Controller  
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B.5 Digital Input Module 
The NI-9411 digital input module is a high-performance digital input-switching 
module for the cRIO system. It provides industrial logic levels for direct connection to a 
wide array of industrial switches and 
transducers [National Instruments, 
2009]. In the present test set-up, signals 
from the Hall-effect sensors embedded 
in the motor phases (for commutation) 
are connected to this module. The 
sensors produce a digital high signal 
when a rotor pole is in complete 
alignment with a stator pole, and a 
digital low otherwise signal otherwise1. 
The digital signals (channels A, B, 
index) from the quadrature encoder also 
input into the module. The module has 
an integrated connector junction box. In 
addition, it generates a regulated 5V 
voltage to power the encoder. The 
module has channel-to-earth ground 
double-isolation barrier for safety, 
noise immunity and channel-to-channel 
isolation [National Instruments, 2009]. 
This module is hot-swappable during 
operation. A partial list of specifications is shown in Table B-5. 
 
                                                 
1 The motor has 6 rotor poles and 8 stator poles and there are four signals (one for each phase A, B, C, D). 
Each signal occurring six times in each rotation of the rotor 
 [National Instruments, 2009] 
Figure B-5: NI-9201 Analog Input Module  
Table B-3 : NI-9201 Specifications  
[National Instruments, 2009] 
Manufacturer National Instruments 
Model No. NI-9201 
Parameter Value Units 
Analog Inputs 8 (single-ended, 12 bit res)  
Range ±10 V 
Sampling Rate 500 (aggregate rate) kS/S 
Temperature -40 to 70 
o
C 
Connector Screw terminal / D Sub 
 
 
[National Instruments, 2009] 




B.6 Digital Output Module 
The NI-9472 digital output 
module provides extended voltage 
ranges (up to 60V, 5V TTL) and high 
current-switching capacity (externally 
powered, up to 20 A per module) for 
direct control of a wide array of 
industrial devices including motors 
[National Instruments, 2009]. It has an 
integrated connector junction box with screw-terminals for easy connection of output 
wires. It is hot-swappable during operation and has channel-to-earth ground double-
isolation barrier (isolation for up to 2,300 Vrms) for safety and noise immunity [National 
Instruments, 2009]. It is capable of as 
low as 100 ns output rate for ultrahigh-
speed control, pulse-width modulation 
(PWM), as well as digital 
communication. In the test set-up, this 
module is used to send the digital PWM 
signals to the driver circuit for each of 
the four H-bridge amplifiers connected to 
the motor phases.  
A total of 7 digital signals are 
needed as output to the four amplifiers. 
Three of these signals are static and 
common to all the H-bridges, the 
remaining four signals control the 
ON/OFF state of each H-bridge (and 
hence the associated motor phase). These 
[National Instruments, 2009] 
Figure B-7:  NI 9472 Digital Output Module  
Table B-4: NI-9411 Specifications 
[National Instruments, 2009] 
Manufacturer National Instruments 
Model No. NI-9472 
Parameter Value Units 
Digital Outputs 8 (100 µs digital o/p )  
Range ±6 to 30 (sourcing 
digital input, 750 mA) 
V 
Sampling Rate 100 ns 
Temperature -40 to 70 
o
C 
Connector Screw terminal / D Sub 
 
 
Table B-5: NI-9411 Specifications  
[National Instruments, 2009] 
Manufacturer National Instruments 
Model No. NI-9411 
Parameter Value Units 
Digital Inputs 6  
Range ±5 to 24 (differential 
/single-ended digital input) 
V 
Sampling Rate 500 (aggregate rate) ns 
Temperature -40 to 70 
o
C 





low power digital output signals from the module are electrically isolated from the high 
power side of the motor using a bank of opto-isolators. A single digital PWM signal from 
the NI-9472 is also converted to an analog DC voltage (using a simple RC low-pass filter 
in the process) to control the hysteresis brake using the external control capability on the 
brake power supply/controller. This provides the ability to change the load acting on the 
motor shaft. Table B-4 provides a partial list of specifications for this module. 
 
B.7 Switched Reluctance Motor  
The test motor is a four-phase Switched Reluctance Motor (SRM) manufactured 
by Motorsoft Inc. A SRM provides various advantages compared to brushed or brushless 
DC motor. It is more rugged due to the lack of fragile magnets on the rotor or 
commutation brushes. It is also more suitable for high-speed operation. Since the major 
source of heating is only the stator, it is easy to provide cooling and enhance the motor 
performance. The motor rotor consists of tightly stacked laminations of ferromagnetic 
material. Since all the phases are electrically independent, it is possible to operate the 
motor with a reduced number of active phases in case of a failure. Thus, the motor is 
inherently fault-tolerant and provides greater reliability compared to other motor types. 
 
[Motorsoft Inc., 2006] 
 
Figure B-8:  Test Motor Characteristics  
Power/Torque vs. Speed 
 
 The motor has four Hall-effect sensors embedded next to the stator on its non-
driving end. These are used to determine the rotor position (as well as motor velocity and 
acceleration). The rotor position is required for commutation (the sequence in which 
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motor phases are energized for continuous rotation). The test motor has a relatively low 
nominal torque (1.8 Nm) but is capable of relatively high-speed operation (6000 rpm).  
Table B-6: Switched Reluctance Motor Specifications 
Manufacturer Motorsoft Inc. 
Model No. RA165157 
Output w/fan and w/out fan 1.13Kw @ 6000 rpm, 0.73Kw @6000 rpm 
Rated Torque  1.8 N-m 
Voltage  24 
Parameter Value Units / Notes 
Number of stator poles/rotor poles 8/6 4 phases  
Stator pole angle 22.5 deg 
Stator outer diameter 130 mm 
Stator back iron diameter 104  mm 
Stator air gap diameter 70 mm  
Air gap length 0.25 mm  
Rotor pole angle 23.6 deg 
Rotor air gap diameter 69.5  mm 
Rotor back iron diameter 52  mm 
Rotor bore diameter 25 mm  
Total axial length (including winding extension) 70  mm 
Total stack length 40  mm 
Stacking factor 0.98   
No of laminations 115   
Thickness of lamination 0.35  mm 
Lamination Material  S-10   
No of turns per phase 13   
Conductor size  0.8mm,9 parallel   
 
B.8 Motor Controller  
The Open Source Motor Controller (OSMC) is a high-power H-bridge power 
amplifier designed to control various types of motors in many commercial or industrial 
control applications [Robot Power Inc., 2009]. It is easy to mount on a variety of 
platforms and also to interface to a range of microcontroller units. A motor control 
system can be considered as being split into two distinct levels- the higher level controller 
which accepts the user input command signals and conveys them to a lower level 
controller or amplifier that translates these command signals to appropriate motor motion. 
The high-power H-bridge amplifier, can be thought of as a dumb controller that 
receives the PWM signals from the digital output module of the cRIO and transfers them 
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to the inputs of its bridge driver circuitry. At the heart of the OSMC board is the 
HIP4081A bridge driver chip. This chip is a monolithic full H-bridge driver chip that 
includes both high- and low-side 
FET drivers and all needed voltage 
boost circuitry [Robot Power Inc., 
2009]. It can accept supply voltage 
ranging from 12-80V and 
generates all needed signals and 
voltages to drive the on-board H-
bridge. It has four inputs that 
correspond to the outputs used to 
switch each individual leg of the 
H-bridge circuit. There is an 
additional disable output as well. 
The input lines of the HIP4081A 
are modified TTL (a high signal 
between 3- 12V), which allows a 
wide variety of signal sources to be 
used to drive the chip (the present 
set-up uses 4.5V). The OSMC H-
bridge board itself does not have any on-board logic to accept or interpret any user 
commands. The second part of the system, which provides the external logic to perform 
this task and generate the PWM signals is a dedicated microcontroller, a PC, etc (or the 
cRIO in the present case). Although this adds to the overall system complexity 
somewhat, it provides tremendous flexibility in terms of  microcontrollers that can be 
used to drive the OSMC as well as in the number of motor phases that can be controlled 
independently [Robot Power Inc., 2009]. The OSMC uses a computer cooling fan instead 
of a heavy plate type heat-sink to extract heat from the MOSFETs (used for switching). 
This allows the removal of heat more quickly and allows the controller to be operated at 
 
[Robot Power Inc., 2009] 
Figure B-9: Open Source Motor Controller  
Table B-7: OSMC Specifications 
[Robot Power Inc., 2009] 
Manufacturer Robot Power Inc. 
Model No. OSMC H-bridge v 4.25 
Parameter Value Units 
Supply voltage   13-50 (36V max battery rating) V 
Output Current  160 (continuous) A 
MOSFETs  16 ea. IRF1405  
On Resistance  .0026 ohm max at 25C Ω 
Cooling   40 CFM fan  
Logic Interface  10-pin dual-row header  
Power Supply  12V .5A regulator V, A 
Connectors  
Solder pads for up to 10 ga wire 





higher switching frequencies and duty cycles, which in turn directly influences the motor 
performance characteristics like torque, speed, acoustic noise, etc.  
  
B.9 Voltage Sensors 
The LEM Module LV 25-P sensor is a closed loop Hall-effect voltage sensor. It 
can be used for measuring voltages (DC, AC, pulsed from 10V-500V) with galvanic 
isolation between the primary circuit 
(the high current or the motor circuit) 
and the secondary circuit (the data 
acquisition set-up). It offers a high 
accuracy and excellent dynamic 
performance (response time 40 µs) 
[LEM Transducers, 2009]. Four voltage 
sensors are used in the present test set-
up and are powered with an independent 
±15V DC power supply (Figure B-10). 
A schematic of the measurement circuit 
using this sensor is also shown. To 
measure the voltage applied across the 
terminals ±HT, a current proportional to 
the measured voltage, IPN, must be 
collected through an external resistor R1, which is installed in series with the primary 
circuit of the LV 25-P. A large value of R1 results in a small current flow (IPN) in the 
primary circuit. This current is transformed by the sensor to produce a proportional 
current in the secondary circuit, IS. The proportionality constant between IPN and IS is 
called the conversion ratio. The final output voltage is measured across the sensor output 
(M) and the ground.  For the test set-up the values of resistances used are R1 = 3 kΩ and 
RM = 200 Ω (max. input voltage 30VDC). The value for RM results in a 25mA nominal 
current for IS at the maximum output voltage of 5VDC. 
 
  
[LEM Transducers, 2009] 
 
Figure B-10: Voltage Sensor  
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The maximum voltages were selected to 
suit the NI-9201 module and the 
maximum input voltage based on the H-
bridge rating2. The sensor is highly 
linear when in range. The sensor output 
is further scaled by a factor of 6 
(30VDC/5VDC) with software signal 
conditioning.  
 
B.10 Current Sensors 
The NT Series current sensor can 
accurately measure both DC and AC currents. It provides electrical isolation between the 
circuit where the current is measured and the sensor output connected to data acquisition 
components. These sensors are based on the anisotropic magneto-resistive (AMR) effect 
(change in circuit resistance with a change in magnetic field). The sensing elements are 
thin film permalloy magneto-resistors on a silicon substrate. This provides a compact 
design for mounting directly 
on circuit boards. A 
Wheatstone bridge of four 
MR resistors is used internally 
in the sensor to ensure that 
external magnetic fields or 
sensitivity to temperature do 
not distort measurement by 
changing the resistance. An 
electrically isolated aluminum 
compensation conductor is integrated on the same substrate above the permalloy resistors 
[F.W. Bell, 2009]. The current flowing in it generates a magnetic field, compensating that 
                                                 
2 These values are chosen only for testing purposes. They can be changed based on requirements. 
Table B-8: Voltage Sensor Characteristics 
[LEM Transducers, 2009] 
Manufacturer LEM 
Model No. LV-25P 
Parameter Symbol Units 
Primary nominal current IPN 10 mA 
Primary current 
measuring range 
IP 0 ±14 mA 
Sec. nominal r.m.s. current ISN 25 mA 
Conversion ratio (IS/IP) KN 2500:1000 
Overall accuracy XG ±0.9% 
Linearity εL <0.2% 






Figure B-11: Current Sensor  
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of the conductor to be measured. The current in the compensation conductor is 
proportional to measured field amplitude; the voltage drop across a resistor forms the 
output signal, which is amplified by on-board signal processing.  
Four sensors are used in the present test set-up, using the same ±15V DC power 
supply used for the voltage sensors 
(Figure B-11). The test bed currents 
have been restricted to an upper limit 
of 10A. Since the sensor exhibits 
highly linear behavior in this range, 
the voltage output at 10A should 
ideally be 1V after accounting for the 
zero current offset. To calibrate the 
output voltage to represent the 
current accurately, it is scaled by a 
factor (IPN/VPN) minus the zero current offset. To fully utilize the scale and resolution of 
the NI-9201 module (and to account for measurement noise), additional signal processing 
is performed by a LM741CN op-amp that amplifies the signal up to the level of its supply 
voltage. The amplification is a function of the external resistors in the op-amp circuit, R1 
= 2.2 k and R2 = 15 k. The amplification ratio is given by 1+(R2/R1). This effectively 
extends the expected output voltage to around the range of 0-8V. This range is lower than 
the 15V op-amp power supply and hence voltage saturation is not a major concern.  
 
B.11 Torque Sensor 
Indirect methods of deriving motor torque (using analytical relations)  from  other 
prime mover electromagnetic characteristics do not account for perturbations due to 
inherent ripple in the torque profile caused by switching of the motor phases and external 
load or disturbance torques. A direct measurement of the motor torque is therefore 
preferable, using a rotary torque sensor. In most rotary torque sensors, the shaft torque is 
typically measured by either sensing actual shaft deflection due to torque, or by detecting  
Table B-9: NT-25 Current Sensor Characteristics 
[F.W. Bell, 2009] 
Manufacturer F.W.Bell 
Model No. NT-25 
Measuring Circuit Units Value 
Nominal current, IPN +A 25 
Peak current +A 75 
Output at nominal, VPN +V 2.5 
Supply voltage +V 12 to 15 
Linearity ( at +25¼C ) +% 0.1 
Typical zero offset ( at +25¼C ) +mV 7.5 
Max. offset over temperature +mV 35` 
Operating temperature range 
o
C -25 to 85 




the effects of deflection using sensing elements directly bonded to the shaft. Torque 
sensors are therefore serial in nature in that they have to be placed directly in the torque 
path.  The torque sensor in use on the present test set-up is 
a Lebow1701-2 inline rotary torque transducer, mounted 
between the motor and load (hysteresis brake). The sensor 
uses strain gages in a Wheatstone bridge arrangement to 
measure the motor torque. The gages are inductively 
coupled to stationary windings on the assembly by a 
rotary transformer, for power and signal return. As the 
shaft deforms due to applied torque, the resistance in the bonded foil strain gages changes 
and modulates the applied input voltage. The change in the resistance of the bridge is 
converted to a calibrated output signal directly proportional to the applied torque.   
Table B-10: Torque Sensor Specifications 
Manufacturer Honeywell Transducers 
Model No. 1701-2 
Parameter Value Units 
Accuracy 0.25 % 
Built-in instrumentation amplifier ±10  V 
Range 2 (Overload=200% rated output) Nm 
Operating temperature 0-60 
0
C 
Supply Voltage 12 (±10 %) V  
Limit frequency (3dB) 200 Hz 
Voltage output 0 to ±10 V 
Spring constant 248 Nm/rad 
Maximum permissible loads 77 (radial and axial) N 




The bridge configuration helps to compensate for temperature effects and 
extraneous signals arising from secondary loads on the shaft.  The contactless 
transmission of supply voltage and measuring signal enables continuous operation with 
low maintenance. The sensor specifications in Table B-10 were verified by performing an 
experimental calibration after integrating the sensor into the test-bed. The torque sensor 
used in the present case is rated for a load of 2 Nm and an output voltage range of ±10V. 
The sensor is powered using a dedicated 12V, 500 mA power supply. The torque/voltage 
 
[Honeywell Transducers, 2009] 
Figure B-12: Torque Sensor  
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curve is linear for the entire range of operation. The output from the torque sensor is 
connected to the NI-9201 analog input module.   
 
B.12 Position Sensor 
The Hall-effect sensors serve as commutation sensors for high-speed operation. In 
such cases, using a high-resolution position sensor is sometimes impractical due to 
bandwidth requirements. On the other hand, for implementing advanced commutation 
strategies like modifying the phase turn-on/off 
angles for shaping the torque profile, reducing 
the torque ripple, reducing acoustic noise, etc. 
there is a need to infer the rotor position with a 
high resolution (of the order of tenths of 
degrees). To provide this capability on the test-
bed, a high resolution optical encoder has been 
used. The E6 series rotary encoder uses a 
transmissive optical encoder module (stationary) with a removable 10-pin finger-latching 
connector. The module consists of a highly collimated solid-state light source and 
monolithic phased array sensor (detector), which together provide a system extremely 
tolerant to mechanical misalignments [U.S. Digital Inc., 2009]. The rotary component 
consists of a shatterproof, transparent mylar disk mounted to a precision-machined 
aluminum hub on the motor output shaft and aligned with the encoder module. The 
number of line pairs patterned on the outer edge of the disc dictates the resolution. Power 
is supplied from a single +5VDC dedicated power supply. This quadrature encoder has 
two channels, A and B, electrically offset from one another by ¼
th
 of a cycle (90
0
) to infer 
direction (B leads A=>clockwise, A leads B=>counterclockwise). Both these outputs are 
connected to the NI-9411 module. A benefit of this scheme is the ability to electronically 
multiply encoder count. In the x1 mode all counts are generated on rising edges of A. In 
the x2 mode, both rising and falling edges of A generate counts. In the x4 mode, the 
rising and falling edges of both A and B generate counts, increasing resolution fourfold. 
 
[U. S. Digital Inc., 2009] 
Figure B-13: E6 Incremental Encoder  
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The index channel outputs one pulse-per-rotation equal to ¼
th
 of a quadrature cycle. 
Output complement signals can also be used as differential inputs for improved common 
mode noise rejection. The digital signals are also used to calculate motor velocity and 
acceleration values through successive discrete differentiation in the FPGA software.  
Table B-11: Incremental Encoder Specifications 
Manufacturer U.S. Digital Inc. 
Model Number EM-6 kit Incremental Encoder with HEDS read-head 
Parameter Value Units 
Resolution ~ 9 (4x after quadrature) Bits 
Supply Voltage 4.5-5.5 V 
Count Frequency 100 kHz (rpm/60)x cycles/rev kHz 
Operating Temperature -40 to 100 
o
C 
Output Voltage 2.4-3.4 (sourcing to +5V) V 
 
B.13 Hysteresis Brake  
Hysteresis brakes produce a braking torque through a magnetic air gap without 
any magnetic particles or friction 
components. This provides better 
operating characteristic like 
smoother torque profile, longer 
life, better reliability, 
controllability, etc. Magnetic 
hysteresis effect is used for torque 
control via a reticulated stator pole 
structure and a steel rotor/shaft 
assembly. Until the field coil is 
energized, the drag cup spins freely on its bearings. When a magnetic field is applied to 
the pole structure, the rotor is magnetically restrained due to the air gap flux field, 
creating a braking action [Magtrol Inc., 2009]. Since braking torque is produced purely 
by magnetic fields, the brake load can be finely controlled independent of speed by 
controlling the DC current supplied to the field coil. The polarity of current does not 
affect the braking effect. Due to non-contacting active components, brake operation is 
 
 
[Magtrol Inc., 2009] 
Figure B-14: Magtrol Hysteresis Brake  
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practically silent and smooth at any speed (very high speed operation is possible) 
[Magtrol Inc., 2009]. 
There is no wear and tear of components, particle emission, seal leakage, etc. all 
of which combine to provide an 
exceptional brake life. These factors 
also provide better torque 
repeatability, which is needed for 
testing purposes. A typical hysteresis 
brake and its torque vs. current 
characteristics are shown in Figure 
B-14. The HB 140 M-2 brake used 
on the testbed is controlled with a 
combined Magtrol-5210 power supply and controller. The controller has a 10-turn 
potentiometer with 3 ranges for high-resolution manual current control. It also offers 
external control via a 0-5V signal using a 3.5mm TRS plug (for instance, using a PWM 
output from the NI-9472 module). This functionality permits precisely controlled load 
profiles to be applied automatically during testing along with static loads when needed. 
 
B.14 Acoustic Noise Sensor  
 Acoustic energy in the range 20 Hz - 20 kHz is manifested as audible sound that 
can be perceived by human hearing. Sound is perceived and measured as pressure 
fluctuations relative to the ambient pressure. Acoustic noise transducers like microphones 
measure frequencies in the audible range by transforming such pressure oscillations into 
electrical signals. The Sound Pressure Level (SPL) is calculated as:  
SPL=20 log (P / Pref) dB   Eq. B-1 
where P, Pref are the measured and reference pressures respectively (Pref =20µPa). The 
sensitivity is often specified in units of mV/ Pa of sound pressure. The range and 
frequency response are crucial when selecting an appropriate sensor. The range of SPLs 
for which a sensor meets its performance specifications is limited on the low end by the 
inherent system noise and on the high end by the maximum SPL (where total harmonic 
Table B-12: Hysteresis Brake Specifications 
[Magtrol Inc., 2009] 
Manufacturer Magtrol Inc. 
Model No. HB 140 M-2 
Parameter Value  Units 
Min.  Torque at 
Rated Current 
1 Nm 
Rated Current 253 mA 
Voltage 24 V 
Max. Speed 12000 rpm 




distortion reaches 3%) dictated by its design and physical characteristics. The frequency 
response is the range of frequencies for which the sensor maintains a constant sensitivity 
within defined limits. Ideally, it should sufficiently cover the frequency bandwidth range 
required for measurement and be as flat as possible in this range.  
Table B-13 : Digital Sound Level Meter Specifications 
Manufacturer Radioshack 
Model No. 33-2055 
Parameter Value Units 
Microphone Electret Condenser  
Range 50 to 126 dB 
Accuracy ± 2 at 114 dB SPL dB 
Reference 0 dB 0dB = 0.0002 MicroBar 
Weighting A and C  
Output 1 (Peak to Peak, Open Circuit, F.S. @ 1 kHz) V 
Impedance 10 (Min. Load) kΩ 
Distortion Less than 2% at 1 kHz, 0.5 V p-p Output  
 
The sensor used for the present test set-up is a RadioShack digital sound level 
meter, Model 33-2055. The meter consists of 
a front-mounted microphone and switches for 
changing the weighting and speed of 
response to sound pressure changes. The 
weighting filters (A, B, C, D, Z) are a 
standard family of curves defined in the 
International standard IEC 61672:2003. They 
reduce the contribution of low and high 
frequencies to produce a reading that 
corresponds approximately to what is perceived by human hearing. The weighting switch 
allows for switching between standard A and C weightings. C weighting provides more or 
less uniform sensor response between 32 Hz -10kHz, and A weighting makes it more 
sensitive to frequencies in the range 0.5-10kHz (also the most sensitive range of the 
human ear). The response switch allows for changing the speed of the meter's response. 
The slow setting makes it less sensitive to rapid changes in sound level and can be used 
[Radioshack, 2009] 
Figure B-15 : Digital Sound Level Meter  
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for measuring average pressure levels. Conversely, the fast setting is more useful for 
rapid changes in SPLs and when peak sound levels are measured.  
 
B.15 Vibration Sensor 
A typical method of measuring motor vibration is by using an accelerometer. 
Piezoelectric accelerometers are commonly used in many vibration monitoring 
applications since they can sense much higher 
frequencies as compared to competing 
technologies like strain gauge based sensors. A 
piezoelectric material (like quartz or 
polycrystalline ceramics like PZT) produces an 
electric potential when it experiences 
mechanical stress in the form of compressive or 
tensile forces, shear forces or flexural forces. In a piezoelectric accelerometer, a seismic 
mass is placed in the accelerometer housing in such a manner that stresses the 
piezoelectric sensing element when the mass is accelerated. The generated electric 
potential is the basis of the accelerometer output signal and is directly proportional to the 
vibration forces. These sensors have a broad frequency response ranging from a few Hz 
to many kHz. They are self-generating and do not need a separate power source. 
However, most sensors include some built-in signal processing electronics which require 
a power supply. Signal conditioning is required to convert the high impedance charge 
output from the piezoelectric sensing element to a low impedance voltage output that can 
be transmitted over cables with relatively good immunity to signal loss or noise and for 
easy interfacing with any data acquisition system. 
The sensor used on the test bed is a PCB Piezotronics ICP Accelerometer Model 
353B17 (the term ICP indicates that the accelerometer has a built-in signal amplifier). 
This sensor has 10mV/g sensitivity over a 0-500g range. The single axis sensor measures 
vibrations only along the radial axis of the motor. The accelerometer is mounted with a 
threaded stud on the motor casing as it provides excellent coupling between the sensor 
[PCB, 2009] 
Figure B-16:  PCB Piezotronics 
353B17 Accelerometer  
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surface and the test object. The test bed uses a 482A22 ICP signal conditioner from PCB 
Piezotronics that provides the required constant current (adjustable, 0-20mA) for the 
signal amplifier. The unit can power up to four accelerometers simultaneously.  
Additionally, the signal-conditioning unit 
minimizes the need for specialized low 
noise cables and converts the 
accelerometer to a signal that can be read 
by the NI-9201 module. Due to the low 
sensitivity of the sensor and the relatively 
low accelerations experienced by the 
motor, additional signal amplification has 
been implemented. Using a LM741CN 
op-amp with a 47 k resistor and a 510 
resistor, a signal gain of approximately 
93 is produced. Additionally, a 1 k resistor is used as a pull down resistor to eliminate 
signal drift. The sensor output is further analyzed in software using Fast Fourier 
Transforms (FFT) to determine the vibration frequencies. 
Table B-14:  Accelerometer Specifications 
[PCB, 2009] 
Manufacturer PCB Piezotronics 
Model Number 353B17 
Parameter Value Units 
Sensitivity ( 10%) 10 mV/g 
Measurement Range  500 g 
Freq. Range ( 5%) 1-10,000 Hz 
Resonant Frequency  70,000  Hz 
Non-Linearity ≤ 1 % 
Overload Limit (Shock)  10,000 
pk 
g 
Excitation Voltage 18 to 30 VDC 
Const. Current Excitation 2 to 20 mA 





Appendix C. The Actuator Management and Operation Software 
(AMOS) Framework 
Most commercially available EMAs are driven using a motion controller with 
proprietary embedded software for motor commutation, sensor data processing, 
communication and control. However, such software is typically custom–designed for a 
specific type of EMA used in an application and not portable across a spectrum of EMAs 
(with different types of prime movers, geartrains, sensors, etc.) as described in the 
Electromechanical Actuator Architecture (EMAA) [Tesar, 2009] or across different 
application domains in which these EMAs may be used. The execution platforms for the 
software are also often tied to specific hardware or operating systems. An effort has 
therefore been initiated at the UT-RRG to formalize a more universal software 
framework for intelligent EMAs, termed as the „Actuator Management and Operation 
Software (AMOS)‟ along the lines of OSCAR (Operational Software Components for 
Advanced Robotics) [Kapoor and Tesar, 1996], a system-level software developed for 
robotic manipulators. The initial architecture for AMOS was proposed by [Huang and 
Tesar, 2000] and later refined by [Yun and Tesar, 2007]. Considering code extensibility 
and reusability, the object-oriented style of software development provides many 
advantages by via abstraction, encapsulation, inheritance, etc. and has been deemed 
suitable for the detailed design of sub-components of AMOS [Yun and Tesar, 2007].  
The goal is to develop a framework of C++ libraries that can be used for creating 
supervisory control programs for a spectrum of intelligent EMA applications. This 
provides the flexibility to create individual modules of the framework independently 
during the software development, debugging and testing phase as well as provides the 
end-user of the final product the ability to choose requisite modules to develop 
customized programs for addressing application-specific needs. This includes 
incorporating features like low-level commutation and control for different types of 
prime movers, data acquisition and signal processing for different analog/digital sensors, 
control of auxiliary devices like clutches, brakes, etc.; algorithms like Condition-Based 




Sensor and Process Fault Detection and Isolation algorithm developed in this report; 
functionality for display, combination and manipulation  of decision-surfaces [Yun and 
Tesar, 2007] 1, system-level operational decision making [Ashok and Tesar, 2007], etc. 
The components of AMOS can be broadly categorized into three levels based on loop 
update frequency requirements [Yun and Tesar, 2007]: the management level, the control 
level and the sensor and communication level, with the loop rates increasing from top to 
bottom (Figure C-1) 
At the Management level AMOS receives input commands from the end-
user/system operator via a graphical user interface (GUI) or from system-level software 
like OSCAR. Typical inputs may be a desired position, speed, torque, or noise level. 
These commands are then processed; along with a combination of the stored decision 
surfaces, measured sensor data, and user-specified performance criteria, to yield the 
appropriate control signals for operation. This level therefore contains code for 
combining the decision surfaces, calculating the norms for those surfaces, displaying the 
different maps/envelopes and norms on the GUI, CBM, etc. 
The code contained at the Control level is primarily responsible for all the 
interactions with the hardware where the user inputs are translated into ―real‖ commands 
(by modulating the control parameters like current or voltage) to control the EMA. This 
level is also responsible for the control of ancillary devices like brakes, lubricant/cooling 
system etc. The lowest Sensors and Communication level includes code for 
communication among the AMOS modules, between the EMA and the system level 
controller, etc. This module is also responsible for the data acquisition and processing of 
data from all the sensors in the EMA and ensuring that the highest quality data is 
available at all times for different levels of the control hierarchy. An efficient 
commutation routine for a four phase switched reluctance motor has been developed as 
                                                 
1 [Yun and Tesar, 2007] described the creation of a graphical user interface for AMOS with features such as 
pan, rotate, zoom, etc. for better visual display, clicking on specific operational points on a performance 
map to automatically command the EMA control parameters,  setting weights for the different performance 




part of the control module during the course of this work (Figure C-2). The SPFDI 
algorithm developed in this work has been implemented as part of the sensor module. 
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The code developed for this work uses a combination of C++ and LabView
TM 
virtual 
instruments (VI)2. As shown in Figure C-4, the VIs are used to display control parameters 
that can be changed by the user as well as record and display measurement data obtained 
from all the sensors integrated into the testbed (Figure C-3). The independent control 
parameters presently available are the main line voltage (controlled directly from the 
variable voltage power supply), the Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) switching duty 
cycle and frequency for each motor phase and the phase turn-on/off angles for each 
phase. The sensor data obtained is filtered using a combination of hardware and software 
filters to remove extraneous noise and is used to generate performance maps and derive 
the CPT parameters for the Bayesian network used for the SPFDI algorithm. C++ has 
been used to develop code to implement a basic graphical user interface that can be used 
to create Bayesian networks (Figure C-5), as well as perform exact inferencing (using 
Pearl‘s belief propagation algorithm, Chapter 2, Section 2.5.2.1.1) or approximate 
inferencing (using Logic Sampling and Likelihood Weighting algorithms as described in 
Chapter 2, Sections 2.5.2.2.1. and 2.5.2.2.2. respectively). In addition, the logic for the 
SPFDI algorithm (Chapter 5, section 5.4) has also been implemented in C++. The 
exchange of data between the C++ and LabView sections of the code is carried out using 
simple text files. All the VIs are written for use with LabView 8.6 using the cRIO-9112 
chassis with FPGA connected to a NI-9014 Real Time Controller (RTC). A host 
computer (PC) is used to interface with the cRIO.  
With the present hardware configuration, there are 3 processors available to run 
the VIs on:  the FPGA, the RTC, and the PC. Hence different portions of the code can be 
executed on different platforms In general, processes that need to be deterministic and 
fast such as data acquisition and control are programmed on the FPGA. Additionally, all 
communication through the I/O modules (for the motor, brake and sensors) is handled by 
the FPGA. Processes that are relatively less time critical such as signal conditioning, data 
processing, and data logging are programmed to run on the RTC. Programs running on 
the PC are primarily used to transfer data from the built-in hard drive on the cRIO to the 
                                                 
2 This was done to ease the development of preliminary code. The eventual goal is to have all the program 




PC hard drive for use with other components of AMOS like the graphical user interface, 
Bayesian network inferencing, etc. The SPFDI code is also executed on the PC. 
The testbed software is written such that the relevant testing parameters (such as 
the PWM values, brake load, etc.) are communicated from the AMOS interface running 
on the PC to a top level VI running on the RTC that in turn communicates with a top 
level VI running on the FPGA. All the top level RTC VIs primarily serve the same 
purpose i.e. accept user specified test parameters and control the actual tests. The test 
parameters may be input manually or via text files. The FPGA VI controls the motor and 
the brake via signals from the cRIO output modules. This VI has the functionality to use 
either the Hall Effect sensors embedded in the motor or the digital encoder to dictate the 
motor commutation. For all the tests carried out in the present work, the motor phases are 
turned on at an angle of -30° and turned off at an angle of -15° (with respect to the 
completely aligned position of the rotor and stator poles). When using the Hall-effect 
sensors for commutation, these angles are fixed.  Using the digital encoder allows the 
user to specify the turn on and turn off angle for the phases for smoother torque profiles 
and better acoustic noise control.  
The FPGA VI also acquires the sensor data by reading signals from the cRIO 
input modules. The data is organized and queued for reading by the RTC. The top level 
RTC VI then reads the sensor data from the FPGA queue, and calibrates it for display and 
data logging. Numerous other sub-VIs are used to in addition to these top level VIs and 
are not discussed in detail here. A typical front panel for a RTC VI is shown in Figure 
C-4. VIs running on the PC serve to transfer data from the RTC to the PC via ethernet 


























Figure C-4: Front Panel of a top level LabView Real Time Controller VI 
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